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Sahid
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Date Joined Jun 2004
Total Posts : 2013
| Posted 8/5/2008 4:23 AM (GMT -6) |   | J: 1) All sin is not volitional. A person who is solidified and impulsive can sin.
Z: I don't want to split too many hairs. The Bible seems to impute the sin of a man to wives, children, and slaves. So, yes, there is a sense in which I can agree with you. But what I'm talking about here is moral sin or guilt. In this sense it is not a moral choice at all what an already automated 'person' does. Even if it is that own person's prior choices that led to his automation, the moral decision is made at the time of those prior choices. So in the narrow sense that I'm addressing here, that of moral sin, it is not the case that such sin can be non-volitional. Solidified people are another matter.
J: 2) What does it mean for something to be a choice? To my mind, there have to be conflicting impulses.
Z: I think this is too narrow a definition. Imagine a situation in which two distinct options (choices) are available to you, only one of which do you have any impulse toward. I think both common sense usage and technical usage will affirm that this is still a choice, there is libertarian freedom here. So, conflicting impulses may be characteristic of SOME choices but not necessarily all.
J: But what could possibly be the MOTIVATION for the choice of conflicting impulses but a belief about what will produce some better sentient state?
Z: To assume that there is such an overarching motivation is to assume your conclusion. Instead of asking what the overarching motivation must be, ask whether there need be such an overarching motivation at all. When assuming that there is an overarching motivation, you fall into the dilemma I posed at the outset: the idea of an ultimately motivating factor precludes LFW which I assume most of us here have a stake in defending. IOW, if there is a unbreakable rule which, given an omniscient observer, could predict perfectly what a person will choose, then there is only one possible choice. Libertarian free choice as I understand it requires a diversity of possible choices. Therefore, such a rule is incompatible with LFW.
1 If there exists a causal relationship determining a choice, then the choice is theoretically predictable.
2 If the choice is theoretically predictable, then there exist no other possible alternatives.
3 If there exist no other alternatives, then the choice is not a libertarian free choice.
Therefore 4 If there exists a causal relationship determining a choice, then the choice is not a libertarian free choice.
This holds regardless of what impulses are felt.
J: I think mine and your difference gets down to the fact that you, like Tom, may not quite define a libertarian choice the way I do.
Z: Yeah. That could be. To my thinking a libertarian choice is one that has at least two possible outcomes. Are you comfortable positing that all human choice might be determined by cause-and-effect motivation? For me this issue and the open view are so intertwined that I have difficulty distinguishing them.
J: I have no way of knowing, from where I'm sitting, that Cain exercised volition in his sin.
Z: Sure, but we get the impression that he is responsible for his action. Maybe there was a life of consistent sin which solidified Cain and which the Bible skips over. I think even you'll admit that's a stretch. But even if it were the case, you are still left with Cain volitionally sinning sometime previously (or else he's just the puppet of a cruel god who caused him to sin).
J: It may have just been an impulsive act for all I know.
Z: But don't you define volition as acting on impulse? Are you saying there are volitional choices based on impulse, but there are also non-volitional impulsive acts? "Just an impulsive act" is what you've defined volitional as, right: the impulse toward sentient satisfaction?
J: My dog seems to have impulses/desires arising from her sentient states as I do, but I don't think her actions, caused by those desires/impulses, are truly libertarian.
Z: Well, I'm not sure what you mean by libertarian any more, so it's hard to respond. I would assume for the purposes of discussion that your dog is solidified/automated. Given certain environmental/biological conditions an omniscient being could predict with certainty what she would do. It seems that this is what you're left with in the case of Cain and Kane: it cannot be that they had identical conditions that led to two different choices, because in your view (I think) the universal motivation of all sentient beings toward satisfaction makes choices predictable in a way that Cain and Kane are not. To say that sentient satisfaction (or anything) is the deciding factor in a decision is to propound determinism (at least when it comes to human decisions). And I'm not able to see how such determinism can be reconciled to the open view.
J: Do you think animals have LFW?
Z: I honestly don't know. For the sake of argument I'll say no. It seems to me that your broadening of LFW would give LFW to any sentient being, including animals. We need to have a common language before discussing this. What is your definition of LFW?
Tom, I'm interested in what you think. As I understand it, I think I've shown that causal motivation for decision-making precludes LFW (kinda obvious), so have I misunderstood sentient satisfaction? Does it not operate causally?
Watch me fly. Freedom like wings and I will use them. Freedom like wings and I will spread them wide. - StavesacrePost Edited (Sahid) : 8/5/2008 4:29:45 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 8/9/2008 8:31 PM (GMT -6) | | Forgot about this thread. To answer your question about my view of volition, I think volition has to do with how the mind can intentionally concentrate or attend to certain thought-objects which naturally arouse desires and their correlative impulses. When these impulses have become habitual, there is virtually no effort or concentration needed to cause the action in question, and so I don't call habitual behavior volitional.
But when we only KNOW that something is better, but have no natural impulse to act accordingly, it can be quite difficult to concentrate sufficiently to arouse an impulse that counters our natural ones that impel contra the better possibility. This was why Jesus had to pray intensely before his crucifixion, IMO. Because he had no natural impulse to suffer thus (who does?). He girded up the loins of his mind, so to speak, to arouse impulses to counter-act those that would have resulted in his having escaped or diminished the pain that he had to endure to be obedient.
I don't think animals do this. I think they are impelled by natural desires that are aroused by associations and instincts. No reason, memory, or volition is necessary IMO to explain how animals function. On the other hand, I don't think they can be explained by purely material causes either. I think there is a true sentient, conscious soul in each animal which experiences impulsive desires just like we do. Maybe the fundamental material elements do too. But the it's the impulses of the animal desires of that one animal soul that animates the animal body in a directed way--not some net effect of the constituent material forces, alone, as materialistic reductionism implies.
So, Cain would have had to have aroused an impulse to restrain his evil desire to rid himself of his brother who he resented. But this he did not do. So I don't have to posit that Cain had some impulse to love Abel. Maybe he had no impulse to love him. And maybe he had become so hardened that he didn't even think about the possible negative consequences of his impulsive murder. People do act impulsively--i.e., without thinking about consequences before acting. Even more than that, the NT says people can be given over to minds to do things unapproving when they harden their hearts.
At that point, they may truly no longer know certain actions are wrong. That seems to be what Paul is saying, IMO, when he says people become ignorant on account of the hardness of their heart. When they "cast off" feelings that would normally have a good impulse associated, they are only left with non-sympathetic impulses in their place. Eventually, that state SEEMS natural to them. For they forget how they used to feel before they hardened (i.e., desensitized) themselves. We, like animals, CAN desensitize ourselves because of the way our nervous system works with our sentient states.
Next thing you know, people are explaining rape in terms of our evolutionary heritage and so on, because they have become convinced that there is no such thing as right or wrong in the conventional sense of the word. Some evolutionists say this explicitly. And some deny we even have volition.
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Post Edited (Similtude) : 8/9/2008 8:46:23 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 8/10/2008 4:57 AM (GMT -6) | | Zach: Tom, I'm interested in what you think. As I understand it, I think I've shown that causal motivation for decision-making precludes LFW (kinda obvious), so have I misunderstood sentient satisfaction?
Tom: Sorry, I dropped out of this one. My mind was somewhere else.
So you've shown that a rational and free choice can't be a motivated choice. On the surface of it, this seems obviously false. Surely to be held 'responsible' for a choices requires our being both 'free' and sufficiently 'motivated'. That is, our acting 'purposefully' or 'intentionally' AND 'freely' are both part of what it means to act 'responsibly'. So I don't know how you account for moral accountability at all if 'freedom' and 'intentionality' are in your view not compossible states.
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 8/10/2008 5:06 AM (GMT -6) | | Sentient satisfaction is a big causal influence, certainly. But given our finite perspective (epistemic distance), our desires and wishes are often times conflicted and compete within us. As well, there's no reason for thinking causality can't be less than 'determinative' of a single outcome. In other words, some causes are consistent with one of any number of outcomes. This would have to be the case if responsible choice is both 'intentional/purposeful' (i.e., motivated) and 'free'.
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Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 8/13/2008 6:33 PM (GMT -6) | | J: I'm not saying motivation always prevails.
Z: I said, "one motivation" referring to satisfaction. Are you saying that this one motivation does not always prevail? That's the only motivation at issue here. Sure we all agree that there are other motivations; no one's arguing against that.
J: If you mean that we don't always specifically think of our ends in terms of satisfaction, I'll agree with you. We may think in terms of guilt or whatever. But each of these has a sentient aspect to it. What I can't conceive of is how a non-sentient being could be motivated at all. Because apart from instinctive and associative impulses (which seem purely natural, as opposed to volitional), the only other ones I know of are those associated with desires--either desires FOR some pleasure/satisfaction or desires to cease/diminish some displeasure/dissatisfaction.
But as I've said, there are times when I have no original desire for the right. In those cases, I simply KNOW that, all things considered, my greatest satisfaction will come from doing the right. So I focus my mind accordingly to arouse an impulse UNTO the right. If you could give me an example of choice that involves no consideration whatsoever of sentient states that is clearly volitional, maybe I could understand what you're arguing the alternative is.
To my mind, a non-sentient being can not be motivated at all. And I don't know what would ground or condition a choice in such a state. So if such a "choice" truly exists, it seems more like what we call indeterminism, to me, than self-determinism.
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Similitude
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Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 8/15/2008 8:29 AM (GMT -6) | | | Again, an example. Say I know that an action is right. By definition, to my mind, if an action is right, it will result in my highest good when all consequences of said action are considered. Otherwise, it wouldn't be right. But merely knowing this does not impel me to focus my mind in a way to ensure that an impulse is aroused to impel me to said action. I have to do that VOLITIONALLY because there are usually natural impulses working counter to my focus and attention. So I'm not seeing how you're response even addresses what I see as the loci of volitional activity--namely, the focusing of attention of the MIND in cases where it is unnatural (i.e., difficult) to focus, thus.
This is why, I think, Paul says transgression, as opposed to a sin of ignorance, causes wrath. Because when we know what we ought to do, we should voluntarily act unto that end. Acting impulsively, habitually or naturally unto the sin, while knowing it is a sin, and yet not volitionally choosing against it, is the essence of transgression. The way you're describing it, a transgression is necessarily a voluntary action. As I'm describing it, it is the restraint FROM transgression or self-discipline UNTO an unsinful alternative that is actually voluntary. The transgression, per se, is NOT voluntary, unless it is a voluntary choice over another impulse that is also impelling unto another transgression.
Why, IOW, would someone voluntarily take other than the past of least resistance if the path of least resistance is that which is perceived as the right action by the agent? This seems counter to how people actually behave, to me.
Post Edited (Similtude) : 8/15/2008 6:11:30 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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