Post Edited (Similitude) : 7/31/2011 3:17:36 PM (GMT-5)

I think that's why I really like that whole "waking lucid dream" analogy, where Creation itself is the immediate, hypostatic activity within the Divine Mind of Christ the Logos in a manner like unto how the waking lucid dream is an immediate, hypostatic activity within the human mind who experiences it.

Post Edited (One Love) : 8/1/2011 10:52:57 AM (GMT-5)

Hey Jeff-

(4) seems obviously false to me given the very definition of ‘contingent’ being. That beings who cannot bring themselves into existence but must be brought into existence by some “cause” can nevertheless sustain their continued existence apart from all causes makes no sense to me at all. Agreeing that contingent entities must have a cause for their “coming to be” but not for their “continuing to be” is what seems to complicate the principle of causality unnecessarily. Your (4) surprises me because it is not at all a parsimonious take on God-World relation, and I know how you like parsimony.

(2) doesn’t complicate the principle of causality that I can see. It simplifies it (given your options) and is more intuitive and in line with common sense. It’s really more complicating to conceive of God actively sustaining what can only come to be through his causality than to conceive of what he brings into existence continuing to exist apart from all causality? Really? I can’t even conceive it. I think erasing causality the way your (4) does complicates the principle more. But I could be wrong.

You’ve already agreed that if God were to cease to exist all creation would cease to exist (unless I’m remembering wrongly). But why would creation cease to be in the event of God’s ceasing to be if creation continues to exist without cause (divine or otherwise) as your (4) states? It could cease to be because there exists a causal link between God and the continued existence of all he creates.

And I remember you elsewhere agreeing that, minimally speaking, creation can’t continue to exit apart from the ‘will’ of God, though you’ve conceived of this in terms of God’s original willing creation to be and not in terms of God’s continued presence in/with existing things (as Alan does). But such willing (of initial states) posits causality for creation’s continued existence. God wills an initial cause that has within it all the possibilities for future becoming. So it's still caused existence if only by divine will at a distance. But it’s not ‘causeless existence’ like your (4). So I don’t see how you even agree with (4) (unless you're abandoning your earlier agreement that creation could not conceivably continue to exist if God were to cease to exist).

When you say (4) means the “principle of causality deals with changes of states of affairs, not continued existence per se” I can see part of what’s keeping us apart here, because in my view there’s absolutely no difference between “changes in states of affairs” and “continued existence per se” (at least the continued existence of created entities, which is what we’re discussing). To “continue to exist” is just to undergo “changes of some state of affairs.”And visa versa; if you undergo some change in state of affairs, you have by definition continued to exist. Even if the changes are imperceptible to us (say, changes on the quantum level), they are changes nonetheless; so nothing created continues to exist without undergoing change on some level. Describing such changes is to describe temporal becoming which is equivalent to “continuing” to exist.

Tom

Post Edited (Tom) : 8/2/2011 7:27:37 PM (GMT-5)

Tom: (4) seems obviously false to me given the very definition of ‘contingent’ being. That beings who cannot bring themselves into existence but must be brought into existence by some “cause” can nevertheless sustain their continued existence apart from all causes makes no sense to me at all.

Jeff: But that's not what 4) says. 4) says NO beings require causality merely to exist for the next 5 secs--even God doesn't.

Tom: Agreeing that contingent entities must have a cause for their “coming to be” but not for their “continuing to be” is what seems to complicate the principle of causality unnecessarily.

Jeff: Either all beings require continued causality or none do or some do. The latter complicates it by creating 2 classes of being in that sense. So are you saying God sustains Himself in existence causally?

Tom: It’s really more complicating to conceive of God actively sustaining what can only come to be through his causality than to conceive of what he brings into existence continuing to exist apart from all causality? Really?

Jeff: Yes, if God requires no sustaining cause for His continued existence. Because that creates 2 classes of beings in that sense. We already have 2 classes of being-contingent and necessary. That's all the distinction we need to make theology rational in terms of causality per se. You're view seems to posit 2 conditions for God to be God where mine requires only one. For you say God must not be contingent as we are, but He must also be continually sustained in existence, causally. I just say He must not be contingent as we are. If you're not saying that God has to be causally sustained in existence moment to moment, then beings, qua beings, don't require it. We need something else to warrant positing it for created beings in that case. What would that be?

Tom: You’ve already agreed that if God were to cease to exist all creation would cease to exist (unless I’m remembering wrongly). But why would creation cease to be in the event of God’s ceasing to be if creation continues to exist without cause (divine or otherwise) as your (4) states? It could cease to be because there exists a causal link between God and the continued existence of all he creates.

Jeff:  If God is a necessary being, as we believe He is, God can't go out of existence. But I don't know that's because He does or doesn't causally sustain His own existence from moment to moment.

Tom: And I remember you elsewhere agreeing that, minimally speaking, creation can’t continue to exit apart from the ‘will’ of God, though you’ve conceived of this in terms of God’s original willing creation to be and not in terms of God’s continued presence in/with existing things (as Alan does). But such willing (of initial states) posits causality for creation’s continued existence. God wills an initial cause that has within it all the possibilities for future becoming. So it's still caused existence if only by divine will at a distance. But it’s not ‘causeless existence’ like your (4). So I don’t see how you even agree with (4) (unless you're abandoning your earlier agreement that creation could not conceivably continue to exist if God were to cease to exist).

Jeff: Given UR, I would say that it's plausible that God either intends a created entity to exist forever or not. His competence assures that intent will obtain. But a "coming into being" is a change of state of affairs that requires a cause by even my principle of causality. So no created being has uncaused existence. My principle implies only God has that. Your principle seems to imply even God requires causal sustenance to continue to exist from t1 to t2, not merely to cause change of states.

Tom: When you say (4) means the “principle of causality deals with changes of states of affairs, not continued existence per se” I can see part of what’s keeping us apart here, because in my view there’s absolutely no difference between “changes in states of affairs” and “continued existence per se” (at least the continued existence of created entities, which is what we’re discussing). To “continue to exist” is just to undergo “changes of some state of affairs.”And visa versa; if you undergo some change in state of affairs, you have by definition continued to exist. Even if the changes are imperceptible to us (say, changes on the quantum level), they are changes nonetheless; so nothing created continues to exist without undergoing change on some level. Describing such changes is to describe temporal becoming which is equivalent to “continuing” to exist.

Jeff: It doesn't follow that because all 3-D entities seem to be in constant motion given our modern understanding of physics that we can't conceive of an entity remaining in a single location for some time. Before children think about atoms, etc, that's precisely what they think is the case much of the time. Rocks just sit there to the superficial appearance of a child that doesn't know the earth beneath him/her is spinning and hurling through space, etc.

So mere continued existence means just EXISTING from t1 to t2 with zero change of state. I'm not convinced this requires a cause. That's what you're saying does require a cause. But that means God's existence is continually caused as well. Because beings, qua beings, either DO or DON'T require continued causality for continued existence. And God is a being.

Tom: Whatever non-God mechanism or endowment of the created order needed to mediate continuing life we imagine, it would fall into the same categories we have--uncreated/divine and created being.

Jeff: So what were you meaning about "mechanism" here? Because I don't know what mechanism, if any, sustains God in existence. So I don't know that there IS such a thing for beings QUA beings. See my confusion?

Post Edited (Similitude) : 8/2/2011 8:56:03 PM (GMT-5)

Tom: (4) seems obviously false to me given the very definition of ‘contingent’ being. That beings who cannot bring themselves into existence but must be brought into existence by some “cause” can nevertheless sustain their continued existence apart from all causes makes no sense to me at all.

Jeff: But that's not what 4) says. 4) says NO beings require causality merely to exist for the next 5 secs--even God doesn't.

Tom: I got that. And that’s what seems obviously false to me. If ‘contingent beings’ require a cause for their continued existence, then it’s false that “No being requires a cause for its continued existence.”

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Tom: Agreeing that contingent entities must have a cause for their “coming to be” but not for their “continuing to be” is what seems to complicate the principle of causality unnecessarily.

Jeff: Either all beings require continued causality or none do or some do. The latter complicates it by creating 2 classes of being in that sense. So are you saying God sustains Himself in existence causally?

Tom: I don’t see why recognizing 2 classes of being complicates causality when there ARE two classes of being—uncreated (divine, or necessary being) and created (contingent) being. The first distinction to draw between the two, in my mind, would be the way they differ in terms of causality. Necessary being either requires no cause or (if one were required to describe its cause) is self-existing or self-causing. But IF a thing begins to exist it has a cause of its existence. That much is clear. And that this class of beings does include God is also clear. So I don’t see why I’m complicating the principle of causality by understanding it in terms of these two classes. What confuses the principle, to my mind, is to recognize the distinction in classes of being (uncreated and created) but insist, as you do, that causality apply to each the same way.

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Tom: It’s really more complicating to conceive of God actively sustaining what can only come to be through his causality than to conceive of what he brings into existence continuing to exist apart from all causality? Really?

Jeff: Yes, if God requires no sustaining cause for His continued existence. Because that creates 2 classes of beings in that sense. We already have 2 classes of being-contingent and necessary.

Tom: But I’m not creating a 2^nd category of 2 classes. The only 2 classes I’m recognizing are uncreated/necessary and created/contingent. It’s the differences between these 2 classes that suggests to me a corresponding distinction in the causal nature of each.

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Jeff: You're view seems to posit 2 conditions for God to be God where mine requires only one. For you say God must not be contingent as we are, but He must also be continually sustained in existence, causally.

Tom: Not at all. I deny that God must be continually sustained causally (unless one wishes to say God causally sustains his own existence, but I don’t find that sort of talk very meaningful).

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Jeff: If you're not saying that God has to be causally sustained in existence moment to moment, then beings, qua beings, don't require it.

Tom: I don’t think that follows. If you posit two classes of being, then you can’t speak of beings “qua beings” in a way that fails to recognizes the differences that account for there being 2 and not 1 class of being. In other words, it doesn’t follow from there being 2 classes of being that the causal nature of beings in both classes must be identical or uniform since on the basis that both classes are classes OF BEING. Yes, but they are DIFFERENT CLASSES of being. And the causal nature (or structures) of their relative being may (and since we’re talking necessary vs contingent being I’d say must by definition) be different. If necessary and contingent being BOTH have identical causal structures/explanations for their being (qua beings), then the whole distinction between necessary vs contingent being disappears. Surely HOW necessary beings exist is different from HOW contingent beings exist, and surely causality is at the heart of this how.

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Jeff: Given UR, I would say that it's plausible that God either intends a created entity to exist forever or not. His competence assures that intent will obtain. But a "coming into being" is a change of state of affairs that requires a cause by even my principle of causality. So no created being has uncaused existence. My principle implies only God has that. Your principle seems to imply even God requires causal sustenance to continue to exist from t1 to t2, not merely to cause change of states.

Tom: I hope it’s clear now that I don’t argue that God requires causal sustenance for continued existence.

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Jeff: So mere continued existence means just EXISTING from t1 to t2 with zero change of state. I'm not convinced this requires a cause.

Tom: Perhaps not. But I don’t think “mere” continued existence (enduring from t1 to t2 with zero change of state is possible for created being. It is the nature of created being to a) be in relation and b) undergo change. As a ‘relational’ thinker, I’m convinced that a thing IS its relations. So a change in something I’m related to is a change in me (in spite of what Aquinas said). So to get the sort of zero-change-continued-existence you’re talking about I’d have to imagine zero change holding universally for all created entities. But that would amount to a denial of temporal becoming—no quantum events, no process, no becoming, total universal lock-down.

Great convo! Loving it.

Tom

Post Edited (Tom) : 8/2/2011 10:15:33 PM (GMT-5)

Jeff: But there's already the distinction, IMO, that God was not caused to COME INTO existence at some point in time, whereas we were brought into existence at a point in time. To add on, for us, a need for continued creation to continue to exist, but not for God, is to create two distinctions when the latter doesn't really explain anything that is not otherwise explained by teleology per se, as far as I can tell.

Tom: Surely that which exists without having come into being (i.e. exists necessarily) also continues to exist by different means than that which was brought into existence. The continued existence of the former bears throughout its career the same causal independence as is expressed in the truth of its not having been brought into existence, while the continued existence of the latter bears throughout its career the same causal dependence as is expressed in the truth of its needing to be brought into existence. What continues to exist continues to exist under the same fundamental causal dependency or independency that accounts for its existing at all. So from my point of view I’m not creating two distinctions, one about the causality of divine vs contingent “coming into being” and a second about the causality of divine vs contingent “continuing to be.” The distinction is one and the same—that being divine vs created being per se. It's just that the causal independency (in God’s case) or dependency (in our case) of either's nature which is born throughout its career.

I suppose the explanatory value of CC is that it allows those of us see the relationship between necessary and contingent being in terms of the above paragraph to view that relationship in a consistent fashion, without self-contradiction.

Tom

Post Edited (Tom) : 8/4/2011 10:35:22 AM (GMT-5)

Post Edited (Similitude) : 8/5/2011 7:35:52 AM (GMT-5)

Post Edited (One Love) : 8/5/2011 8:05:10 AM (GMT-5)

And because God is perfectly sympathetic, that satisfaction INVOLVES our satisfaction and the Son's satisfaction.