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Similitude
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| Posted 12/10/2011 11:35 AM (GMT -6) |   | When you're positing something, you can posit THAT each creator creates freely (i.e., volitionally). That's all I'm saying. Positing something is not proving it to be true. It's just asserting that you consider it to be at least a merely logical possibility (in the merely deductive sense). There's an infinite set of merely logical possibilities (logical in the merely deductive sense, i.e.) that I don't think are REAL possibilities (i.e., consistent with INDUCTIVE logic applied to my conscious states). Indeed, induction/parsimony is applied to rule out merely logical possibilities in the deductive sense.
The point is, what is A PRIORI are the relations/concepts that FUNDAMENTALLY ground the very possibility of BOTH deductive AND inductive DISCURSIVE thought. Anything arrived at discursively can not BE a priori, by definition. But to GROUND is an instance of CAUSE. Thus, the very existence of discursive thought (deductive and inductive) is only intelligible in terms of CAUSALITY. This means CAUSALITY is a a priori, best I can tell.
As I see it, parsimony is not a priori. It is ultimately grounded in BOTH the a priori belief of teleology AND the most fundamental teleological INFERENCE we make--that there is a designed/teleological CORRESPONDENCE between my sentience and my mind. I.e., TRUE beliefs must not only result from the natural tendencies/laws of human thought, but they must also correspond with the instantiation of my MAXIMAL satisfaction once ALL consequences of the volitional-teleological order are worked out. This correspondence has the corrollary that my Designer is competent and benevolent. If this correspondence is not true, all MERELY logical (in the deductive sense) possibilities (the whole infinite set) are equally plausible as far as I can tell.
So parsimony, while not being a priori, is so low in the epistemological grounding hierarchy that it is just as important to epistemologically relevant inferences AS are a priori beliefs. Two very hierarchically-low infereneces we are virtually compelled to make to are:
1) The teleological causality we are compelled to interpret is ULTIMATELY benevolet,
AND
2) Without parsimony, we can't NARROW the range of MERELY logical possibilities in a way that ANY OTHER human being need take seriously in a NON-RELATIVISTIC human society (i.e., both beliefs and actions are NECESSARILY evaluated normatively, so that we HAVE to have NON-RELATIVISTIC criteria to do that COMMUNALLY).
In other words, what more fundamental criteria that we can use COMMUNALLY serves to tell us WHEN parsimony isn't relevant? As I see it, parsimony is precisely what we CAN use communally. Because the minute my OWN personal satisfaction trumps parsimony, I've entered into a purely RELATIVISTIC or PRIVATE realm of adjudication where MY sensibilities trump ALL otherwise communally-accepted epistemological criteria for normative evaluation.
As Porter said, the actions required for the attainment of any individual's highest natural good either are or are not consistent with and conducive to the highest natural good of all other individuals. If the latter, there is no communal way to do argument benevolently. If the former, the whole game is about determining WHAT those communally-accepted normative criteria for beliefs must be and then applying them rigorously and consistently as possible. All else is private; not communal. And clearly there's a place for such private belief. Even the scripture tells us so. But that has no relevance communally.
It wasn't Paul's character, per se, that serves as evidence he was right about what he said, it was his signs and wonders combined with the fact that the Torah SAID true prophets will have signs. Even Jesus appealed to that very thing. According to scripture, signs and wonders, per se, can LIE.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 12/10/2011 11:22:15 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 12/10/2011 12:04 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom: It's not even possible in your merely logical/deductive sense to post ... for to ascribe to EACH god in an infinite series of created gods the power/freedom to not create anything at all is to posit the possibility of each god's not having been created at all (for its creator may not have created anything at all),...
Jeff: No, Tom. Because to POSIT a thing/event is just THAT. It's merely POSITING it. I can posit all day long that every god in the series created freely, just as I can for the necessary God. I can't PROVE a necessary God created freely. That belief is correlatively entailed in my a priori belief in teleology. But I can posit LESS than what is categorical in that regard just to SEE what kind of logical possibilities (in the merely deductive sense) follow from it. Unfortunately, it's an infinite set of equally a-plausible logical (in the merely deductive sense) possibilites.
That's the epistemic fatality of atheism and deism. Once you deny benevolent teleology, we've lost the criteria of epistemic PLAUSIBILITY. And without that, there's nothing worth talking about.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 12/10/2011 11:13:07 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 12/10/2011 1:29 PM (GMT -6) | | Greg says Hartshorne didn't think his theistic proofs were "in themselves sufficient to unambiguously demonstrate the existence of God... Thus there is a need for a 'cumulative case" for God: a series of arguments, each of which supplement one or more of the others in their WEAK spots." The ontological proof is not a proof PRECISELY because of what you've already admitted--our designer need not BE (per our a priori categories, i.e.) the necessary being even if there IS one. And yet what we mean by God IS our designer, whether or not He is necessary.
Porter on the other hand explains how God is a priori because God is the CORROLLARY of our a priori relation of teleology. But even then, it takes an INFERENCE (a most fundamental one) to get to a BENEVOLENT/COMPETENT designer. But without that inference, we can't get ANYWHERE else inferentially. Because we can't even get a criteria for plausibility apart from BENEVOLENT/COMPETENT design. But once we realize that parsimony is a criteria that must be valid if the correspondence of mind and sentience is true, we have precisely the criteria to PLAUSIBLY infer that our Designer(s) IS/ARE necessary beings.
In short, it is not sufficient to define God as a perfect being. A perfect being need not create. Thus, a necessary/perfect being need not BE our creator merely because that being is necessary/perfect. But by taking Porter's teleological route, God can actually BE known to exist a priori and still be inevitably inferred to be competent, benevolent and necessary because of HOW we have to infer to get ANYWHERE worth getting to, inferentially. Porter's route gets us what we need without totally blind leaps.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 12/10/2011 7:22:42 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 12/11/2011 8:35 AM (GMT -6) | | I don't need parsimony to choose between an "infinite regress of exclusively contingent beings" and "a single, necessary being." The entire regress, like all its members, is contingent and (apart from some ultimate ground in necessity) could not obtain, i.e., is not possible. As well, such a regress cannot explain WHY anything exists at all, though a necessary being can explain why anything should exist at all. You only need parsimony to adjudicate between options of equal explanatory value, and an infinite regress of contingencies (itself contingent) does not possess an explanatory value equal to the explanatory value of a necessary being. Yes of course, there will always be smart people who in spite of their intelligence really do think they're conceiving of a meaningful (conceivably obtainable) state of affairs when they posit the possibility of a contingent totality/world populated exclusively by contingencies. Smart people always provide the best entertainment.
Tom
"The aesthetic value the world has for God is in expressing, not constituting, the aesthetic value God eternally finds within Godself." Greg BoydPost Edited (Tom) : 12/11/2011 7:40:13 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 12/11/2011 10:08 AM (GMT -6) | | Tom: As well, such a regress cannot explain WHY anything exists at all, though a necessary being can explain why anything should exist at all.
Jeff: You need to clarify what you mean by this. I've been clear. To me, all it means to explain WHY anything exists at all NOW is to satisfy, explanatorily, my 1) & 2). Either an infinite or finite regress will do that. A necessary god-world relationship will do it. But existence isn't ALL we want to explain. That's why we are not satisfied with a smorgasboard of options. They don't all equally well explain OTHER things we want to explain.
But WHAT other than my 1) & 2) needs to be accounted for in this explanation you're talking about, and WHY? My 1) and 2) don't even require THAT there is such a thing as libertarian freedom. They merely lay down the absolute minimal conditions, per what seems to be my categorical thinking, that would need to be accounted for in explaining existence, per se, of beings existing RIGHT NOW.
BTW, I don't find this stuff entertaining at all. In the science world, e.g., those otherwise smart people PERSECUTE those that dissent as HERETICS.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 12/11/2011 9:15:58 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 12/11/2011 10:32 AM (GMT -6) | | I'm just interested right now in the conceivability of an infinite regress of only contingent beings (i.e., a possible world void of all necessity, i.e., a world which is itself contingent and is populated exclusively by contingencies). I want to know whether I can put that up on the table as an explanatory option at all. I'm of the opinion that it isn't conceivable. It involves inherent contradictions. But if it WERE conceivable, it still doesn't explain all that can be explained by a necessary being, in which case the explanatory values of each option are NOT equal and you don't need parsimony to choose between them. But foremostly, it can't explain why anything should exist (or course exist "now," since "now" is the only time anything does exist) at all. Construe that 'why' in as many ways as we can to generate as much explanatory value as we can--i.e., make it a teleological why, make it a strictly causal why, or what have you. It all needs to be explained.
Tom
"The aesthetic value the world has for God is in expressing, not constituting, the aesthetic value God eternally finds within Godself." Greg BoydPost Edited (Tom) : 12/11/2011 9:39:42 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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One Love
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| Posted 12/11/2011 10:35 AM (GMT -6) | | | | |
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One Love
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| Posted 12/11/2011 10:43 AM (GMT -6) | | It's simply ludicrous to say otherwise. I'll say it.
The old original idea which was enunciated first in India, that the world was flat and stood on the back of an elephant, and the elephant did not have anything to stand on was the world's thought for centuries. That story is not as good as the Richmond negro preacher's who said the world was flat and stood on a turtle. They asked him what the turtle stood on and he said another turtle, and they asked what that turtle stood on and he said another turtle, and finally they got him in a hole and he said. "I tell you there are turtles all the way down."
Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me, a sinner. | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 12/11/2011 10:57 AM (GMT -6) | | Tom: Do you grant, Jeff, that an infinite regress of only contingent beings is itself contingent and utterly void of all necessity?
Jeff: In one sense it is. But I'm only contending that one or more beings with the causal capacity to originate other beings NECESSARILY has/have existed into the infinite past--otherwise, nothing would exist right now, per my 1) & 2). That's the only KIND of necessity we need to account for to account FOR present CONTINGENT beings. We don't even need libertarian freedom at all to account for THAT kind of contingency.
But once we want to explain MORE than that, we have to choose between multiple conceivable options in terms of their relative explanatory value.
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One Love
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| Posted 12/11/2011 11:06 AM (GMT -6) | | Jeff:
I'm only contending that one or more beings with the causal capacity to originate other beings NECESSARILY have existed into the infinite past--otherwise, nothing would exist right now, per my 1) & 2). That's the only KIND of necessity we need to account for to account FOR present CONTINGENT beings.
I got that. What Tom is saying is that the "infinite regression of creators" idea is a non-starter. It should not be allowed on the table at an option for the reason that Tom just pointed out: if the entire infinite regression process itself is contingent (ie all of the potential Originators of Creation could choose not to originate any subsequent Originators), then there can be NO necessity involved AT ALL. There could be NO "Unoriginate" Reality to EVER exist at all, personal or otherwise. Thus the process of origination itself could NEVER REALLY get have any ontological grounding...right?
SO...with that in mind, it seems MOST PARSIMONOUS to say that there is ONE UNORIGINATED ORIGINATOR for all possible worlds. This means that this Unoriginated Originator Reality is NECESSARY to all possible worlds.
Make sense?
1) Causal capacity is an attribute that INHERES in a being (not in nothing or reference frames like space and time)
and
2) Events (including origination events) are caused.
Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me, a sinner. Post Edited (One Love) : 12/11/2011 10:15:22 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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One Love
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| Posted 12/11/2011 11:18 AM (GMT -6) | | The principle is often summarized as "simpler explanations are, other things being equal, generally better than more complex ones." In practice, the principle is usually focused on shifting the burden of proof in discussions. That is, the razor is a principle that suggests we should tend towards simpler theories until we can trade some simplicity for increased explanatory power. Contrary to the popular summary, the simplest available theory is sometimes a less accurate explanation. Philosophers also add that the exact meaning of "simplest" can be nuanced in the first place.
What's simpler?
An indeterminate number of potential Originator(s) before the origination of Creation...who cannot explain the ontological grounding of origination itself
or...
A singular Unoriginate Originator who is the necessary ground of origination itself AND Creation.
"Turtles all the way down" or "Something (Someone) exists necessarily"
What's your choice, Jeff?
Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me, a sinner. Post Edited (One Love) : 12/11/2011 10:21:47 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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One Love
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| Posted 12/11/2011 11:29 AM (GMT -6) | | Similtude:
What I disagree with is that a necessary being is known to exist A PRIORI. I say we infer it BY parsimony ONLY. But that's the reason why most people believe in a necessary being--because most people think it proper to explain PARSIMONIOUSLY.
So, if I'm hearing you right, then would you agree that...
1) positing an infinite (or finite) regression of creators ends up being LESS PARSIMONOUS than positing a singular uncreated creator reality.
and...
2) a singular uncreated created reality is NECESSARY to all possible worlds and all possible experiencers of those worlds.
If you do agree to both, then we can throw the whole infinite/finite regression of creators thing off the table, yes? You are effectively choosing "Something exists necessarily" over "Turtles all the way down", yes?
Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me, a sinner. Post Edited (One Love) : 12/11/2011 10:33:42 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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One Love
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| Posted 12/11/2011 11:41 AM (GMT -6) | | |
Let's substitute something...
3') God cannot be conceived as contingent without contradiction. (via the discussion)
so now we have...
1) A necessarily existing being (God) can be conceived without contradiction.
2) Therefore God is not impossible.
3') God cannot be conceived as contingent without contradiction.
4) Therefore God is either necessary or impossible.
5) God is not impossible, therefore, God is necessary.
More Tom...
...what you can’t say is, “I’m claiming that there is in fact no metaphysical advantage of one over the other and that both are in fact equally possible—ontologically speaking,” for THAT denies LNC and the very meaningfulness of language. One of these options is THE necessity implied in “Something exists” and the other is in fact impossible. You can settle for a single necessary being over an infinite regress of contingent beings on the basis of parsimony if you can't discern which is necessary and which is impossible; but settling for one over the other means at least settling for the impossibility of the one not chosen and the necessity of the one chosen. That's the meaning of the option parsimony asks you to settle on. I don't think you see this. In other words, you can not know which is possible and which is impossible, or you can make an argument for the necessity of the one and the impossibility of the other. But you cannot make an argument for both being possible. Neither of the options (an infinite regress of contingent beings or a single necessary being) can obtain or fail to obtain contingently.
To conceive of the possibility of an infinite regress of contingent beings is to conceive of the non-existence of a necessary being, and to conceive of the non-existence of a necessary being is to conceive of its impossibility.
Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me, a sinner. Post Edited (One Love) : 12/11/2011 11:20:20 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 12/11/2011 12:24 PM (GMT -6) | | It is Hartshorne's argument that fails. Because it assumes our creator HAS to be necessary. Greg even admitted that is merely ASSUMED. So that is either known a priori or not. All I can tell you is, it's NOT a priori for me, best I can tell.
In the meanwhile,
1) I'm obligated to be fully persuaded in my OWN mind,
and
2) I'm fully persuaded that parsimony and parsimony alone gets us to the belief that our creator is a necessary being, whether or not an INFINITE or FINITE regression is conceivable to any other human mind.
But let's think through what it is entailed in the assumption that God is a necessary being that created us.
1) There is a being that existed sans creation.
2) That being created us.
3) That being exists necessarily.
IOW, there's a least 3 beliefs there. Teleology [i.e., 2)] accounts for 3 by itself once parsimony is understood to be a design feature. And my previous 1) & 2) already account for this 1). So which is really better, per communal normative standards of explanation evaluation?
Post Edited (Similitude) : 12/11/2011 11:56:00 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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