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Open Theism Discussion Board > Public Forums > General Chat > (No Subject) | Forum Quick Jump
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|  Tom Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 10353 | Posted 2/23/2009 5:54 PM (GMT -6) |   | | | |
 |  Corey Five with a Four-wing

Date Joined Feb 2003 Total Posts : 1893 | Posted 2/23/2009 8:35 PM (GMT -6) |   | | | |
   |  Tom Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 10353 | Posted 2/23/2009 11:55 PM (GMT -6) |   | | | |
 |  JET Registered Member
 Date Joined Jun 2002 Total Posts : 397 | Posted 2/24/2009 3:50 AM (GMT -6) |   | I’m probably misunderstanding Plantinga, …. just thinking out loud …
Let “truth” with a small “t” refer to that set of truths that corresponds with the ontological features of our natural world that can or could, in principal, be scientifically observed.
And let “Truth” with a big “T” refer to that set of truths that corresponds with all other ontological features of our world, if any.
As I understand it, the argument goes as follows: Naturalistic evolution makes metaphysical claims (i.e., claims about Truth) in its denial of the supernatural. However, given naturalistic evolution, adaptive beliefs do not track with Truth, but rather with survival in the natural world. Therefore, given naturalistic evolution, all beliefs about Truth are unreliable. Therefore, belief in naturalistic evolution is self-defeating.
However, since naturalism’s only claim, essentially, with respect to Truth is a negative one (i.e., that nothing exists with which it may correspond), it seems to me that naturalism’s concern with metaphysics is substantively different from Plantinga’s. How can it be a defeater for belief in naturalistic evolution to say that, given naturalistic evolution, there is a low probability that our adaptive beliefs would track with Truth when, given naturalistic evolution, the Truth does not consist of anything with which to track? The naturalist is being perfectly consistent not to care in the least whether or not belief in naturalistic evolution corresponds with something that, given naturalistic evolution, doesn’t even exist.
On the other hand, it does not seem unlikely that adaptive beliefs could track with "truth" with a small "t" (i.e., the actual features of the natural world). If the natural features of our world are such that certain animals eat humans, then, given naturalistic evolution (according to which adaptive beliefs tracks with survival), it would not be surprising to find that humans would instinctively fear those animals. And as human adaptation began to involve the use of language as symbols for what exists in the natural world, it would not seem unlikely that humans would organize such instinctive feelings into beliefs using such language. And as human brains evolved into increasingly complex computing devices, it would not seem unlikely that human brains would organize an increasing number of beliefs into more complex belief systems such as “naturalistic evolution”, for example.
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  |  Corey Five with a Four-wing

Date Joined Feb 2003 Total Posts : 1893 | Posted 2/24/2009 7:39 AM (GMT -6) |   | JET: set of truths that corresponds with the ontological features
Corey: I'm probably splitting hairs, but I'd suggest that "truth" doesn't correspond the ontological features, it is the ontological features themselves. Truth itself doesn't correspond. Our summary abstractions, our representations, our models, our beliefs, THOSE are what may or may not correspond to reality. To the extent that they do, they are considered "true beliefs." But they ought not be considered "truth" per se.
But in fact, I'd suggest that our beliefs cannot entirely correspond to reality because of their very nature as abstractions. The Essence and Energies conversation of this board tie in here. We can only know Truth in its energies (its expressions). In Plantinga's terms, it's that aspect of reality which can be perceived by properly functioning sense faculties (which may include sensus divinitatus, our internal sense of the Holy Spirit). But naturalism supposes to make claims about essence, which is something well beyond our capacities, especially if naturalism is true.
I'll respond further later. But let me say quickly that I believe that "proper function" is at the heart of his objection against naturalism.
Post Edited (Corey) : 2/24/2009 6:59:23 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Similitude Registered Member
 Date Joined Apr 2004 Total Posts : 4968 | Posted 2/24/2009 11:49 AM (GMT -6) |   | |
Here's where I'm at. To say Truth does not correspond to any real beings/attributes/events is to say what, exactly? I'm not even following what that means. Regardless, naturalists are inconsistent when they use the very NOTION of "probability" or "plausibility." They don't have an epistemology that will get them there. Because they don't acknowledge the reality of "proper" function. Because "proper" is a normative word that implies teleology--the very thing they reject arbitrarily. I say arbitrarily because the consensus opinion in academe is that humans are NATURAL teleologists. And they can't prove teleology invalid without proving that natural evil is inconsistent with even the very conception of God. That is by far the best argument the atheist has in my opinion. But there are those like Flew who posit an a-sympathetic god. All other anti-teleological arguments are absurd BECAUSE we are natural teleologists.
THere is a decent book called "Teleological Realism" that argues that the a-teleological philosophers have failed in their attempt to reconcile folk psychology (that which we speak in accordance with when we're not trying to shove God out of His universe) with naturalism. Interestingly, the author seems to BE a naturalist and a non-dualist. He just sees that teleology and naturalism, by the traditional meaning of those terms, are seemingly incompatible.
Philosophy of science texts talk as if we POSIT that there is a real world which corresponds to our natural modes of thought and inference. I don't ever remember making that conscious choice. I think what most people do when confronted with that logical choice, because they think teleologically, is to pick the idea that we are "DESIGNED to know" over "we are NOT designed to know." To choose the latter would drive a person insane. So we can't BUT choose the more benevolent if it ever becomes apparent to our mind AS a choice. Our own pleasure-oriented/displeasure-averse nature compels us to believe the choice we all, in fact, make, when confronted with that CONSCIOUS choice. IOW, to choose thus is compelled because when we are confronted with the choice of whether we are to believe we are "DESIGNED to seek pleasure" or "we are NOT designed to seek pleasure," our sentient nature drags us kicking and screaming away from the latter answer so long as we can find meaningful satisfaction from our volitional choices that render those choices "worth it."
IOW, our inherent teleological modes of thought in combination with our sentient nature pretty much makes the correspondence view of reality a no-brainer for humans. So the atheist is using his teleologically acquired beliefs to argue AGAINST teleology. It's like saying because I err in a SPECIFIC causal inference, causality is not a real RELATION. It is a futile approach. A-teleology is epistemologically bankrupt because we can't move from a reality void of normative relations to notions like "plausible," etc. There is nothing there to bridge the gap.
Post Edited (Similtude) : 2/24/2009 11:02:44 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
      |  Tom Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 10353 | Posted 2/26/2009 12:25 AM (GMT -6) |   | Chaz: Truth is reality; the truth of a proposition is grounded in it's correspondence to reality.
Tom: You've got two contrary things here. Truth IS reality (i.e., truth = reality) and truth is grounded in correspondence TO reality. Which is it? Can't be both.
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 |  Chaz Finney Registered Member
 Date Joined Jan 2008 Total Posts : 102 | Posted 2/27/2009 6:01 PM (GMT -6) |   | |
Tom:
Truth = reality, when speaking of propositions, the truth value of a proposition is grounded in it's correspondence to reality. We are talking about two different issues here. To speak of knowledge and truth; if anyone is to make any knowledge claims, they must retreat to a commonsense view and be willing to accept certain presuppositions if they are to ground their knowledge in a manner that does not beg the question.
The Correspondence theory of truth (which is what most of us subscribe to) does indeed beg the question; yet most of us are willing to overlook the circularity. For example. The proposition "the bench in front of me is red" is true because of its correspondence to the reality that there is indeed a red bench in front of me. But if you were to ask me to prove that there is a red bench in front of me, I couldn't do it without appealing to my vision. And if you were then to ask me to prove that my vision was a reliable source of knowledge; I couldn't do so without appealing to my vision. Additionally one could also challenge the "so called reality of the red bench" by appealing to color skepticism, or the problem of the criterion. One could also ask me to prove that I am not dreaming that there is a red bench in front of me... So the problem with the correspondence theory of truth is that we cannot prove what reality is without committing a fallacy or getting cought on an infinite regress.
So I am a commonsense realist - I believe that generally what we perceive is what is reality. I do acknowledge that if I am to make any knowledge claims, I have to dogmatically ground them in basic beliefs or I have to dogmatically declare my senses to be reliable sources of knowledge, or do the same with a coherent web of beliefs. But to my knowledge there is not any theory of knowledge that can escape the fallacies of circularity etal.
Epistemology and logic are all grounded in our presuppositions that are influenced by our conceptual framework and environment and therefore boils down to my assumptions versus someone else’s.
Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 2/28/2009 1:30:08 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Asher Registered Member
 Date Joined Apr 2003 Total Posts : 477 | Posted 2/27/2009 6:12 PM (GMT -6) |   | "Epistemology and logic are all grounded in our presuppositions that are influenced by are conceptual framework and environment and therefore boils down to my assumptions versus someone else’s."
Logic is not grounded in our presuppositions. Our presuppositions may cause us to misrelate to logic, but logic is the only game in town. Existence is grounded in logic. Your presuppositions are grounded in logic, even if your use of logic is bumbling.
In the beginning was the Logic, and the Logic was with God, and the Logic was God.
The fool has said in his heart, there is no Logic (except that grounded in our presuppositions). | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Chaz Finney Registered Member
 Date Joined Jan 2008 Total Posts : 102 | Posted 2/27/2009 11:30 PM (GMT -6) |   | |
Good, now try to bumble through this and prove to me that you can know anything objectively apart from your human reasoning or senses? Regarding logic being grounded in ones presuppositions, did you not read the entire post? What do you think it is that grounds the truth value of a proposition in logic? How can you prove that this correspondence is adaquate? How can you prove the reality that grounds the propositon without begging the question? Answer: develop some pressupositions about reality and the nature of correspondence.
I think you need to read the entire post before you go off half cocked.
Many bumbling philosophers don't accept the presuppositions of simplification or disjunctive syllogism as valid rules of inference. Logic my friend is not as cut and dry and many novices believe, nor is it the answer to all the mysteries of the universe. Logic is often grounded in axioms which are nothing more than the presuppositions which some by agreement consider to be basic or self-evident truths. Logic is grounded in your presuppositions that there is an extended universe, that there is an existence and you are not dreaming nor a brain in a bell jar in some mad scientists laboratory. Logic assumes that a propositon can be grounded in reality via correspondence, yet you cannot prove any of these without your presuppositions and if you have no truth, you have no logic, you will be on an inifinte regress for a very long time or chasing your tail.
In the begining was logic, so are you saying that the concepts such as disjunctive syllogism or modus ponens were floating around in abstract space long before any sentient being came on the scene? If your concepts are eternal in nature, then your propositions are of necessity eternal; which would have to include necessary and contingent propositions as well; and if these are all eternal than we can assume that God knows the truth value of all propositions which goes against the empiricist grain of the Open View.
Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 2/28/2009 1:37:16 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Asher Registered Member
 Date Joined Apr 2003 Total Posts : 477 | Posted 2/28/2009 4:25 AM (GMT -6) |   | But Chaz, this quote of yours:
"Another conundrum: God exists in three persons, yet God is one, this doctrine seems to violate one of the primary laws of thought viz. identity; yet many of us trinitarians are willing to play the mystery card as well."
indicates that you are maybe a little misrelated to the laws of logic, so it's hard to really engage your overall thoughts in this thread. | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Tom Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 10353 | Posted 2/28/2009 5:32 AM (GMT -6) |   | I feel ya Asher. Yep.
I didn't wanna get off onto logic or semantics. Was more interested in Plantinga and Dennett. But epistemology came up, so....
I just wanted to toss in my 2 cents. Strictly speaking (well, from my point of view anyhow), truth is a property of propositions and not a constituent reality of the world to which our propositions correspond. Basically you've got language (propositions) on the one hand and reality (the world in all its actual states of affairs) on the other. Truth values are properties of the former (of our language), not of the latter. If our language accurately describes the world, that 'language' is true. If not, then that language is false. But it's not the realities described that are true or false. I like to use the analogy of 'maps' and 'territory'. The map describes the territory but isn't the territory itself. Correspondence theory says that 'truth value' is a property of the map, not the territory. Truth value measures the accuracy of the map--is the territory as the map says it is? Is so, the map is true. If not, the map is false.
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