Yep, that would explain the mystery of it all. LOL!

Seriously, though. I think I get it if by conceive we mean posit. The idea, then, is that to posit the non-existence of a necessary being is to posit the impossibility of a necessary being. But that IS a mere logical possibility if an infinite regress of creators is CONCEIVABLE. So, as has been conceded, it doesn't work like a hard-fast proof.

Rather, it seems ludicrous to posit the impossibility of a necessary being since we NATURALLY infer the minimal number of SANS-CREATIONAL beings to satisfy my 1) & 2) by parsimony anyway. But apart from the sheer naturalness of that inference, the positing of the non-existence of a necessary being is just to posit a mere logical possibility since we can still account for necessary EXISTENCE without one. No one is interested in MERE logical possibilities, because there is an infinite set of them.

Thus, the ontological "proof" is just a way of bringing to the fore how ludicrious the alternative really is. In that sense, it has some force. It shows that the other side not only claims to be right even though they are going against the vast majority of the human race, but they have to do so with a feel of DOGMATISM (the "impossibility" part)--even though there is nothing intuitive about their position.

Of course, impossibility in that case is sui generis, having to do with temporality rather than causal capacity. So it's not as dogmatic as it feels. It merely means that a necessary being either always has existed, or it never can--by definition alone. Which means that the concept of a necessary being used by Hartshorne REQUIRES the temporality of God. Thus, those who deny that much deny the validity of the whole approach.

Post Edited (Similitude) : 12/15/2011 6:13:41 AM (GMT-6)

Jeff: The idea, then, is that to posit the non-existence of a necessary being is to posit the impossibility of a necessary being.

Tom: Right. I think Hartshorne would say that to conceive of X is to posit the (metaphysical) possibility of X.  One can concevie of both Necessay(X) and Necessary(-X) in the sense of contemplating the competing arguments for each. In THAT sense, yeah, we can conceive of both. And one could say, “Hey, I can’t adjudicate the competing evidence, so I’m agnostic.” But one can't consistently say, “I grant that the concept of a necessary being is meaningfully conceivable (i.e., conceivably compatible with all other conceivable worlds), but I choose not to believe such a being exists.” For in Hartshorne’s view, to concede the metaphysical possibility of a necessary being at this point (as an espitemic commitment to belief in the possibilty of such a being) is equally to commit to the impossibility of his non-existence, and that means to concede that any ‘possible world’ that doesn’t have him in it is an equally possibile state of affairs.” The latter can be a candidate for possibility. One can be thinking through the arguments for/against a necessary being. But once one concludes that “necessarily, God” is possible (as a conclusion to and not a premise of some argument), one necessarily concludes “An infinite regress of contingent beings” is not possible (as a conclusion to and not a premise of some argument).

Jeff: But that IS a mere logical possibility if an infinite regress of creators is CONCEIVABLE.

Tom: What’s “that”? The “impossibility” or the “possibility” of a necessary being? I wasn't sure. IF an infinite regress populated exclusively by contingent beings IS possible, then the existence of a necessary being is impossible. And nothing one believes to be impossibile is conceivable (so Hartshorne is arguing). So "conceivable" means more than just asking some candidate for conceivability to make its appeal for our belief in its meaningfulness. Metaphyiscal impossibilities are conceivable in the tentative sense that they can be talked about as candidates for conceivability. We put them up on the table and debate their status. But one can’t consistently ‘conclude’ that both the existence and the non-existence of a necessary being are equally possible. That’s incoherent.

Possible World1 (PW1) = infinite regress of only contingent beings. Is there a necessary being in PW1? No. So belief in PW1 as a possible world (i.e., positing the possibility of PW1) excluding a necessary being in turn means belief in (positing) the impossibility of a necessary being. What’s the ONLY way a being defined as necessary can fail to exist? Necessarily. Therefore, if PW1 describes a genuine, metaphysical possibility, then God’s existence is a genuine, metaphysical impossibility. The only way to argue for the possibility of an infinite regress of contingent beings is to argue for the impossibility of a necessary being...unless you're pulling each option up at before thinking through their entailments as 'candidates for consideration'.

This is part of Hartshorne's interest in all of this. The Modal Argument provides us a way to require the atheist to argue the impossibility of God as opposed to agreeing that God is, strictly speaking, possible but dismissing his actuality on insufficient evidence. On the contrary, Hartshorne would say, the unique KIND of being under consideration (necessary perfect being, etc.) means that God's conceivability justifies belief in his actuality. If one wants to justifiably disbelieve in God, the ONLY option one has is to argue positively that his existence is impossible. If you can’t do that, then you can’t justifiably be an atheist.

I should admit, Jeff, that maaaannyyyyy philosophers buck against Hartshorne’s identifying ‘logical’ and ‘metaphysical’ possibility. Greg once debated Swinburne (who actually believes God is contingent!) over this issue. Swinburne thought Greg was an idiot who didn’t understand the ABC’s of logic. But he was just arguing Hartshorne all the way.

Jeff: Rather, it seems ludicrous to posit the impossibility of a necessary being…

Tom: And yet the infinite regress of contingent beings which you posit entails the impossibility of a necessary being. So you’re the one positing the impossibility of that necessary being, Jeff. Every time you argue FOR the possibility of such a regress you argue AGAINST the possibility of God.

Jeff: But apart from the sheer naturalness of that inference, the positing of the non-existence of a necessary being is just to posit a mere logical possibility since we can still account for necessary EXISTENCE without one.

Tom: How can an infinite regress of contingencies account for ANYTHING necessary? Everything about such a regress (its consitutent members and the fact that there even if a regress at all) is contingent. If you want to think such a regress “explains/accounts for necessary existence,” then we don’t have anything to talk about.

Tom

Post Edited (Tom) : 12/16/2011 12:01:42 PM (GMT-6)