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Alan Rhoda
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   Posted 2/4/2008 12:45 AM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Tom asked me to chime in here, so I'll do so briefly.

First, Chaz, under the heading of the "third law of logic" you are conflating the law of excluded middle (for every proposition, either it or its denial is true) and the principle of bivalence (for every proposition, either it is true or it is false). That these principles are not identical is show by the existence of multi-valued systems of logic that affirm LEM while denying PB.

Second, it is neither a law of logic nor an immediate deliverance of those laws that "all propositions are omnitemporally true or false". That doesn't follow from either LEM or PB. It might be thought that as abstract entities the properties of propositions cannot change, and that this includes their truth value. But this is a mistake. From the abstract nature of propositions it only follows that their internal properties (their meaning or content) cannot change. When it comes to contingent truths, however, truth is an external or relational property. According to the correspondence theory, a true proposition (a truth-bearer) is true only in relation to a truth-maker. Get rid of the truth-makers, and a proposition that was true can become false.

Third, Chaz is right that arguing from NEC(If p then q) and q to NEC(q) is a modal fallacy, but he is mistaken in thinking that the standard arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and future contingency commit this fallacy. We do NOT argue like this:

1. Necessarily, either God knows that Clarence will eat a cheese omelet tomorrow or 
   God knows that Clarence will not eat a cheese omelet tomorrow.
2. Necessarily, if God knows that Clarence will eat a cheese omelet tomorrow, then 
   Clarence will eat a cheese omelet tomorrow.
3. Necessarily, if God knows that Clarence will not eat a cheese omelet tomorrow, 
   then Clarence will not eat a cheese omelet tomorrow.
Therefore,
4. Either (necessarily, Clarence will eat a cheese omelet tomorrow) or (necessarily, 
   Clarence will not eat a cheese omelet tomorrow).

Note that all of the instances of "necessarily" in this argument are intended to describe "logical" or "absolute" necessity. This argument does commit the modal fallacy and also, I submit, has a false premise in (1). (I argue in the papers to which Tom linked above that corresponding pairs of "will" and "will not" propositions are not contradictories, but contraries. If that's right, then (1) is not a proper instance of either LEM or PB.)

Now, here's how we REALLY argue:

1. God has always known that Clarence will freely eat a cheese omelet tomorrow. 
   (assumption for reductio)
2. Necessarily, if God has always known that Clarence will eat a cheese omelet
   tomorrow, then Clarence will eat a cheese omelet tomorrow. (divine infallibility)
3. The past is now-unpreventable. (fixity of the past)
4. Therefore, it is now-unpreventably the case that God has always known that Clarence
   will freely eat a cheese omelet tomorrow. (1,3)
5. Therefore, it is now-unpreventably the case the Clarence will freely eat a cheese
   omelet tomorrow. (2,4)
6. It is not now-unpreventably the case that Clarence eat a cheese omelet tomorrow. 
   (def. of libertarian freedom)
7. Therefore, (1) is false - God cannot have always known that Clarence will freely
   eat a cheese omelet tomorrow. (reductio ad absurdum, 1-6)

Unlike the modal fallacy, there is no inference from the logical necessity of a conditional (2) to the logical necessity of its consequent. To conclude that it is now-unpreventably the case that Clarence will eat a cheese omelet tomorrow is not to say that his action is logically necessary. It is simply to say that it is as fixed and unchangeable as the past. This is a much weaker type of necessity than logical necessity, but it is incompatible with libertarian freedom nonetheless.

Of course, there have been various attempts to refute the sort of argument I have just given (Ockhamism, Molinism, Boethianism, etc.). Nevertheless, I think the argument is sound because I don't think any of those attempts work. I won't go into detail on that right now. Suffice to say, theological incompatibilism (the view that infallible foreknowledge is incompatible with creaturely libertarian freedom) is NOT guilty of the modal fallacy that Chaz calls attention to. That's nothing more than a red herring in this debate.
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Chaz Finney
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   Posted 2/4/2008 8:35 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Alan;

I began to comment on this post and realized that I have made my points in the previous posts. Thank you for your comments. I will offer one comment: your closing paragraph; you are arguing that the ‘fixity’ of the future is incompatible with ‘libertarian freedom’. But on your account, you are demanding that ‘libertarian freedom’ involves the ability to actualize a contradiction. If that were what ‘libertarian freedom’ were, then its existence would be logically impossible.

Chaz
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Alan Rhoda
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   Posted 2/4/2008 11:45 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Chaz: On your account, you are demanding that ‘libertarian freedom’ involves the ability to actualize a contradiction. If that were what ‘libertarian freedom’ were, then its existence would be logically impossible.

Alan: Huh??? Care to articulate your point a bit? How exactly do I demand that libertarian freedom involves the ability to actualize a contradiction?
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Chaz Finney
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   Posted 2/6/2008 1:36 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Alan;
 
There are several fallacies in your reasoning that should be obvious to you. For example, another case in point: Alan wrote: Of course, there have been various attempts to refute the sort of argument I have just given (Ockhamism, Molinism, Boethianism, etc.). Nevertheless, I think the argument is sound because (Italics mine) I don't think any of those attempts work.

 

Alan you should know better that to claim that your argument is sound because you are unaware or don't accept any of the counterexamples that would rebut your theory. Pointing out this fallacious reasoning is not a red-herring. Again per my original post; The Open View builds a straw case that knowledge of a future contingent precludes free will, and then attempts to show that the Open View is the only theory that can preserve free will.

 

Chaz

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Alan Rhoda
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   Posted 2/6/2008 4:17 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Your last comment, Chaz, is tremendously condescending and unproductive. It seems that you either have no interest or no aptitude for serious discussion. If you want people to take what you have to say seriously, then you need to stop giving lazy and insulting responses and engage in specific detail with the arguments offered to you.

I presented an apparently valid argument for the conclusion that infallible foreknowledge is incompatible with libertarian. If you think the argument's unsound, fine, but please extend me the courtesy of identifying a premise that you believe to be false and justifying your rejection of that premise.

And, for the record, my claiming that the argument is sound is hardly fallacious. It may be a false claim, if one or more of the standard types of response actually work. But I have (elsewhere) looked at all of the responses very closely, and I really don't think any of them work. Admitting the conclusions one has come to is not a fallacy. I think it's sound because I think the premises are true and the logic is good. I don't mind that you disagree with that assessment, but please engage with the argument.

I'm open to having further dialogue with you, but only if you give my arguments the same detailed and fair-minded scrutiny that I have tried to give to yours.

Sincerely,

Alan
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Tom
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   Posted 2/7/2008 1:24 AM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Alan-
Good comments. I think you're right on of course.

I'm interested in a slightly different question as well. If we admit a diversity of theories of knowledge and truth consistent with our unity in Christ, and if these theories construe the doctrine of omniscicne differently, how would you suggest the Church go about expressing a doctrine of omniscience that doesn't either beg the question by being too closely related to one specific theory of knowledge/truth or by being so general (to accommodate a diversity of theories of truth) it's not helpful? In other words, is a doctrine of omniscience possible without assuming a particular theory of knowledge and truth?

Tom


 

Post Edited (HumanHypostasis) : 2/7/2008 12:27:07 AM (GMT-6)

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Alan Rhoda
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   Posted 2/7/2008 5:33 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Hi Tom.

Well, I don't think we want to be completely neutral when it comes to truth and knowledge. Serious realist theology requires a broadly realist orientation, and that means some version of the correspondence theory of (propositional) truth.

As for the concept of knowledge, yeah there are details that are hard to work out, but its very hard to see how (propositional) knowledge could be anything other than some variation on the justified true belief (JTB) theme. Truth, because knowledge excludes error - you can't know what ain't so. Belief, because to have propositional knowledge is to represent the world a certain way and to either consciously or practically endorse that representation (It's nonsense to say "I know that 2+2=4, but I really don't believe it" ). Justification (grounding, warrant, etc.), because knowledge is incompatible with getting it right by blind luck. Rather, your having a true belief must be appropriately non-accidental.

One final thought. Part of the reason why epistemologists have had such a hard time with the concept of knowledge is that until recently they've generally supposed (as analytic philosophers are wont) that there is a precise and invariant set of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. That assumption leads headlong into Gettier problems, the problem of the criterion, lottery paradoxes, and so forth. A better approach, I think, is to recognize that knowledge is an analogical concept of which God is the paradigm instance. Consider this: All of the various concepts that philosophers have used to try to get a grip on knowledge admit of degrees. Beliefs can be more or less strong. There can be better and worse approximations to the truth. One can have more or less justification, greater or lesser reliability, and so forth. Human knowledge is always partial and imperfect, but the idea of God as the greatest possible being requires us to think of him as the perfect knower. That means that, unlike us, God is not plagued by doubt (his degree of belief is always maximal) or by error (he is infallible). His knowledge is unlimited in scope, and he is maximally reliable and has maximal justification, so there can be "epistemic distance" between God and his creation. Put it all together and you get the result that with maximal confidence God infallibly knows all that is as it is - "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth".

So, I guess I really don't see what the big problem is. Unity in Christ means nothing if there is no such thing as objective truth knowable as such.
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Tom
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   Posted 2/8/2008 12:33 AM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Thanks Alan! That clarifies things for me.

T


 

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Corey
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   Posted 2/8/2008 7:56 AM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
"... realist theology ..."
Could someone unpack that a bit? Are we committed to it? I've been thinking some form of nominalism might be correct. Am I in a bad way?


Before God, in grace, we will with all our power to be that which He shows us we are.

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Tom
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   Posted 2/8/2008 8:45 AM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.

Corey:  Am I in a bad way?

 

Tom: You’re definitely going to hell now. icon_smile_tongue 

 

My question to Alan was along those lines too. Are realists and nominalists committed to fundamentally different understandings of omniscience?

 

I’d be interested in your reasons for preferring nominalism.

 

I’m basically a realist because it seems to follow from theism. In the simplest form, the argument asserts that before God creates X, God conceives of X. However, if God can conceive of X without X actually existing, then it follows that the possibility of X is independent of the actuality of X. So if God created our world (of particular objects), and God in some sense conceived of that world prior to creating, then that in itself entails some notion of universals existing apart from particular objects. Like Augustine, I posit those universals in the mind of God. Universals just are God’s own conceiving of or imagining all the infinite possibilities he grounds, all the things God ‘can’ do. God envisions the world, contemplates its possibilities, and his infinite actuality is the ground of those possibilities. Realism follows.

 

But that’s a philosophical/theological argument. I wouldn’t know how to construct a ‘biblical’ argument for realism. So if realism and nominalism are both consistently biblical/Christian positions, how does the Church construct an understanding of ‘omniscience’ that’s compatible with both?.

 

 I think that’s what Alan has in mind.

 

Tom

PS Alan's post for some reason is extra WIDE and screwed up the layout of the page. $&%#)


 

Post Edited (HumanHypostasis) : 2/8/2008 7:49:44 AM (GMT-6)

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Chaz Finney
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   Posted 2/8/2008 10:48 AM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.

Alan & Tom;

I may post a few more comments over this weekend; however, as you read the rest of this post I think you will see that I personally believe that the argument over omniscience is senseless.

Tom there is no theory of knowledge that doesn't beg the question. All knowledge (even logic) is plagued by the Problem of the Criterion which states that: In order for us to know what knowledge is we must have some criteria to judge an instance of "knowledge" by; however, in order to have an instance of knowledge we need to have the criteria to judge it by, and in order to have the criteria, we need to have an instance of knowledge judge it by, and the circle never ends. Attempts to jump out of the circle (Particularist and Methodist) have failed. Within this "circle of knowledge” (no pun intended) the "leading theory" of truth is the correspondence theory which in its own way further begs the question.

The correspondence theory states that a proposition is true in virtue of its "fitting the facts" or its relation or correspondence to reality or truth. Yet the very thing we are searching for is "truth or the facts" - do you see how this begs the question? Our propositions posits "truth" yet to justify this "truth" we need to point to "Truth", the very item of debate...

Additionally the correspondence theory is of no use with regards to necessary truths or a falsehood...Another leading theory is the Coherence theory; but the circularity of this theory is too obvious for most of us to stomach.

You raised a valid concern in that how can we begin to discuss God's knowledge when we can't even punch our way out of our own circle? Can we justify a claim of God's knowledge when we can't even define knowledge of the human domain without begging the question or getting stuck on an infinite regress? I don't think we need to introduce Gettier at this juncture; suffice it to say that the tripartite JTB view of kowledge don't cut the mustard neither. (By the way I think an externalist or reliabilist view of knolwedge would accept that omniscience could know the future while maintaining that the future is contingently free).

There is another classic problem in philosophy viz. The Problem of Other Minds. The question is simply: Can we assume we know what or how someone else thinks or knows without; let us say in a loose sense "privileged access” to their minds? So even after all of the ciphering, and logical proofs and theories have been posted...we still have not dealt with these two fundamental issues of knowledge that doesn't beg the question or gets caught on the infinite regress, and the problem of Other Minds viz. God's mind to be specific. Additionally it seems as though every theory of omniscience proffered by man assumes that God’s knowledge is restricted to the domain of human knowledge (empirical, a priori); or some other way, regardless; how defendable of a presupposition is this? How can we step outside the domain of our humanity and understand God? A God who has said His ways are not our ways, His thoughts are not our thoughts, His knowledge is inifinte and without limits... To put forward a theory of omniscience such as the one Alan just posted, or my theory that God "somehow unknown to us" knows the truth value of a future contingent; is no more or less cogent or justifiable than the other. We all try to marshall the laws of logic to our side; but ultimately, the issue of omniscience is well beyond logic or any human reasoning.

It is quite humorous, in that as sophisticiated as all of this talk of epistemology sounds, the impressiveness of the logical notation...it is all build on presuppositions that can't be justified, and knowledge that is circular. As concerned over "soundness" as we seem; we all overlook that fact that the very essense of these logical and epistemic arguments are tained with circularity. Jesus would call this "Endless geneologies" and a "Houses built on the sand" (at least with regards to the attempts to understand the infinite with the finite mind). We need to realize that much of the abstract issues of God need to be accepted as a mystery or "unknowable" to us as humans. On ocassion one might receive "revelation knowledge; yet this too is unexplainable.

Fear God and keep his commandments, feed the poor, take care of widows and orphans,

Chaz

 

Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 2/8/2008 12:32:02 PM (GMT-6)

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Alan Rhoda
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   Posted 2/8/2008 1:56 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Corey,

By "realist" theology I wasn't primarily alluding to the realism/nominalism debate, though that may have some relevance here. What I meant was that we believe things like the following:

God really exists.
Jesus really rose from the dead.
Evil is real (it's not illusory) and it needs to be combated.

These are objective facts about the world. They are true in the sense that they correspond to reality.
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Alan Rhoda
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   Posted 2/8/2008 2:26 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Chaz,

Your recent post is a much better attempt at dialogue than your previous two missives, so thank you for that.

Question: If you think that the argument over omniscience is senseless, then why did you bring it up in the first place? You began this thread by insinuating, if not frankly stating, that open theists are guilty of obviously fallacious reasoning. But after some inconclusive back-and-forth with Tom you took an abrupt skeptical turn, which seems to pull the ground out from under your initial critique. What gives?

As for your skeptical turn, I have a hard time taking the issues you bring up - the problem of the criterion, other minds, etc. - as seriously as you do. I wrote my dissertation on the skeptical problem of induction, so I'm familiar with the general nature of these sorts of problems. The correct general response to all of them is, I think, basically the same. It's what Peirce calls 'critical common-sensism'. Starting off with an initial posture of skepticism is self-stultifying. It stops the process of inquiry dead in its tracks in an unending hermeneutical spiral of suspicion. The only possible productive posture is to start out by trusting the appearances, what 'seems' to be the case, as genuine though defeasible guides to reality. We have to start inquiry from where we're at. That's the common-sensism part. The critical part comes in the need to harmonize, systematize, and test the appearances. Obviously, any test is going to involve appeal to further appearances. But that's okay. We don't need a neutral, absolutely certain starting point a la classical foundationalism. We just need faith, hope, and love. Love for the truth as something of ultimate intrinsic value. Hope that we can discover the truth, at least in good measure. And faith that the means actually at our disposal are generally trustworthy for getting us there.


Grammar must be based in logic, logic in ontology, ontology in onto-theology.
-- Bill Vallicella

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Tom
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   Posted 2/8/2008 2:31 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Alan and Chaz-

Just thinking out loud...

Chaz argues that we can't justifiably claim to know what knowledge is. As far as I can tell, this reduces to the claim that knowledge of anything,
knowledge itself, is impossible. But isn't this self-defeating? That is, isn't Chaz exempting himself from the implications of his own assertion? He
claims to be justified in knowing something, namely, that we can't justificably claim this or that (regarding knowledge per se). But surely his claim
is a claim to know something.

Your work is epistemology, Alan; do I have a point?

Tom


 

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Chaz Finney
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   Posted 2/8/2008 4:01 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.

Tom that is not what I am arguing;

 

My point is not that "I am claiming to have knowledge that we have no knowledge". I hold to a pragmatic or commonsense approach of epistemology and therefore I am willing to accept that we do indeed have knowledge despite the fallacious reasoning that I have to accept that comes with the notion of knowledge. 

 

The points I was making were that in light of these issues, if we can’t come up with a concept of knowledge or truth (In the human domain) that aren’t beguiled with circulatory or infinite regress, how can we expect to understand divine knowledge? I don’t believe that the arguments that are put forth by Open Theists are consistent with a pragmatic or a commonsense approach, I have noted the issues that would be acceptable to a commonssense approach that the Open Theist refutes; the theology seemingly postures itself as a bulwark against fallacy, yet the concepts of knowledge and truth are laiden with circular reasoning.

 

Would anyone on this BB rely on someone's view of divine knowledge when this individual couldn't give you a definition of knowledge and truth that are not beguiled with circular reasoning?

 

This was my point,

 

Alan;

 

I think this may have answered your question in part. The reason I brought the issue up on the BB was:

 

1. To show that one need not go to multi-valued logic to defend free will 

 

2. Often advocates of a particular thology will put forth their arguments as though they are logically and epistemically air-tight. My goal was to show that this isn't the case and that to try to understand omniscience, noble as it may be is an excercise in futility. We need to settle the issues of knowledge - before we can even hope to understand God's knowledge.

 

3. I don't think that the issues that I raised are those of a skeptic, they are problems that have caused many to "walk away" from epistemology and are acknowledged by many in the ranks of the common-sense camps.

 

 

Chaz

 

 

 

 

Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 2/8/2008 3:56:27 PM (GMT-6)

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Alan Rhoda
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   Posted 2/8/2008 6:05 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Chaz,

Re (1), I agree, but as Tom pointed out earlier, bivalence is compatible with open theism.

Re (2), I disagree. Understanding omniscience is not an exercise in futility because, despite your insistence to the contrary, the concepts of knowledge are truth are not inextricably circular. Rather, they are primitive concepts, ones that are necessarily presupposed in any attempt to make sense of anything whatsoever. We have a pretheoretical grasp of such notions as they are given in the intentionality of human intelligence and rationality. (For an elaborate development of this idea you might take a look at Bernard Lonergan's magisterial tome, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, esp. the first 12 or so chapters.)

Re (3), whether you call your stance 'skeptical' or not, it is not the stance of commonsense. Only philosophers of a certain stripe worry about things like the problem of the criterion. The average, run-of-the-mill, commonsense folk get along just fine in using the concepts of 'truth' and 'knowledge' even if they can't articulate them to an analytic philosopher's satisfaction.
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Chaz Finney
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   Posted 2/8/2008 6:58 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Alan wrote:

Re (3), whether you call your stance 'skeptical' or not, it is not the stance of commonsense. Only philosophers of a certain stripe worry about things like the problem of the criterion. The average, run-of-the-mill, commonsense folk get along just fine in using the concepts of 'truth' and 'knowledge' even if they can't articulate them to an analytic philosopher's satisfaction.

Chaz:

Alan, you are misrepresenting my position when you say that I “worry”, I don’t worry about the problem of the criterion; I simply acknowledge it and its implications. I acknowledge that all knowledge is circular and assuming the circle is “large enough” I am willing to grant that we often have knowledge.

I mentioned in the post to Tom that I hold to the commonsense approach, and get along just fine using the concepts of truth and knowledge. My point is that we commonsense folk acknowledge the issues that plague knowledge and truth and are willing to accept that we possess knowledge despite these problems. The skeptic is the one who would not grant anyone knowledge based on these issues.

Again these problems with the tripartite analysis, correspondence theory, and problem of the criterion are patently open to all who study epistemology. These are paradigm examples of problems in epistemology, not skepticism. To point these problems out is not a skeptical view but rather a view of intellectual honesty. A commonsense approach is not ignorant or in denial of these problems of circularity, commonsense says that we are willing to grant that we have knowledge despite these maladies.

Knowing the issues that plague knowledge; it is “dishonest” to represent a view of knowledge (which would include divine knolwedge) that denies or ignores these issues; somewhat of a sin of omission.

These issues are not primitive; epistemologists have been struggling with them for thousands of years and still can’t overcome them.

Call me a skeptic if you like, I prefer to consider my views as forgiving, studied, intellectually honest; and above all – commonsense.
 

Chaz

Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 2/8/2008 6:08:50 PM (GMT-6)

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JET
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   Posted 2/9/2008 1:40 AM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Chaz,

1. You came here saying that the OV can only defend the doctrine of free will by “changing the laws of logic” -- by denying the rule that "every proposition is either true or false” (i.e. the principle of bivalence). But what about Alan’s statement that "will" and "will not" propositions are not contradictories, but contraries?

a. Do you agree with this statement? If so, then you would agree that corresponding “will” and “will not” propositions can both be false (according to the definition of contraries). Thus, the propositions “A will do X” and “A will not do X” can both be false (in which case the proposition “A might or might not do X” would be true). All of the foregoing propositions are either true or false. No need to deny bivalence.

b. Or do you disagree that “will” and “will not” propositions are contraries? If so, why? Can you engage with the issue in a way that demonstrates you understand the bivalent model of the OV?

2. You came here saying that the logic of the OV is based on the modal fallacy that “foreknowledge implies necessity”, thus confusing "necessity of consequence with the necessity of the consequent". Alan laid out a formal argument that avoids the type of modal fallacy you assumed the OV makes. You responded to Alan’s comments about the argument, but you never responded to the argument itself. Can you discuss the merits of the formal argument itself? Do you claim the argument is not sound? If so, on what basis? Or do you claim that one or more of the premises is false? If so which one(s)?

Or do you now agree that the OV does not necessarily violate the principle of bivalence and does not necessarily commit a modal fallacy?

Thanks,

JET
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Chaz Finney
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   Posted 2/9/2008 1:22 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
JET;

Thanks for your comments, I assume that you have read the entire thread. Here are the comments on Alan's "chime in"; I must admit as I have stated in a few posts back; "I have made my points". I will leave this thread with these final comments:

Alan wrote: Now, here's how we REALLY argue:

1. God has always known that Clarence will freely eat a cheese omelet tomorrow. (assumption for reductio)

2. Necessarily, if God has always known that Clarence will eat a cheese omelet tomorrow, then Clarence will eat a cheese omelet tomorrow. (divine infallibility)

Why is this premise said to be a case of (or follow from) God’s infallibility. Premise #2 would be true for any knower, God or otherwise. E.g. this claim is true, and has nothing whatever to do with infallibility: “2. Necessarily, if Alan has always known that Clarence will eat a cheese omelet tomorrow, then Clarence will eat a cheese omelet tomorrow.” (def. of “knows”)

3. The past is now-unpreventable. (fixity of the past)

But ditto for the future. If some event has happened, e.g. the outbreak of World War II, then there is nothing anyone can do now to prevent its having happened. But similarly for the future. If some event, E, will happen in, let’s say the year 2239, (we’ll call this event “E2239”), then there is nothing anyone can do now to prevent its happening.

4. Therefore, it is now-unpreventably the case that God has always known that Clarence will freely eat a cheese omelet tomorrow. (1,3)

5. Therefore, it is now-unpreventably the case the Clarence will freely eat a cheese omelet tomorrow. (2,4)

So what? Remember “Clarence will freely eat a cheese omelet tomorrow” was posited as true in premise #1. And on the reconstruction of #3, #5 follows. (As the song said, “Que Sera, Sera”) No big deal.

6. It is not now-unpreventably the case that Clarence eat a cheese omelet tomorrow. (def. of libertarian freedom)

This definition and the particular application in this instance seems to be ‘pulled out of a hat’.

Let’s go back to the example of E2239. Imagine someone saying, “For a proposition to be contingent it must be both possibly true and possibly false. But since E2239 is already (i.e. now) true (and indeed always has been [from time immemorial]), it is not possibly false. Hence E2239 is not contingent.” The reasoning in the preceding two (quoted) sentences is broken-backed. and that #6 commits analogous errors. Leave it to Alan to see what they are.

7. Therefore, (1) is false - God cannot have always known that Clarence will freely eat a cheese omelet tomorrow. (reductio ad absurdum, 1-6)

It seems that Alan is playing fast-and-loose with the concepts of “[non]-unpreventably the case” and “libertarian freedom”.

Unlike the modal fallacy, there is no inference from the logical necessity of a conditional (2) to the logical necessity of its consequent. To conclude that it is now-unpreventably the case that Clarence will eat a cheese omelet tomorrow is not to say that his action is logically necessary. It is simply to say that it is as fixed and unchangeable as the past. This is a much weaker type of necessity than logical necessity, but it is incompatible with libertarian freedom nonetheless.

Alan is arguing that the ‘fixity’ of the future is incompatible with ‘libertarian freedom’. But on his account, he is demanding that ‘libertarian freedom’ involves the ability to actualize a contradiction. If that were what ‘libertarian freedom’ were, then its existence would be logically impossible. But if ‘libertarian freedom’ does not entail the ability to actualize a contraction, then what is he arguing?

It seems that, without Alan’s giving a really good and clear explication of the concepts of “libertarian freedom” and “[non]-unpreventably the case”, he has more-or-less resurrected and endorsed, but using different vocabulary, Aristotle’s errors about tomorrow’s sea battle.

Of course, there have been various attempts to refute the sort of argument I have just given (Ockhamism, Molinism, Boethianism, etc.). Nevertheless, I think the argument is sound because I don't think any of those attempts work. I won't go into detail on that right now. Suffice to say, theological incompatibilism (the view that infallible foreknowledge is incompatible with creaturely libertarian freedom) is NOT guilty of the modal fallacy that John calls attention to. That's nothing more than a red herring in this debate.

I Hope that everyone watching this thread has broadened their understanding of epistemology and logic with regards to omniscience a bit more this week. If anyone has not read the entire thread, please do so!

Good day, God bless, signing off this thread. Thank you Tom and Alan for your comments.

Chaz Finney

Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 2/9/2008 12:25:38 PM (GMT-6)

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Corey
Five with a Four-wing




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   Posted 2/12/2008 3:04 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Tom: I’d be interested in your reasons for preferring nominalism. I’m basically a realist because it seems to follow from theism.

Corey: I'm not strongly committed to either position, but am sympathetic to what I understand of nominalism in that it seems our "names" are just conventional signs with little relationship to the things they designate. Our minds have to work in terms of symbols, but the symbols are not the things themselves, nor must they necessarily refer to anything real. When referring to real things, like God, or the even the pen on my desk, how well do our symbols represent that reality? Very poorly it seems. Most of our constructions are mere "flatus vocus."

One of the most famous realists was Anselm, who used this paradigm to develop the Ontological Argument for the existance of God. But shortly after that, most Christian thinkers, at least in the West, abandoned realism: Abelard, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Ocham, Luther. Anyway, my point is, these thinkers apparently didn't find it incompatible with theism.


Before God, in grace, we will with all our power to be that which He shows us we are.

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Corey
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   Posted 2/14/2008 7:56 AM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
What do you think, Tom?


Before God, in grace, we will with all our power to be that which He shows us we are.

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Tom
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   Posted 2/14/2008 12:15 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Corey-

Right, nominalism is compatible with theism. So given THAT, how does the Church construct a doctrine of omniscience that expresses the faith of the ONE Church if that Church is comprised of both realists and nominalists who have different understandings of truth and knowledge? How do that agree on what it means for God to “know” the “truth” about the world?

Whenever I overhear realists and nominalists debate, in spite of the fact that they always seem to feel that their disagreements are really substantial, it always appeared to me that the differences were just semantic. I walk away wondering if I really “get it.”

I agree that the ‘names’ we attach to objects are just conventional and not the things themselves. Nor do our names have to refer to anything actual, like “unicorns” or “hobbits,” (though those DO represent discrete, defined things in another sense; “Hobbits” for example are the creation of Tolkien who gave them definite characteristics). When you say “Hobbit” you’re not referring to “nothing.”

I guess.

But doesn’t it seem to you Corey that the created ‘objects’ God creates have to pre-exist in God’s mind? Doesn’t this entail realism? I’m not sure. I wonder what sort of explanation nominalists give to the preconceived objects of God’s contemplation which then become the actual objects God creates? What would their understanding of the relationship be?

Tom


 

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Corey
Five with a Four-wing




Date Joined Feb 2003
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   Posted 2/14/2008 2:04 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Probably I don't understand the nuance of the debate, but I just don't think God has any need of symbolic representation of reality; he simply doesn't need to abstract it to something more managable like we do. So, from God's perspective, I'd guess that there is just realism. The nominalism/realism debate is about OUR epistemology, a result of our finitude. I don't have any problem affirming that God knows reality EXACTLY as it is, whether in potentiality or actuality.
 
In other words, God's the only realist, the rest of us are necessarily nominalists.


Before God, in grace, we will with all our power to be that which He shows us we are.

Post Edited (Corey) : 2/14/2008 1:09:56 PM (GMT-6)

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Tom
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   Posted 2/14/2008 2:22 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
So you don't think God has any idea or concept of what he's going to create before he creates? There's no intentional content behind his command, "Let there be..." that's logically prior to the coming into being of those objects? What else do we mean when we say God could have created World A, B, or C? How does God differentiate between possible worlds?

Please answer in 25 words or less!

;o)

T


 

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Corey
Five with a Four-wing




Date Joined Feb 2003
Total Posts : 1893
 
   Posted 2/14/2008 2:44 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
We've had discussion in this neighborhood before, about whether God holds infinite propositions regarding possible worlds. I still say no. In fact, I might go to the other extreme and say he doesn't hold any propositions (representational abstractions) whatsoever of what he's about to create. He simply and immediately knows -- in himself -- his potential for creation. I doubt he had to "think it through" and make a selection from the results of that contemplation.

Maybe wrong, but is it at least consistent?

---

Am I even answering the question? Does the realism/nominalism debate even pertain to what God knew sans creation? Hey, I'll speak plainly: I'm way novice on this stuff.


Before God, in grace, we will with all our power to be that which He shows us we are.

Post Edited (Corey) : 2/14/2008 1:53:18 PM (GMT-6)

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