Jeff: I follow your distinction between substance monism and attributive monism, but what is the distinction between substance monism and absolute monism? Or are you saying that absolute monism IS substance monism?

D: From my understanding, substantial monism doesn't require that there be any personal element to the substance. (thinking of some forms of pantheism) There could be ONE substance and NO beings in this substance. Absolute monism can posit personality in the substance such that there is "one being" (like some forms of Hinduism)

Jeff: OK, I think we're using the word "substance" differently. I'm using it in its more philosophical sense as per:

10.	Philosophy. a. something that exists by itself and in which accidents or attributes inhere; that which receives modifications and is not itself a mode; something that is causally active; something that is more than an event.

By that definition of "substance", God is a substance. For He is a being "in which accidents or attributes inhere."

Jeff: I'm comfortable with allowing for the Trinity actually consisting of three BEINGS that depend on each other for the full actualization of their respective capacities. And these divine actualizations are completely harmonious, even when they are volitional. This, to me, satisfies the requirements of the unity of the godhead so as to account for both the scriptural statements and a coherent, robust metaphysics/ontology/epistemology.

D: Uh huh. I would just want to make sure that we are affirming divine triunity, and not tritheism. We are dealing with one God, not three. I probably wouldn't refer to them as three BEINGS. There is one God because there is one Father. I would say that the Trinity is one divine personal being with three "centers of indivisibility" in that one being...given the eternal procession of the Spirit and the eternal begetting of the Son.

Jeff: But even if they ARE three beings, so long as they each depend on each other for their full range of actualization of their capacities, then we're still dealing with three beings which function as a unit. To me, this satisfies all that needs to be true to account for scriptural language. And we still leave the traditional judaic concept of monotheism intact. Jesus not only said the Father was the ONE true God, but he said the Father was HIS God. Thus, the traditional view of monotheism is still true because the Father IS that ONE God OUT of whom are all created things. But on the other hand, there are attributes of the Father which can only exist because He is essentially relational. And He is so because the existence of the Son and the Spirit condition that capacity in Him.

Thus, the Father can NEVER act ONLY for Himself. He must, as an essentially relational being, always act FOR both Himself AND the Son. In this sense, He IS love. For He never does, or even CAN, seek ONLY His own. Thus, creation could not exist apart from the capacites of all three members of the godhead. I think this view explains things without rendering the intuitive substance-attribute metaphysic insufficient. IOW, we don't need to add on more mystery by positing ONE being in the godhead. I think we can still explain the unity of the godhead with three BEINGS, thereby eliminating THAT particular mystery. But granted, there is always mystery to any ontology, for all ontologies run into brute facts beyond which analysis is impossible. I'm just trying to explain as much as possible within the framework of human categories.

I also allow for the possibility that Christ never had to give up essential capacities. By my view, the Son's capacities always DID depend on the Father/Spirit for actualization--the ability to dispose or actualize those capacities was not INHERENT in him. You are saying the same thing by speaking of the "eternal begetting" of the Son. Thus, there is no need to say the Son somehow gave up what were once essential attritubes of deity (which creates the whole problem of trying to account for his lack of omniscience, etc). If the actualization of the Son's capacities depends on the Father/Spirit, then the actualized states of those capacities never WERE essential attributes of the Son. But I go further: to my mind, essential attributes are MERELY capacities in most cases, while particular disposings/actualizations of these capacities are accidental attributes, only.

It may very well be that only the Spirit has ESSENTIAL attributes that are not mere CAPACITIES (i.e., potentialities), but which are true, eternally-occuring ACTUALITIES/DISPOSINGS. IOW, the Spirit may eternally dispose primally in certain ways (like causing the eternal consciousness of the Father) without any being providing those primal capacities, though It also may have Its own capacities that depend upon others for actualization, too--like the capacity to be grieved. The Father and the Son may depend on the Spirit for the ability to dispose or actualize their capacities--both voltional and non-volitional.

In that sense, actual omniscience, insomuch as it is an ACTUALIZATION of a capacity, is not an essential attribute of the Father, even. For even the CAPACITY of the Father to know/prehend may be CONDITIONED by the Spirit. Thus, any actual intellectual state of the Father may be an ACCIDENTAL attribute of a capacity (to know) that is conditioned by the Spirit--i.e., neither the state of knowing or the ability to know is completely INHERENT in the Father as a being, by my view. Viewed this way, many of the brain-contorters about the essential attributes of deity are really based on mistakes about 1) what grounds what, and 2) what is accidental and what is essential. Jeff: That being said, I don't , know what you mean by the "hypostatic union of Christ" or how it might fit or not with my conception of things.

D: The actualization of uniquely eternally begotten "center of indivisibility" (the Son) of the one divine being (God) takes upon himself dispositional tendencies that involve natural limitation and possibility for non-being (non-divine nature) ...

Jeff: This is where my intuitions fail me. I don't know how to equate "non-divine nature" with the idea of "non-being." To my mind, a "nature," whether divine or non-divine, is a collection of attributes that inhere in a being. These attributes may be MERELY capacities which depend on other beings for actualization.

D: ... by hypostatic (personal) activity.

Jeff: So "hypostasis" is the instantiation of personality?