Truthlikeness
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthlikeness/

Graewe / Reijseger / Hemingway

Counterfactuals is the first CD by German pianist Georg Graewe, Dutch cellist Ernst Reijseger, and American percussionist Gerry Hemingway in almost five years. It is well worth it to hear this trio again after such a long sabbatical.

Counterfactuals, as with the trio’s other six CDs, presents a new reality and standard of music. According to Markus Heuger, "Pianist Georg Graewe, cellist Ernst Reijseger, and drummer Gerry Hemingway celebrated the 10th anniversary of their trio in November 1999. They were invited to the Kerrytown Concert House in Ann Arbor, Michigan, where they made another exciting recording. Five years had passed when the trio traveled to perform the concert we find on this CD, but it sounds as if they had never left the stage. Graewe, Hemingway and Reijseger don’t have to prove themselves as some other super heroes of high energy ‘chopism;’ their business is intelligent radical improvised trio music."

Counterfactuals has already gathered a lot of attention. The recording was a July 2001 "Crew's Choice of the Month" for Drimala Records, and was an "Editor's Pick of the Month" in August 2001 for the All About Jazz web site.

According to Glenn Astarita from All About Jazz, "Counterfactuals signifies a gregarious event, marked by unorthodox harmonic structures, ferocious interplay, and a plethora of contrasting elements. Highly recommended."

In his four-star review in the December 2001 issue of Downbeat magazine, Greg Buium says, "It is astonishing to think that pianist Georg Graewe, cellist Ernst Reijseger, and drummer Gerry Hemingway created Counterfactuals without notes or charts or cues. The six improvisations cohere and breathe. Structures are assembled (and understood) on the spot, by telepathy or some other internal device. Indeed, this 1999 recording, taken from a North American tour celebrating 10 years together, reaquaints us with a collective voice that delights in instant composition and sonic bravery."

This release, which is the first live recording on the nuscope label, features an 8-page booklet with liner notes from WDR Radio chief Markus Heuger and strikingly original cover photography by Catherine Wagner.

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Does God know Subjunctive conditional truths??

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That's it! This is the one. I did a search with the words "subjunctive" and "conditional" in it, searching the subject line only, and I specified Doc as the author, any date, searching "any of these words" that match. Got nothing. How did you do it?

I think I just might be MORE computer dumb than Doc.

Oh hey, and the pictures of the counterfactuals were sweet! I'm rolling on the floor.

Tom

"Every saint has a history and every sinner a future." Oscar Wilde

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Zosima



646 Posts Posted - 06/27/2001 : 09:06:23 AM
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GregBoyd

12/13/00 5:46 PM

Does God Know Subjunctive Conditional Truths???


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Hi chat gang. I asked this question at the end of my comments on a different thread, but I'd like to ensure getting as much feedback as possible, so I'm posting it as a new thread. It's an issue I'm presently working on for the Four Views on Foreknowledge Book (IVP).

The issue is this: Subjunctive Conditional Statements are statements like "agent x might do y in situation z." They intend to assert a state of affairs, and thus are either true or false. If they are true or false, they must be known by God. Hence, AS PART OF THE AFFIRMATION THAT GOD IS OMNISCIENT, we should affirm that part of the content of what God knows is the truth value of subjunctive conditional statements. GOD KNOWS "MAYBES."

If we deny that God knows subjunctive conditional statements, we can do so only by a) denying God knows all reality or b) denying that subjunctive conditional statements assert any genuine state of affairs. "A" is obviously out, so we're left with "b." But on what basis can we assert that it is NEITHER true or false that "agent x might do y in situation z"? This seems patently false. We talk this way all the time, asserting states of affairs. And even GOD, in Scripture, speaks this way, asserting (presumably) a state of affairs. "Perhaps they will understand" (Ezek. 12"3). "I may change my mind" (Jer. 26:3). Is God not talking truthfully in these passages?

Besides, on what basis can one simply decide that subjunctive conditionals are not real. Wouldn't you have to be omniscient to know this?

Just floating a balloon for you philosophical types. I'm looking for holes. Give me a hand with a critique.

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



beso

12/13/00 5:52 PM

RE: Does God Know Subjunctive Conditional Truths???


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Interesting. Can you say more about the difference between the Molinist view that God knows what WOULD happen and your view that God know what MIGHT happen... the difference between counterfactuals and subjunctives, as you say?

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



ModesofThought

12/13/00 7:16 PM

RE: Does God Know Subjunctive Conditional Truths???


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It seems that subjuntives are "over-qualified" (sorry 'bout the pun) to be either patently true or false. They may assert something, they may not, this is the nature of the subjunctive form. Is a subjunctive statement falsifiable? How could it be? Both forms of the statement are identical in meaning, "I may die tomorrow, I may not die tomorrow." The question may be asked, "will you die tomorrow?" and I would answer, "maybe". The presence or lack of the "not" is irrelevant. From my perspective, subjunctives are neither are falsifiable nor demonstrable.

The argument has been that God would presumably know the truth of whether I would die tomorrow or not and so if we were Classical Theists, subjunctives would be falsifiable, but since we are not, the subjunctive is a structure that admits ingorance on my part and depends upon EDF for its truth value. If I possessed EDF it would be a statement which is overly ambiguous given my knowledge.

It seems to me so far, that the effectiveness of this approach is dependant upon the falsifiability of the subjunctive. The falsifiability is dependent upon an EDF knower and that knowledge in turn defeats the subjunctive character of the statement ontologically. Perhaps I blew it somewhere, I am no philosopher (and I did this way too fast!), but I don't see this as all that helpful.

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



ModesofThought

12/13/00 7:34 PM

RE: Does God Know Subjunctive Conditional Truths???


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An important part of the question that I just realized that I missed is the question of what it means for God to "know" something.

"God knows all things, some as possible and the rest as actual," Open Theists say something like this all the time. When we say God knows something as actual we mean that it can be stated by God, "x will occur." When we say that God knows something as possible, we might state it, God knows that "there is a y% chance that x will occur." (tell me if there is a better way to do this!) This of course means that there is a 100-y% chance that x will not occur and so we could say so. Are these still subjunctive statements when they express an acurate percentage? (they seem to be closer to falsifiable than without the %) God could say, "given my comprehensive knowledge of the state of affairs at present, there is an x% chance that y will occur, unless I do something about it." Do we even have appropriate language to classify this sort of statement. I mean with the divine influence factored in as a potential key variable? Is this why the insurance company talks of "acts of God"?

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



Geebob

12/13/00 8:55 PM

RE: RE: Does God Know Subjunctive Conditional Truths???


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Modes, I don't know that I'll answer your whole contention here as I am too tired to think deeply but I think you are missing something here. You are right that the statement "you might die tomarrow" is not falsified by the statement "you might not die tomarrow." The crux of the matter is the certainty and guarantee that a person will die or that he will not die. A falsification of the statement would be "you will most certainly die tomarrow" or you will most certainly not die tomarrow." Negate the uncertanty and you will negate the subjunctive conditional statement. If we find some guaranteeing factor, then the statement will be falsified.

actually now that i've thought about it more, (I'm not going to erase the above because i'm too lazy and you can follow my thought process), You can say of someone (lets call him jimmy), "Jimmy may die tomarrow," when in fact something does determine such an outcome as long as you do not know that it is determined. otherwise your statement will be logicaly weak. And though logicaly weak statements are not false, they are deceptive. It's been a while since I've taken formal logic so I do not recall any examples of deceptive yet logicaly week statents. Okay now its coming back to me. It has to do with predicate logic and I think it has to do with universals and existential quantifiers but It may take a while for me to think of an example as I do not remeber precisly.

In short, If God uses a subjuctive conditional and yet knows for certainty what will be, then he is being deceptive, but not necessarily illogical.

Posted Originally From: Open Theism Information Site



Geebob

12/13/00 9:32 PM

RE: RE: RE: Does God Know Subjunctive Conditional Truths???


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Aha! I remember it now! Here's an example of a logically true statement that is deceptive because it is logically week.

Some cows (by cow I mean the hairy animal that is raised by dairy farmers and moos(In logic, its important to be specific-I think)), are mammals. This does not contradict that all cows are mammals but it is deceptive if stated by a person who in fact knows that all cows are mammals because there is the deliberate openness for the possibility that some cows are not mammals.

Posted Originally From: Open Theism Information Site



ModesofThought

12/13/00 10:19 PM

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Geebob,
Thanks, I haven't had any formal logic classes so any help with technical definitions I can get is appreciated. I think that your recognition that some propositions may be logically true, but deceptive may help us, especially if we don't want to say that God is deceptive. Get some rest and give us a fresh start when you get a chance, it seems that you are on to some things that could help us in this...

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



GregBoyd

12/13/00 10:51 PM

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Thanks for the feedback. Keep it coming.

The point about "logically weak" statements entailing that God is decepive is interesting. If God says "perhaps" or "maybe" when it is in fact certain may be an example of such problematically deceptive statements. But in Scripture its worse than this. For God doesn't just UNDERSTATE things --e.g. "perhaps" when in fact it was certain. He sometimes COUNTER-STATES things -- e.g. "perhaps" when in fact it DOESN'T come to pass. (Ezek. 12:3 and Jere. 26:3 are examples of this.)

To Beso: A CounterFACTUAL is factual... what an agent WOULD (certainly) do in situation z. A Subjunctive statement is, if you will, counterPOSSIBLE... what an agent MIGHT (or might not) do in situation z. I think an adequate account of God's knowledge must incorporate facts, counterfacts, and subjunctives, for factual statements, counterfactual statements, and subjunctive statements ALL HAVE TRUTH VALUES that an omniscient God would know (and know eternally).

To Modes: Unless you are a strict "verificationist" (are any around any more?) than the issue of whether a subjunctive is falsifiable TO US or not is irrelevant. The same logic would entail that NO statement -- including counterfactual or factual statements -- are true or false unless they can be falsified. But THAT is absurd. (For example, try to falsiable the sentence that states that all statements must be capable of falsification). So I'm still submitting that SUBJUNCTIVE PROPOSITIONS MUST BE TRUE OR FALSE, HENCE KNOWN AS SUCH BY AN OMNISCIENT GOD. God knows "maybes." And, to reverse an old tactic, any view that DENIES that God knows the truth value of subjunctive statements is LIMITING GOD'S KNOWLEDGE.

Yet waiting to be proven wrong.
Greg

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



Mephi2K

12/14/00 1:56 AM

RE: Does God Know Subjunctive Conditional Truths???


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Sup, Doc. Here we go again, right? LOL

Dr. Boyd said:
"The issue is this: Subjunctive Conditional Statements are statements like "agent x might do y in situation z." They intend to assert a state of affairs, and thus are either true or false. If they are true or false, they must be known by God. Hence, AS PART OF THE AFFIRMATION THAT GOD IS OMNISCIENT, we should affirm that part of the content of what God knows is the truth value of subjunctive conditional statements. GOD KNOWS "MAYBES."

and later, said,

"So I'm still submitting that SUBJUNCTIVE PROPOSITIONS MUST BE TRUE OR FALSE, HENCE KNOWN AS SUCH BY AN OMNISCIENT GOD. God knows "maybes."

The question to be addressed is this one.
"But on what basis can we assert that it is NEITHER true or false that "agent x might do y in situation z"?


Mephi:
Here is a statement:

"Either X is Y or X is not Y."

This is what logicians would refer to as a tautological statement. It is a statement that does convey truth NECESSARILY because of the law of contradiction, but it does little more than that. Its structured is this fashion: A\/~A. This statement effectively does NOTHING to convey any meaningful information for any prediction or anything else. This could not be used in any type of theory or anything. Modes was quite right to point this out to you like he did. It seems to me that all of you have done is to restate the tautological statement to try to make a meaningful statement out of it. But have you accomplished this? Let's look.

What is the essential difference between these 2 statements?
1) Either X is Y or X is not Y.
2) X might be Y.

Hmmmm...if we look at these statements, we can all see that the difference is more apparent than real. They BOTH mean basically the same thing. With the second statement, adding the phrase "X might not be Y" is redundant and pointless. The term "might" IMPLIES the "is/is not" connection that is made explicit in the first statement. This is part of the problem I had with your subjunctives the last time we spoke about it. This applies to any and ALL subjunctive statements. (Try it!) The only way that the second statement makes ANY TYPE of meaningful conveyance is to posit the probabilities, as Modes suggested (Modes, you're the bomb, man. ) Modes said this:

"When we say that God knows something as possible, we might state it, God knows that "there is a y% chance that x will occur." (tell me if there is a better way to do this!) This of course means that there is a 100-y% chance that x will not occur and so we could say so. Are these still subjunctive statements when they express an acurate percentage? (they seem to be closer to falsifiable than without the %)"

He was QUITE on point. And that is why I posited the change to your idea, as follows...

"Agent X has the CAPACITY to do actions A-S given the situation Z. (Very important distinction) Due to the personal and environmental makeup of situation Z, taking ALL stimuli bearing upon Agent X into consideration, Agent X WILL do action S when encountering situation Z."

You see how the problem is fixed? In this version of the your subjunctive statement, it implicitly deals with probabilities! How does it do so? Notice the "CAPACITY" statement. This introduces the fact that Agent has a reasonable probability and possibility to perform actions A-S. When THIS element is introduced, the problem of meaninglessness with regard to pragmatic utility is solved. What this entire statement assumes is that as the knowledge of Agent X and her enviroment increases, there should be a corresponding increase in the accuracy of a observing third person's prediction of Agent X's behavior. IDEALLY, if any observer were to have completely exhaustive information about both Agent X and her environment before her actual decision, said observer should have 100% accurate predictive power of the decision she will make. The observer could KNOW that Agent X would do action S when encountering situation Z. (Didn't I talk about this before?...hehe) However, at the same time, that observer would still be able to say this:

"Actions A-S were GENUINELY open to Agent X."

From what I understand, Doc, isn't THAT all you really want for human beings? But see, the problem that you are having is trying to stretch the subjunctive to the omniscient third person observer. Heh. That's where everything goes screwy, though. A omniscient third party observer can acknowledge the reality of options for the observed WITHOUT those options having to be binding upon the observer. In other words, my observer knows possibilities as such, but his EXTENSIVE knowledge insures that not all of the possibilities are of equal probability, and the observer can, nay, MUST well note this. I hope I'm coming across clear.

Let me state what it is that I think that you may be trying to do. When a given person says this: "It might rain tomorrow," the implication is this:

"Hey, dude. I don't KNOW for certain if it will rain tomorrow. But it might happen. In short, what I KNOW as reality is that it either will rain tomorrow or it won't."

I think that it is this sense of UNCERTAINTY that you are trying to attribute to God by positing God's knowledge of subjunctives. But as we've both seen, it just doesn't work, especially with an omniscient third party observer like God.

SUMMING UP:
Subjunctive propostions, like the ones you are mentioning, are ALWAYS true, by definition. They are tautological. So of course, they will be known as true by God. Moreover, God's knowledge of "maybes" as maybes does NOT logically entail that God must be ignorant of the situations in which the "maybes" are a part.


I don't know if this proved you wrong or anything, but I'm sure that it's given us food for thought, yes? I REALLY want to pursue this some more with ya. So...let's get down!


In Christ,
Mephi2K


P.S.:
By the way, Doc...with regards to my brainteaser, you said,

"I would apply this to your brainteaser. I don't know what aspects of "ME" were open and/or settled before my birth. I do know that "I" could have been different -- owning to circumstances outside my control (e.g. different parents) or circumstances within my control (my choices). I am partly defined as a "will be," a "would be" and a "might be." How much of this, if any, God controls I do not pretend to know. Neither do I know how much a person's "might be" can take over their "would be" and "will be" before that person ceases to be that person. This is the metaphysical issue of self-identity, and its tough. "

But unfortunately, you applied (though I still don't know how) your idea of subjunctives to it, with which I already had problems, as you can see. But bottom line, you didn't really answer the question. Holla back at me on this, please?

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



ghost-dog-girl

12/14/00 11:08 AM

RE: Does God Know Subjunctive Conditional Truths???


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I think I have identified the source of my exceeding confusion and frustration with middle knowledge.

MODAL AUXILIARIES (verbs that modify other verbs to create a verb phrase) such as "can," "could," "might," "may," "must," "ought to," "should," and "would," show possibility, necessity, and obligation.

whereas

The SUBJUNCTIVE MOOD (different moods are used to express different kinds of claims, i.e. fact, opinion, or inquiry) expresses wish, requirement, demand, or condition contrary to fact. It is used in dependent clauses beginning with "that" or "if."

So when Dr. Boyd says, "Subjunctive Conditional Statements are statements like 'agent x might do y in situation z,'" this example is in the indicative mood (it communicates fact--at least in grammatical categories) and "might" functions as a modal auxiliary (it modifies "do"). Restating it in the subjunctive mood might look something like this: "If agent x were to do y in situation z, agent x would do y' in situation z'." OR "I hope that agent x does y in situation z." OR EVEN "I know that agent x does y in situation z."

Well, that really cleared things up, didn't it?

(OK, I admit it, I'm a grammar geek.)

p.s. If there are any other grammar geeks out there, I highly recommend Karen Elizabeth Gordon's "Deluxe Transitive Vampire: The Ultimate Handbook of Grammar for the Innocent, the Eager, and the Doomed," and her "Torn Wings and Faux Pas: A Flashbook of Style, a Beastly Guide Through the Writer's Labyrinth."

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



Mephi2K

12/14/00 11:24 AM

RE: RE: Does God Know Subjunctive Conditional Truths???


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GDG, you grammatical whiz, you...

Thanks for that, lady. I think this emphasizes my point more.

You said:
"Restating it in the subjunctive mood might look something like this: "If agent x were to do y in situation z, agent x would do y' in situation z'."

Mephi:
This would be the more logical restatement, given what Dr. Boyd is trying to accomplish. But you expose the problem even more.

"If agent x were to do y in situation z, agent x would do y' in situation z'."

Hopefully, you guys can see the redundant, tautological nature of this restatement. Doc made a grammatical attempt to get away from the philosophical nature of the statement...and it didn't work. (Note: THIS is why all of y'all end up scratchin' yer heads when you read Doc talking about this "reality of subjunctives" stuff) The problem is not necessarily with middle knowledge. Statements of Middle knowledge CAN be reconciled easily and coherently (See my restatement of the whole Agent X thing...)

Peace,
Mephi2K

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



ghost-dog-girl

12/14/00 1:05 PM

RE: RE: RE: Does God Know Subjunctive Conditional Truths???


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Um....heh, heh.

Mephi, you seem to understand my reckless romp through the St. Martin's handbook better than I do (which is quite possible). What do other folks make of this?

Here is what I think I understand: In terms of nit-picky grammar, the example Dr. Boyd offered ("agent x might do y in situation z") used modal auxiliaries in the indicative mood, not the subjunctive mood.

I must revise my association of the indicative mood solely with statements of fact (i.e. provability/disprovability): apparently it can also be used to question fact, or voice an opinion or probability. (How clear is THAT?)

I must also renege two of my examples of subjunctive statements from my previous post: "I hope that agent x does y in situation z" and "I know that agent x does y in situation z." These are indicative, not subjunctive, because they contain independent clauses rather than dependant clauses.

So I'm still fuzzy on the subjunctive mood thing--by definition, it is used to express a wish, request, or condition THAT DOES NOT EXIST (yet?). The following statements are correct examples, "She requested that he correct his grammar," "He wished she would stop being so picky," "If this discussion were less technical, she would not feel compelled to be so picky."

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



Lion-Lamb

12/14/00 1:43 PM

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Grammatical mood--whether indicative, interrogative, imperative, subjunctive--does not, in itself, depict reality or anticipated reality. Take for example the indicative mood. The indicative, in itself, does not state fact . Rather, we use the indicative mood to state a matter as fact. The indicative is the mood of choice that speakers and writers use when they want to portray something as fact. Of course, the indicative is the mood of choice for liars. After all, a liar wants to portray something as factual. Though a lie is stated by using the indicative mood, that hardly makes the statement factual. Rather, a liar presents lies using the indicative mood because a liar intends to portray falsehood as factual.

Likewise, we use the subjunctive mood to project suppositions, whether forward or backward. If we project forward, our suppositions express contingencies thus--if this happens, then that will happen. If we project backward, our suppositions express contingencies in another way--if this had been true, then that would have been true also. The latter, of course, is typically called a contrary-to-fact-condition. The subjunctive mood, as with the indicative mood, does not itself portray reality. The subjunctive mood does not itself portray possibility or impossibility, probability or improbability. Rather, speakers and writers use the subjunctive mood to state suppositions that they want to project as possible or impossible, probably or improbable.

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



Mephi2K

12/14/00 1:58 PM

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Lion-Lamb,

You study Koine Greek, don't you? Admit it... Great elaboration on the use of grammatical mood.

Meph

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



Lion-Lamb

12/14/00 3:48 PM

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Oops! Did I let it slip? I didn't intend to.

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



ghost-dog-girl

12/14/00 4:08 PM

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Lion-Lamb: The distinction you make between stating facts and stating matters as facts (in your first few sentences or so) and also between "portraying" reality and "projecting" reality (in your final few sentences) escapes me. Could you say more about these distinctions and why they matter?

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



Ken15

12/15/00 8:41 AM

RE: Does God Know Subjunctive Conditional Truths???


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Dr. Boyd, I think this same subject was directed at myself in another thread, if you do not mind, I will throw in my two cents here... I have been having the same difficulty with this subject that Mephi has described, and he? she? has done a far better job at explaining why then I believe I could ever do. At the other thread, you wished me luck at my attempts to answer you. But I see that you are still waiting to be answered even here. Somehow, if you can pardon my skepticism, I am doubtful that you will be convinced by myself or anyone else. Convincing another person of something that there has already been much thought on, and conclusions have already been well established in their own mind, is a pretty tall order really. I have not seen it happen much online at all.
RE Subjuntive & etc: Really, no luck is necessary for this supposed quandary. The subjunctive mood is used in dependent clauses to express unreal conditions and in dependent clauses following verbs of wishing or requesting. Given that a human being is offering an imaginary situation in which agent x might do y in situation z, this poses no real problem as to what God’s knowledge of the unreal might be or might not be, for the situation does not actually exist in reality, it exists only in the imagination of the human considering the possibilities, and is thus, unreal. Since God knows what will indeed happen, there is nothing left to the imagination, as least as far as God’s knowledge goes. God will even know the human’s minds as they consider various possibilities. (Remember, how bored you think God might or might not be with such a situation is really no indicator of truth concerning God's omniscience, though it tells what you experience at the thought of God having such thoughts. Perhaps God's imagination is something like Ravi Zacharias has proposed, His ability to delight in the mundane-sun go up, sun go down, sun go up....)But God still will know which choice will be made. Does that mean that their choice was not free? I guess so, at least not free according to the libertarian definition of freedom. But then, I do not define freedom in a libertarian fashion.
In Christ, Ken

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



Lion-Lamb

12/14/00 6:24 PM

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G-D-G,



For the sake of convenience I will include my two paragraphs in this note so that I can refer you to them more easily than having you scroll back to my earlier note.



Grammatical mood--whether indicative, interrogative, imperative, subjunctive--does not, in itself, depict reality or anticipated reality. Take for example the indicative mood. The indicative, in itself, does not state fact . Rather, we use the indicative mood to state a matter as fact. The indicative is the mood of choice that speakers and writers use when they want to portray something as fact. Of course, the indicative is the mood of choice for liars. After all, a liar wants to portray something as factual. Though a lie is stated by using the indicative mood, that hardly makes the statement factual. Rather, a liar presents lies using the indicative mood because a liar intends to portray falsehood as factual.


Likewise, we use the subjunctive mood to project suppositions, whether forward or backward. If we project forward, our suppositions express contingencies thus--if this happens, then that will happen. If we project backward, our suppositions express contingencies in another way--if this had been true, then that would have been true also. The latter, of course, is typically called a contrary-to-fact-condition. The subjunctive mood, as with the indicative mood, does not itself portray reality. The subjunctive mood does not itself portray possibility or impossibility, probability or improbability.
Rather, speakers and writers use the subjunctive mood to state suppositions that they want to project as possible or impossible, probably or improbable.



Here is the important point I was making. Grammatical mood itself says nothing about reality or possibility. For example, most of us learned in elementary school that the indicative mood states a fact. This is not correct. Instead, we should say, we use the indicative mood when we want to state something as factual. That, I submit, is substantially different from what most of us learned. What is the difference? The factuality of what we state bears no necessary or essential connection with our stating it with the indicative mood. The factuality of what we present as factual lies elsewhere. This must be so, for otherwise there would not be such a thing as a lie whenever stated using the indicative mood. Yet liars routinely state their lies with the indicative mood.



So, the indicative mood itself does not mean that the thing expressed is factual. It cannot mean that. Rather, people use the indicative mood to represent a matter as factual. The matter represented as factual may actually be false. In other words the truth or falsity of a statement does not depend upon the grammatical mood with which it is expressed. Rather, the truth or falsity of a statement depends upon the statements accurate or inaccurate representation of reality. Here’s an indicative statement, “Al Gore was elected President of the United States of America on November 7, 2000.” Some people believe this statement is true. Unfortunately for them, the statement reflects no accurate representation of reality as known by count and recount and partial recount, etc., etc., given the US Constitution and Electoral College. The fact that the statement is expressed by using the indicative mood hardly means that the statement is factual or correct. Granted, the indicative statement asserts it as factual that “Al Gore was elected President of the United States of America on November 7, 2000.” However, the statement actually expresses a falsehood, for no evidence supports the claim.



We use the indicative mood to sketch or portray the way things are as we see them and/or as we want others to see them. The truthfulness and accuracy of our statements, indicative though they are, depends not upon the fact that we use the indicative mood but upon whether or not we fairly, accurately, and truthfully portray what we represent with our words.


We use non-indicative moods to project ideas, concepts, wishes, commands, prayers, petitions, requests, hopes, expectations, suppositions, etc., etc., concerning things that stand outside present reality as known to us.



So, for example, we use the imperative mood to petition God in prayer. We use the imperative mood to give instructions on how to put a bicycle together. We use the imperative mood to express expectations of our children.

We use the interrogative mood to ask questions. So, we use the interrogative mood to inquire concerning things we do not presently know. We often use the interrogative mood to raise questions for others, though we fully know the answers. Teachers, parents, and lawyers do this routinely. Police often use the interrogative mood to convince a suspect to confess to a crime, not because they don’t know who committed the crime but because they know; they may simply not have sufficient evidence to convince a jury.

We use the subjunctive mood to project thoughts in terms of logical connections. For example, we state a hypothesis using the subjunctive mood: If I do __________, then ___________ will follow. Then we test the hypothesis. We use the subjunctive mood to project thought either backward or forward, also. Backward imaginary projection of thought, thus a contrary-to-fact expression, might state, “If I had been born in 12th century Europe as a peasant, I would likely have faced a difficult and short life.” Imaginary projection of thought may also embrace the present or immediate future: “If I were to win the lottery, I would give you all the money you would need to pay your school bill.” Imaginary projection of thought may take other forms. For example, Satan says to Jesus, “If you are the Son of God, tell these stones to become bread” (Matt 4:3). Certainly, the fact that Satan expresses his words with a supposition hardly means that we should conclude that it is uncertain and doubtful whether or not Jesus is the Son of God. Likewise, consider Paul’s suppositions in 1 Corinthians 15:12-19. I quote two verses, 13 and 14—“If there is no resurrection of the dead, then not even Christ has been raised. And if Christ has not been raised, our preaching is useless and so is your faith.” Paul’s suppositional statements are true, though the things he supposes or assumes to be true for the sake of his argument are in fact not true. We may use imaginary projection of thought to represent something that we know to be a present reality, but we are not prepared to permit others to know that it is a present reality. For example, a married couple who holds secret knowledge that they are expecting a child may use suppositional language to retain their secret until a time when they believe it is right to let others know. So, a mother-in-waiting may reply to an inquisitive grandmother, “If I were pregnant, do you think that I should tell you now? Look at my tummy. It’s flat!”


These are examples of what I mean by language of projection. It is language we use to project thoughts concerning things that we desire to represent as not yet real. Such things may actually be real or may not be real. The fact that we use the subjunctive mood itself says nothing concerning the reality or non-reality, the possibility or non-possibility, the probability or non-probability of the ideas or concepts we depict with language of projection. Whether or not it is real or possible or probable depends not upon the mood we use to represent it.


Why does any of this matter? Let me put it simply. Everything we express hangs on selection of verbal mood. The accuracy and correctness of every expression of our concepts depends upon our understanding of how language functions, in this case how mood functions. Accurate logical expression depends upon this. Coherent philosophical reasoning depends upon it. Truthful theological expression depends upon it. That’s why this discussion matters.

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



GregBoyd

12/14/00 11:13 PM

RE: RE: Does God Know Subjunctive Conditional Truths???


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Good feedback folks. Love it. One quick response to Meph2K's 1:56AM log in.

I wholly agree with you and Modes re: all "mights" can be translated into probability statements. (ARgued this in Trinity and Process and in God of the possible).

But two points: one very short. one a bit less short.

a) Meph, I don't know what on earth you mean when you claim that all subjunctive statements are true, and in fact tautological. There is NO false subjunctive???? This seems so obviously false that I have to assume I'm misunderstanding you. It is not true, let alone tautological, that I "might" choose to slaughter as many children as possible tomorrow. Maybe I'm slow, too tired, or just too rushed right now, but give me another shot.

b) Two points: If I understand you correctly, Meph, you grant that God knows subjunctives -- all probabilities -- but then claim that because God knows all conditions, he knows the probabilities as 100%. But this is simply to assert that God doesn't know subjunctives. Sure, God knows that WE experience reality partly in a subjunctive mode. But GOD never knows there is a y% chance of something happening, and a -y chance of it not happening. (This is why your statement that God doesn't know probabilities as equal seems contradictor. . If God knows everything as 100% probable, he DOES know all probabilities as equal).

Secondly, To make this short and sweet (my lovely wife just cried out -- "honey, come on, get to bed!") do you at least see that you are PRESUPPOSING a metaphysics in these statements? You are ASSUMING that subjunctives do not apply to "real reality" (as Francis Schaffer used to say -- reality as known by GOD, in contrast to us). You thus assume that an omniscient mind would know things with 100% probability (viz. without subjunctives). Now, let me for the time being grant that I am ASSUMING that subjunctives DO apply to "real reality." I thus assume that subjunctives would be known by an omniscient God.

But I would just be tickled pink, Meph, if you would acknowledge that your anti-subjunctive view of "real reality" is just as much an assumption as is mine. Is there anything in the logic of omniscience itself -- apart from a presupposed view of reality -- that rules out the ontological reality of subjunctives? If not, then, at the very least, one can no more say that Open Theists are "limiting" God by saying he DOES know subjunctives than Open Theists can say that traditionalists (I know you don't like the word "classical theists") are "limiting God" because they say God does NOT know subjunctives. It's ALL about what view of reality you assume, NOT GOD. AGree?

Now, if you agree, we can argue about whose assumed view is best, and by what criteria. But slumber calls, so this will have to wait till tomorrow.
blessings
GREG

IDEALLY, if we had exhaustive knowledge of all conditions, etc... the probability would be 100%. If so, we are no longer dealing with subjunctives. We are dealing with counterfactuals. There is no sense in saying an agent "might" do x when the probability of their doing x is 100%. So you must hold that subju

Subjunctive statements like "x might do y" are "always true." Indeed, you claim they are tautological. Mephi, me thinks you are thinking funny.

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



Mephi2K

12/15/00 9:38 AM

Mephi Dines On Humble Pie


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Okie Dokey

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Dr. Boyd says:

"Meph, I don't know what on earth you mean when you claim that all subjunctive statements are true, and in fact tautological. There is NO false subjunctive???? This seems so obviously false that I have to assume I'm misunderstanding you. It is not true, let alone tautological, that I "might" choose to slaughter as many children as possible tomorrow. Maybe I'm slow, too tired, or just too rushed right now, but give me another shot."

Mephi:
Hmmm...well, now, Doc. Oh, my stars and garters. Maybe I should have placed my thinking cap on just a bit harder. LOL Now that you mention it, I think now that I undersand what's going on now.

Take this 1st statment.

"X might be Y"

I thought that is was more like this statement:

"Either X is Y or X is not Y"

This is a tautological statement. However, I now see that I was wrong. Now, that I'm looking at it, the statement is MUCH more like this 2nd one:

"It is possible that X is Y"

This last statement IS, indeed, falsifiable. For any statement "I is possible that X is Y", the statement can be logically false if:
1) It can be reasonably asserted that Y=~X
2) It can be reasonably asserted that Y NECESSARILY cannot be X, given some type of other parameter(s) outside the original statement.

I would say that the confusion is due to the ambiguity of this entire idea of the "reality of subjunctives." But now, I think the light's breaking through. If the second statement is what you really mean by your "subjunctive" statements, then I was quite incorrect, with respect to ALL subjunctive statements like yours being tautological, and therefore true. Let me say that again. I was WRONG about ALL subjunctive statements being tautological. Time to eat some humble pie! (Um, um, good! hehe) But I would like you to note something. The way that you formulate your statement makes for a LOT of confusion regarding how to interpret your statement. I want to use Modes as an example. He said:

"Is a subjunctive statement falsifiable? How could it be? Both forms of the statement are identical in meaning, "I may die tomorrow, I may not die tomorrow." The question may be asked, "will you die tomorrow?" and I would answer, "maybe". The presence or lack of the "not" is irrelevant. From my perspective, subjunctives are neither are falsifiable nor demonstrable."

Now, I'm not using this to show that Modes was wrong. It's MY thinking that was somewhat screwed. But I would like you to see how, in some cases, someone may see what you are saying as being somewhat tautological. Clarity is key, yes?

Now, Let's put this back into the right context. Let's change your statement...

"Agent x might do y in situation z"

...into something more sensible and less able to be misconstrued...

"It is possible that Agent X will do Act Y in Situation Z"


Now this statement makes flows a LOT better with what you are trying to say, in my opinion. And, as I have said before, it is theoretically verifiable and falsifiable.

Now let's tweak it for dealing with actions of agency:
For any statement "It is possible that Agent X will do Act Y in Situation Z", the statement can be logically false if:

1) It can be reasonably asserted that Act Y is impossible for Agent X, due to the constitution of Agent X
2) It can be reasonably asserted that Situation Z doesn't allow for Act Y in any case whatsoever.

But I think that this brings out something interesting. You say:

"Subjunctive Conditional Statements are statements like "agent x might do y in situation z." They intend to assert a state of affairs, and thus are either true or false. If they are true or false, they must be known by God. Hence, AS PART OF THE AFFIRMATION THAT GOD IS OMNISCIENT, we should affirm that part of the content of what God knows is the truth value of subjunctive conditional statements."


So what does this mean? It means that for every possible "subjunctive statement" like the above that can be made, God NECESSARILY knows the 2 parameters made above. In order for God to know if the "subjective statement" is false or not, he MUST, according to what you have stated, know one or both of the two things above. Thus, he knows whether or not certain things are genuine possibilities or not, because of his omniscience. So basically you are saying this:

"God has knowledge such that for every "state of affairs" involving human agency that can be described using the paradigm of "It is possible that Agent X can do Act Y in Situation Z", (or something close to that) God KNOWS whether or not Act Y is a genuine possibility or not"

[Note: When I say an act is "possible", I mean that it is able to be done by an agent, within the limitations of the agent and her environment]

But doesn't this only show that God knows what acts are genuine possibilities for Agent X and what acts are NOT genuine possibilities for Agent X, given various situations? It doesn't show what you want it to: that GOD percieves these possibilities in the SAME manner as an objective observer without omniscience would do so, namely by probabilities. Check it out. Let's say we have Actions A-Z. We say that God can know the genuineness of possibility, with respect to Agent X in the context of Situation Z, using the two indications of falsifiability noted above. After doing so, it is seen that ONLY Acts A-S are actually genuinely possible for Agent X to do in Situation Z. How would we say this? This way:

"It is genuinely possible for Agent X to do Acts A-S in Situation Z."

I have no problem with this. You can see that by my restatement earlier. But it seems to me that you want to say that this means that God knows "maybes", such that God can ONLY discern the range of possible actions that Agent X COULD perform and no more than that. Like God can only figure out how many acts Agent X has to choose from and that God CANNOT truly know which ONE act Agent X will actually choose. However, as I have indicated before, God's exhaustive knowledge about Agent X and her environment will not allow for this. Regardless, of my admittedly muddled thinking on the score of the truth value of your "subjunctive statements," this is STILL the case. God's exhaustive knowledge of the Agent and her environment entails 100% predictability of her action in Situation Z.

[Digression: Just thought of something. Is a prediction the same thing as "knowledge"? If so, why? If not, why not?]


***********************************************
Dr. Boyd said:
"If I understand you correctly, Meph, you grant that God knows subjunctives -- all probabilities -- but then claim that because God knows all conditions, he knows the probabilities as 100%. But this is simply to assert that God doesn't know subjunctives. Sure, God knows that WE experience reality partly in a subjunctive mode. But GOD never knows there is a y% chance of something happening, and a -y chance of it not happening. (This is why your statement that God doesn't know probabilities as equal seems contradictor. . If God knows everything as 100% probable, he DOES know all probabilities as equal)."

Mephi:
The first thing I thought when I read this is "What the heck is he saying?" But after mulling it over, I think I get it...I think.

If you are saying that to "know subjunctives" that God has to know probabilities in terms of his OWN predictive power (i.e. God saying "Eh, I give it a 30% chance that he's gonna do that), then I would definitely say that God doesn't "know subjunctives." Probabilities in predictive power assume ignorance, does it not? I don't see how God can have exhaustive knowledge of a given agent AND that agent's environment and NOT have 100% accurate predictability of that's agent's action. Do we really understand what EXHAUSTIVE knowledge is? Remember how I asked the question long ago about God's knowledge of the quantum event. Does the Uncertainty Principle apply to God? If not, then this has far reaching implications. I just don't see how God can know...

1) every quantum event that composes Situation Z
2) all the memories, historical events, moral and emotional predispositions, and internal functions of Agent X
3) any and all events that lead up to Agent X encountering Situation Z
4) all the memories, historical events, moral and emotion predispositions, and internal functions of any OTHER agents involved in Situation Z

...and know these things exhaustively and STILL not be able to predict with 100% accuracy what decision Agent X will make when encountering Situation Z. It's plain ludicrous to me! I'd like you to explain this in depth, please, Doc.

[Digression: This is what really gets my goat about libertarian free will. It ends up on the rocks of "mystery" and "paradox" in a most unacceptable way. It relies highly on the concepts of naive and Scottish "common sense" realism. We feel it and intuitively perceive it, thus it MUST be so. This is not the same thing a the Principle of Belief Conservation, which rational beings use to form and hold worldviews using evidences. It's merely the "what you see is what you get" mentality. And, in my opinion, it sucks. If we were to take an inanimate object, place it in a secured lab, posit an fully omniscient scientist that knows the object and every activity going on in the lab, down to the quantum level of events such that she violates the Uncertainty Principle, it would take pure idiocy for anyone to say that said scientist wouldn't have a 100% prediction rate with any given experiment that she would choose to hold with the object. But all of a sudden, because we posit sentient beings, things somehow automatically change...and a wonderful enigmatic piece of the puzzle called "free will" gets tossed in to the mix. The omniscient scientist is now at a relative loss. She can know EVERYTHING about the lab and the sentient being, but unexplainably, she cannot predict the being's behavior with perfect accuracy. Did I miss something here?? LOL ]



*********************************************
Dr. Boyd said:

"You are ASSUMING that subjunctives do not apply to "real reality" (as Francis Schaffer used to say -- reality as known by GOD, in contrast to us). You thus assume that an omniscient mind would know things with 100% probability (viz. without subjunctives). Now, let me for the time being grant that I am ASSUMING that subjunctives DO apply to "real reality." I thus assume that subjunctives would be known by an omniscient God. But I would just be tickled pink, Meph, if you would acknowledge that your anti-subjunctive view of "real reality" is just as much an assumption as is mine. Is there anything in the logic of omniscience itself -- apart from a presupposed view of reality -- that rules out the ontological reality of subjunctives? "

Mephi:
My dear sir, how is this assumption? The entire framework on the scientific method works on this principle: The more we know about an object and it's environment, the more we can predict the behavior of said object IN that environment. Ideally, if we could get exhaustive knowledge of both factors, then we could have perfect predicability. So, again, please tell me how God can have knowledge such that He can even know the velocity and location of an subatomic particle AT THE SAME TIME (which is the basis of the Uncertainty Principle), and yet cannot predict with 100% accuracy what I will do in the next minute. God knows my psychological, emotional, biological, and SPIRITUAL makeups intimately on a level which surpasses any type of self-knowledge I could ever hope to procure...and God has to TEST me empirically to know what I'm going to do in a given situation? It just doesn't make sense. Sorry, Doc. I'm not going on some Platonic assumption. I'm going by logical extrapolation of the facts that we know about God.


Again, I was very mistaken about the tautological nature of ALL "subjunctive statements" I'm really sorry about that, y'all. Flag on the play! However, I must say that I stand by the rest of my stuff. I don't see how my error in this matter negates the sheer absurdity of trying to posit an omniscient God that knows everything there is to be known at any given moment in time and yet, STILL have to make very informed, yet potentially imprecise, guesses about what will happen in the future.

Quite embarrassed (LOL ),
Mephi2K


P.S.
There's still the matter of the brainteaser and the Analogy, Doc. Hopefully, my thinking is not as muddled in those areas. hehe...











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