 |
Open Theism Discussion Board > Public Forums > General Chat > (No Subject)
| Forum Quick Jump
|
| 
Asher
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 477
| Posted 8/30/2010 4:38 PM (GMT -6) |   | I previously posted a link to a paper by Hoppe, which turns out to be a chapter from his book, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, pdf available as a free download from mises.org:
mises.org/books/economicsethics.pdf
The chapter (chapter 9) is masterful alone, but combined with chapters 11,12,13,14,15 it becomes a coup de grace against socialism and also relativistic ethics. The first 8 chapters of the book concentrates on the economic aspects of why capitalism is, not just superior to socialism, but is the only workable economic system PERIOD. The last 130 pages of the book covers the philosophy (epistemology and ethics) of why capitalism is the only workable and just system of economics.
The first part of the book has been covered by many Austrian economists, so it was old ground for me...and the second part has also been covered by Mises and Rothbard, but scattered throughout their works. Hoppe, in 130 pages, has amassed the necessary arguments from Mises and Rothbard and made them much more clear in the meanwhile...while also adding value of his own (the sections on the a priori of argumentation)
Basically, if you are not familiar with chapters 9-15 you have missed the BEST writing about economics, epistemology and ethics. And being widely read in all these fields that is saying a lot.
From chapter 9:
Quite in line with the tradition of Mises, the foundations of economics
are also the subject of this chapter. I have set myself a twofold
goal. First, I will explain the solution which Mises advances regarding
the problem of the ultimate foundation of economic science (i.e., his
idea of a pure theory of action, or praxeology, as he himself terms it).
Second, I will demonstrate why Mises’s solution is much more than
just an incontestable insight into the nature of economics and economic
propositions.
Mises provides an insight that also enables us to understand the
foundation on which epistemology ultimately rests. In fact, as the title
of the chapter suggests, I will show that it is praxeology which must
be regarded as the very foundation of epistemology, and that Mises,
in addition to his great achievements as an economist, also contributed
pathbreaking insights regarding the justification of the entire
enterprise of rationalist philosophy.1
---
And Hoppe delivers!
You've gotta read this! | | Back to Top | | |
 |
Asher
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 477
| Posted 8/31/2010 4:40 PM (GMT -6) | | Hey Jeff,
Have you read chapter 9 yet?
Another snippet from that chapter:
"It is not difficult to detect that both a priori axioms—of action and
argumentation—are intimately related. On one hand, actions are
more fundamental than argumentation with whose existence the idea
of validity emerges, as argumentation is only a subclass of action. On
the other hand, to recognize this regarding action and argumentation
and their relation to each other requires argumentation. Thus, in this
sense, argumentation must be considered more fundamental than
action, for without argumentation nothing can be said to be known
about action. However, argumentation itself reveals the possibility
that argumentation presupposes action because validity claims can
only be explicitly discussed in the course of an argumentation if the
individuals doing so already know what it means to act and have
knowledge implied in action. Thus, both the meaning of action in
general and argumentation in particular must be thought of as logically
necessary interwoven strands of a priori knowledge.
What this insight into the interrelation between the a priori of
action and the a priori of argumentation suggests is the following:
Traditionally, the task of epistemology has been conceived of as that
of formulating what can be known to be true a priori and what can be
known a priori not to be the subject of a priori knowledge. Recognizing,
as we have just done, that knowledge claims are raised and
decided upon in the course of argumentation and that this is undeniably
so, one can now reconstruct the task of epistemology more precisely
as that of formulating those propositions which are argumentatively
indisputable in that their truth is already implied in the very
fact of making an argument and so cannot be denied argumentatively;
and to delineate the range of such a priori knowledge from the
realm of propositions whose validity cannot be established in this way
but require additional, contingent information for their validation, or
that cannot be validated at all and so are mere metaphysical statements
in the pejorative sense of the term metaphysical.
Yet what is implied in the very fact of arguing? It is to this question
that our insight into the inextricable interconnection between
the a priori of argumentation and that of action provides an answer.
On a very general level, it cannot be denied argumentatively that
argumentation presupposes action and that arguments, and the
knowledge embodied in them, are those of actors. More specifically,
it cannot be denied that knowledge itself is a category of action; that
the structure of knowledge must be constrained by the peculiar function
which knowledge fulfills within the framework of action categories;
and that the existence of such structural constraints can never
be disproved by any knowledge whatsoever.
It is in this sense that the insights contained in praxeology must be
regarded as providing the foundations of epistemology. Knowledge is
a category quite distinct from those explained earlier—from ends and
means. The ends which we strive to attain through our actions and
the means which we employ in order to do so are both scarce values.
The values attached to our goals are subject to consumption and are
exterminated and destroyed in consumption and thus must forever be
produced anew. The means employed must be economized, too. It is
not so, however, with respect to knowledge, regardless of whether
one considers it a means or an end in itself. Of course, the acquisition
of knowledge requires scarce means, at least one’s body and time. Yet
once knowledge is acquired, it is no longer scarce. It can neither be
consumed, nor are the services that it can render as a means subject
to depletion. Once there, it is an inexhaustible resource and incorporates
an everlasting value (provided that it is not simply forgotten).16
Yet knowledge is not a free good in the same sense as air, under normal
circumstances, is a free good. Instead, it is a category of action.
It is not only a mental ingredient of each and every action, quite
unlike air, but more importantly, knowledge, and not air, is subject to
validation, which is to say that it must prove to fulfill a positive function
for an actor within the invariant constraints of the categorical
framework of actions. It is the task of epistemology to clarify what
these constraints are and what one can thus know about the structure
of knowledge as such.
While such recognition of the praxeological constraints on the
structure of knowledge might not immediately strike one as of great
significance in itself, it does have some highly important implications." | | Back to Top | | |
|
Asher
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 477
| Posted 8/31/2010 5:06 PM (GMT -6) | | Another quote apropos to your question:
"One can not know a priori what the specific values, choices and
costs of some actor are or will be. This would fall entirely into the
province of empirical, a posteriori knowledge. In fact, which particular
action an actor is going to undertake would depend on his knowledge
regarding the observational reality and/or the reality of other
actors’ actions. It would be manifestly impossible to conceive of such
states of knowledge as predictable on the basis of time-invariantly
operating causes. A knowing actor cannot predict his future knowledge
before he has actually acquired it, and he demonstrates, simply
by virtue of distinguishing between successful and unsuccessful predictions,
that he must conceive of himself as capable of learning
from unknown experiences in as yet unknown ways. Thus, knowledge
regarding the particular course of actions is only a posteriori.
Since such knowledge would have to include the actor’s own knowledge—
as a necessary ingredient of every action whose every change
can have an influence on a particular action being chosen—teleological
knowledge must also necessarily be reconstructive or historical
knowledge. It would only provide ex post explanations which would
have no systematic bearing on the prediction of future actions
because future states of knowledge could never be predicted on the
basis of constantly operating empirical causes. Obviously, such a
delineation of a branch of a posteriori and reconstructive science
of action fits the usual description of such disciplines as history and
sociology.28
What is known to be true a priori regarding the field of action and
what would then have to constrain any historical or sociological
explanation is this: For one thing, any such explanation, which essentially
would have to reconstruct an actor’s knowledge, would invariably
have to be a reconstruction in terms of knowledge of ends and
means, of choices and costs, of profits and losses and so on. Second,
since these are evidently the categories of praxeology as conceived of
by Mises, any such explanation must also be constrained by the laws of
praxeology. Since these laws are a priori laws, they must also operate
as logical constraints on any future course of action. They are valid
independent of any specific state of knowledge that an actor might
have acquired, simply by virtue of the fact that whatever this state
might be, it must be described in terms of action categories. And as
referring to actions as such, the laws of praxeology must then be coextensive
with all the predictive knowledge there can be in the field of the
science of action. In fact, ignoring for the moment that the status of
geometry as an a priori science is ultimately grounded in our understanding
of action and in so far praxeology must be regarded as the
more fundamental cognitive discipline, the peculiar role of praxeology
proper within the entire system of epistemology can be understood as
somewhat analogous to that of geometry. Praxeology is for the field of
action what Euclidean geometry is for the field of observations (nonactions).
As the geometry incorporated in our measuring instruments
constrains the spatial structure of observational reality, so praxeology
constrains the range of things that can possibly be experienced in the
field of actions."
You should at least read chapter 9, which is close to 30 pages...it really is some of the most interesting and exciting reading I have experienced in years. | | Back to Top | | |
|
Asher
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 477
| Posted 8/31/2010 5:21 PM (GMT -6) | | one more:
"When one understands that knowledge as displayed in argumentation
is a peculiar category of action, the validity of the perennial
rationalist claim that the laws of logic—beginning here with the most
fundamental ones of propositional logic and of Junctors (“and,” “or,”
“if-then,” “not”) and Quantors (“there is,” “all,” “some”)—are a priori
true propositions about reality and not mere verbal stipulations
regarding the transformation rules of arbitrarily chosen signs, as
empiricist-formalists would have it, becomes clear. They are as much
laws of thinking as of reality because they are laws that have their
ultimate foundation in action and can not be undone by any actor. In
each and every action, an actor identifies some specific situation and
categorizes it one way rather than another in order to be able to make
a choice. It is this which ultimately explains the structure of even the
most elementary propositions (like “Socrates is a man”) as consisting
of a proper name or some identifying expression for the naming or
identifying of something and a predicate to assert or deny some specific
property of the named or identified object. It is this which
explains the cornerstones of logic: the laws of identity and contradiction.
And it is this universal feature of action and choosing which also
explains our understanding of the categories “there is,” “all,” “some,”
“and,” “or,” “if-then,” and “not.”19 One can, say, of course, that
something can be “a” and “non-a” at the same time, or that “and”
means this rather than something else. But one cannot undo the law
of contradiction and one cannot undo the real definition of “and.”
Simply by virtue of acting with a physical body in physical space we
invariably affirm the law of contradiction and invariably display our
true constructive knowledge of the meaning of “and” and “or.” | | Back to Top | | |
|
Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 8/31/2010 5:59 PM (GMT -6) | | More specifically,
it cannot be denied that knowledge itself is a category of action; that
the structure of knowledge must be constrained by the peculiar function
which knowledge fulfills within the framework of action categories;
and that the existence of such structural constraints can never
be disproved by any knowledge whatsoever.
It is in this sense that the insights contained in praxeology must be
regarded as providing the foundations of epistemology.
Jeff: That's clearer. What is important is that, like he says, values of individuals are learned a posteriori. If there is no post-mortem, sentient state of affairs where there are CONSEQUENCES of our pre-mortem actions, there is no way to get past relativism (because people ARE too different for a non-relativistic ethic to be rational if ALL consequences are pre-mortem). But with such a post-mortem state of affairs, we can actually use the golden rule as the grounds for volitional action and use induction to infer, to the best of our ability, what TRUE human interest is--true, i.e., in the sense that it takes ALL CONSEQUENCES of action into account. Consequentialism without post-mortem accountability is worthless. Because it can't even get us past relativism.
| | Back to Top | | |
|
Asher
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 477
| Posted 8/31/2010 11:14 PM (GMT -6) | | Jeff you should read chaps 9-15 and see what you think.
Hoppe is not a consequentialist, though Mises was. Hoppe sides more with Rothbard. And I think he makes a strong case in this book for his position. Just check out his writing on this topic, it's not like most of the stuff you've probably read before.
From chapter 13:
"I demonstrate that only the libertarian private property ethic can
be justified argumentatively, because it is the praxeological presupposition
of argumentation as such; and that any deviating, nonlibertarian
ethical proposal can be shown to be in violation of this demonstrated
preference. Such a proposal can be made, of course, but its propositional
content would contradict the ethic for which one demonstrated
a preference by virtue of one’s own act of proposition-making, i.e., by
the act of engaging in argumentation as such. For instance, one can
say “people are and always shall be indifferent towards doing things,”
but this proposition would be belied by the very act of proposition making,
which in fact would demonstrate subjective preference (of saying
this rather than saying something else or not saying anything at
all). Likewise, nonlibertarian ethical proposals are falsified by the
reality of actually proposing them.
To reach this conclusion and to properly understand its importance
and logical force, two insights are essential.
First, it must be noted that the question of what is just or unjust—
or for that matter the even more general question of what is a valid
proposition and what is not—only arises insofar as I am, and others
are, capable of propositional exchanges, i.e., of argumentation. The
question does not arise vis-à-vis a stone or fish because they are incapable
of engaging in such exchanges and of producing validity claiming
propositions. Yet if this is so—and one cannot deny that it is without
contradicting oneself, as one cannot argue the case that one cannot
argue—then any ethical proposal as well as any other proposition
must be assumed to claim that it is capable of being validated by
propositional or argumentative means. (Mises, too, insofar as he formulates
economic propositions, must be assumed to claim this.) In
fact, in producing any proposition, overtly or as an internal thought,
one demonstrates one’s preference for the willingness to rely on
argumentative means in convincing oneself or others of something.
There is then, trivially enough, no way of justifying anything unless it
is a justification by means of propositional exchanges and arguments.
However, then it must be considered the ultimate defeat for an ethical
proposal if one can demonstrate that its content is logically incompatible
with the proponent’s claim that its validity be ascertainable by
argumentative means. To demonstrate any such incompatibility would
amount to an impossibility proof, and such proof would constitute the
most deadly defeat possible in the realm of intellectual inquiry.
Second, it must be noted that argumentation does not consist of
free-floating propositions but is a form of action requiring the
employment of scarce means; and that the means which a person
demonstrates as preferring by engaging in propositional exchanges
are those of private property. For one thing, no one could possibly
propose anything, and no one could become convinced of any proposition
by argumentative means, if a person’s right to make exclusive
use of his physical body were not already presupposed. It is this
recognition of each other’s mutually exclusive control over one’s own
body which explains the distinctive character of propositional
exchanges that, while one may disagree about what has been said, it
is still possible to agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement.
It is also obvious that such a property right to one’s own body must
be said to be justified a priori, for anyone who tried to justify any
norm whatsoever would already have to presuppose the exclusive
right of control over his body as a valid norm simply in order to say,
“I propose such and such.” Anyone disputing such a right would
become caught up in a practical contradiction since arguing so would
already imply acceptance of the very norm which he was disputing.
Furthermore, it would be equally impossible to sustain argumentation
for any length of time and rely on the propositional force of
one’s arguments if one were not allowed to appropriate in addition to
one’s body other scarce means through homesteading action (by putting
them to use before somebody else does), and if such means and
the rights of exclusive control regarding them were not defined in
objective physical terms. For if no one had the right to control anything
at all except his own body, then we would all cease to exist and
the problem of justifying norms simply would not exist. Thus, by virtue
of the fact of being alive, property rights to other things must be presupposed
to be valid. No one who is alive could argue otherwise.
Moreover, if a person did not acquire the right of exclusive control
over such goods by homesteading action, i.e., by establishing an
objective link between a particular person and a particular scarce
resource before anybody else had done so, but if instead late-comers
were assumed to have ownership claims to goods, then no one would
be allowed to do anything with anything as one would have to have all
of the late-comers’ consent prior to ever doing what one wanted to do.
Neither we, nor our forefathers, nor our progeny could, do, or will survive
if one were to follow this rule. In order for any person—past, present,
or future—to argue anything it must be possible to survive then
and now, and in order to do just this property rights cannot be conceived
of as being timeless and nonspecific regarding the number of
people involved. Rather, property rights must be thought of as originating
as a result of specific individuals acting at definite points in time.
Otherwise, it would be impossible for anyone to first say anything at a
definite point in time and for someone else to be able to reply. Simply
saying that the first-user-first-owner rule of libertarianism can be
ignored or is unjustified implies a contradiction, for one’s being able to
say so must presuppose one’s existence as an independent decision making
unit at a given point in time.
Finally, acting and proposition-making would also be impossible
if the things acquired through homesteading were not defined in
objective, physical terms (and if correspondingly, aggression were not
defined as an invasion of the physical integrity of another person’s
property), but in terms of subjective values and evaluations. While
every person can have control over whether or not his actions cause
the physical integrity of something to change, control over whether or
not one’s actions affect the value of someone’s property rests with
other people and their evaluations. One would have to interrogate
and come to an agreement with the entire world population to make
sure that one’s planned actions would not change another person’s
evaluations regarding his property. Surely, everyone would be long
dead before this was accomplished. Moreover, the idea that property
values should be protected is argumentatively indefensible, for even
in order to argue so it must be presupposed that actions must be permitted
prior to any actual agreement. (If they were not one could not
even make this proposition.) If they are permitted, however, this is
only possible because of objective borders of property, i.e., borders
which every person can recognize as such on his own without having
to agree first with anyone else with respect to one’s system of values
and evaluations.
By being alive and formulating any proposition, one demonstrates
that any ethic except the libertarian private properly ethic is invalid.
If this were not so and late-comers had to have legitimate claims to
things or things owned were defined in subjective terms, no one could
possibly survive as a physically independent decision-making unit at
any given point in time. Hence, no one could ever raise any validity claiming
proposition.
This concludes my a priori justification of the private property ethic.
A few comments regarding a topic already touched upon earlier, the
relationship of this “praxeological” proof of libertarianism to the utilitarian
and to the natural rights position, shall complete the discussion.
As regards the utilitarian position, the proof contains its ultimate
refutation. It demonstrates that simply in order to propose the utilitarian
position, exclusive rights of control over one’s body and one’s
homesteaded goods already must be presupposed as valid. More
specifically, as regards the consequentialist aspect of libertarianism,
the proof shows its praxeological impossibility: the assignment of
rights of exclusive control cannot be dependent on certain outcomes.
One could never act and propose anything unless private property
rights existed prior to a later outcome. A consequentialist ethic is a
praxeological absurdity. Any ethic must instead be “aprioristic” or
instantaneous in order to make it possible that one can act here and
now and propose this or that rather than having to suspend acting
until later. Nobody advocating a wait-for-the-outcome ethic would be
around to say anything if he took his own advice seriously. Also, to
the extent that utilitarian proponents are still around, they demonstrate
through their actions that their consequentialist doctrine is and
must be regarded as false. Acting and proposition-making require
private property rights now and cannot wait for them to be assigned
only later. | | Back to Top | | |
|
Asher
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 477
| Posted 8/31/2010 11:23 PM (GMT -6) | | See this is why I think there has to be something like my Set A and Set B ethics, with Set A being the foundation (i.e. nothing in our Set B ethics can contradict anything from Set A, which is universally valid.)
And so, there is part of ethics that applies to everyone and can be legitimately enforced upon everyone. But Set A all by itself doesn't cover all ethical situations and so we must supplement it with a Set B (which may be a consequentialist system, or whatever else...it's a personal ethic that can be employed by the person themselves and even propagated argumentatively, but not enforced on anyone else ever) Set A alone is enough for there to be an ordered society, but not enough to have a fulfilling ethical life.
Set A is pretty well laid out by Hoppe. | | Back to Top | | |
|
Asher
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 477
| Posted 9/1/2010 5:35 PM (GMT -6) | | Hey Jeff,
I didn't say anything about a "full, meaningful life" I said a "fulfilling ethical life". Full and fulfilling are not the same thing.
And although among all members of the board, I probably agree with you the most across the spectrum of things discussed here, we do disagree on some things. I'm not necessarily trying to raise those things as issues, just to delineate where we disagree so we can understand where the other is coming from. For example, the Bible, while a valued source, does not have the same authority for me as for you...and resting on the foundation of the Bible, the idea of The Fall, has some issues for me if by The Fall or fallen men we mean there has been a change in the nature of mankind because of the Fall. Yes, I do agree there was an original fall, and that every man since has experienced a personal existential fall...and while that does have lasting consequences, especially psychologically, for men...it does not change what is more primary within mankind...the image of God.
Part of what I consider most important in many different aspects of being a human being is learning to govern oneself, so that an external governor is unnecessary. Yes, there is great failure at this by the majority of humankind; but we don't gain anything by obscuring the valid goal of self-government.
You said, "What rational ethicists want is a system that guarantees ALL volitional beings that if they choose RIGHTLY, their highest good will occur."
Of course they "want" it in the sense that it is a desired value, I assume you also "want' it in this sense; but by "want" do you mean that rational ethicists think it is absolutely achievable?
That may be true of Aristotle, but it certainly isn't true of Hoppe, Rothbard or any of the Austrian rationalists...or any Objectivist ethicists either. They all acknowledge that it is not achievable. But that does not speak at all to the validity. Here's Hoppe on this:
"Amazingly, Friedman, Yeager, Steel, Waters, Virkkala, and Jones
believe I must have overlooked the fact that all existing societies are
less than fully libertarian (that there is slavery, the gulag, or that husbands
own wives, etc.), and that this somehow invalidates my argument.
Obviously, I would hardly have written this article if it had been
my opinion that libertarianism were already prevalent. Thus, it
should have been clear that it was precisely this nonlibertarian character
of reality which motivated me to show something quite different:
why such a state of affairs cannot be justified. Citing facts like
slavery as a counter-example is roughly on a par with refuting the
proof that 1+1=2 by pointing out that someone has just come up
with 3 as an answer—and about as ridiculous.
To restate my claim: Whether or not something is true, false, or
undecidable; whether or not it has been justified; what is required in
order to justify it; whether I, my opponents, or none of us is right—
all of this must be decided in the course of argumentation. This
proposition is true a priori, because it cannot be denied without
affirming it in the act of denying it. One cannot argue that one cannot
argue, and one cannot dispute knowing what it means to raise a
validity claim without implicitly claiming at least the negation of this
proposition to be true.
With the a priori of argumentation established as an axiomatic
starting point, it follows that anything that must be presupposed in
the act of proposition-making cannot be propositionally disputed
again. It would be meaningless to ask for a justification of presuppositions
which make the production of meaningful propositions possible
in the first place. Instead, they must be regarded as ultimately justified
by every proposition maker. Any specific propositional content
that disputed their validity could be understood as implying a performative
contradiction (in the sense explained by David Gordon), and
hence, as ultimately falsified.
The law of contradiction is one such presupposition. One cannot
deny this law without presupposing its validity in the act of denying it.
But there is another such presupposition. Propositions are not freefloating
entities. They require a proposition maker who in order to
produce any validity claiming proposition whatsoever must have
exclusive control (property) over some scarce means defined in
objective terms and appropriated (brought under control) at definite
points in time through homesteading action. Thus, any proposition
that would dispute the validity of the homesteading principle of property
acquisition or that would assert the validity of a different incompatible
principle would be falsified by the act of proposition making
in the same way as the proposition “the law of contradiction is false”
would be contradicted by the very fact of asserting it. As the praxeological
presupposition of proposition making, the validity of the
homesteading principle cannot be argumentatively disputed without
running into a performative contradiction. Any other principle of
property acquisition can then be understood—reflectively—by every
proposition maker as ultimately incapable of propositional justification.
(Note, in particular, that this includes all proposals which claim
it is justified to restrict the range of objects which may be homesteaded.
They fail because once the exclusive control over some
homesteaded means is admitted as justified, it becomes impossible to
justify any restriction in the homesteading process—except for a selfimposed
one—without thereby running into a contradiction. For if
the proponent of such a restriction were consistent, he could have
justified control only over some physical means which he would not
be allowed to employ for any additional homesteading. Obviously,
he could not interfere with another’s extended homesteading simply
because of his own lack of physical means to do anything about
it justifiably. But if he did interfere, he would thereby inconsistently
extend his ownership claims beyond his own justly homesteaded
means. Moreover, in order to justify this extension he would have to
invoke a principle of property acquisition incompatible with the
homesteading principle whose validity he would already have admitted.)
My entire argument, then, claims to be an impossibility proof. It is
not, as the mentioned critics seem to think, a proof that means to
show the impossibility of certain empirical events so that it could be
refuted by empirical evidence. Instead, it is a proof that it is impossible
to justify nonlibertarian property principles propositionally without
falling into contradictions. Whatever such a thing is worth (and
I’ll come to this shortly), it should be clear that empirical evidence
has absolutely no bearing on it. So what if there is slavery, the gulag,
taxation? The proof concerns the issue that claiming such institutions
can be justified involves a performative contradiction. It is purely
intellectual in nature, like logical, mathematical, or praxeological
proofs. Its validity, like theirs, can be established independent of any
contingent experiences. Nor is its validity in any way affected, as several
critics—most notoriously Waters—seem to think, by whether or
not people like, favor, understand, or come to a consensus regarding
it, or whether or not they are actually engaged in argumentation.
Since considerations such as these are irrelevant in order to judge
the validity of a mathematical proof, for instance, so are they beside
the point here. In the same way as the validity of a mathematical
proof is not restricted to the moment of proving it, so is the validity
of the libertarian property theory not limited to instances of argumentation.
If correct, the argument demonstrates its universal justification.
(Of all utilitarian critics only Steele takes up the challenge
that I had posed for them: that the assignment of property rights cannot
be dependent on any later outcome because in this case no one
could ever know before the outcome what he was or was not justified
to do; and that in advocating a consequentialist position utilitarianism
is [strictly speaking] no ethic at all if it fails to answer the alldecisive
question “what am I justified to do now?” Steele solves this
problem in the same way as he proceeds throughout his comment:
by misunderstanding what it is. He misconceives my argument as
subject to empirical testing and misrepresents it as claiming to show
that “I favor a libertarian ethic” follows from “I am saying something,”
while in fact it claims that entirely independent of whatever
people happen to favor or utter “the libertarian ethic can be given an
ultimate propositional justification” follows from “I claim such and
such to be valid, i.e., capable of propositional justification.” His
response to the consequentialist problem is yet another stroke of
genius: No, says Steele, consequentialism must not involve a praxeologically
absurd waiting-for-the-outcome ethic. His example: Certain
rules are advocated first, then implemented, and later adjusted
depending on outcomes. While this is indeed an example of consequentialism,
I fail to see how it should provide an answer to “what are
we justified in doing now?” and so escape the absurdities of a waiting-
for-the-outcome ethic. The starting point is unjustified [Which
rules? Not only the outcome depends on this!]; and the consequentialist
procedure is unjustified, too. [Why not adopt rules and stick to
them regardless of the outcome?] Steele’s answer to the question
“what am I justified in doing?” is “that depends on whatever rules
you start out with, then on the outcome of whatever this leads to, and
finally on whether or not you care about such an outcome.” Whatever
this is, it is no ethic.)
The reaction from the other Randian side, represented by Rasmussen,
is different. He has fewer difficulties recognizing the nature
of my argument but then asks me in turn “So what? Why should an a
priori proof of the libertarian property theory make any difference?
Why not engage in aggression anyway?” Why indeed?! But then, why
should the proof that 1+1=2 make any difference? One certainly can
still act on the belief that 1+1=3. The obvious answer is “because a
propositional justification exists for doing one thing, but not for
doing another.” But why should we be reasonable, is the next comeback.
Again, the answer is obvious. For one, because it would be
impossible to argue against it; and further, because the proponent
raising this question would already affirm the use of reason in his act
of questioning it. This still might not suffice and everyone knows that
it would not, for even if the libertarian ethic and argumentative reasoning
must be regarded as ultimately justified, this still does not preclude
that people will act on the basis of unjustified beliefs either
because they don’t know, they don’t care, or they prefer not to know.
I fail to see why this should be surprising or make the proof somehow
defective. More than this cannot be done by propositional argument.
Rasmussen seems to think that if I could get an “ought” derived
from somewhere (something that Yeager claims I am trying to do
though I explicitly denied this), then things would be improved. But
this is simply an illusory hope. For even if Rasmussen had proven the
proposition that one ought to be reasonable and ought to act according
to the libertarian property ethic, this would still be just another
propositional argument. It can no more assure that people will do
what they ought to do than my proof can guarantee that they will do
what is justified. Where is the difference, and what is all the fuss
about? There is and remains a difference between establishing a
truth claim and instilling a desire to act upon the truth—with “ought”
or without it. It is surely great if a proof can instill this desire. But
even if it does not, this can hardly be held against it. It also does not
subtract anything from its merit if in some or even many cases a few
raw utilitarian assertions prove more successful in persuading anyone
of libertarianism than it can do. A proof is still a proof and social psychology
remains social psychology."Post Edited (Asher) : 9/1/2010 5:41:09 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
|
Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 9/1/2010 7:16 PM (GMT -6) | | |
First of all, for me, fallen man is man in an environment that he is not sufficiently adapted to always be able to choose aright. IOW, fallen man is man in an environment in which sin is inevitable.
As for the homestead principle Hoppes is talking about, I don't know what he's meaning. I would assume, though, that he's talking about something that is seen as obviously "proper." But proper is a normativity concept which, IMO, is only intelligible in terms of teleology. So to me, what is more fundamental than any such principle is the human intuition that we are designed to CHOOSE in CERTAIN ways. The homesteading principle would just be one such WAY of choosing that many people see as obviously true.
But this says nothing against consequentialism. For consequentialism to be ultimately rational--i.e., humans act aright WHEN they act in their greatest self-interest--this seems to demand that there are post-mortem consequences which RENDER it rational, thus. But what a robust ethical theory needs as a foundation is the belief that those voluntary actions which produce any given person's highest good are also CONSISTENT with and CONDUCIVE to the highest good of all other members of the volitional community--including God.
This axiom may only be true if UR is true for all I know. But short of that ethical axiom, nothing like what most people conceive of as ethical seems obviously true or demonstrably so. And most people find post-mortem consequences a deductively inevitable implication of that axiom, when taken in conjunction with the seeming impossibility of its validity if there are NO post-mortem consequences.
Apart from consequentialism of that kind, I have no idea what Hoppes is saying. For if the good/interest of humanity is not an END of creation, what normative claim could possibly seem compellingly believable to us other than "you are a fool not to do what seems to be your own interest irrespective of the interest of others"? And yet that claim is antagonistic with our sympathetic nature, implying, by such premises, not only that the world is not well-adapted to our nature, but fundamentally contrary to it.
But to successfully function at all, people have to believe, as Hoppe suggests, that they are designed to apprehend. But they must also believe, for the SAME reason, that their basic, natural impulses are not FUNDAMENTALLY at odds with the world and the ends for which it exists, however fallible they may actually be.
This is WHY relativism never garners very many adherents. Relativism leaves out the important axiom. And non-relativism without that axiom is of no more discernable value for the SAME reason. Kant tried the "do right for righteousness sake," independent of consequences. But even he had to eventually posit REWARD to render it normatively rational.
This view (which I learned from Noah Porter), too, is quite parsimonious. I have not been able to conceive of a more parsimonious explanation of common human ethical belief.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 9/1/2010 7:32:22 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
|
Asher
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 477
| Posted 9/1/2010 7:57 PM (GMT -6) | | Your missing Hoppe's point. You should just read chapter 9 and chapter 11, it's less than 60 pages for both chapters. Then pick apart the logic if you can. I'd be interested in reading your analysis. Hoppe's primary objective is not destroying consequentialism. Mises was a consequentialist, and both Rothbard and Hoppe are disciples of Mises. They both, in turn, have just pointed out that to carry praxeology to it's logical conclusion gives you a different result than Mises held to. And, in fact, Rothbard published his differences while Mises was still alive, and Mises, while not declaring any changes in his views, definitely did not attack Rothbard's position.
Jeff: First of all, for me, fallen man is man in an environment that he is not sufficiently adapted to always be able to choose aright. IOW, fallen man is man in an environment in which sin is inevitable.
OK, I don't have major problems with the kernal you are trying to get at...just one little question...man, as created, was fallen?
Jeff: As for the homestead principle Hoppes is talking about, I don't know what he's meaning. I would assume, though, that he's talking about something that is seen as obviously "proper." But proper is a normativity concept which, IMO, is only intelligible in terms of teleology. So to me, what is more fundamental than any such principle is the human intuition that we are designed to CHOOSE in CERTAIN ways. The homesteading principle would just be one such WAY of choosing that many people see as obviously true.
Read it! Read it! Read it! All Hoppe's points are a priori. No seeing as "proper" in the mix, straight up a priori axioms. If you read it, I don't think you are going to have major problems with it. | | Back to Top | | |
|
Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 9/1/2010 8:54 PM (GMT -6) | | | Asher: OK, I don't have major problems with the kernal you are trying to get at...just one little question...man, as created, was fallen?
Jeff: No. I take the straightforward reading that man was created for and in an environment that no longer exists.
As for Hoppes, I may try to find time to read it. It sounds good simply because he's trying to build economics up with a sound epistemological approach. That sounds interesting. However, I'm at a loss to see how anything about homesteading could be a priori. Nor do I know how to make sense of human praxeology apart from normative relations. To say that economics or any other human activity is void of normative relations is to say it is not very important, to my mind. But the normative relations themselves are well-nigh fundamental to human thought. All that it requires are the beliefs that the world is an order of means to ends and that humans, themselves, are teleological beings, being intended to choose in PARTICULAR ways.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 9/1/2010 9:22:04 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
|
Asher
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 477
| Posted 9/1/2010 9:53 PM (GMT -6) | | Jeff: But the normative relations themselves are well-nigh fundamental to human thought. All that it requires are the beliefs that the world is an order of means to ends and that humans, themselves, are teleological beings, being intended to choose...
THAT'S PRAXEOLOGY! Human Action...Mises' best known work. Means, ends, preference, cost-benefit, profit, loss, utility.
Jeff: However, I'm at a loss to see how anything about homesteading could be a priori.
What is a priori is the action axiom (praxeology-human action) and argumentation. Other things, such as homesteading, follow logically from the axioms, Hoppe lays it all out well and clearly.
Another Hoppe quote:
"Let me start by asking what is wrong with the position taken by
Mises and so many others that the choice between values is ultimately
arbitrary? First, it should be noted that such a position assumes that
at least the question of whether or not value judgments or normative
statements can be justified is itself a cognitive problem. If this were
not assumed, Mises could not even say what he evidently says and
claims to be the case. His position simply could not exist as an
arguable intellectual position.
At first glance this does not seem to take one very far. Indeed, it
still seems to be a far cry from this insight to the actual proof that normative
statements can be justified and that it is only the libertarian
ethic which can be defended. This impression is wrong, however, and
there is already much more won here than might be suspected. The
argument shows us that any truth claim, the claim connected with any
proposition that it is true, objective or valid (all terms used synonymously
here), is and must be raised and settled in the course of an
argumentation. Since it cannot be disputed that this is so (one cannot
communicate and argue that one cannot communicate and argue),
and since it must be assumed that everyone knows what it means to
claim something to be true (one cannot deny this statement without
claiming its negation to be true), this very fact has been aptly called
“the a priori of communication and argumentation.”16
Arguing never consists of just free-floating propositions claiming
to be true. Rather, argumentation is always an activity, too. However,
given that truth claims are raised and settled in argumentation and
that argumentation, aside from whatever it is that is said in its course,
is a practical affair, it follows that intersubjectively meaningful norms
must exist—precisely those which make some action an argumentation—
which have a special cognitive status in that they are the practical
preconditions of objectivity and truth.
Hence, one reaches the conclusion that norms must indeed be
assumed to be justifiable as valid. It is simply impossible to argue
otherwise, because the ability to argue so would in fact already presuppose
the validity of those norms which underlie any argumentation
whatever. In contradistinction to the natural rights theorists,
though, one sees that the answer to the question of which ends can or
cannot be justified is not to be deduced from the wider concept of
human nature but from the narrower one of argumentation.17 With
this, then, the peculiar role of reason in determining the contents of
ethics can be given a precise description. Contrary to the role of reason
in establishing empirical laws of nature, in determining moral
laws reason can claim to yield results which can be shown to be valid
a priori. It only makes explicit what is already implied in the concept
of argumentation itself, and in analyzing any actual norm proposal its
task is merely confined to analyzing whether or not it is logically consistent
with the very ethics which the proponent must presuppose as
valid insofar as he is able to make his proposal at all." | | Back to Top | | |
|
Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 9/2/2010 7:48 AM (GMT -6) | | |
"In contradistinction to the natural rights theorists,
though, one sees that the answer to the question of which ends can or
cannot be justified is not to be deduced from the wider concept of
human nature but from the narrower one of argumentation."
This is a good point. It doesn't rule out what a lot of people mean by human nature. It's just that we infer THAT there is something like human nature from more fundamental grounds. Indeed, the golden rule is a-rational if there is not SOMETHING like human nature in SOME SENSE.
Most everyone acknowledges that the phrase human nature is not meant to rule out real distinctions between capacities of age, for example. And even those are statistical in nature. But all it takes is statistical trends to justify the propriety of "best practices" that are based on acknowledged STATISTICAL differences in the capacities of CLASSES of humans. It couldn't be otherwise without creating social chaos. People whose sense of "fairness" disregards these trends have negated the very POINT of fairness which is to maximize HUMAN good--not some individual's or special interest group's good at the expense of the greater community.
E.g., just because there are wiz kids that graduate from college at 12 can not be a relevant fact for coming up with NORMAL educational policy for 12 year olds. And if the state could only help the wiz kid get the exceptional education at the expense of dumbing down most other 12 year olds, rational states wouldn't do it. They would leave it to private funding.
But what you and I suspect is that there is plenty of private charity to get the basic needs of a functional society met if States didn't tax it all away and PRAISED charity and benevolent collective bargaining, as per Rom 13. And that states that are literally ZEALOUS about wealth-redistributing, because of their disregard for the very PURPOSE of the state, create just the kinds of out-of-control debt our country has. In short, the wealth-redistribution ends up ultimately being from future generations to current ones. But that is not the purpose of human government I infer from scripture (or the one stated in the preamble of the US constitution). If anything, societal prosperity should GROW over time via strategic allocation of resources, etc.
In my opinion, there is a very profound reason why motivation to MORAL action should ultimately be post-mortem motivation--i.e., until one is solidified in a loving nature, in which case there's not a whole lot of volition going on in loving action (because it has become second nature). And that is, that ALL normativity is grounded in the fact that all things EXIST FOR GOD. The minute we take away the notion that all our praxeological duty is in part TO GOD, we have started humanity down a path to depravity.
But wealth-redistributing states tend to focus motivation on the here and now, based on real or perceived injustices, appealing, ultimately, to the jealousy, envy, and fear of man. Such motivations can't get us anywhere good over the long run. Indeed, tyranny is the end game of all political motivation that is "this-worldly" oriented. Because, for the reasons I've articulated in prior posts, most people can't see how a non-relativistic ethic is RATIONAL if the here and now is ALL there is.
So unjust states ALWAYS try to get people to focus on the HERE and NOW to keep them in a state of DISCONTENT. This way, governments can garner support for greater power, etc. In fact, I've come to notice what other people have--Republican politicians tend to use religion with any zeal for about 2 purposes: 1) to convince the religious right to vote for them, and 2) to appeal to an afterlife so people will be willing to die in their wars. Apart from that, they, too, are mostly about motivation to the HERE and NOW--except to the extent that they need to reassure the religious right they're still on their side.
But once motivation is unto post-mortem states, the ethical bar is MUCH higher. Then, not only do people tend to be more charitable (in a more effectual way), but they are less tolerant of the injustices of government. This ends up rendering the partisan grounds for voting less motivating than grounds of JUSTICE. And once there is more justice, there is more predictability in government policy and, therefore, more reasons to invest, etc, with confidence.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 9/2/2010 4:22:08 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
|
Asher
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 477
| Posted 9/2/2010 5:34 PM (GMT -6) | | Jeff,
I don't know how familiar with Mises and Rothbard's work you are, but you miss, or seem to anyway, some very important points.
Jeff: humans are TOO diverse. There are people who, due to the their diverse upbringings and natural sensitivies, are so different than you and I that we can't begin to relate to what makes them happy, etc. This is, IMO, the absolutely undeniable fact that has to be taken into account when talking AXIOMS of praxeology.
Mises, and all the Austrians, acknowledges the subjective differences in valuation that people have. But given that, ALL people ACT to achieve their subjective goals. They ALL make use of scarce resources. They ALL use means to ends. They ALL experience profit or loss...vis-a-vis their subjective goals. Praxeology is all about what can be objectively said about the subjective. I don't have to have a clue in the world about any given person's subjective valuation to know that they MUST act praxeologically. Praxeology, human action, is what is known a priori. The fact that ALL people communicate via argumentation is what is known a priorily (Is that how one says that?) But once you have some a priori knowledge, some other things fall in line with just as much certainty. So that, given the a priori of argumentation, any logical preconditions of argumentation are also known with the level of certainty that knowledge about argumentation holds. All this is what it seems to me that you are overlooking. Seriously, you should read chapters 9 and 11, they are so well constructed, so clear and building logically point by point to the overall point.
All that said...I am not denying your basic thrust.
Jeff: I don't think there is much of anything praxeologically axiomatic if accountability to God is not axiomatic
Without taking God into consideration...I don't think anything much matters at all. Sans God, I have a tendency to agree with Sartre on the absurdity of it all. If I will be dead within 30 or 40 years and completely pass out of existence, and within 50-100 years everyone who even knew me will also pass out of existence...how big of a deal is it if I am treated unfairly, harassed and harangued and made a slave my whole life, or if I treat others that way if I can get away with it. I have a hard time mustering much "give a damn" if that is the case. It's ALL absurd.
So, I am taking account of your concerns in my own views. But, given my own views about God and human dignity...the Austrians are saying things that 1) I also agree with (in fact, given my views of God, these things would probably have to be the case)and 2) aren't being said by anybody but the Austrians...and that also excludes every branch of Christianity.
With that said...there are propositions about God that are very much needed to form a cohesive integrated view that the Austrians do not say. Of all Mises references to God (there are actually quite a lot throughout his work) he 1) takes for granted the traditional views about God 2) discounts those views...because...he has a priori knowledge about human action and argumentation that belie the traditional views about God. This is why I see a synthesis of open theism and Austrian rationalist philosophy as being just the right combination to give that cohesive, integrated viewpoint. This is why I consider Hoppe's work of such tremendous importance.
A good percentage of Austrians are either atheists or agnostics. And given the God they have in view, I am also, if I can say, atheistic about that God as well. There are also a number of Austrians that are generically theists. Their own discipline makes it impossible for them to be traditional Christians...but, I think, open theism is a viable option, but they know nothing about open theism.
I am working out the integration of these things, and I would be interested in your views about Hoppe's work. The a priori's are pretty much solid...but what about the overall structure of Hoppe's work would have to be subtracted, and what would have to be added? | | Back to Top | | |
|
Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 9/2/2010 8:15 PM (GMT -6) | | Asher: the Austrians are saying things that 1) I also agree with (in fact, given my views of God, these things would probably have to be the case)and 2) aren't being said by anybody but the Austrians...and that also excludes every branch of Christianity.
Jeff: Yes, the existence of a divinely created moral order is what makes libertarianism make sense. But I know that there are atheists that write for Lewrockwell.com, e.g. In particular, one of their regulars, Block, is an atheist. And yet he claims to be a libertarian economist. And I suspect he would embrace Rothbard. Supposedly, Rothbard himself was originally an atheist or agnostic. What some of those guys don't realize is that a rational moral order that requires, for its intelligibility, a benevolent, competent Creator is the only way they can RATIONALLY get to praxeological axioms that aren't consistent with what you call "absurdity."
I love the economic writings of libertarians, though, because they don't actually just talk about freedom, but JUSTICE as well. And, yes, I look forward to reading Hoppes. He sounds VERY interesting.
I was once involved with a several-way debate with Block on abortion. I couldn't follow his reasoning. Once I found out, thereafter, that he was an atheist, everything made sense. He HAS to start with beliefs like "every person OWNS their body." Whereas, per theism, that is just flat false. But why he can't see that a theist could never accept what HE accepts axiomatically is beyond me.
| | Back to Top | | |
|
Asher
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 477
| Posted 9/2/2010 11:22 PM (GMT -6) | | Jeff: I was once involved with a several-way debate with Block on abortion. I couldn't follow his reasoning. Once I found out, thereafter, that he was an atheist, everything made sense. He HAS to start with beliefs like "every person OWNS their body." Whereas, per theism, that is just flat false. But why he can't see that a theist could never accept what HE accepts axiomatically is beyond me.
Well, see, here I am, a theist, and I agree with Block on this one. Every person owns their body. Let's not get too hung up on all the loaded things that "own" could mean...all I mean by "own", and as far as I understand what Block would mean as well, is the idea of exclusive control. To own something means that you have exclusive control of it. And to turn it inside out...all that really means is that man has free will.
I know that most theist are gonna wanna say God owns them...but to even have arrived at the idea of saying "God owns me" means that you HAVE exercised exclusive control over your own body and consciousness.
You control (own) your own body like it or not.
Now the abortion aspect is much more complex and I am not lock step with libertarians like Block on that score. | | Back to Top | | |
|
Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 9/3/2010 9:00 AM (GMT -6) | | Asher: Well, see, here I am, a theist, and I agree with Block on this one. Every person owns their body. Let's not get too hung up on all the loaded things that "own" could mean...all I mean by "own", and as far as I understand what Block would mean as well, is the idea of exclusive control. To own something means that you have exclusive control of it. And to turn it inside out...all that really means is that man has free will.
Jeff: This is where I disagree with Block and atheists in general. No one OWNS their body in the SENSE that is required to apply normativity to the act of abortion such that abortion is RIGHT merely because one OWNS their body. You see, it's the NORMATIVE aspect of "owning" that he gets wrong. They constantly get confused about this. If humans are not designed FOR some end(s) of another competent, benevolent designer, then relativism is all that follows if humans are volitional. The atheist, libertarian or otherwise, has no conceivable grounds to argue otherwise.
Many atheists, realizing this, go whole hog and reject free-will as well. Why not? What's so special about free-will if relativism is true, especially if you're pretty much a creature of habit anyway? Nothing. So you might as well be more parsimonious. And yet those same atheists speak of the ILLUSION of moral relations. IOW, they can't shake their OWN teleological a priori category or the specific applications of it to normative criteria for thought and action. But this is why it really IS more parsimonious to acknowledge final causality as a priori. Because NO ONE can shake it.
The minute we argue that a theist and an atheist can both CONSISTENTLY use the same a priori beliefs and come to the same normative conclusions about praxeology, we ERR. The real implication of argumentation is that the arguer has implicitly admitted he believes he is DESIGNED TO APPREHEND (if, indeed, argumentation is volitional in any sense) and that normative criteria are, therefore, applicable to at least some THOUGHT.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 9/3/2010 9:45:54 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
|
Asher
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 477
| Posted 9/3/2010 8:52 PM (GMT -6) | | Jeff: No one OWNS their body in the SENSE that is required to apply normativity to the act of abortion such that abortion is RIGHT merely because one OWNS their body.
Agreed. We all know where babies come from. There are things that can be done in advance to preclude the possibility of pregnancy. If we engage in the activity that goes along with procreation, and a pregnancy occurs we are just as much responsible toward that other human being as we are any and all other human beings. I think this is the weakest point of many libertarians philosophy. Not all libertarians are atheists, not all libertarians are pro-abortion. But an abortion is an initial act of force against another human being. No doubt abortion is one of the most complex issues. For example, I have been asked this question:
Currently there is spongicide to destroy sperm before it makes it to the egg. Most have no difficulty accepting this as a pregnancy precluding measure. There are pills that can be taken shortly after fertilization that destroys the fertilized egg. Most people who are against abortion, are also against this. What if a pill is developed that can be taken BEFORE intercourse that would destroy any fertilized eggs that come along within a given number of hours, say 48 or so, after the pill is taken. There is no fertilized egg before the pill is taken. The pill only creates a hostile environment for any future occurrence of fertilized eggs. Is that anywhere akin to an abortion?
Jeff: If humans are not designed FOR some end(s) of another competent, benevolent designer, then relativism is all that follows if humans are volitional. The atheist, libertarian or otherwise, has no conceivable grounds to argue otherwise.
This is complex as well. We both believe in the existence of God. Given my belief in God, I can take Hoppe's a priori axioms and add them seamlessly to my belief in God. And both sets of beliefs condition each other, so that while seeing both ( God...and the action and argumentation axioms) as true, there are natural boundaries that are easily seen for both things (given the action and argumentation axioms something like open theism would have to be the case...given the existence of God there are some natural constraints put on all other a priori knowledge) But when God is not taken into account, the other a priori knowledge is constrained only by itself. And here's the thing...there are many different types of libertarians. Some that will remain atheists no matter what. But there are some atheist/agnostic libertarians that I think would be open to a reformulation of theism such as open theism provides. There are other libertarians that are generically theists that I think would be pleased with the ideas of open theism. And there are some libertarians that are Christians, but don't have a seamless integrated whole philosophy...and perhaps seeing open theism united with libertarian ideas would attract them because of the answers it would provide. But, even given just the a priori axioms Hoppe talks about complete relativism DOES NOT follow. To explain this all we have to do is say, both you and I and the Austrians live in a universe in which God does exist...and even if God is not acknowledged as existing, the order He gave the universe is what we all are experiencing...so that for you and I...we can point to the axioms the Austrians believe in (and that I believe in as well) and we can say, "Yes, that follows quite naturally from the fact of the existence of a loving, rational God. And whether or not any given Austrian agrees with us or not, they still live in the same world we do...and they remain non-relativistic rationalists either way, even if their complete philosophy is not as seamlessly integrated as ours.
Jeff: Many atheists, realizing this, go whole hog and reject free-will as well. Why not? What's so special about free-will if relativism is true, especially if you're pretty much a creature of habit anyway?
Yes, that certainly is true, but it just as certainly does not apply to Austrians, who are staunchly free will proponents...much more staunchly advocates of free will than most Christians I know. And Austrians don't believe relativism is true...given the action and argumentation axioms, complete relativism CANNOT be true.
Jeff: But this is why it really IS more parsimonious to acknowledge final causality as a priori. Because NO ONE can shake it.
All a priori knowledge has the same validity. Not all a priori knowledge will get you as much as any other given a priori knowledge, granted.
Hoppe lays out the a priori axioms of action and argumentation with great clarity and beauty. Building from many different angles. Jeff, how would you lay out your case for final causality as being a priori so that it is clear and concise, so that others can readily see it?
Jeff: The minute we argue that a theist and an atheist can both CONSISTENTLY use the same a priori beliefs and come to the same normative conclusions about praxeology, we ERR.
Why? You think we live in different universes or something?! We live in the same universe. Something that is true is true for us all. And as far as I know, there is not 2 people in all the world that hold to the same exact set of beliefs. So does it follow that no two people can come to the same conclusion about anything. No, it does not follow. If your statement is reworded for more precision, I think I MAY see what you are driving at, but as stated I don't think it stands.
Jeff: The real implication of argumentation is that the arguer has implicitly admitted he believes he is DESIGNED TO APPREHEND (if, indeed, argumentation is volitional in any sense) and that normative criteria are, therefore, applicable to at least some THOUGHT.
That certainly is a valid implication of the axiom of argumentation...but if by saying "The real implication" you are implying that there are no other implications..or that your stated implication is somehow more "implicationy" than the other implications then you are incorrect.
Hoppe says this about the two axioms he discusses (action and argumentation):
"Thus, both the meaning of action in general and argumentation in particular must be thought of as logically
necessary interwoven strands of a priori knowledge"
I think this applies to all a priori knowledge. And you seem to be wanting to make an a priori that you strongly hold to, to be somehow the linchpin...I see it more as being "logically necessary interwoven strands"
And I have no idea what you mean by this "if, indeed, argumentation is volitional in any sense"
Have you read Hoppe yet? I'm not nagging, I just think it will be easier for me to converse about these things once you have read him and I'd like to know when that is the case. | | Back to Top | | |
|
Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 9/4/2010 7:27 PM (GMT -6) | | |
Asher: The pill only creates a hostile environment for any future occurrence of fertilized eggs. Is that anywhere akin to an abortion?
Jeff: I would say that the issue of abortion is the termination of this-wordly, materially-based life of a human being. If the hostile environment renders it more likely that an ultimately fertilized egg will die AND that fertilized egg is the this-worldly, materially-based host of a human life, then I would say the intentional use of such a pill is a species of homicide. To the extent that we can't prove whether a fertilized egg is such a host, it implies a gamble with life and death that is unnecessary.
Asher: But there are some atheist/agnostic libertarians that I think would be open to a reformulation of theism such as open theism provides. There are other libertarians that are generically theists that I think would be pleased with the ideas of open theism.
Jeff: I wouldn't doubt that a bit. But it might be that people who don't think a lot about the relationship between philosophy and theology just work from intuitions that are higher up the scale, and, thus, may not see the relevance of it. I mean, I went years without questioning absolute foreknowledge. I had plenty else that concerned me to keep me busy at the time.
Asher: And there are some libertarians that are Christians, but don't have a seamless integrated whole philosophy...and perhaps seeing open theism united with libertarian ideas would attract them because of the answers it would provide.
Jeff: It's worth a shot.
Asher: But, even given just the a priori axioms Hoppe talks about complete relativism DOES NOT follow. To explain this all we have to do is say, both you and I and the Austrians live in a universe in which God does exist...and even if God is not acknowledged as existing, the order He gave the universe is what we all are experiencing...so that for you and I...we can point to the axioms the Austrians believe in (and that I believe in as well) and we can say, "Yes, that follows quite naturally from the fact of the existence of a loving, rational God. And whether or not any given Austrian agrees with us or not, they still live in the same world we do...and they remain non-relativistic rationalists either way, even if their complete philosophy is not as seamlessly integrated as ours.
Jeff: The question, with respect to what IS a priori is NOT what do people believe is a priori. It's what, if any, more fundamental or equally fundamental (or at least corrollary beliefs) beliefs render those beliefs INTELLIGIBLE. Relativism, as I understand it, is simply the view that humans are volitional and significantly diverse in interests and good fortune, but yet not designed to choose in any way other than a self-interest calculated in terms of inferred consequences OF THIS LIFE ONLY.
The minute you add post-mortem consequences, you are typically dealing with non-relativists (per my experience, anyway). Yes, atheists can be non-relativists. But many atheists see the sheer arbitrariness of that approach, PER their epistemological axioms. They typically assume they're just evolved to think that way even though, in their opinion, it is arbitrary (i.e., a-rational).
Asher: And Austrians don't believe relativism is true...given the action and argumentation axioms, complete relativism CANNOT be true.
Jeff: I agree. I just don't think those axioms are separable from the corrollary that we are designed to apprehend by a competent, benevolent designer. Granted, most people don't think about it. But when you analyze it down, I don't see how it can be denied. Indeed, a lot of Plantinga's work is getting at that without explicitly saying it.
Asher: Jeff, how would you lay out your case for final causality as being a priori so that it is clear and concise, so that others can readily see it?
Jeff: People think in terms of temporal ordered events. That requires temporal relations. They also seem to believe in the causal relation of events a priori. At least, I can't see how causality can be derived from other categories. But more than that, researchers will tell you that children think causally in a teleological way quite promiscuously.
Think of something as basic as what we call the regularity of nature. To say nature is regular is to say that natural events will continue to occur and do so in specific ways that can, potentially, be predicted. And yet, there is no way to prove that empirically or derive it from the mere belief THAT events are caused as opposed to occurring for no reason whatsoever.
Thus, what seems to explain it is the belief that specific events occur for one or more purposes. For what we call nature, at least ONE purpose of all specific, NATURAL event states is to FIT our NATURAL analogical mode of inference by behaving REGULARLY. As for what we call effects (events) of human volition, the purpose of an attained end is the INTENTION of the human agent.
This is a very parsimonious way of explaining our native trust in inductive reasoning, people's tendency to believe in a creator, people's application of NON-RELATIVISTIC normativity to human action and thought, and children's natural teleological inference-making.
Asher: And you seem to be wanting to make an a priori that you strongly hold to, to be somehow the linchpin...I see it more as being "logically necessary interwoven strands"
Jeff: No, I'm just emphasizing final causality because it is generally NOT accepted as a priori. I agree with you that there is an interweaving of notions in apriori beliefs. For example, causality is probably intelligible apart from temporal relations just as is teleology is intelligible apart from causality. But causality is not MERE temporal ordering. And teleology is not MERE causality.
Asher: And I have no idea what you mean by this "if, indeed, argumentation is volitional in any sense"
Jeff: What I meant there is that if argument is non-volitional, then we have no reason to believe we're designed to apprehend. Because to believe all argument is ultimately deterministic is to basically believe IN determinism. And final causes are the antithesis to determinism.
Asher: Have you read Hoppe yet? I'm not nagging, I just think it will be easier for me to converse about these things once you have read him and I'd like to know when that is the case.
Jeff: No. Actually, I'm on vacation trying to get a lot done. I would probably do better with an actual book in hand. I'm not one to read long texts off the internet. I'll probably need to buy the book to find time to be able to digest it all. But it sounds fascinating. I've been hearing of Hoppes for years from visiting LewRockwell.com. I had no idea his ideas were so philosophical in nature.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 9/4/2010 8:17:11 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
|
Asher
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 477
| Posted 9/4/2010 8:22 PM (GMT -6) | | Jeff: No. Actually, I'm on vacation trying to get a lot done. I would probably do better with an actual book in hand. I'm not one to read long texts off the internet. I'll probably need to buy the book to find time to be able to digest it all. But it sounds fascinating. I've been hearing of Hoppes for years from visiting LewRockwell.com. I had no idea his ideas were so philosophical in nature.
Do you prefer "book in hand" reading, or will listening work for you? If so, I have taken the pdf of the book and turned it into an mp3 using TextAloud. I use a Neospeech female British voice called Kate, but I've also got British Paul and a couple of other voices, if you would prefer a male reader. I could upload the mp3 to a file hosting site and give you the link. Interested? | | Back to Top | | |
|
Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 9/4/2010 10:47 PM (GMT -6) | | | | |
| 28 posts in this thread.
Viewing Page : 1 2 |
| Forum Information | Currently it is Monday, November 09, 2026 6:15 PM (GMT -6)
There are a total of 97,718 posts in 6,040 threads.
In the last 3 days there were 0 new threads and 0 reply posts. View Active Threads
|
Forum powered by dotNetBB v2.42EC SP3
dotNetBB © 2000-2026 |
|
|