Post Edited (Daniel M) : 11/25/2010 2:28:17 AM (GMT-6)

Daniel: So, the rationalist must keep digging to the point where a "self-evident material axiom" appears. The problem here, of course, is whether or not the resulting axiom is an actual axiom. Further, anything derived from pure reason requires the complete exclusion of observational information. Thus, the resulting proposition must be true by definition. For how can any proposition that is derived from pure reason that is true be anything but a statement true by definition?

Tom: I wish I could give the economic side of this discussion a lot more attention and catch up. But for now I just wanted to quickly comment on this...

“Self-evident” in the philosophical sense just describes a prop whose truth cannot be denied without self-contradiction. But the sort of props that qualify as self-evident in this sense include more than JUST "definitions." And it doesn't mean all such props must exclude observation (for such props may be about what one observes, as in Hartshorne’s first a priori “Something exists” which is both self-evidently true, observational, and non-tautological). I’m not able to comment on Autrian-style economics, but it SEEMS to me that what Asher is saying about this school of thought is that it attempt to ground economics in this KIND of proposition, i.e., props which cannot be denied without self-contradiction, for such props are vastly more fundamental to the WAY the world is and as such are more naturally suitable to bearing the weight of a full system of beliefs. I don't know if the Austrian school succeeds in this. But I totally appreciate the "method." I know Hartshorne’s six a priori truths (Greg did his PhD diss on them), and I don’t think there’s anything in them that entails any one particular system of economics. 

Daniel: If it is impossible to falsify something then it is impossible to verify it.

Tom: That doesn’t seem right to me. All Hartshorne’s a priori truths appear undeniable and verifiable. The proposition “Something exists” is both undeniable and verifiable. I’m not siding with the Austrian school here (I don’t understand it), I’m just commenting on the logical status of props thought to be true a priori.

Daniel: All of this is to say that to the Christian to be a human is not by definition to exist as a being who necessarily consumes other matter.

Tom: If we’re speaking “ultimately,” then I agree. God exists without consuming anything else. So reality per se can’t be thought of as intrinsically consuming. And to the extent that we shall exist by “participation” in the life of God we too shall exist without needing to consume matter. Perhaps that’s a better word to describe what IS intrinisic to us—that we exist by participating in that which lies outside ourselves. We’re intrinsically ecstatic beings (and so is God who, trinitarianly, ‘participates without consuming’). And ‘participation’ seems far more fundamental than ‘consumption’. The latter shall pass and be no more while the former will endure forever.

But we’re not on that side of the eschatological divide just yet, so any this-worldly economics will have to assume as axiomatic the necessity of consumption. We have to eat to live. But I don’t see how one constructs an entire economic system on the fact that we have to eat to survive.

Tom

I would agree that self-evident truths are non-verifiable. To me, that's what it means to say they're self-evident. But that's of no consequence. The fact is, if there is not such a thing as a knowable HUMAN normativity that applies to thought/belief, then it makes no difference what anyone believes in the sense that is relevant to benevolent theism. And in that case, there's no sense debating anything. THAT'S THE POINT!

That's why Hoppes says the very act of debating is a manifestation of certain fundamentals held by the debater UNLESS the debater is being intentionally deceitful, in which case, again, WHO AMONGST US THAT CARES about HONESTY SHOULD CARE what they think?

Answer that for me, Daniel. That's what I'm not seeing in yours and Zach's approach to debate. We have to agree on certain axioms before we have any reason to pursue convergence by debating. So what beliefs do you hold axiomatically (leaving aside the question of whether they're intuitive or not)?

E.g.,

1) Are all events caused?

2) Are any events caused?

3) If only some events are caused, how do you determine which ones are?

4) How do you determine when caused event sequences are means to intended ends, if ever?

5) etc.

Post Edited (Similitude) : 11/25/2010 12:04:47 PM (GMT-6)

Not to derail this thread.  Brief thought for Tom.

Post Edited (Daniel M) : 11/25/2010 7:44:44 PM (GMT-6)

Daniel: There is a reason why rationalism was abandoned.

Jeff: How are you defining rationalism? I'm pretty sure I would oppose it too, but I'm not exactly sure what you're meaning by it. If you're saying rationalism is the view that some beliefs are intuitive, then I don't oppose that species of rationalism. Apart from intuition and modes of inference it grounds, there is just blind faith, right?

And if all belief is arbitrary/blind, then there is no sense in which there can be any non-relativistic normativity to it, right?

Post Edited (Daniel M) : 11/26/2010 12:22:22 AM (GMT-6)

Anyone who, like me, believes that some beliefs are just intuitive can not be a rationalist by your definition. Per my view, intuitions are required for reason to be possible. Reason is discursive. Intuition is not.

But with respect to whether there is intuition, how, without intuition, do we even know THAT we observe? It is conceivable that solipsism is correct. How, apart from intuition, do we know it's not true.

Tom: To me, that's just what it means to verify them. In other words, to demonstrate that denying a self-evident truth involves self-contradiction IS to verify its truth.

Jeff: Yes, that works for me because I consider self-contradiction an intuitive criteria for falsification. But I'm thinking Daniel means, by verify, something that somehow works apart from intuition. And I don't get that at all. Nothing seems more obvious to me than Lewis' famous claim: "If nothing is obvious, nothing can be proved." IOW, if nothing is intuitive, nothing can serve as a ground for an inference, deductive or otherwise.

Tom: Right. I too consider self-contradiction an intuitive criteria for falsification.

------------

Daniel: Rationalism is the view that true knowledge can only be attained through abstract reasoning or logic.

Tom: I’m not a rationalist then. But I do believe there are SOME beliefs that are attained through abstract reasoning or logic…

…UNLESS you want to say that self-consciousness is itself an empirical act of observation of one’s self, one’s own conscious existence. If that’s the case, then of course NO knowledge can be gained by PURELY abstract reasoning/logic.

One can say that self-consciousness/self-reflection is a kind of self-observation. To reflect on the self is to observe the self, as you say Daniel. BUT I don’t think empiricists would say self-observation is INCLUDED by empiricists in the field of data that’s collected and called “empirical.” In fact, isn’t self-observation expressly excluded from the set of data that empiricists call “empirical”? Sure, one can construe self-reflection as an act of observation. Fine with me. But it’s also very different (in kind) from the observations one makes outside one’s self.

--------------

Jeff: Anyone who, like me, believes that some beliefs are just intuitive can not be a rationalist by your definition. Per my view, intuitions are required for reason to be possible. Reason is discursive. Intuition is not.

Tom: Yep.

What I don’t get is Hoppe’s construing the axiom “Humans act intentionally” as involving NO observation whatsoever. That seems obviously false to me. He seems to claim that the axiom is arrived at by contemplating the bodily movements and auditory sounds which one DOES observe to arrive at the conclusion that “humans do (what I observe them doing) intentionally, and freely,” etc. But contrary to Hoppe’s claim, this final axiom IS derived from observation, thought not SOLELY observation, for the belief that we do what we do freely is arrived at intuitively (and perhaps somewhat discursively). If you suck out 100% of what is “observed,” Hoppe would never be able to arrive at his axiom. He wouldn’t even know there are any humans other than himself that act. But it’s true that his axiom is not arrived at (or derived) ENTIRELY from observation, for the belief that the actions one OBSERVES are done FREELY is more than mere observation, though one must observe.

Hoppe: All of these categories which we know to be the very heart of economics—
values, ends, means, choice, preference, cost, profit and loss—are implied in the axiom of action.

Tom: I can see that. I’d prefer to say that the axiom of action is implied in them, for one can only conclude the truth of the axiom that the actions one observes in others are, like one’s own, free choices based on valuations, etc., if one has FIRST taken the categories of choice, freedom and importance, etc., as intuitively definitive of the human experience per se.

Whitehead has a great little book out call Modes of Thought in which his first chapter deals with the notion of “importance” (or “value”) as the all-important intuition that grounds all these others.

Hoppe: Like the axiom itself, they are not derived from observation. Rather, that one is able to interpret observations in terms of such categories requires that one already
knows what it means to act.

Tom: But all interpretation is derived in part from that which is interpreted. If we’re interpreting observations we make, then we’re deriving (in part at least, though not exclusively necessarily) our interpretation from the observations we interpret. So to the extent that Hoppe’s axiom regards “observed human actions” his axiom is derived from those observation, though ALSO from other intuitions about his own acting self.

But I agree that one can only interpret human actions in terms of free choice, value, costs, etc., by appealing to what is NOT directly observed in the actions of others but which is only be observed as a feeling or sense (i.e., intuition) in observing one’s own deliberating/choosing self. And like Jeff says, unless we are justified in assuming that the actions we observe in others are the SAME KIND OF THING we observe in ourselves (grounded in intuitions re: fundamental laws of logic that make argumentation and meaningful observation even possible), then there’s no point in debate.

So how’s this get us ONE and only ONE right and proper economic system?

Tom

Post Edited (Tom) : 11/26/2010 8:43:59 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Similitude) : 11/26/2010 11:23:22 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Tom) : 11/27/2010 7:20:05 AM (GMT-6)

Tom: It looks like Asher wants to argue that 'life, libertry, and personal property' as individual rights are derived from the irreducible givens of rational thought. That is, the propositon "Each individual has a right to live free and own property" is true a priori (or at the very least derivable by rational argumentaion from a priori truths). Is that right Asher?

Jeff: I doubt Asher or Mises could go that far. E.g., unless they are prepared to argue that capital punishment or imprisonment for any reason is necessarily "wrong," they couldn't state, as an apriori belief, that each individual has a right to live, much less live free. Indeed, I'm sure Mises would argue that we only can get to such phrases as "Each individual ..." by observing that there are, in fact, other individuals.

What is fundamental, though, seemingly, is that teleological thought is natural to the human race. Otherwise, how do we even get to the notion of normativity at all? Even the notion of "importance" has to do with normativity/teleology.

As I see it, ultimate grounds for all the species of inferences I can conceive of are either known intuitively by me or they are VOLITIONALLY chosen by me out of an already existing set of mental categories and then believed by blind faith. Why anyone thinks the latter is an improvement on the former is beyond me. Especially since even saying they are VOLITIONALLY chosen is to create the infinite regress I explained to Zach many moons ago.

Daniel: If faith is what you mean by a "intuitive belief" then yes, I think intuitive belief exists as a category, but the content of that category can change because of the world one is born into.

Jeff: You don't even know you ARE in a world of other beings apart from intuition.

Daniel: It doesn't make sense to talk about the LNC in Buddhist philosophy.

Jeff: That's true. But it's also true that nothing makes sense apart from the LNC. And if that means Buddhist philosophy is actually not philosophy at all, but non-sense, so be it. The denial of the LNC is for all practical purposes (insomuch as the LNC is a species of the law of identity) the denial of the capacity to distinguish, whether that distinguishing is of beings, concepts, relations, conscious states, etc.

I think it is ONLY sensible to believe there are categories that are universal in certain senses precisely BECAUSE once we take them non-universally we have created the impossible need for an infinite regress in inferential thought. Alternatively, one can avoid inferences altogether and become completely arbitrary, epistemologically. I don't see a 3rd possibility that is intelligible.

Take for example, causality. If some events are uncaused, we would need a criteria to determine that. But what would that criteria be that wouldn't, itself, work universally for this kind of adjudication? I see no way around it other than to just be arbitrary. Because we can't do infinite regresses.

Post Edited (Tom) : 11/27/2010 11:49:02 PM (GMT-6)