Post Edited (PotOnWheel) : 3/3/2009 4:15:28 PM (GMT-6)

D, pages 207-208, on Cyril’s ‘mia physis’, especially 2^nd paragraph on p. 208.

http://books.google.com/books?id=QxhR9ihUAWkC&pg=PA207&lpg=PA207&dq=miaphysis&source=bl&ots=5YHubdcpwY&sig=7MjMO6v_QU7xeDI2gMlDU22_cZg#PPA207,M1

That’s kinda where I am.

I can see how miaphysites can stick with the "one person-two natures" aspect of Chalecedon, but they completely negate the 6th Ecumenical Council.

The Third Council of Constantinople is believed to have been the Sixth Ecumenical Council by the Eastern Orthodox, the Roman Catholics, the Old Catholics, and a number of other Western Christian groups. It met on November 7, 680 for its first session; it ended its meetings, said to have been eighteen in number, on September 16 of 681. The number of bishops present was under three hundred and the minutes of the last session have only 174 signatures attached to them.

The conclusion of the council was that Jesus has two wills as well as two natures (divine and human), and that those two wills did not conflict with or strive against each other. It thus refuted the heresy of monothelitism, which held that Jesus Christ had only one (divine) will. Further, it posthumuously restored Pope Martin I and Maximus the Confessor to communion with the church.

Post Edited (One Love) : 3/4/2009 8:49:25 AM (GMT-6)

OK for now I guess. I’ve got a couple of books on Cyril on order. That’ll help. Plus I wanna spend some more time chewing on the miaphysite and monothelite positions.

Here’s where the rub is. The trick is to posit two ‘subjectivities’ (as you say) but one ‘subject’. It’s clear that the actions of human Jesus are all to be ascribed to one and the same divine subject, the Son. Even champions of Chalcedon are clear on that. So the question is HOW we ascribe the actions of the subjectivities to one and the same subject.

In the end, you can posit as many ‘wills’ as you like each an independent faculty within a distinct subjectivity. If all are the actions of one and the same ‘subject’, then the distinctions between monothelitism and other views is academic to my mind. See, D, for me ‘person’ determines the exercise of ‘will’. ‘Wills’ don’t go around just doing their own thing. Some ‘identity’ or ‘person’ determines its disposition through the will. So the ‘will’ is an instrument of ‘person’. You want to say the human will acted independent of the divine will in Christ. I say, ‘wills’ per se don’t act at all, persons do. I can see some of what motivates the monothelites. I want to posit the singularity of ownership and authorship for both divine and human wills in Christ. So posit two, or three, or four wills if you like. All are equally instruments of one and the same ‘person’.

For me, in the end you get a functional equivalent to monothelitism, because the wills never compete, can never contradict or conflict, etc. They are instruments in turn determined in their exercise by one and the same person. You seen to think ‘wills’ qua faculty are independently self-determining entities, like we’re supposed to account for their functions, how they’re initiated and completed, prior to any consideration of ‘person’. For me it’s quite the opposite: Choice is always an attempt at or expression of personhood. You’ve still never told me whether you’re on board with this ‘rule’ of mine. If it’s true, then both divine and human wills are distinct, and operate independently of each other, but both are in fact instruments of personal expression by one and the same person, the Son. You want to say the human will isn’t determined by the faculty of the divine will. I say, well, OK, IF that’s true, big deal. You still have a functional monothelitism (of sorts) because you have a ‘mono’ hypostasis (one person) who equally defines the range of possibilities for both wills. That’s the singularity I want to keep. To say there are two wills that don't determine each other in any way just means there are two natural contexts (one divine and one human) in which the one person of the Son is free to dispose of himself. It doesn't open up the door to the peccability of the divine person, for example.

Tom

Post Edited (Tom) : 3/4/2009 10:05:05 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (One Love) : 3/4/2009 10:08:51 AM (GMT-6)

Trial and exile

Maximus' refusal to accept Monothelitism caused him to be brought to the imperial capital of Constantinople to be tried as a heretic in 658. In Constantinople, the Monothelite position had gained the favor of both the Emperor and the Patriarch of Constantinople. Maximus stood behind the Dyothelite position, and was sent back into exile for four more years.

In 662, Maximus was placed on trial once more, and was once more convicted of heresy. Following the trial Maximus was tortured, having his tongue cut out, so he could no longer speak his rebellion and his right hand cut off, so that he could no longer write letters .^[6] Maximus was then exiled to the Lazica or Colchis region of modern-day Georgia and was cast in the fortress of Schemarum, perhaps Muris-Tsikhe near the modern town of Tsageri.^[7] He died soon thereafter, on 13 August 662.^[8] The events of the trials of Maximus were recorded by Anastasius Bibliothecarius.

The Spirit is the Father's spirit in some primary mode that it is not for the Son. The Spirit is what "bounds" the nature of the Father and the Son, though maybe not in the same way. The Son experiences "becomings" that the Father can not. He can be embodied and become human, for example, whereas the Father can not. I'm not convinced they are cosubstantial, but I think they can not exist independently. They ARE a relational pair whose attributes/capacities depend on each other for existence/expression. If that's two gods, GREAT!  Jesus said the Father was the ONE, TRUE God. There's the Hebrew monotheism. I doubt seriously the apostles were haggling over what a "person" was in trying to understand the godhead. I think they just saw Christ as him THROUGH WHOM AND FOR WHOM all things exist. That's deity enough to account for all the scriptures on the subject whether or not the Father and the Son are cosubstantial. After all, Thomas called him God just because he resurrected, which is not nearly as impressive as all things existing THROUGH and FOR him. That leaves those verses that speak of the Father as the ONE God perfectly sensible, to me.

Regardless, all I ask is that you use A-1 Bold on me when you cook me. I love tabasco and A-1, but together, WOW! 

Post Edited (Similtude) : 3/4/2009 1:45:54 PM (GMT-6)

http://ancientfaith.com/podcasts/byantoro

 

Christ the Eternal Kalimat

Fr. Daniel brings an Indonesian perspective to his discussion of the identity of the 2nd person of the Trinity - Jesus the Christ. Is He who He claims to be - Very God of Very God? Jesus is the Eternal Kalimat - Arabic for Word or Logos in Greek.

 

Post Edited (PotOnWheel) : 3/4/2009 5:32:57 PM (GMT-6)

http://www.holytrinitymission.org/books/english/byzantine_theology_j_meyendorf.htm

•  In Antiochian Christology, it was possible to say that the two natures were united by one common "will."
• ...the Monophysites would accept the Chalcedonian formula of the "two natures" with the specification that they were united into one "energy" and one will.
• the Sixth Ecumenical Council, which restated the Chalcedonian affirmation that each nature keeps in Christ the entirety of its characteristics; and therefore, there are two "energies" or wills, the divine and the human in Christ.
• God-established "movement," "energy," or will of man is therefore directed toward communion with God, "deification," not in isolation from the entire creation, but leading it back to its original state.
• One could understand at this point why Maximus felt so strongly that both Monoenergism and Monotheletism betrayed the Chalcedonian affirmation that Christ was fully man. There cannot be a true humanity if there is no natural, authentic human will or "movement."
• NOTICE ABOVE THE WORD 'MOVEMENT!'
• But if the human will is nothing but a movement of nature, is there a place for human freedom?
• Therefore, for Maximus, when man follows his natural will, which presupposes life in God, God’s co-operation, and communion, he is truly free. But man also possesses another potential, determined not by his nature, but by each human person, or hypostasis, the freedom of choice, of revolt, of movement against nature, and therefore of self-destruction.
• Christ could thus be truly the saviour of humanity because in Him there could never be any contradiction between natural will and gnomic will. Through the hypostatic union, His human will, precisely because it always conforms itself to the divine, also performs the "natural movement" of human nature.
• Affirming the absolute transcendence of God is only another way of saying that He is the Creator ex nihilo: anything, which exists outside of God, exists only through His "will" or "energy," and can participate in His life only as a result of His will or "grace."

Post Edited (PotOnWheel) : 3/4/2009 4:29:46 PM (GMT-6)