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|  Tom Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 10353 | Posted 2/10/2006 9:59 AM (GMT -6) |   | |
Yo crowd! What's going down?
Just finished up a grrrrrreat course (New Testament Backgrounds) here in Brussels. Mephi, you would of loved this prof. We were all over the place. Dude, you wouldn't believe what evangelical grad students outside the NewNited States believe. Hell? Dude, that's just apocalyptic. Eternal conscious torment? You gotta be kidding!
Anyhow...
I had to turn in my thesis proposal.
A Critical Evaluation and Reconstruction of the Claims of Open Theism.
I don't have an adviser, and I have to find one in the Twin Cities. Has to have a Ph.D. That's it. Let's see now. Who do I know who has a Ph.D. and would be knowledgeable enough to advise me on THIS particular subject? Hmmmmm.
Rock on.
Tom
By the way, Mephi, I ran accross a couple of very interesting unpublished dissertations and theses on the open view, some pro and some con. But two pro were especially interesting. Here they are:
Robinson, Franklin Webster. "Adversity, crisis counseling, and the openness of god: An evaluation of open theism for pastoral response to victims of violence." Azusa Pacific University, 2002.
Verhage, Kara Elizabeth. “Prayer and a Partially Unsettled Future: A Theological Framework for Prayer From the Perspective of Open Theism Emphasizing Prayers of Supplication.” Luther Seminary, 2004.
I wrote Kara and hope to get her thesis. I wonder if any of you know her since she’s there in town. But I’m having trouble getting Robinson’s dissertation.
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 |  selah Registered Member

Date Joined Oct 2001 Total Posts : 1210 | Posted 2/11/2006 10:49 AM (GMT -6) |   | Hey Tom,
Robinson, Franklin Webster. "Adversity, crisis counseling, and the openness of god: An evaluation of open theism for pastoral response to victims of violence." Azusa Pacific University, 2002.
Verhage, Kara Elizabeth. “Prayer and a Partially Unsettled Future: A Theological Framework for Prayer From the Perspective of Open Theism Emphasizing Prayers of Supplication.” Luther Seminary, 2004.
Wow. Are you sure these people really exist?
I would love to have a look at those if you ever get them!
good stuff.
Blessings, T | | Back to Top | | |
  |  One Love Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 13888 | Posted 2/11/2006 2:45 PM (GMT -6) |   | GREAT STUFF,Tom! I'd be willing to go in with you on getting those, if you want. I'm very interested.
Can't wait to debrief some of this stuff with ya, when you get back!
The newest mantra:
God graciously FINDS us meaningful when God doesn't need to do it and we, in ourselves, can't do it.
"Hmm. Why not? What the hell. Let's try it." --God
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 |  Humphrey Bogart Registered Member

Date Joined Jun 2003 Total Posts : 205 | Posted 2/13/2006 12:49 AM (GMT -6) |   | Hi Tom! You seem to really get around. Good luck with the PhD. My experience (in an unrelated discipline) is that the last six months are shocking, but the rest was OK. I handed in my thesis less than two days before I got married (like, I handed it in Thursday night, got married Saturday). I spent my honeymoon sleeping.
So what am I doing? Well, we were going to take up a pastoral position but that all fell through. That left me really wondering about what God wanted me to do. I was thinking about starting a PhD in something related to Biblical Studies or Theology, but am not sure about employment at the end because, as you might have gathered, I have controversial and idiosyncratic views and think I would find it difficult in a Bible college, or a secular Uni (for opposite reasons - too "heretical" for a Bible college, too supernaturalistic for a Uni). Also, jobs in that field aren't that easy to come by. In any case, I'm becoming increasingly disgruntled with "organized religion" - we're starting a house church that's developed from a really great Bible study we've been involved in for a while now. I'm attending an Anglican church near where we live but frankly don't like it very much, it's only that there are hardly any churches nearby and the Bible study is associated with that church. There are four or five Anglican churches in our parish and no minister, so it's all fairly anarchic, but there's a lay worker who looks after things (Church of Christ trained) who is a good friend and our families really get along well, so I'm mainly there to support them. Are any of you guys interested in "the emerging church"? I think it's got some good things going for it.
So, after long and painful deliberations about "following my dreams" versus "earning an income to help support the family", I've opted for the latter, and I'm starting off studying graduate law at Sydney Uni - 3 years. My fourth degree! But law at least provides the opportunity of independent employment in the local area (we live out in a bush village a fair way from civilization - I have to do a 2 hour commute by train into Sydney for lectures). Once established as a soliciter or whatever I am hoping to pursue other interests in theology, but will have to put it on hold for now. Anyway, given how argumentative I am (as you all know), I guess I will make a good lawyer! But I like the idea of pursuing my academic interests without being affiliated with any institution or depending on them for employment. One thing I admire about Spinoza is that he never accepted any academic position, and supported himself throughout his life by grinding lenses.
One other thing - if any of you guys do ever get to visit Australia, drop me an email, and I'd love to catch up with you and show you around!
All the best!Post Edited (Humphrey Bogart) : 2/18/2006 11:41:32 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
   |  Tom Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 10353 | Posted 2/18/2006 3:03 PM (GMT -6) |   | I meant reconstructing the philosophical case, or rather the articulation of the open view. Not all open theists agree on everything, so I was thinking of arguing a most plausible case. As I see it there are four articulations, or models, of the open view.
A) Voluntary nescience (There are truths about future contingents which God can know but which he chooses not to know; Dallas Willard) B) Involuntary nescience (There are truths about future contingents which no sentient being can know; Bill Hasker) C) Non-bivalent omniscience (God knows all truths but there are no truths describing future contingents; Rissler, Rae, Merricks, Crisp) D) Bivalent omniscience (God knows all truths, there are truths describing future contingents, but the class of truths describing the future includes propositions positing what “might/might not” occur in addition to those which posit what “will” and what “will not” occur; Rhoda, Boyd, Belt)
I think (D) is the most plausible model. But that all four are argued by open theists appears confusing to opponents who aren't aware of the diversities.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
    |  Similitude Registered Member
 Date Joined Apr 2004 Total Posts : 4968 | Posted 2/18/2006 11:28 PM (GMT -6) |   | | Tom: But only God can establish this relevance, and he can only do that by knowing the truths in question.
Jeff: Right. But establishing relevance with respect to purposes is something WE do. So it doesn't require ETERNAL omniscience. It only requires knowledge, PRE-volition. And for God, knowledge about the future can arise in imagination just as it does for us, as far as I know. Without the scientific imagination, hypotheses can not be formed and tested to generate knowledge. Likewise, God may create as a RESULT of His imagination. I'm not saying I can prove this, it just allows for an easier conception of God's volition for me.
Tom: I'd place ya in option (A)--voluntary nescience. You admit there are truths that can be known but which God chooses not to know by making his knowledge of such truths dependent on their relevance to freely chosen ends.
Jeff: Well, I would say that it seems possible that God may CHOOSE to not think about necrophiliacs once their punishment is complete. The only reason why I would think otherwise is if it can be demonstrated that God is conscious of ALL truths at ALL times by NATURE. But if this is not necessarily true, God can imagine IN TIME and act volitionally therefrom. Indeed, imagination IS an act of volition.
So it's not so much that I think God chooses NOT to know; rather, He chooses WHAT to think about. He KNOWS about the necrophiliac in one sense, for the rest of time, insomuch as those facts have been attained by God. But that doesn't imply that He can't refuse to consciously CONTEMPLATE the necrophiliac for the rest of time.
Similarly, God may not CHOOSE to think about what He might do billions of years out. Maybe He lives in a dynamic mode which stimulates His imagination in ways that ensure an on-going volitional and relational existence. Just wondering...
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 |  Tom Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 10353 | Posted 2/19/2006 12:42 AM (GMT -6) |   | Jeff: Well, I would say that it seems possible that God may CHOOSE to not think about necrophiliacs once their punishment is complete.
Tom: Sure. But this isn’t a denial of omniscience. God can choose to not think about something without being ignorant of that something. We discussed this a long time ago. Are you still under the impression that knowing something means consciously entertaining it? It doesn’t. If you just want to avoid having God eternally ‘contemplating’ evil without a break, you can do that without denying omniscience.
Jeff: The only reason why I would think otherwise is if it can be demonstrated that God is conscious of ALL truths at ALL times by NATURE.
Tom: Who argues that? That’s not what omniscience is.
Jeff: But if this is not necessarily true, God can imagine IN TIME and act volitionally therefrom.
Tom: If this is not necessarily true, what about God being able to not consciously contemplate all that he knows? That's what I've always argued.
Jeff: So it's not so much that I think God chooses NOT to know; rather, He chooses WHAT to think about. He KNOWS about the necrophiliac in one sense, for the rest of time, insomuch as those facts have been attained by God. But that doesn't imply that He can't refuse to consciously CONTEMPLATE the necrophiliac for the rest of time.
Tom: Dude, I was the first to suggest to you (because you were bothered at the time by the idea that God might be eternally ‘contemplating’ necrophiliacs) that God doesn’t have to be thought of as consciously contemplating all he knows (just as we don’t). But that’s no denial of omniscience. This has been MY position. You're been arguing for flat out IGNORANCE of truths. Dude, don't tell me know that you think God DOES know all truths but only chooses to "consciously think about" those truths as are revelant to his purposes at particular times.
Not sure what you mean by “facts attained by God.” But would you agree that all “facts” are attained by God?
Jeff: Similarly, God may not CHOOSE to think about what He might do billions of years out. Maybe He lives in a dynamic mode which stimulates His imagination in ways that ensure an on-going volitional and relational existence. Just wondering...
Tom: (1) God can ‘know’ that something might happen in the future without ‘thinking about it’ (if by that you mean ‘consciously contemplating it’). No denial of omniscience required by that. And (2) volitional and relational existence isn’t jeopardized by such knowledge even when consciously contemplated. I can know all the possible ways a particular meeting with a friend will turn out, and know how I would best choose in each possible outcome without any harm being done to volitional and relational integrity. I do it all the time.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Humphrey Bogart Registered Member

Date Joined Jun 2003 Total Posts : 205 | Posted 2/19/2006 12:57 AM (GMT -6) |   | Corey said... There's enough other boards out there to discuss politics on; let's keep this on topic.
OK, sorry, relevant post and paragraph from previous post deleted!
Jeff said... Well, I would say that it seems possible that God may CHOOSE to not think about necrophiliacs once their punishment is complete. The only reason why I would think otherwise is if it can be demonstrated that God is conscious of ALL truths at ALL times by NATURE. But if this is not necessarily true, God can imagine IN TIME and act volitionally therefrom. Indeed, imagination IS an act of volition. So it's not so much that I think God chooses NOT to know; rather, He chooses WHAT to think about. He KNOWS about the necrophiliac in one sense, for the rest of time, insomuch as those facts have been attained by God. But that doesn't imply that He can't refuse to consciously CONTEMPLATE the necrophiliac for the rest of time. Similarly, God may not CHOOSE to think about what He might do billions of years out. Maybe He lives in a dynamic mode which stimulates His imagination in ways that ensure an on-going volitional and relational existence. Just wondering...
Jeff, I think you are spot on here, and can I help you out with a suggestion that might help you make your position more rigorous? There is an important difference between two kinds of knowing - knowing by acquaintance (direct apprehension), and propositional knowledge. Betrand Russell wrote an influential essay on this topic, if you want to look at it. Anyway, classical omniscience involves the claim that God has exhaustive knowledge of both kinds. For instance, Morris (2003, 65) defines the classical doctrine of omniscience as follows:
“(1) God has all propositional knowledge and (2) God has perfect acquaintance with all things”
Now I think a very good case can be made that the Bible only claims that God has perfect acquaintance with all things (Morris' point 2), and does not necessarily have exhaustive propositional knowledge. Can I post here a couple of paragraphs in which I argued this in an essay for college (which got marked by a Calvinist who hated open theism and was not impressed, but that's another story!). I had to be very succinct as the topic of the essay was a critique of classical theism in 3000 words, and I had other points to make also.
HB said... The concept of propositional knowledge derives from Greek philosophy. Plato gave the classical definition of this form of knowledge (“justified true belief”) which has survived for 2,500 years1 (1973, 94). The Hebrew and Biblical conception of knowledge, however, is generally much closer to knowledge by direct apprehension, then it is to propositional knowledge. It involves intimate and direct knowledge of things, not knowledge of propositions. When Genesis talks about “knowing good and evil”, it is not talking about propositional, abstract knowledge, but knowledge by acquaintance. When the Bible says that Adam “knew” (yada`) his wife, it is not referring to propositional knowledge, but to intimacy. When Paul instructs the Ephesians “to know the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge” (Eph. 3:19), he is talking about knowledge by direct apprehension, not abstract knowledge. When John writes that “everyone who loves is born of God and knows God” (1 Jn. 4:7), he means that these people know God personally, by acquaintance, not that they know abstract propositions concerning him. In light of these observations, we need to carefully reconsider what kind of knowledge the Bible ascribes to God. Important in this regard is panta, “all things”. Frequently, panta is used to mean all created things (e.g. 1 Cor. 15:27; Eph. 1:10, 3:9; Phil. 3:21; Heb. 1:3). Furthermore, there is no example anywhere in the New Testament where panta is used to refer to all true propositions2. Thus verses such as 1 John 3:20 which state that God ginwskei panta, “knows all things”, only prove that he has comprehensive knowledge by direct apprehension of what exists. It does not prove that he has any propositional knowledge at all. Hebrews 4:13 reads, “And before him no creature is hidden, but all are naked and laid bare to the eyes of the one to whom we must render an account”. As in 1 John 3:20, in the second half of the verse the phrase panta is used to describe the domain of God's knowledge. However, in this case the first half of the verse makes quite clear what the “all things” being referred to are. It states that no “creature” (ktisis) is hidden in God's sight. Therefore the “all things” referred to in the second half of the verse must be all ktiseis, “all creatures”, that is, everything which exists. It has nothing to do with propositions or propositional knowledge.
Nowhere does the Bible assert that God knows all true propositions. In fact, some scriptures imply the very opposite. In Isaiah 43:25 God promises that he will not remember our sins. Grudem argues that this means only that God will not allow his knowledge of our sins to impact on the way he relates to us (1994, 192). However, the straightforward interpretation is more consistent with the Biblical concept of forgiveness. Jeremiah 19:5 states that the fact that the Israelites would do certain evils did not even enter into God's mind before they occurred. Grudem (1994, 192) argues that this cannot be taken literally either, since God specifically forbade child sacrifice in Leviticus 18:21, and it had occurred a century earlier in Israel. However, neither of these facts implies that God anticipated these particular people sacrificing their children. In a relationship, unless we are paranoid, we do not contemplate all the possible ways that our spouse or friends might in future do something terrible to us. If pressed, we might acknowledge that, because they possess free-will, it is theoretically possible that they could one day do us harm; but normal people do not plan out in detail what they will do for each and every such possible eventuality. God does not need to plan ahead of time what he will do if we turn away from him. He is infinitely brilliant and can come up with the best plan instantly if it should turn out to be required3. God always thinks the best of people. In fact, it might be morally wrong to make plans for the possibility that those we love will betray us. Perhaps we ought not to think or dwell on such matters. If so, then God's perfect goodness would rule out his knowing all true propositions.
Furthermore, the classical doctrine of omniscience results in all sorts of difficulties. For instance, there are an infinite number of propositions of the form “a right-angled triangle with short sides of length such-and-such and such-and-such, has a hypotenuse of length such-and-such”. So we must suppose that God keeps in his mind an infinite number of propositions about right-angled triangles for no reason. And each of these propositions can be expressed in an infinite number of possible languages. If God knows all true propositions, then he would have to know what each individual proposition would be like expressed in every one of these possible languages. This has shades of Platonism, and the idea that God must know these propositions because they need to be somewhere. More importantly, they render God a rather impersonal being. Persons do not keep vast repositories of useless abstract knowledge in their consciousness just for the sake of it. Persons use abstract knowledge as a means to an end, to engage in relationship with other persons. Why would God be obliged to keep all these propositions in his mind? Does he have no choice? There are numerous other problems with the classical doctrine of omniscience4. Classical omniscience, therefore, should be rejected. Instead, we should affirm only the second of Morris's points: that “God has perfect acquaintance with all things”. Clearly, God has some propositional knowledge. But there is no Biblical or theological reason to suppose that his propositional knowledge goes beyond what is required for practical purposes in interacting with his creation. Grenz rightly points out:
“... in declaring `God is omniscient' we are not intending to make a claim concerning God's theoretical knowledge, but to affirm his perfect cognition of the world” (1994, 92).
Hope that is some help!
Tom said... Are you still under the impression that knowing something means consciously entertaining it? It doesn’t.
For a being that has perfect knowledge, yes, "knowing" something must mean consciously entertaining it. Although we would say that a human being knows X, even though he currently does not consciously entertain it, but can call it up at will (or work it out by thinking about the topic), the word "knowledge" is being used in a weak sense that would be defective from a divine point of view. Indeed, once one allows that God does not consciously entertain all propositional knowledge, then I fail to see how your position is any different to mine or Jeff's. I don't know anyone who would deny omniscience, if omniscience merely means that God has the capacity to bring any fact to his conscious attention. After all, God is infinitely brilliant, and could figure out every truth in an instant. The question is whether he has already so figured everything out, and retained it in consciousness.
In addition, humans can "know" things without being consciously aware of them only because our cognition is governed by unconscious processes. I think it would be problematic to say that God's cognition is governed by unconscious processes. Could Freud have psychoanalyzed God?Post Edited (Humphrey Bogart) : 2/19/2006 12:07:48 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Tom Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 10353 | Posted 2/19/2006 4:59 AM (GMT -6) |   | |
Hi Humphrey. Sorry for the length!
HB: For instance, Morris (2003, 65) defines the classical doctrine of omniscience as follows:
“(1) God has all propositional knowledge and (2) God has perfect acquaintance with all things”
Now I think a very good case can be made that the Bible only claims that God has perfect acquaintance with all things (Morris' point 2), and does not necessarily have exhaustive propositional knowledge.
Tom: I think I could probably agree with the first part, not with the second. I agree that the biblical portrayal (certainly the OT) of the scope and nature of God’s knowledge is of God as infallibly acquainted with all realities (as opposed to an infallible knower of propositional truths). That’s how the Bible presents God. Unfortunately this doesn’t at all mean God doesn’t have exhaustive propositional knowledge.
I for one think divine knowledge of propositions is entailed in perfect acquaintance of all things/realities. We leave biblical theology, strictly speaking, and move into systematics when we talk about divine knowledge of all truths/propositions. But so what? Nobody does their faith solely in biblical terms and leaves it at that. If we did we’d have no doctrine of the Trinity and much of our Christology would not exist. We reflect on the Bible’s portrayal (in the Bible’s terms and contexts) of God, the world, and the relationship between the two, but in the end we do so in our language and contexts. Nothing wrong with that. Some NT writers do it in working out their Christology. It’s necessary. So I don’t at all mind admitting that the Bible nowhere makes a philosophical case for God’s knowledge of all propositions. Big deal?
But for someone who argues the truth of propositions is grounded in realities God is perfectly acquainted with, the absolute distinction you make between “apprehending all things/realities” and “propositions” is simply false. I’m not suggesting there is no distinction. There is. The truth-value of propositions, an adherent of the correspondence theory of truth can argue, is grounded in the realities that make our world what it is…the Bible’s “all things.” I’m just suggesting that if propositional truths are grounded in realities/states of affairs, then one can also argue that knowledge of propositions is entailed in a perfect knowledge of the realities that ground those propositions, and that someone who failed to know all S’s properties and relations shouldn’t be thought of as perfectly acquainted with S.
Propositional truths are arrived at through the very sort of perfect acquaintance you agree God has of all things, assuming such acquaintance involves reflection and contemplation. To suggest that God has perfect or infallible acquaintance of some reality but does not know the truths that reality grounds is to suggest God is THE most unreflective sentient being that could possibly exist.
I think we’ve discussed this at length before without convincing each other!
HB: Furthermore, the classical doctrine of omniscience results in all sorts of difficulties. For instance, there are an infinite number of propositions of the form “a right-angled triangle with short sides of length such-and-such and such-and-such, has a hypotenuse of length such-and-such”. So we must suppose that God keeps in his mind an infinite number of propositions about right-angled triangles for no reason. And each of these propositions can be expressed in an infinite number of possible languages. If God knows all true propositions, then he would have to know what each individual proposition would be like expressed in every one of these possible languages. This has shades of Platonism, and the idea that God must know these propositions because they need to be somewhere. More importantly, they render God a rather impersonal being. Persons do not keep vast repositories of useless abstract knowledge in their consciousness just for the sake of it. Persons use abstract knowledge as a means to an end, to engage in relationship with other persons. Why would God be obliged to keep all these propositions in his mind?
Tom: It might seem strange coming from someone who believes anthropomorphic language is reality depicting, but it seems to me you have a overly anthropomorphic view of God. I mean really, who are we to say what God can enjoy thinking about or not? You come close to simply denying that God’s even smart enough to know all the propositional truths there are. You assume that since no human knower has enough intelligence to contain all that’s knowable, or has to spread his intelligence thinner the more he knows, God must be limited in the same ways. But why think that?
(1) There are, I think, an infinite number of propositions. All one has to do is consider the set of all numbers 1, 2, 3, and so on. They go on infinitely, as do that propositions positing these numbers. If the infinite mind of God is the truth grounds for such propositions, then I can completely understand why they go on forever. Does God sit around counting numbers like shepherds count sheep? Does he need to? If he wanted to, is not capable?
(2) I find little to commend the objection that God can’t know such things because knowing them is of no practical use to God. Who are we to judge what uses God may find in knowing those truths which his own being and existence ground? Perhaps God enjoys himself and the infinite variety of possibilities and truths that flow from him? Perhaps he gets pleasure from reflecting upon his own infinite capabilities. Who are we to deny him this pleasure?
(3) There’s even less to commend the objection that if God did know all propositions that he’d be less personal: “…they render God a rather impersonal being. Persons do not keep vast repositories of useless abstract knowledge in their consciousness just for the sake of it.” I’m just being honest here, HB, but this just appears so presumptuous to me. Humans do sometimes possess gratuitous knowledge. And we’re not less personal for this fact. So in principle there’s no basis for your claim. But once again, who can say what purpose God’s knowledge may serve him, if only the justifiable enjoyment God gets from reflecting on his own infinite worth and capabilities?
(4) You ask, “Why would God be obliged to keep all these propositions in his mind?” This misunderstands the issue. Nobody claims God is “obliged” to know anything. To be obliged is to be subject to a rule outside one’s self. God exists necessarily, so is God obliged to exist? Nobody thinks this. Of course God isn’t ‘obliged’ to know all propositions. I might as easily ask you if God is obliged to apprehend all realities perfectly? Really? All realities? Perfectly? What obliges him to do so?
HB: Does he have no choice?
Tom: Does he have no choice in what you claim is the biblical presentation, viz., that God perfectly apprehends all realities? Does God have no choice in apprehending those realities the Bible claims he perfectly knows? Must God contemplate ALL realities throughout the universe? Must he apprehend the slightest movement of every spec of dust on Saturn’s moon Janus? Personally I don’t think he has a 'choice' in the matter (except in as much as he was free not to create at all). I don’t find that lessens his perfections, not does it imply an "obligation" to do so.
HB: Classical omniscience, therefore, should be rejected. Instead, we should affirm only the second of Morris's points: that “God has perfect acquaintance with all things”.
Tom: If I begin with affirming just this I still get to propositional knowledge.
HB: But there is no Biblical or theological reason to suppose that his propositional knowledge goes beyond what is required for practical purposes in interacting with his creation.
Tom: Once again, this just seems so presumptuous to me (not that you intend it that way). But it would be arrogant for me to view it this way. To suggest that God can only know those propositions that concern his relationship to US and OUR world is arrogant. HOWEVER (important!), if by “practical purposes in interacting with creation” I can include God’s getting personal enjoyment from knowing things about the universe that are completely gratuitous so far as his purposes US and OUR world are concerned, then I totally agree, there’s no reason to suppose God knows any more than that! But there’s no reason to suggest he knows any less.
-----------------
Tom: Are you still under the impression that knowing something means consciously entertaining it? It doesn’t.
HB: For a being that has perfect knowledge, yes, "knowing" something must mean consciously entertaining it. Although we would say that a human being knows X, even though he currently does not consciously entertain it, but can call it up at will…the word "knowledge" is being used in a weak sense that would be defective from a divine point of view.
Tom: Says who? On what grounds do you consider such an ability a defect? One could easily argue it as a great-making property.
HB: Indeed, once one allows that God does not consciously entertain all propositional knowledge, then I fail to see how your position is any different to mine or Jeff's.
Tom: It’s quite different. As your next quote shows, for you God’s not keeping facts in conscious contemplation amounts to ignorance, since God has to “figures out” what is not consciously contemplated when God chooses to do so. That’s not at all my view, since it involves a movement from ignorance to knowledge, and I don’t think God is ever ignorant. But not consciously contemplating something one does know is different. I know that I was born in California. I don’t consciously contemplate this at all times. But when I do contemplate it consciously I do so without “figuring it out.” I know it even when I don’t contemplate it. I see now defect whatsoever in God’s being able to manage facts in like manner.
HB: I don't know anyone who would deny omniscience, if omniscience merely means that God has the capacity to bring any fact to his conscious attention. After all, God is infinitely brilliant, and could figure out every truth in an instant.
Tom: It all depends on what you mean by “bring any fact to attention.” If you mean God is ignorant of some fact but is able to “figure it out,” then I’ll disagree. If you mean God is able to call to attention for contemplation some known fact (such as we often do), then of course I agree.
HB: The question is whether he has already so figured everything out, and retained it in consciousness.
Tom: That’s a question you’ll have to struggle with since you limit divine knowledge to what is analogous with our conscious contemplation of facts. I don’t find it attributing defective knowledge to God to suppose that he is able to call to attention what he knows (as opposed to having to “figure it out”). And the reasons you offer for why God should be thought of as not knowing all propositions (that such knowledge is pointless, doesn’t have anything to do with God’s relating to US, that God gets not use out of such vast knowledge, and that if he so knew all truths he’s be less personal) all seem extremely weak to me for the reasons I shared.
Well, peace out,
Tom Post Edited (TGB) : 2/19/2006 4:02:11 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Similitude Registered Member
 Date Joined Apr 2004 Total Posts : 4968 | Posted 2/19/2006 9:37 AM (GMT -6) |   | Tom (in response to HB): I find little to commend the objection that God can’t know such things because knowing them is of no practical use to God. Who are we to judge what uses God may find in knowing those truths which his own being and existence ground? Perhaps God enjoys himself and the infinite variety of possibilities and truths that flow from him? Perhaps he gets pleasure from reflecting upon his own infinite capabilities. Who are we to deny him this pleasure?
Jeff: I take you to be admitting that we can't prove the case either way--that God may or may NOT find it useful to contemplate necrophiliacs billions of years before their existence. Now THAT'S the point. We can't prove WHICH is true, unless the ontological argument does that for us. And I'm assuming that God's mind is quintessentially telological. Maybe He daydreams, but I doubt it.
But let's step back and consider the idea that God does not consciously contemplate ALL truths at ALL times in light of the idea that time is eternal (past and present). You had said in another thread that God's knowledge doesn't just exist--that it is ontologically and epistemologically grounded. You said it was epistemologically grounded insomuch as God INTUITIVELY apprehends ALL truths FROM His exhaustive self-knowledge.
I can follow this easily if apprehension occurs at a point of time when God PURPOSELY directs His attention to the question of what is possible, given His own self-knowledge. But if this intuitive apprehension occurs automatically and continuously, then HOW can we be sure that God can ever cease to be conscious of a truth about a necrophiliac?
It would seem that the intuitive mechanism you posit to account for God's ETERNAL omniscience would render it impossible for God to contemplate only a SUBSET of all truths at any given time. In other words, it seems to me that the intuitive mechanism that you postulate to account for the ETERNALITY of God's omniscience can only work if it works ALL THE TIME. Otherwise, we can only account for a NON-continuous apprehension of truths by God's VOLITIONAL CHOICE. I.e., He must CHOOSE to apprehend and consciously contemplate all possible truths at a point in time, if He does so at all.
It is the eternality of time that creates the problem for me. The only way I can see an intuition-mechanism generating all truths from eternity past, is if it is continually occurring forever. But if so, how can we suppose God can be conscious of only SOME truths at any particular time? I'm not being clear, but I hope you see what I'm asking.
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  |  Similitude Registered Member
 Date Joined Apr 2004 Total Posts : 4968 | Posted 2/19/2006 5:16 PM (GMT -6) |   | | Tom: I assume you know some truths intuitively. Do you hold these all in conscious contemplation at all times by virtue of the fact that they are known intuitively?
Jeff: No, but whatever truths I have obtained intuitively (i.e., non-discursively) were obtained AUTOMATICALLY. That's the point. If either we OR God obtain knowledge AUTOMATICALLY, it would seem that such knowledge would either "come to" conscious contemplation or not, AUTOMATICALLY.
Post Edited (jefscott) : 2/19/2006 8:42:11 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Similitude Registered Member
 Date Joined Apr 2004 Total Posts : 4968 | Posted 2/19/2006 9:39 PM (GMT -6) |   | Tom, I'll be back on-line next weekend. Until then, let me try to boil it down. All knowledge acquisition must occur, I would think, in one of three ways:
1) the knowledge is attained automatically, like intuitive knowledge,
2) volitionally AND automatically, like discursive knowledge, or
3) possibly, in the case of God, volitionally only.
Now 2) & 3) require that the knowledge acquistion is done AT THE TIME that the agent VOLITIONALLY chooses to acquire the knowledge. Thus, 2) and 3) can not get us to ETERNAL knowledge. Now 1) might be able to get us to eternal knowledge, but I need to understand how you account for purely automatic knowledge generation resulting in conscious contemplation at some times but non-conscious knowledge acquistion at others. I would think ALL conscious contemplation by God would be volitional.
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 |  Humphrey Bogart Registered Member

Date Joined Jun 2003 Total Posts : 205 | Posted 2/20/2006 4:21 AM (GMT -6) |   | Hello Tom!
Tom said... I think I could probably agree with the first part, not with the second. I agree that the biblical portrayal (certainly the OT) of the scope and nature of God’s knowledge is of God as infallibly acquainted with all realities (as opposed to an infallible knower of propositional truths). That’s how the Bible presents God.
Excellent! I'm glad you agree at least on this point. 
Tom said... We leave biblical theology, strictly speaking, and move into systematics when we talk about divine knowledge of all truths/propositions. But so what? Nobody does their faith solely in biblical terms and leaves it at that. If we did we’d have no doctrine of the Trinity and much of our Christology would not exist.
Again, this is true, but it raises an important point. While we may need to leave biblical theology when we get into systematics, I do think that means that whatever portion of our systematics is not directly based on biblical exegesis, should not become an article of faith. In other words, believers should be free to adopt different views on the matter without being condemned or excluded. So in the case of the Trinity, I personally think that the biblical texts themselves entail that there are three persons who are God, and they are one God. I think believers should accept that. But when we get into the explanations of how that might be so, I don't think believers are obliged to any one particular view, even if it was the view expressed by the fathers and early church councils.
In other words, systematics should be regarded as a developing, intellectually interesting and important field, but not as dogma. Only what we can say is plainly taught in scripture should be dogma. So for instance on the issue of foreknowledge, no view is clearly and plainly taught (in my opinion, although obviously I think the open view fits the data best), and therefore Calvinists, classical Arminians and open theists should all be happy fellowshipping together, and we can continue to debate the issue in a scholarly and friendly way.
Tom said... But for someone who argues the truth of propositions is grounded in realities God is perfectly acquainted with, the absolute distinction you make between “apprehending all things/realities” and “propositions” is simply false. I’m not suggesting there is no distinction. There is. The truth-value of propositions, an adherent of the correspondence theory of truth can argue, is grounded in the realities that make our world what it is…the Bible’s “all things.” I’m just suggesting that if propositional truths are grounded in realities/states of affairs, then one can also argue that knowledge of propositions is entailed in a perfect knowledge of the realities that ground those propositions, and that someone who failed to know all S’s properties and relations shouldn’t be thought of as perfectly acquainted with S.
This is an interesting point. I think a being could be perfectly acquainted with S without knowing all S's properties and relations, as I might be perfectly acquianted with my wife, without knowing all her properties and relations (e.g. precisely how far she is from Jupiter at a given point in time). But even if we accept what you're saying here, and God does have propositional knowledge of everythings properties and relations - and well he might - I still don't see why this would require exhaustive propositional knowledge.
Tom said... To suggest that God has perfect or infallible acquaintance of some reality but does not know the truths that reality grounds is to suggest God is THE most unreflective sentient being that could possibly exist.
Again, I don't suggest that God is unreflective. I just don't understand why whatever propositional knowledge that he had by means of reflection would have to be exhaustive. For instance, it is easy to prove that there are an infinite number of well-formed languages. Why would God need to know every one of those? Wouldn't it suffice just to know his own language and human/angelic languages? Why would knowledge of all the other possible but non-existent languages arise from contemplating his creation?
Tom said... but it seems to me you have a overly anthropomorphic view of God. I mean really, who are we to say what God can enjoy thinking about or not? You come close to simply denying that God’s even smart enough to know all the propositional truths there are. You assume that since no human knower has enough intelligence to contain all that’s knowable, or has to spread his intelligence thinner the more he knows, God must be limited in the same ways. But why think that?
No, I'm not denying that God could, if he so choose, know all propositional knowledge. What I'm saying is (a) there doesn't seem to me to be any systematic/philosophical reason that he would have to choose to have exhaustive propositional knowledge, and (b) there doesn't seem to be any biblical reason that he has to have exhaustive propositional knowledge (and indeed, I think there are biblical suggestions, by no means unambiguous, that he doesn't).
The problem with your position is that you're just saying "why couldn't God know all propositions?". But I agree that he could. I just don't see how you can prove that he does.
Tom said... I find little to commend the objection that God can’t know such things because knowing them is of no practical use to God. Who are we to judge what uses God may find in knowing those truths which his own being and existence ground? Perhaps God enjoys himself and the infinite variety of possibilities and truths that flow from him? Perhaps he gets pleasure from reflecting upon his own infinite capabilities. Who are we to deny him this pleasure?
Perhaps, but it seems to me that there are some true propositions that he may find distinctly unpleasurable. For example, a true proposition prior to David committing adultery might have been "my good friend and servant David might murder an innocent man and commit adultery with his wife". I don't see how God would have found it pleasurable to entertain that particular truth! I think that's the point of Jeff's necrophilia example.
Tom said... here’s even less to commend the objection that if God did know all propositions that he’d be less personal: “…they render God a rather impersonal being. Persons do not keep vast repositories of useless abstract knowledge in their consciousness just for the sake of it.” I’m just being honest here, HB, but this just appears so presumptuous to me. Humans do sometimes possess gratuitous knowledge. And we’re not less personal for this fact. So in principle there’s no basis for your claim. But once again, who can say what purpose God’s knowledge may serve him, if only the justifiable enjoyment God gets from reflecting on his own infinite worth and capabilities?
I'm arguing from analogy with humans, which of course has its weaknesses, but is not entirely without merit. Humans find some kinds of propositions interesting (such as general theories, for instance), but other kinds of propositions boring (such as a list of statements about the possible number of grains of sand on every possible planet). Now granted, God may find such things interesting, but I doubt it. It is hard to know precisely what God's personality is like, but it would be an odd sort of personality in human terms - indeed perhaps autistic - who found such things interesting.
Tom said... Nobody claims God is “obliged” to know anything. To be obliged is to be subject to a rule outside one’s self. God exists necessarily, so is God obliged to exist? Nobody thinks this. Of course God isn’t ‘obliged’ to know all propositions. I might as easily ask you if God is obliged to apprehend all realities perfectly? Really? All realities? Perfectly? What obliges him to do so?
This cuts to the heart of the matter. Either God's exhaustive propositional knowledge is voluntary (he chose to know it), or it is necessary (he simply knows it by virtue of his necessary nature). Now we all agree that God's apprehension of reality is necessary, I think. But with propositional knowledge, things are different. If it arises from reflection on his creation, surely that reflection is voluntary. And if so, why would he have to go further than he wanted to?
Personally, I think it is logically impossible for propositional knowledge to be a necessary attribute of God. That has to do with the fact that propositions reference something other than themselves, and the meaning of propositions (i.e. the arbitrary rules governing what they reference) have to be selected or chosen by a free subject.
But knowledge by acquaintance is not referential, it is direct. It does not require any choice or selection on the part of the subject. So it can be a necessary attribute of God.
Tom said... Says who? On what grounds do you consider such an ability a defect? One could easily argue it as a great-making property.
OK, I need to elaborate a bit more here on issues related to cognition. Knowledge that is not currently in our consciousness is only of use if it can be brought into consciousness by us. Indeed, it would seem odd to claim that one knew something, but when asked to consciously recall it, could not do so. But knowledge that is not currently in our consciousness is part of our unconscious, and the process or recall is in large part an unconscious cognitive process. It would be impossible for us to be entirely conscious of every cognitive process without equally being conscious of all we knew, because what we know, even unconsciously, has widespread cognitive ramifications (I can give empirical evidence if you doubt this). Now I have at least three objections to God operating like this:
(a) The idea that anything could be unconscious to God seems to imply ignorance on his part. Indeed, the very idea of an unconscious is surely only possible to a being that is finite and ignorant.
(b) Our unconscious processes are not within our conscious control. They are like a "universe inside", a law-governed open system of cause and effect. If God has unconscious cognitive processes, then they must also be not within his conscious control, and there exists a "universe within God" that partly governs his behaviour without his being aware of it. That seems almost an abandonment of theism.
(c) Knowing something consciously is superior to knowing it unconsciously, because the only virtue in knowing it unconsciously is derived from the fact that one can bring it to consciousness. For instance, gold is more than valuable than lead, if the only reason why people value lead, is that it can be turned into gold.
Tom said... It all depends on what you mean by “bring any fact to attention.” If you mean God is ignorant of some fact but is able to “figure it out,” then I’ll disagree. If you mean God is able to call to attention for contemplation some known fact (such as we often do), then of course I agree.
I can see why God consciously conteplating some fact could be useful, but I fail to see why holding it in his unconscious would be of any use at all. He could figure out the relevant fact in the same time that it took to recall it. The end result, that he had the fact in consciousness, would be the same either way. Only the means would be different. I don't understand why someone would get so hung-up about the means.Post Edited (Humphrey Bogart) : 2/20/2006 3:37:48 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Similitude Registered Member
 Date Joined Apr 2004 Total Posts : 4968 | Posted 3/20/2006 1:10 PM (GMT -6) |   | |
Albert: (b) Our unconscious processes are not within our conscious control. They are like a "universe inside", a law-governed open system of cause and effect. If God has unconscious cognitive processes, then they must also be not within his conscious control, and there exists a "universe within God" that partly governs his behaviour without his being aware of it. That seems almost an abandonment of theism.
Jeff: I don't follow you, here, Albert. If there are any attributes of God that are necessary, the same issue arises, does it not? I mean, once we say something is necessary, we're at the end of our epistemological rope. But how is that an "abandonment of theism?" I would think the same kind of thing could be said about whatever constitutes God as benevolent. It would be beyond His control, wouldn't it? And for all I know, if it's beyond His control, it might be outside of His consciousness. I'm confused. | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Humphrey Bogart Registered Member

Date Joined Jun 2003 Total Posts : 205 | Posted 3/21/2006 3:52 AM (GMT -6) |   | jefscott said... I don't follow you, here, Albert. If there are any attributes of God that are necessary, the same issue arises, does it not? I mean, once we say something is necessary, we're at the end of our epistemological rope. But how is that an "abandonment of theism?" I would think the same kind of thing could be said about whatever constitutes God as benevolent. It would be beyond His control, wouldn't it? And for all I know, if it's beyond His control, it might be outside of His consciousness. I'm confused.
Fair enough, I was very brief and didn't explain myself. I think that the crucial, essential feature of theism is that it puts the existence of whatever is down to one factor: the will of God. In other words, things are because God chose them to so be. I think, therefore, that we should reject the idea of God having necessary psychological attributes which causally explain how he acts. In doing so, we shift the explanation from the free will of God, to some logically prior necessary state of affairs that constitute God's essence or psychological makeup or whatever. The explanation for things being the way they are is no longer "because God freely chose to make them that way", it is, "because God has such-and-such a nature which, by the way, is necessary". The reason I think that is really an abandonment of theism is that it really substitutes an impersonal explanation (that God has some necessary nature) for a personal one (that a personal being chose freely). Indeed, I see little different between saying that God has some necessary psychological nature with fixed law-like behaviour and saying that the existence of some kind of physical universe with fixed laws is necessary; and one could merge the two in pantheism.
There are, ultimately, only two possible chains of causation. These are:
(a) CHOICE OF GOD (uncaused and free) -> WORLD
OR
(b) GOD'S ESSENCE (uncaused and necessary) -> CHOICE OF GOD (caused) -> WORLD
The ultimate choice, therefore, is between the "uncaused and free" of option (a) or the "uncaused and necessary" of option (b). But, in a real sense, God's essence constitutes a part of the world (what is). So option B becomes:
(b) WORLD (includes GOD'S ESSENCE) -> CHOICE OF GOD (caused) -> REST OF WORLD
That's why option (b) undermindes theism. It makes God an actor on a pre-existent stage, rather than the creator of the stage.
The ultimate example of this is Calvinism. Calvinists argue that God's acts are an expression of his essence. Of course, they say that God is free. But when pushed, they admit that by "free" they do not mean counter-causal freedom in the libertarian sense. They usually are somewhat embarrassed to talk about the application of their theory to God, but they in essence argue that God's acts are determined by his nature. Logically, this means that the entire course of history, down to the minutest detail, was settled in God's nature before history began. But since they claim that God's nature is necessary, there is only one obvious conclusion, which they rarely draw: that all is necessity, that nothing could be other than it is. Spinoza would be right: God exists and acts of necessity. Essentialism ends with Spinoza, who was the last and final prophet of that doctrine.
Psychological explanations are, after all, "mechanical", in an internal rather than an external sense. So someone might say, Jim repressed his anger towards Bill, but this caused him to show passive aggression towards Bill, or something like that. We postulate the existence of a state (repressed anger) which causally influences Jim's behaviour just like causation in the physical universe. We postulate a "universe inside". My point is that there can be no such universe inside God; and even if there was, he could not possibly be ignorant of it, which would nullify it anyway (he would like the perfectly cured psychoanalytic patient - he would fully understand his inner workings, and hence would no longer be dominated by them).
I would also argue that whatever being has unconscious psychological processes which influence their behaviour, cannot be perfectly rational and cannot be perfectly good. I will leave the argument aside, but this entails that God, and indeed, we in the resurrection of the dead, will not have unconscious cognition. I would tend to associate the Biblical concept of "the flesh" in us that wars against the spirit, with our unconscious psychological drives, desires, and so forth.
In short: God has perfect apprehension of all things, but there is no "inner essence" or psychological nature that lies behind his conscious apprehension and which is capable of further apprehension. He is that which apprehends but which cannot be apprehended. He is pure consciousness. Nothing is unconscious to him.
Therefore, whatever God knows, he knows consciously and not by means of the possibility of recall.Post Edited (Humphrey Bogart) : 3/21/2006 3:08:07 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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