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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 11/26/2011 1:22 PM (GMT -6) |   | |
Jeff: First, scripture itself speaks AGAINST traditions of men. Thus, whether we like it or not, we have to judge extra-scriptural traditions BY scripture, not the other way around, to give meaning to scriptural warnings about tradition.
Tom: You’ve misunderstood my point. Who would disagree that traditions can go awry? But to say they go awry is to say there’s an orthodox/correct “way to be the Church” from generation to generation (which we have missed) is just to say the Church is undeniably “a” tradition. Of course Scripture judges any particular “way we attempt to be the Church,” but only because it already IS the “way we are to be the Church,” that is to say, it IS the tradition we ought to seek to be, and that’s because the tradition we seek to be produced the docs we call the NT. The NT didn’t CREATE the NT Church (its faith, its way of life, etc.). Quite the reverse.
Besides condemning the “traditions of men,” Scripture also speaks positively of tradition, even characterizes itself as tradition. Several passages come to mind:
1 Cor. 11:2: “Now I praise you because you remember me in everything, and hold firmly to the traditions, just as I delivered them to you.”
2Th. 2.15: “So then, brothers, stand firm and hold to the traditions which you were taught, whether by word of mouth or by letter from us.”
2Th 3.6: “Now we command you, brothers, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you keep away from every brother who leads an unruly life and not according to the tradition which you received from us.”
But also 1Co 11:20, “I pass on to you that which I also received, that on the night…” and Eph 2.20, “You are built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets; Christ Jesus himself is the cornerstone.”
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On Hebrews…
We’ll just have to disagree on Heb 1. I’m not promoting it as a particular version of creatio continua (along the lines of an occasionalism). I’m not that smart! I'm just positing the actual presence of God as the presupposition for all created actuality per se (without speculating on ‘how’ this works)—though I think you disagree with even this as well. You find divine actuality to be required only for bringing creation into being. You COULD BE a deist after that; God could wind up the clock and then not be present in an absolute sense. For me, deism isn’t a possible “way to be the Church” at all. It would represent a going astray of the biblical tradition. Don’t misunderstand me, it may be a minimal “way to be an individual who happens to be saved.” But that’s never been what I’ve been talking about. To answer the question, “What’s the absolute minimum amount of accurate faith-content required to get somebody out of hell and into heaven” is NOT to answer the question, “How do WE be the Church, the Body of Christ, in the world.” The latter expresses a more substantial narrative sufficient for expressing the Church’s identity and purpose.
Re: Hebrews 1...I’m not disputing the main verb or it’s relation to the participles. What follows the main verb describes the atoning work. But you misunderstand the tense relation of the coordinate participles preceding the main verb. By your logic, Jeff, Jesus is not “the image of Father’s essence” until AFTER he had completed his atoning work (or at the most, AS he atones for us and takes his seat). But that’s to deny the tense relation of the participles and the logic of the argument. Christ’s “being the express image” is the pre-requisite for atoning work. In as much as Christ IS this naturally, he is able to redeem us at all. That is, only the one who IS this image can atone for us in any case and then take his seat. Same thing for the next phrase “bearing all things.” Only one who relates to the created order IN THIS WAY (i.e., as he in whom that order subsists) may implicate that order in his atoning work by virtue of that relationship.
You can’t attribute the first participle “being the express image of…” to the Son/Logos qua Son (i.e., not as a contingent function he takes up by virtue of his atoning work) but then attribute the coordinate “bearing all things by his powerful word” to the Son as a description of his contingent atoning work along with the participles that follow the main verb. If you’re using the main verb and its atoning work as the context by which to interpret the participle “bearing all things” as limited to the atoning work (as you are), you have to consistently do the same with ALL the participles, including “being the express image.” But that’s not viable (however ‘logically’ possible it may be). The Logos doesn’t become (and is not in fact) the image of the Father BY SAVING US (or BECAUSE he saves us). He saves us BECAUSE he is in fact the image of the Father (and, as well, BECAUSE all created being subsists in him, so that “bearing all things” describes a pre-requisite to what you think it in fact describes, viz., Jesus’ actual atoning work). One can propose your view of the first two participles and claim it’s genuine, biblical Christianity (because after all, it’s a logically and exegetically possible view), but you’ll have to forgive those of us who reject it as un-Christian (i.e., as a narrative incapable of grounding and sustaining OUR identity and purpose as the Body of Christ).
I honestly want to be open to how you’re interpreting Heb 1, Jeff, but I can’t find it plausible, Bro.
Jeff: Personally, I don't know why the word “heretic” is of any consequence if it doesn’t mean you aren’t a true believer anyway. In that case, it’s just a way of saying you disagree on something.
Tom: The historical use of the word (in acts of discipline) left the actual salvation of the heretic a moot point I think. Not sure. I'm not personally gonna get hung up on the term. The issue, historically speaking, was that those who advocated unorthodox views on core issues (like Christology) were not allowed to exercise influence within the community. God knows whether and how to save those whose understanding of core issues is not orthodox. Hey, on an individual level I'm cool with "trust that in Christ on the cross God acts to save you" to secure saving faith. But we're not talking about the minimal requirement to get folks in. We're talking about growing people into perfection. I defended the genuineness of the faith of Muslim converts who for years still found it difficult to say, "Jesus is God" (or divine). But I wouldn't ask them to teach Sunday School. Eventually they grew into a better understanding of the implications of their trust in Jesus. In terms of a shared narrative in which the community’s identity and purpose was maintained and expressed (which just is the function of tradition rightly understood), the Church was (rightly, I think) particular about which Christ would qualify as ground and means (author and finisher) of human salvation (understood as the perfecting human being through union with God).
Tom
"The aesthetic value the world has for God is in expressing, not constituting, the aesthetic value God eternally finds within Godself." Greg BoydPost Edited (Tom) : 11/26/2011 2:29:12 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 11/27/2011 11:03 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom: But we're not talking about the minimal requirement to get folks in. We're talking about growing people into perfection. I defended the genuineness of the faith of Muslim converts who for years still found it difficult to say, "Jesus is God" (or divine).
Jeff: The confession that Jesus is Lord is paramount to us having any reason to believe a person has justifying faith. If they deny Christ is divine in any sense without plausibly explaining away the seemingly obvious meaning of the verses to that effect, then I would certainly say they are flirting with judgment by teaching ("be not many teachers, brethren, for they shall receive the greater judgment." )
Tom: By your logic, Jeff, Jesus is not “the image of Father’s essence” until AFTER he had completed his atoning work (or at the most, AS he atones for us and takes his seat). But that’s to deny the tense relation of the participles and the logic of the argument. Christ’s “being the express image” is the pre-requisite for atoning work.
Jeff: Exactly. His being the "image" of the Father is a pre-requisite for his being sufficient for the atoning work. I've said that very thing. And yes, he always was and will always be that "image," best I can tell. IOW, the second person was that image SANS CREATION. But Hebrews is tying that fact TO Christ's incarnational role with respect TO creation.
Tom: Same thing for the next phrase “bearing all things.” Only one who relates to the created order IN THIS WAY (i.e., as he in whom that order subsists) may implicate that order in his atoning work by virtue of that relationship.
Jeff: Yes. Bearing things is part of the redemptive aspect of his incarnational mission. That's precisely what I'm saying. But as I understand you, you're saying he has to perform creatio continua (your view of "bearing" ) whether or not atonement had been necessary.
Finally, you're misunderstanding me if you think I'm arguing for the possibility of deism. The only way deism could be conceivable to me is if there was no such thing as moral accountability. I don't believe any human being can consistently believe any such thing.
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 11/28/2011 12:47 PM (GMT -6) | | |
Jeff,
Let me try again. You objected to my understanding of “bearing all things” as unrelated per se to Christ’s redemptive work because the main verb “sat” implicated the participles in that work. Forget for the moment just what “bearing all things” in fact refers to. It cannot be the case that the phrase cannot depend for its meaning upon the redemptive work of Christ simply because (as you say) the main verb “sat” implicates the “bearing” in question substantively to the redemptive work.
THIS is our disagreement. For you, “bearing all things” HAS to describe the actual redemptive work of Christ throughout his career (or specifically in his passion, dudn’t matter). In your view the “all things” he bears cannot refer to sustaining the cosmos because the main verb precludes that. It has to refer to our sins, or the sinfulness of humanity, or what have you, so that “bearing” refers not to his “sustaining” the cosmos but to his redeeming it by virtue of successfully tolerating (bearing up underneath, or carrying vicariously) the consequences of our sin.
But this won't do. You cannot object to my taking “bearing all things” as UNRELATED to Christ’s redemptive work by arguing that the main verb implicates the reality referred to by the phrase in the redemptive work of Christ, for then you would have to say the same thing about the participial phrase “being the express image of the Father” which you do NOT do. In other words, since you don’t reduce “being the image” to being the means or substance of the redemptive work of Christ based on its relationship to the main verb “sat,” you can't consistently object to my not reducing “bearing all things” to being the means or substance of the redemptive work of Christ as you do.
No doubt, Christ must both “be the image of the Father” and “bear all things by his powerful word” as pre-requisite to saving us. But where you agree that “being the image” obtains regardless of the actual events which redeem us, you don't (and object if I) construe “bearing all things” in the same way. Instead, you want Christ’s “bearing all things” to constitute the events which redeem us. For you, Christ’s “bearing all things” = Christ’s “purging our sins” (or the phrase's meaning participates in the events which redeem us). See the difference? For me, “being” and “bearing” both obtain independently of any actual redemptive work. They're meaning doesn't participate in the redemptive work of Christ. Indeed, they obtain independent of any actual incarnation. Quite the opposite. The meaning of the events which redeem (the “purging” and the “inheriting of a name” and “he sat”) participate in the events of his “being the image” and his “bearing all things.” My point was that you can’t (as you did) object to my understanding “bearing all things by his powerful word” in this way by arguing that the main verb which governs it (“sat”) has to do with redemption. The more natural reading takes both present-tense verbs as coordinate prior to the main verb whose particularly redemptive work is borne by aorist participles that follow.
The connections to Philo’s logos cosmology (his use of “bearing all things” as a function of the Logos relative to creation’s existence) are too relevant to dismiss. Many scholars have noted the connection. And consider ALSO that the two present participles “being” and “bearing” are not separated by the conjunction “and” but instead are more intimately connected by the absence of "and" and the presence of the particle “besides” that immediately follows “bearing” (thus connecting it MORE fundamentally with his being the image than it does his actually saving us). The flow is: “being the express image of his substance besides bearing all things by his powerful word....” The meaning is quite beautiful. The author lays down the two fundamental qualifications that have to obtain before Christ can even attempt to redeem us: He has to sustain a relationship to God by which he can rightly implicate creation in his reconciling creation to God, and he has to sustain a relationship to creation by which he can rightly implicate all creation in his reconciling creation to God. You get both with the two present participles.
If “bearing all things by his powerful word” means the Logos continued to sustain the cosmos as Logos while incarnate, this would hardly be the only place to justify such a relation.
Did I miss your explanation of how Christ bears our sins “by his powerful word”? Sorry if I did. I still wanna know just what “by his powerful word” means in your understanding of the passage?
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Tom: I defended the genuineness of the faith of Muslim converts who for years still found it difficult to say, "Jesus is God" (or divine).
Jeff: The confession that Jesus is Lord is paramount to us having any reason to believe a person has justifying faith.
Tom: True. The converts I have in mind never failed to confess that Jesus as Lord. They trusted in him alone, prayed to him, submitted their life to him, believe he rose from the dead and was personally present, etc.
Jeff: If they deny Christ is divine in any sense without plausibly explaining away the seemingly obvious meaning of the verses to that effect, then I would certainly say they are flirting with judgment by teaching…
Tom: I'd agree. But they never positively “denied” he was divine. They just weren’t prepared to positively affirm it. It took time and catechism to bring them to a place where the words “Jesus is God” could be responsibly affirmed. There is a difference.
But from my perspective Jeff, you positively deny Christ is divine “in a sense” by reducing the divinity of the Logos to the material constraints of the zygot in Mary’s womb where not only is there no human consciousness to provide the means in which the Son’s own personal identity may rest, but neither is there a sufficient material context (i.e., brain) in which the Logos’s personal identity may be said rest subconsciously in a sleeping state. Not only are omnipresence and omniscience not essential attributes of divine being on your view, but neither are “being conscious,” “being asleep but subconsciously online,” or even “being uncreated.” I don’t know how to even agree that you agree Jesus was “divine.” In what sense can you agree that the “personal presence” of the created Jesus is one and the same with that of the eternal “uncreated personal presence” of the Logos? My struggling Muslim converts eventually affirmed more than you presently do with respect to Jesus.
Tom
"The aesthetic value the world has for God is in expressing, not constituting, the aesthetic value God eternally finds within Godself." Greg BoydPost Edited (Tom) : 11/29/2011 7:18:54 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 11/29/2011 9:23 PM (GMT -6) | | | Tom: In other words, since you don’t reduce “being the image” to being the means or substance of the redemptive work of Christ based on its relationship to the main verb “sat,” you can't consistently object to my not reducing “bearing all things” to being the means or substance of the redemptive work of Christ as you do.
Jeff: Here's what I said:
His being the "image" of the Father is a pre-requisite for his being sufficient for the atoning work. I've said that very thing. And yes, he always was and will always be that "image," best I can tell. IOW, the second person was that image SANS CREATION. But Hebrews is tying that fact TO Christ's incarnational role with respect TO creation
Now, the key, to me, is the greek particle "te" that you translate "besides." That particle is adjunctive rather than conjunctive. It implies a logical relationship that is not always obvious. I'm thinking in this context it has a kind of emphatic role that brings to the fore the surprise theme of the NT--that the messiah had to SUFFER first, prior to the GLORY.
So it could have the feel of "EVEN while bearing all things ..." That is, it's a bit surprising that a human who is the very image of the Father needed to suffer at all, much less FOR all things. So yes, I think the "all things" is universal since the article is used. But I think it's universal in the sense that apart from the second person's incarnational work (which involve the "bearing" ), the creation would not have continued past the Fall. This is what I think is meant in Rom. 3 where Paul explains that Christ becoming a propitiation is what demonstrates God's JUSTICE in passing over the sins that had theretofore taken place, etc. And it explains why it is prophecied right there in the beginning of Genesis in more figurative language.
IOW, I see it saying that though the second person is the "image" of the Father independent of redemption, the fact that he had to bear was a fact contingent upon the entry of sin into the world. And the two are juxtaposed to bring out the consistent, explicit, thematic irony of the NT--that in this fallen world, true conquering comes through suffering love; even for God.
Tom: The author lays down the two fundamental qualifications that have to obtain before Christ can even attempt to redeem us: He has to sustain a relationship to God by which he can rightly implicate creation in his reconciling creation to God, and he has to sustain a relationship to creation by which he can rightly implicate all creation in his reconciling creation to God. You get both with the two present participles.
Jeff: I know of no passage that even clearly says the second person is continuously sustaining creation in existence, much less how that would be a necessary condition of his capacity to redeem. On the other hand, there are several verses, including passages in Hebrews itself, that explain why Christ had to be as perfectly holy as the Father to redeem.
Tom: If “bearing all things by his powerful word” means the Logos continued to sustain the cosmos as Logos while incarnate, this would hardly be the only place to justify such a relation
Jeff: Where else?
Tom: Did I miss your explanation of how Christ bears our sins “by his powerful word”?
Jeff: I'm not convinced the "his" is not the Father as it is in "his character." Regardless, I think it very awkward that the second person would have to continually "speak" a "word" to continuously uphold the universe in existence. The power of the word was usually portrayed as a speaking followed by its continued effect. If that were the case with respect to his "bearing," creation continua wouldn't even be true in the first place. In short, I'm not sure how to make clear sense of how it works for either of our views if the "his" means Christ's. At least it would mean that his power is exercised VIA words. And since he is essentially faithful, to speak of what will be is to prophecy infallibly.
Tom: But from my perspective Jeff, you positively deny Christ is divine “in a sense” by reducing the divinity of the Logos to the material constraints of the zygot in Mary’s womb where not only is there no human consciousness to provide the means in which the Son’s own personal identity may rest, but neither is there a sufficient material context (i.e., brain) in which the Logos’s personal identity may be said rest subconsciously in a sleeping state.
Jeff: Identity, in the basic logical sense, just means the SAME BEING. Whether humans can distinguish it from one state to another is not relevant. The Father can. Thus, identity is not even an issue except in a non-logical sense that you are concerned about that I'm not. You don't think the second person is a BEING. So you use identity completely different than I do.
Tom: Not only are omnipresence and omniscience not essential attributes of divine being on your view, but neither are “being conscious,” “being asleep but subconsciously online,” ...
Jeff: There's diversity in the godhead. I would say all the above are essential attributes of the Father, because neither the teleology of the world nor scripture can be made sense of otherwise. But neither requires that the second person have omnis or be unable to become unconscious for finite periods of time for teleological reasons, best I can tell.
Tom: ... or even “being uncreated.”
Jeff: As a matter of fact, Tom, I think ONLY parsimony gets us to an uncreated creator. It's perfectly conceivable, logically, that our creator is created and that all creators prior to Him were created too, in an infinite series going back into the infinite past. I see no point in being that non-parsimonious. I think God designed us TO think parsimoniously. As Swinburne said, science is impossible without parsimony.
But if scripture said the second person was created, I would believe it. It doesn't, so I don't non-parsimoniously posit it.
Tom: I don’t know how to even agree that you agree Jesus was “divine.” In what sense can you agree that the “personal presence” of the created Jesus is one and the same with that of the eternal “uncreated personal presence” of the Logos?
Jeff: I believe the non-material Jesus of Nazareth (i.e., the person, not the body) WAS the very same person through whom and for whom all things were created, just like the scripture says. IOW, he was NOT created. If he WAS created, then the world was not created THROUGH him in the most conventional sense of that phrase. The only way the world could have been created through Jesus, as scripture says, is if Jesus WAS the very person that was not only BEFORE Abraham, but BEFORE the world. That is, if Jesus was a PERSON and not a mere parallel stream of consciousness of another person.
Tom: My struggling Muslim converts eventually affirmed more than you presently do with respect to Jesus.
Jeff: And yet I affirm more of him than literally EVERY other use of the greek and hebrew words for "god" except when used of the Father. Take every other being those words are used in scripture OF, and ALL of them were created beings. ONLY the second person and the Father are said to be beings THROUGH whom and FOR whom are all CREATED things. If this is not enough divinity for you, it's not because the greek and hebrew words are the issue.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 11/29/2011 10:05:46 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 11/30/2011 11:59 AM (GMT -6) | | Very different cosmologies. Wow. I'd check my Greek particles if I were you. Not sure who told you 'te' doesn't function as a conjunction. It's not identical to the conjunction 'kai' of course. But even if we go with your "even" and translate "even while bearing all things" (which better suits me actually!), we still don't identify the bearing WITH the redeeming. But the sort of "bearing" you have in mind DOES identify the two, which leaves the "even while redeeming us he redeemed us." But if you want a real surprise (you spoke of 'surprise'), then perhaps the surprise is what you find LEAST likely! Surprise!  That is, EVEN while the Son/Image of the Father remains as universally present and related to the cosmos as ever he was as creator and as "he in whom all things hold together," he nevertheless redeemed us through suffering. But maybe you want to pick your 'surprises' so they're a bit more palatable? 
In the end, I can't call your description of the divine relations "trinitarian monotheism" at all. For you the trinitarian relations are secondary (ontologically secondary). God's ACTUAL 'oneness' is, on your view, possessed entirely by the Father whether or not the Father ACTUALLY relates to the Son and/or Spirit. You've got the ONE God who is "Father" accidentally related (or not related at all) to the Son and Spirit, which means the relations themselves don't ACTUALLY have anything to do with constituting God's oneness (or the Father's own personal identity). That's why I can't see it as 'trinitarian monotheism' (monotheism that believes that the relations [we all have to stretch language a bit, but you get my meaning] participate in the oneness and visa versa; i.e., co-constitute each other as it were). The 'oneness' obtains 'relationally'. So it's not the case that God is complete in his oneness/unity "as Father" and only THEN relates triunely (as you seem to have it). Nor is God's oneness the product of three individuals who reeeeeally like each other and choose to merge their identities. But for you the 'oneness' (the monotheism) obtains independently of the 'relations' (trinity) which themselves can come or go without consequence to the unity of divine being.
On the one hand you agree that the Son is unchangeably/unalterably "the exact representation of the Father's being." Good. But on the other hand you REDUCE this same Son (this same image) to LESS/OTHER than unconscious gestation. You keep calling it sleep, but it's nothing like a sleeping state at all. But whatever the few celled zygot may be, for you THAT has to be "the exact representation of the Father's own being." But you agree that the Father's own being IS essentially conscious, actual, self-perceiving, etc. Those aren't accidental properties of the Father. The "being/substance" of the Father can't be void of these properties and still be the one self-existent God. So how can he who in his own person (the Son) in actuality is the exact represetation of those properties divest himself OF those properties absolutely and still be said to bear those properties as the exact representation of the Father? In what sense does the zygot bear in actuality the representation of the Father's own being? It doesn't. So I don't see how you maintain that the Son isn't "the exact representation of the Father's being" accidentally. The zygot is a created, non-conscious (not just unconsious or subconscious, come on now), impersonal, non-volitional, cellular mass. How is the Father's own being perfectly and exactly represented in such a state? Is the Father essentially conscious or volitional or related? The zygot is none of those things. Yet you agree the zygot is the exact representation of the Father's own being.
Affectionately, Tom
"The aesthetic value the world has for God is in expressing, not constituting, the aesthetic value God eternally finds within Godself." Greg Boyd Post Edited (Tom) : 11/30/2011 5:58:31 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 11/30/2011 8:56 PM (GMT -6) | | |
Jeff: As a matter of fact, Tom, I think ONLY parsimony gets us to an uncreated creator. It’s perfectly conceivable, logically, that our creator is created and that all creators prior to Him were created too, in an infinite series going back into the infinite past.
Tom: Couldn’t disagree more, Jeff. There’s nothing logically possible about an infinite regress of explanations like this. You can say the words and think you’re conceiving it meaningfully because the grammar plays out, but it’s quite inconceivable. Hartshorne was SO right about this. Imagine everything that exists to exist contingently. Madness.
But more importantly, you cannot posit the possibility that OUR CREATOR, as you say (i.e., the actual revealed God of biblical faith), could be created, for if he were created he would not BE the God posited by biblical faith, viz., the uncreated and self-existent God. By definition an uncreated and self-existent God cannot be created. Once you imagine him to be created, you cease imagining HIM and begin imagining a different KIND of being, not the SAME GOD just minus the incidental property of self-existence.
The uncreated God of the Bible—which you posit parsimoniously to save paper work—simply cannot be any of the infinite regress of created gods you think logic justifies an equation to. There can only be one instance of an uncreated and necessary God. Furthermore, none of the infinite regress of created gods could conceivably be as great as an uncreated God, nor could the entire regress explain what needs to be explained and which only a necessary first-cause can explain. So a God greater than any of an infinite number of created gods IS imaginable—the uncreated God. Parsimony is not why we posit an uncreated God as opposed to an infinite number of copies of him; (a) they're not copies (because you can't create a copy of uncreated being), and (b) the absolute contingency of your infinite regress of instances seeking explanation explains nothing about why anything exists at all. And why ANYTHING should exist at all is the only truly philosophically interesting question.
I urge Hartshorne’s ontological argument upon you. If the existence of a necessary being IS logically possible (and it is), then his non-existence is not logically possible, in which case your infinite regress of created gods is not conceivable. Parsimony has nothing to do with it. You have to suppose the impossibility of necessary existence in order even to begin trying to conceive consistently of an infinite regress of contingent gods.
Tom
"The aesthetic value the world has for God is in expressing, not constituting, the aesthetic value God eternally finds within Godself." Greg BoydPost Edited (Tom) : 12/1/2011 2:27:09 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Asher
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| Posted 12/1/2011 12:22 AM (GMT -6) | | | Yep, this is one area where Hartshorne shines. His reworking of Anselm is a beauty to behold. Might also check out Franz Brentano. | | Back to Top | | |
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Asher
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Total Posts : 477
| Posted 12/1/2011 1:21 AM (GMT -6) | | Check this from Susan Kranzt Gabriel with regard to Franz Brentano, late 1838 - 1917, unlike Hartshorne, Brentano rejects a priori proofs of God's existence or non-existence, but has well developed and interesting a posteriori proofs:
It will be remembered in this connection that Brentano holds that everything which exists is temporal, however, and the directly necessary being is no exception. He even tells us that the directly necessary being could just as easily be thought of as a directly necessary process. In any event, its being in time has the important consequence for Brentano that the directly necessary being is not changeless. Two considerations shed light on this. First of all, as the productive cause and first principle of all motion and change, it must be active in the fullest sense and not static or changeless itself. Secondly, as the first productive cause of all things the directly necessary being must know all things, and what it knows must, of course, be true. But because things change, what was true in the past may not be true now, and what is true now may not be true in the future. The knowledge which the directly necessary being has, then, must likewise change over time. Otherwise, Brentano points out, the directly necessary being would be no better than a bachelor planning to get married in a year who, when the year is up, still plans to get married in a year.
and this which should probably be more aptly posted in the What is a Person, Again? thread:
Although the human soul is an indirectly necessary being and has need of bodily organs, the creative intelligence is a directly necessary being, absolutely undetermined by things outside itself {I think she means here undetermined with reference to it's being} , and thus cannot be thought to be physical or extended in space. In sharp contrast to all embodied minds, then, the creative intelligence is to be conceived of as a substance without any accidents. The embodied minds, such as human minds, are substances (things, or beings) whose existence is enriched, as Brentano sees it, by a multitudinous variety of accidents (attributes, or characteristics ) over time. Many of these accidents involve sense perception, as when one becomes a taster, or hearer, or seer of something. Other accidents involve judgment and still others the emotive phenomena of love, hate, and desire. For Brentano, one who sees is actually an accident containing a substance, a thinking thing, as a one-sidedly separable proper part. Thus the thinking thing continues to exist while various accidents of perception, judgment, and feeling come to be and pass away. Unlike other theories of substance and accident, Brentano's theory treats each accident as a distinct individual, yet retains human individuality and identity by locating them in the mental substance which participates (literally is a part of) many different accidents over a lifetime. Brentano even claims, in disagreement with Descartes, that the human embodied mind can continue to exist while unconscious, that is while having (strictly speaking, being a part of) no accidents at all. The creative intelligence, however, so far from being asleep or unconscious when it has no accidents, is actually always actively thinking and never has any accidents whatsoever. For the thinking of the creative intelligence, of the directly necessary being, is a substantial determination, not an accidental one. Thinking constitutes its very being, whereas for us thinking comes and goes. | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 12/1/2011 7:06 AM (GMT -6) | | | No time to respond to all of it. But let me just say that you are arguing with a straw man, Tom. I've never said most of what you read into my words. For example, it does NOT follow that because the godhead is a multiplicity of beings/persons that they can't have a NECESSARY relationship to one another. It just DOESN'T. Maybe in your head, but not in logic.
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Tom
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| Posted 12/1/2011 9:49 AM (GMT -6) | | Sorry if I'm misreading you, Jeff. I do want to understand. I don't think I've constructed a straw man, rather I'm trying to deal with what's implied in your view. But I'm open.
However, I would never say that because God is a trinity of persons they can't have a necessary relationship to one another. I'm arguing the contrary--that the relations ARE necessary. In my view the relations ARE the necessity of God's being/existence as the 'one' God. It's you I see who is denying the necessity of the relations (not explicitly of course) by essentially reducing the Son without remainder to the constraints of Mary's womb. I don't see any of the necessary properties of the Father-Son relationship obtaining in the zygot. I know you use the sleep analogy to hold it all together, but I don't think the analogy works.
T
"The aesthetic value the world has for God is in expressing, not constituting, the aesthetic value God eternally finds within Godself." Greg BoydPost Edited (Tom) : 12/1/2011 1:12:50 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 12/1/2011 9:05 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom: I know you use the sleep analogy to hold it all together, but I don't think the analogy works.
Jeff: He didn't just sleep. He died. This whole "Mary's womb" without remainder is not what most Christians or even reincarnationists believe about the substance that IS a person. That person is NOT material (at least it's not a material particle like other ontologically-material entities, if so). Otherwise, REincarnation would have no intelligible meaning.
By my view, Jesus' soul is not a created entity. It's the PERSON that was before Abraham and before the world began. Thus, your whole construct of my view is just wrong. You're not saying what I'm saying. Maybe your metaphysic rules out my view. But that's another argument altogether. We BRING our metaphysic TO our hermeneutical inductive inferences. We couldn't do otherwise.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 12/1/2011 8:47:37 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 12/1/2011 9:55 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom: I urge Hartshorne’s ontological argument upon you. If the existence of a necessary being IS logically possible (and it is), then his non-existence is not logically possible, ...
Jeff: False. A logical possibility is just that--a kind of POSSIBILITY. The fact that a necessary being is logically possible does not mean it is the only conceivable possibility.
Tom: Parsimony has nothing to do with it. You have to suppose the impossibility of necessary existence in order even to begin trying to conceive consistently of an infinite regress of contingent gods.
Jeff: False. Parsimony only comes into play BECAUSE there are multiple possibilities. I can't comprehend the infinite regress of creational events any more than I comprehend the infinite regress of infinite (because eternal into the past) streams of conscious states. That's beside the point. You DEMAND, as I do, that the godhead as a whole can NOT be unconscious at ANY time in the infinite past. Thus, that infinite regress is UNDENIABLE. Thus, such infinite regresses are not only permissible but NECESSARY.
Tom: I don't see any of the necessary properties of the Father-Son relationship obtaining in the zygot. I know you use the sleep analogy to hold it all together, but I don't think the analogy works.
Jeff: What necessary properties are those? And how do you know they're necessary? When you answer those questions, you will be stating your metaphysic--a metaphysic that you find intuitive and I don't. That's the point. We have to agree to disagree once we differ on fundamentals until we can convince one another who is wrong (if not both of us)--calling one another heretic is pointless. And the only criteria that I know of to argue against a view of fundamentals is parsimony. If one view of intuition explains equally what seems to be the most common beliefs of humanity more parsimoniously, it is the BETTER view of what is intuitive to the human race, whether or not it is the TRUE view (the true view is presumably the MOST parsimonious view possible).
Without parsimony, we are at a complete deadlock with respect to debating fundamental metaphysics as far as I can tell. Which is all the more reason to leave "heresy" out of the discussion. To judge one another without a HUMANLY-accepted criteria for what is BETTER is arbitrary and, therefore, irrational. Private revelation is PRIVATE.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 12/1/2011 9:04:49 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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One Love
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| Posted 12/1/2011 10:18 PM (GMT -6) | | Similtude:
By my view, Jesus' soul is not a created entity. It's the PERSON that was before Abraham and before the world began. Thus, your whole construct of my view is just wrong.
Ok. You can't get any clearer than this. You just identified the SOUL of Jesus with the uncreated PERSON of the Logos...basically saying the soul of Jesus is uncreated. This is undeniably, unquestionably Apollinarian. I know that you don't care about that. At the same time, this belief pushes you directly out of acceptable Protestant "orthodoxy"...as well as Roman Catholicism or Eastern Orthodoxy. Even the Oriental Orthodox--non-Chalcedonians--would consider your beliefs healthy Christianity. In other words, you ain't in step with the vast majority of Church...by any stretch.
Love you, bro...
Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me, a sinner. Post Edited (One Love) : 12/1/2011 9:49:55 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 12/2/2011 11:24 AM (GMT -6) | | | Just for the record, Jeff (because you entirely missed my point about possibility and Hartshorne)...I'm not denying the possibility of an infinite regress PER SE. For example, though I have difficulties with a temporally infinite past, denying its possibility creates equal problems for me. Nor do I deny a legitimate use of parsimony. It's a great tool to have in one's repetroir. What I'm denying is that any or all KINDS of infinite regress (i.e., an infinite regress of any kind of thing) are possible just because infinite regresses per se are possible. And I also deny that an infinite regress of instances seeking explanation explains why anything should exist at all. And I'm especially denying that parsimony is why we settle for believing in a single, necessarily existing God over believing in an infinite regress of created/contingent gods.
The deities under consideration here are CATEGORICALLY different kinds of being, and it's the difference (the metaphysical difference) between them, not parsimony, that decides which is better to believe in. It's not the case that we're faced with deciding between one instance of X on the one hand and infinite instances of X (X being identical in both options and both options being equally possible) on the other hand and parsimony steps in and saves us from our indecision.
Now, if a single, necessarily existing instance of X is necessarily temporal, then we do have an infinite regress of moments in X's life. Sure. But that does't place "necessary self-existent X" on equal metaphysical footing with ANY of your "infinite regress of created Xs" under the assumption that both are the same deity and so both scenarios are equally possible and explain the same things and thus leave us with no reason but parsimony for choosing one over the other. No entity contingently repeated/created in your infinite regress is just my entity (necessary X) repeatedly created over and over intead of existing necessarily. Au contraire mon frere! They are not the same entity. No single instance of an infinite regress of created instances seeking explanation and ground for their existence can be equivalent to a single instance of a necessary, self-existent being who seeks no explanation for its existence outside itself and who explains all else that exists.
Hartshorne, Hartshorne, Hartshorne. You tell him, Asher.
Tom
"The aesthetic value the world has for God is in expressing, not constituting, the aesthetic value God eternally finds within Godself." Greg BoydPost Edited (Tom) : 12/2/2011 5:25:11 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 12/2/2011 8:11 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom: And I also deny that an infinite regress of instances seeking explanation explains why anything should exist at all. And I'm especially denying that parsimony is why we settle for believing in a single, necessarily existing God over believing in an infinite regress of created/contingent gods.
Jeff: To ask WHY anything should exist at all is a non-sense question, to my mind. The question WHY amounts to the positing of a causal capacity. But a causal capacity, to my mind, is an attribute of a being. Thus, there's a kind of answer to the question impied in the question. Had there been nothing at any time, there would have remained nothing thereafter. For given the categorical truth that events are caused (hence, we can ask WHY about events), origin events must be explained by prior-existing entities that CAUSE the originating.
This is precisely how the infinite regress of creators is ONE way to account for our existence. The big-bang, as held by many atheists, is posited to be a-causal. In that view, there is no answer to the question "WHY is there anything at all." Because in that case, we don't have to contend with causality at all. The universe supposedly just popped into existence a-causally.
Tom: The deities under consideration here are CATEGORICALLY different kinds of being, ...
Jeff: I agree. But that's because being uncreated is categorically different than being created. What, other than that, do we know intuitively or discursively that tells us a creator of our universe can't be created? I can't think of anything but parsimony that can resolve that question. Regardless, OUR designer MUST be competent and benevolent to account for the propriety of rational, human belief. And this is where the other attribute of non-extinquishability comes into play for our God. His fidelity (which is an aspect of His benevolence) requires the He continue to exist to fulfill His promises. Hence, He is not only uncreated, but non-extinguishable. THAT is what I call a necessary being--no beginning and no possibility of annihilation.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 12/2/2011 7:19:25 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 12/3/2011 12:19 PM (GMT -6) | | Well, it's a bipolar view of God. So God as a necessary being exists necessarily and has absolute/necessary features which are the ground of everything else. God's other pole instantiates contingent perfections of who and what he is. So the number and kinds of worlds God relates to are themselves contingent, but the totality (of both poles) can't be contingent. That would mean the totality would be void of any necessary features and 'necessity' per se would fail to obtain necessarily. Hartshorne held that God is essentially temporal of course, so there's no problem with an infinite regress of changing/contingent features (worlds created by a necessary existent, moments in the life of that existent, etc.), but the existence of God isn't contingent. Hartshorne develops (logically and aesthetically) why we must posit "necessary existence" to have any contingent features as well.
The important point for Harshorne which you might not like is his identifying logical and metaphysical possibility...ultimately speaking. For an omniscient God who knows all truths, logical and metaphysical possiblity are one and the same, so that logical possibility would just track and supervene upon metaphysical possibility. And he's perfectly right on this. We're not omniscient of course, so WE may be WRONG about what is an isn't in fact metaphysically possible/impossible, so the epistemic possiblities open up for us (regarding what is in fact true). But God is never in such a place, knowing all truths. We may not know whether or not a necessary God in fact exists (hence there are epistemic possibilities, even contrary ones, which we have to concede could be the truth), but we can't be wrong in concluding that the only way to deny the existence of a necessarily existing being is to argue the impossibility of necessary existence. God can't exist or not exist contingently. This was his challenge to atheists. Disbelief if you like, bit you can't concede the POSSIBILITY of NECESSARY existence and then deny that existence. If necessary existence is possible (conceivable), then by definition it's actual; or so far as we believe his existence is possible we must commit to his actual existence. To disbelief in the actual existence of a necessary being one has to deny the POSSIBILITY of such being. It's a MODAL ontological argument, which takes us a bit away from Christology, but it's still fun.
It'd be cool to talk about Hartshorne's modal argument though.
Tom
"The aesthetic value the world has for God is in expressing, not constituting, the aesthetic value God eternally finds within Godself." Greg BoydPost Edited (Tom) : 12/3/2011 3:32:34 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 12/3/2011 12:24 PM (GMT -6) | | Jeff: ...being uncreated is categorically different than being created. What, other than that, do we know intuitively or discursively that tells us a creator of our universe can't be created? I can't think of anything but parsimony...
Tom: Just to clarify again...it would be possible to say the creator of our universe is himself created, yes. What's impossible is to extend that infinitely into the past. Even though infinite regresses per se are conceivable, not all infinite regresses are conceivable. Particularly, Hartshorne would say you can't have an infinite regress of Gods, i.e., and infinte regress of instances seeking explanation. For in that case no explanation comes; you just have an infinite search for identity that never rests in what can bestow identity without needing to have it bestowed upon him from outside himself. At some point you have to posit a necessarily existing first-cause. Now, parsimony WOULD then play in. If one were to concede that (A) it's possible that the God who created our universe may have been created, and that THAT God may have been created, but also that (B) at SOME point there has to be an uncreated first-cause, THEN parsimony would definitely tell us not to multiply explanations needlessly and to conclude that the necessary first existent IS the God who created our universe. There's no explanatory value or metaphysical mileage to be gained in supposing there to be two, three or any FINITE number of createrr "gods" if all ultimatly owe their existence to the one uncreated "God." Just posit the uncreated God to begin with. Yes...parsimony is why we make THAT move. But it wouldn't explain why we choose between an INFINITE regress of gods seeking explanation and ONE God who seeks no explanation.
Tom
"The aesthetic value the world has for God is in expressing, not constituting, the aesthetic value God eternally finds within Godself." Greg BoydPost Edited (Tom) : 12/3/2011 12:36:09 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 12/4/2011 1:42 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom: Particularly, Hartshorne would say you can't have an infinite regress of Gods, i.e., and infinte regress of instances seeking explanation. For in that case no explanation comes
Jeff: It doesn't "come" in the same sense that I can't explain an infinite regress of distinguishable conscious states of an eternal mind. But that doesn't mean we don't know what an infinite regress MEANS. It truly MEANS that there IS a merely logically-possible explanation for EACH instance in question. We just can't finitely GRASP an infinite set of anything, even when we know what we mean by it.
But the relevant point is that parsimony is all we have to reject needless multiplication of events or beings. The key is what Hartshorne claims: we are trying to explain OUR EXPERIENCE. We don't need an infinite set of gods for that, because a necessary being is not inconceivable, and its definitely more parsimonious. But we DO need an infinite set of distinct conscious states, it seems, if God, sans creation, is temporal--and how else can you make sense of the attributes of deity everyone wants to make essential? That's the difference. So WHEN we use infinite regresses depends on WHEN they explain something necessary to explaining our experience.
But we also seem to need a multiplicity of divine persons to get around a necessary god-world relationship if the godhead is essentially SOCIAL. Once we posit that divine sociality is contingent, we have to EXPLAIN it INDEPENTLY. And that's less parsimonious. So that's why having multiple persons in the godhead can truly parsimoniously EXPLAIN something about our experience in terms of our relationality to our creator.
But it is not obvious that multiplying persons in ONE being is more simple than multiplying beings that are essentially in harmony with one another. Because they are posited to be essentially in harmony with one another either way. So I'm not seeing the intellectual value of positing a sui generis kind of being with multiple persons since the scriptures already say the Father is sui generis in the relevant theistic sense ANYWAY. I.e., the Father has the relevant omni's to account for the existence and benevolent/competent teleology of the world even IF the 2nd divine person has no omni's. And by that approach, the kenosis can be a surrender of the satisfying comfort of the Father's bosom by entering into an uncomfortable, God-opposing world with human limitations. Thus, by my view, the incarnational ministry of the 2nd person just IS how he suffers for the world and, indirectly, FOR himself and the Father. The Father, by virtue of His omni's, is suffering/forebearing the world ALL THE TIME.
So positing mulitiple, temporally-parallel streams of consciousness to one such person seems even less parsimonious since the Father has all the needed attributes (omni's, e.g.) of explaining our experience in the relevant senses. But the fact is, I can't see how both a non-omniscient and an omniscient 1st-person persective can simultaneously be held by the same person anyway--it just flat seems like a contradiction.
By my view, the 2nd person was a necessary mediator of the existence of the world in at least this one sense--the creation could not have come about without his VOLUNTARY CONSENT since he TOO was risking suffering thereby seeings how his incarnational suffering was one such possible outcome of creation.
If naturalism were true, no explanation would be necessary at all, because naturalism is a species of intellectual suicide. It's precisely benevolent/competent theism that gets us ANYWHERE inferentially. But I'm going with the rules of deduction and parsimony/analogy as applied to my experience to work that out.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 12/4/2011 1:09:49 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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