Asher asks: “So....how am I going to have FULLNESS of joy...if I have knowledge of irrevocable loss.” And on that basis affirms UR.

But it seems that OL and Daniel are in agreement as OL says: Even process theism's "objective immortality" idea means that utter destruction of a creaturely being would not bring it to non-being, in the sense of having no more possible impact on God or Creation. God "remembers" us and that impact stays with God eternally, even in the absence of our actual existence.

So. If even God’s remembering is not the same as actual existence what are we to do with your question of irrevocable loss? I ran to the University after work and pulled out Kelly James Clark’s, “Return to Reason.” Here is what he says:

Too Much Evil?

Even if Plantinga has successfully rebutted the atheologian's charge that God and evil are not logically incompatible, the problem of evil rears its ugly head in another form: the atheologian may now contend that whereas it is not impossible that God exists given the fact of evil, it is nonetheless unlikely that God exists given both the abundance of evil in the world and the existence of apparently gratuitous or pointless evil. Gratuitous evils are those that do not endanger any greater goods.

How much good and evil are there in the world? Are there gratuitous evils? These questions are not easily answered and, I shall argue, will be answered differently by the theist and the nontheist.

There are surely some judgments about the quantities of good and evil that the theist will share with the nontheist: both will lament earthquakes, tornadoes, and tidal waves; they will grieve together over famines, pestilence, and plagues; they are equally saddened by man's inhumanity to man—wars, family strife, envy, injustice, and prejudice. The theist is not party to diminishing the actual quantities of these evils.

But whereas the theist and the nontheist profoundly agree about the existence of evil, they will clearly part company in their various assessments of the quantities of good in the world. The theist sees many of these evils (or evil, generically) as a means to a greater good. In Mackie's term the greater goods absorb some evils:

For example, some bit of suffering which is actually the object of kindness or sympathy whose goodness outweighs the badness of that suffering itself will be an absorbed evil, as will be miseries or injustices that are in fact progressively overcome by a struggle whose nobility is a higher good which outweighs the evils without which it could not have occurred. What this defence shows, then, is that the existence of completely absorbed evils is compatible with the existence of an omnipotent and wholly good god.

These absorbed evils may provide the opportunity for courage in the midst of war, heroism in the wake of a natural disaster, charity in a time of famine, self-sacrifice in a world of both abundance and want, etc. Thus, these evils are not gratuitous. Of course, these evils do not actually entail their greater goods: people consistently squander occasions for greater goods, since the same situation allows for greater evils, namely cowardice, shrinking fear, hatred, and selfishness.

Mackie restates the problem of evil in terms of unabsorbed evils, evils which are not accounted for by engendering a greater good. For example, when someone is a coward in a war, then some of the evil of the war is not absorbed by the greater good. Mackie raises the issue this way:

"But then the vital question is this, can the theist maintain that the only evils that occur in the world are absorbed evils? When this question is squarely put, it is surely plain that he cannot. On the one hand there are surplus first-order evils, suffering and the like which are not actually used in any good organic whole, and on the other there are second-order evils; these will not be incorporated in second-order goods, but will contrast with them malevolence, cruelty, callousness, cowardice, and states of affairs in which there is not progress but decline, where things get worse rather than better. The problem, therefore, now recurs as the problem of unabsorbed evils, and we have as yet no way of reconciling their existence with that of a god of the traditional sort."

Hence, Mackie agrees that while the free will defense explains the existence of some evil, namely absorbed evils, there is simply too much evil—unabsorbed evil or gratuitous evil— which logically militates against the existence of the God of orthodox theism.

Somerset Maugham has graphically raised this problem in his observations of a hospital ward where he was training to be a doctor:

“At that time (a time to most people of sufficient ease, when peace seemed certain and prosperity secure) there was a school of writers who enlarged upon the moral value of suffering. They claimed that it was salutary. They claimed that it increased sympathy and enhanced the sensibilities. They claimed that it opened to the spirit new avenues of beauty and enabled it to get into touch with the mystical kingdom of God. They claimed that it strengthened the character, purified it from its human grossness, and brought to him who did not avoid but sought it a more perfect happiness.... I set down in my note-books, not once or twice, but in a dozen places, the facts that I had seen. I knew that suffering did not ennoble; it degraded. It made men selfish, mean, petty, and suspicious. It absorbed them in small things. It did not make them more than men; it made them less than men; and I wrote ferociously that we learn resignation not by our own suffering, but by the suffering of others.”

The Christian cannot deny Maugham's observation.

It also seems, however, that while the theist and the nontheist will agree about the many and abundant evils in the world, they will disagree about the amount of good there is in the world. This problem may be addressed with Mackie's useful term. Will the theist agree with Mackie that there are unabsorbed or gratuitous evils? The answer is "No,' at least for the Christian theist. And the theist's evaluation of the problem of absorbed evils manifests the substantial disagreement between the theist and the nontheist about the amount of good there is in the world.

The Christian theist believes that the fall of mankind engendered the greatest possible good—that God so loved the world that he gave his only son. The Christian believes that there is no greater love than that a man lay down his life for his friends. Thus, Christ's sacrificial death on the cross is seen as the supreme good, redeeming (absorbing, in Mackie's terms) all evils. The value that the Christian attaches to this act is not the finite value attached to, say, a human being's act of courage, compassion, or kindness. The Christian believes that Christ's death succeeded because it was more than a merely human and finite act: God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself. The joint mysteries of the incarnation and the atonement combine to cause the Christian to radically reassess the balance of good over evil in the world. This picture is further enhanced by the Christian view of heaven. This life of strife and striving is not all there is; God has provided the opportunity of eternal happiness. Of course, the incarnation and the atonement would hardly be necessary without the fall and its requisite evils. Hence, the Christian theist will rationally believe that no evils are unabsorbed, that all evils are absorbed ultimately by Christ's redeeming death and in the afterlife. God's love as demonstrated in Christ provides the theist with reasons for trusting in a good God. Even if he does not know how all evils are redeemed, he will rightly believe that they are redeemed. Without knowing God's reasons for allowing evil, God's redemptive work provides reason to believe that he is good.

Hence, the Christian will rationally believe that there are no unabsorbed or unredeemed evils. The nontheist, on the other hand, not believing that God exists, will not put much stock in the incarnation (which seems, minimally, to presuppose theism) or the atonement or heaven (which are afflicted with the same problems, for the nontheist, as the incarnation). The nontheist will rationally disagree with the theist about the relative amount of unabsorbed or gratuitous evils and greater goods in the world.

So then, just as pointing to the mere fact of evil does not contradict the existence of God (as demonstrated by the free will defense), so too pointing out the quantity of evil in the world will not demonstrate that God's existence is unlikely. Furthermore, the problem of gratuitous evil is resolved by the Christian theist's commitment to a redeeming God. To prove the theist's irrationality the atheologian must demonstrate that, given the Christian's beliefs, there are unabsorbed or gratuitous evils; this has not been done.

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Given what he Clark is saying about evils being absorbed, it seems that there is no need to posit your question nor any reason to affirm UR on the basis of such questioning. This is not to say that UR is not a possibility its just that it seems that there is no reason for positing the question.