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Chaz Finney
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Total Posts : 102
| Posted 1/29/2008 11:32 PM (GMT -6) |   | | I applaud the open view for defending free will; however, the teaching is fallicious and unnecessary. The open view violates the third law of reason in that it does not attribute a truth value to future contingent propositions. All propositions are omnitemporally true or false; knowledge of future contingents just happen to be outside the domain of human knowledge. The third law of logic is "Every proposition is either true or false"; propositions don't become true or false; this is quite easy to see with regards to necessary propositons, and a bit more difficult with contingent propositions. Too often there is too much mystery attributed to knowledge of the future when in fact there are as many issues with knowledge of the past as well.
"Necessarily God knows the truth value of a future contingent" does not preclude it's contingency nor does it change the modal status of a proposition from contingent to necessary. This is a common fallacy committed by some very astute philosophers. They confuse the "Necessity of consequence with the Necessity of the consequent" and assume that knowledge of a relationship of implication precludes free will. This confusion gives rise to determinism and once accepted; is the springboard for the open view as well. Unfortunatley if most would educate their intuitions; they would understand that free will is logical and a defensible position within formal and modal logic as it stands to reason.
Example: (P) If Chaz an unmarried male in 1999 then (Q) Chaz was a bachelor
(P) Chaz was unmarried in 1999
:: (Q) Chaz was a bachelor
Note the following: the relationship between the antecedent propositon and the consequent of one of implication or necessity, the antecedent implied the consequent; yet was this logical necessity the reason why Chaz was a bachelor? Clearly not, the truth value of this proposition is not causal anymore than the truth values of a future contingents. Just because God knows the truth value of a contingent propositon (past or future) does not determine, or cause the event.
Nobody would argue that the truth value of necessary truths has always been true even before one came to "know it", in fact the truth value of every contingently true proposition has always been true; even before anyone came to "know". I tjust so happens that the truth value of future contingents as well as many other necessary propositions are outside of the domain of human knowledge!
Many people only consider the truth value of the propostions and neglect the modal status of the proposition which amounts to making a judgement with half the truth. All propositions are necessary or contingent; and by law of logic this status never changes. A proposition that is contingently true does not become necessary true with the introduction a propositions about God's knowledge.
The bottom line is this: The future is contingent and is not settled,yet God knows it and this does not preclude man's free will.
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Tom
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| Posted 1/30/2008 12:20 AM (GMT -6) | | | | |
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Chaz Finney
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Date Joined Jan 2008
Total Posts : 102
| Posted 1/30/2008 10:35 AM (GMT -6) | | | Tom;
"Tom will turn either left or right at the stop sign tomorrow". The truth value of this proposition exists today (or else the we have a problem in that we have a proposition that is not true or false thus violating the thrid law of logic). Yes God knows it in ways outside of the domain of human knowledge. If Tom freely chooses to turn left, then God will knows it; if Tom freely chooses to turn right, God knows it.
Tom I have read many articles on the open view, and I choose to study logic and epistemology for the reasons previously mentioned viz. the open view begins with the modal fallacy that foreknowledge implies necessity which is simply not true, and then looks for a way to change the laws of logic to defend the doctrine of free will. Again this is not necessary if one understands modality. Additionally if one is willing to begin tinkering with the three most basic laws of reason...we have no grounds for rational discussion.
Chaz
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Tom
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| Posted 1/30/2008 11:23 AM (GMT -6) | | |
Hi Chaz-
Chaz: "Tom will turn either left or right at the stop sign tomorrow." The truth value of this proposition exists today…
Tom: It might interest you to know that in our article we endorse bivalence. So yes, all propositions are either true or false, including future-tense propositions. I encourage you to read the first of the above articles.
Chaz: Tom I have read many articles on the open view, and I choose to study logic and epistemology for the reasons previously mentioned viz. the open view begins with the modal fallacy that foreknowledge implies necessity which is simply not true…
Tom: However many articles on the open view you’ve read, Chaz, you need to read a few more, because you obviously aren't aware of bivalent models of the open view.
Come on, a few more articles won’t hurt ya. You can read ‘em. 
Chaz: Again this is not necessary if one understands modality. Additionally if one is willing to begin tinkering with the three most basic laws of reason...we have no grounds for rational discussion.
Tom: As anyone here can tell you, I’m anal when it comes to being consistent and logical. It’s a vice of mine! Modality and logic aren’t problems for an open view of the future, Chaz. I encourage you to familiarize yourself with the above articles.
If you wanted to just come on and announce your view, that’s cool. You’re welcome to do so. But if you want to discuss and engage views, then there are published views on record I’d be willing to discuss, views you obviously aren't familiar with. As for an open model within a bivalent semantic that’s carefully logical, I offer the above three articles (particularly the first one, the Faith & Philosophy article by Rhoda, Boyd, & Belt).
Blessings,
Tom
Post Edited (HumanHypostasis) : 1/30/2008 10:27:15 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Chaz Finney
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Total Posts : 102
| Posted 1/30/2008 12:30 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom;
Do you believe that God's knowledge of a future contingent proposition precludes it's contingency? I think the real question is not one of logic but rather "What and how does God know things?"; therefore the issue of foreknowledge and free will is one of ontology and not logic. I would safely assume that God comes to know things through ways beyond our grasp outside of the domain of the experiental/a priori destinctions.
Logically there is no "friction" between foreknolwedge and free will, this is a determinist's chimera based on a fallacy or misunderstanding of logic. Once we acknowledge this, there is no reason to futher search for a deffense of free will. I am content with the biblical concept of an all knowing God and the free will of His moral agents. If find no reason to have to go beyond formal, modal logic to defend this position against the claims of the determinist. justification prima facie, Chaz Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 1/30/2008 11:40:34 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 1/30/2008 2:07 PM (GMT -6) | | Chaz: Do you believe that God's knowledge of a future contingent proposition precludes it's contingenchy?
Tom: Not as I construe “future contingent propositions,” no. A future contingent proposition is a proposition positing the contingency of some future state of affairs. I’m sure that’s NOT how you construe them though.
Chaz: I think the real question is not one of logic but rather "What and how does God know things?"
Tom: Not so much ‘What’ but certainly ‘How’. As for the ‘What’, I agree all propositions are either true or false, including future-tense propositions, and I agree God knows all propositional truth values. God knows all truths and believes no falsehoods. I don’t know how to affirm omniscience any more explicitly.
The question regards temporal logic and the semantics of the future as well as the nature of propositional truth (truthmakers). I take a Peircean as opposed to an Ockhamist approach.
Well, I hope you read the articles. If this subject is something you like to stay informed about you’ll want to know how some open theists articulate their views. Not all open theists are Peirceans; just the smart ones!
Take care,
Tom
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Tom
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| Posted 2/1/2008 6:26 AM (GMT -6) | | Right, Chaz. Knowledge itself is a complicated issue, which in turns complicates the doctrine of omniscience. I think the biblical authors operated with a simple, intuitive driven approach without speculating very much. If forced to systematize their belief in the supreme manner of God's knowledge/apprehension of creation, I think they'd be happy to say something like God knows all truths and beliefs no falsehoods and leave it at that. But they prefer to 'describe' it, to 'picture' it. For example:
Hebrews 4.13, "And there is no creature that is not manifest in his sight: but all things are naked and laid open before the eyes of him with whom we have to do."
and
Prov. 5.21, "For a man's ways are before the eyes of the Lord...."
What they wanted to emphasize is that nothing escapes God's notice, that since all creation is sustained and permeated by God's presence, God's apprehension equally encompasses all things, so that God's knowledge (if we were to express it more philosophically) is co-terminous with reality. Would you agree Chaz? That says enough to serve as a foundation for a shared view of God's perfection but leaves open the philosophical issues which, as you point out, may never be resolved at all.
Tom
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Chaz Finney
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| Posted 2/1/2008 1:56 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom;
I think we are still plagued with the issues that I mentioned because in one way or another we have to determine the foundational question of what is knowledge.
Regardless of what verbiage we decide to employ, we are still describing the same concepts or propositions that the word "knowledge' represents. "Co-terminus", "correspondence", "fits the facts", these concepts are all the same and still puts us back to the issues of circularity and regress. Epistemologists have not purposely made this a difficult issue for no good reason.
To say "Nothing escapes God's notice" in and of itself is innocuous; however, to move beyond this and have any meaningful discussion of knowledge, foreknowledge, or omniscience would require a general agreement on certain unavoidable precise, complex epistemic concepts which have yet to be settled.
So to answer your question, the scriptures that you have cited, are not adequate to serve as a foundation for a definition of knowledge, much less discussions of omniscience or open theism. They may be mere "attributes" of God's knowledge; they need much clarification and are far from a being considered a "foundation". for example: "...His notice", how does God notice(know) things? Is it experiental, ratiocinative, are there other ways He notices(knows) things? Are all things laid open to Him; with respect to time (past, present, future). So as you can see; although these scriptures are assertions from men inspired by the Holy Spirit, they are not foundational with respect to developing a theory of knowledge.
Oh well, it's really become a hobby for me at this point, fun to ponder and debate, I don't take these issue too seriously because what we think we know is all defeasible... therefore I don't attempt to assert my theories of knowledge or even God's knowledge with any force. If I can't tell you what it is to know something in the domain of human knowledge without avoiding the aforesaid issues; how can I begin to tell you of God's knowledge? Talk about the "Problem of other minds"!
Fear God and keep His commandments and you will do well,
ChazPost Edited (Chaz Finney) : 2/1/2008 3:58:03 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 2/2/2008 2:27 AM (GMT -6) | | Chaz-
Given the unsettled nature of our understanding about what knowledge even is and the unresolved debates over theories of 'truth', what would you suggest a doctrine of 'omniscience' look like? Surely the Christian community will want to agree upon some notion of divine perfections. So how would you define a doctrine of 'omniscience'? I guess the question is:
Can articulating a biblical view of omniscience be done apart from assuming any particular theory of knowledge and truth? Or can articulating such a doctrine be done in a way that satisfies a number of such theories? Or must an such doctrine embrace a particular theory of knowledge and truth?
Jeff, are you around?
Tom
Post Edited (HumanHypostasis) : 2/2/2008 1:38:48 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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One Love
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| Posted 2/2/2008 1:35 PM (GMT -6) | | Weird thought...
What about God's omniscience as God's infinite self-understanding and self-knowledge via God's Spirit, the agency of creation and re-creation? God "knows" the future as God knows himself, essentially and contingently.
We do, however, speak a message of wisdom among the mature, but not the wisdom of this age or of the rulers of this age, who are coming to nothing. No, we declare God's wisdom, a mystery that has been hidden and that God destined for our glory before time began. 8 None of the rulers of this age understood it, for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory. However, as it is written:
"What no eye has seen,
what no ear has heard,
and what no human mind has conceived—
these things God has prepared for those who love him" —
for God has revealed them to us by his Spirit.
The Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God. For who knows a person's thoughts except that person's own spirit within? In the same way no one knows the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God. We have not received the spirit of the world but the Spirit who is from God, that we may understand what God has freely given us. This is what we speak, not in words taught us by human wisdom but in words taught by the Spirit, explaining spiritual realities with Spirit-taught words. The person without the Spirit does not accept the things that come from the Spirit of God but considers them foolishness, and cannot understand them because they are discerned only through the Spirit. The person with the Spirit makes judgments about all things, but such a person is not subject to merely human judgments, for,
"Who has known the mind of the Lord
so as to instruct him?"
But we have the mind of Christ.
God's knowledge of space-time would be a part of that knowledge because God's Spirit creates and sustains all space-time at every "present" moment. (Creatio continua)
Right?
The Orthodox Church believes, as it prays, that the Holy Spirit is always "everywhere and fills all things." The invocation of the Holy Spirit at the Divine Liturgy is the solemn affirmation that everything in life which is positive and good is accomplished by the Spirit of God. Creation, salvation, eternal glorification; the entire work of God in making and saving the world is accomplished by the power of the Holy Spirit. He is the one who dwelt in Jesus making him the Christ. He is the one by whom Christ was incarnate of the Virgin Mary. He is the one who led Christ to the cross as the innocent Victim, the one who raised him from the dead as the triumphant Victor. He is the one who guarantees the indwelling of God with men in the Holy Communion of the Church and in the life of the Kingdom to come.
Again...just a thought.
What do you think, Bruce?
In the Spirit of Christ, BE Christ to every "Christ" you see when you look at yourself and other human beings. "Insofar as you've done to the least of these..." Post Edited (Imago Dei) : 2/2/2008 12:41:54 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Chaz Finney
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| Posted 2/2/2008 9:24 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom;
I wouldn't suggest any doctrine of omniscience whatsover; especially since the issue is non-salvific and beyond the human domain. I don't think that there is a view of omniscience that can be justified. Again, if we cannot define what it is to know something in the domain of human knowledge without avoiding the aforesaid issues; how can we begin to define God's knowledge?
Suffice it to say, God knows the beginning from the end, His knowledge is infinite (without LIMITS), His ways are not our ways(beyond empirical, a priori...), He is truth... Ultimately we are just a little snow scene on God's desk anyways. The determinist says that when God shakes it up, He ordains where every little flake drops, I say the snow flakes freely fall, though He knows where they will land; and you say that He doesn't know where the flakes will land. Yet we're all in the same little globe filled with water.
Back to my original points: If we accept the reasoning of "logic", the classical view of omniscience does not preclude true freedom or contingency and there is no need to posit the open view to defend free will. I lean toward the classical view, and maintain that men are contingently free; yet I wouldn't die on this hill. I don't know what God knows or how He knows things; nor does anyone on this BB.
Chaz Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 2/2/2008 10:40:32 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Laika
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| Posted 2/2/2008 10:06 PM (GMT -6) | |
Chaz Finney said...
Back to my original points: If we accept the reasoning of "logic", the classical view of omniscience does not preclude true freedom or contingency and there is no need to posit the open view to defend free will.
Chaz Finney said...
I applaud the open view for defending free will; however, the teaching is fallicious and unnecessary. The open view violates the third law of reason in that it does not attribute a truth value to future contingent propositions. All propositions are omnitemporally true or false; knowledge of future contingents just happen to be outside the domain of human knowledge. The third law of logic is "Every proposition is either true or false"; propositions don't become true or false; this is quite easy to see with regards to necessary propositons, and a bit more difficult with contingent propositions.
Chaz, I assume you're referring to the "third law" of classical logic.
You do realize that there are hundreds (thousands?) of formal logics, all of which are (should be)
internally consistent yet may differ across the logics. Many of these do not hold to
the "third law of logic". (I assume you mean excluded middle)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classical_logic
As Lakoff and Nunez point out:
"The general subject matters of mathematics (arithmetic, geometry, probability, topology)
arise from general human activities. However,
differing versions of these subject matters can be created by mathmeticians using normal
conceptual mechanisms. Thus, a specialist in geometry can choose to study one or another
form of geometry defined by whatever axioms he or she is interested in (e.g. Euclidean or
non-Euclidean, projective, inversive, differential, and so on).
Each type of geometry is a separate subject matter, a human creation that is the product of
human imagination, which in turn uses ordinary human cognitive mechanisms. Each subject matter
is internally consistent, though there are inconsistencies across the subject matters.
In projective geometry, for example, all parallel lines meet at infinity.
In Euclidean geometry, parallel lines never meet.
In spherical geometry, there are no two lines (great circles) that are parallel.
These are not contradictory theories of a single subject matter but different subject
matters defined by different assumptions.
.
.
.
The same is true of set theory
.
.
.
There are thus no monolithic subject matters in mathematics like the geometry or the set theory
or the formal logic."
Where Mathematics Comes From - How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being
George Lakoff, Rafael E. Nunez, page 354, 355
So, for you to say "The third law of logic is...." is only true when you are talking about one system of
formal logic invented by humans. It may not apply to other systems of logic invented by humans.
Hence, we see you using one system of logic to talk about God's knowlege yet your digital camera, with it's
automatic focussing and automatic exposure uses another system of logic for control, one that doesn't hold to the law of excluded middle.
Now I'm curious why you, or anyone, thinks God holds to this one form of classic logic and none of the
others?
And which system of geometry does He follow?
Romance at short notice was her specialty. Post Edited (Laika) : 2/2/2008 9:10:45 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Laika
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| Posted 2/2/2008 10:40 PM (GMT -6) | | | I found some old stuff I had on the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM) that Tommy and I talked about on Alan's blog.
The topic of our discussion was the necessity or lack of necessity of LEM:
1. Is the proposition pC = (hertz of 269.4028 is C) true or false? (Middle C = 261.6226 hertz; C# = 277.183 hertz.)
LEM holds that if pC is not true then necessarily it is false. Would you say that, universally/necessarily, anyone hearing a hertz of 269.4028 would recognize that as being C? or not C?
You would actually get some people asserting pC is true, "that's C" and some asserting it's false, "that's a C#". (pC V ~pC) would not be necessarily true.
Fuzziness of reality doesn't need LEM to be never true, only that it doesn't necessarily/universally hold.
2. There are numerous logics that don't hold to the universality/necessity of LEM:
"In those systems that do embrace truth value gaps (Strawson, arguably Frege) or non-classically-valued systems (Lukasiewicz, Bochvar, Kleene), some sentences or statements are not assigned a (classical) truth value; in Strawson's famous dictum, the question of the truth value of “The king of France is wise”, in a world in which France is a republic, simply fails to arise. The negative form of such vacuous statements, e.g. “The king of France is not wise”, is similarly neither true nor false.
This amounts to a rejection of LEM, as noted by Russell 1905. In addition to vacuous singular expressions, gap-based analyses have been proposed for future contingents (following one reading of Aristotle's exposition of the sea-battle; cf. §2 above) and category mistakes (e.g. “The number 7 likes/doesn't like to dance”)."
What is being rejected, he says in his notes, is not (P V ~P) but the necessity of it.
3. LEM is used in non-constructive proofs in mathematics but not allowed in constructive proofs.
What's a non-constructive proof?
For example to prove that U = (unicorns exist) is true, you assume that U is false and then show how that is absurd (reductio ad absurdum).
Once you've proved that it's absurd to hold that U is false, ~(unicorns exist), then you've proved U is true (unicorns exist) via LEM. But you've still not produced an actual unicorn.
One example used to show the uselessness of LEM is:
Q = (there exist irrational numbers a and b such that a^b is rational) {a^b means a raised to the b power}
Given, the square root of 2, sqrt(2), is irrational and 2 is rational.
Let q = sqrt(2)^sqrt(2). Either q is rational, R, or it is irrational, ~R --- (R v ~R) by LEM
If q is rational, then Q is true, with a being sqrt(2) and b being sqrt(2)
If q is irrational, then Q is true, with a being sqrt(2)^sqrt(2) and b being sqrt(2) since [sqrt(2)^sqrt(2)]^sqrt(2) is equal to
sqrt(2)^(sqrt(2) * sqrt(2) which is equal to sqrt(2)^2 which is equal to 2, a rational number.
So q is rational is proved and q is irrational (~rational) has been proved, showing LEM to be false. (Q v ~Q) is false
Romance at short notice was her specialty. Post Edited (Laika) : 2/2/2008 10:36:30 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Chaz Finney
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| Posted 2/2/2008 10:49 PM (GMT -6) | | |
So according to your reasoning, if I KNOW(see the epistemic definition of knowledge) today that when I offer my dinner guest tomorrow the choice between lobster & steak or cyanide; she will choose the lobster combo... I authored her choice?
Two issues to consider 1. Knowledge of something isn't causative 2. To assume that an infinite being is limited to knowledge as you know it(empirical or a priori); is hard to justify. My dinner guest will not choose the steak and lobster combo plate because I or God knew it today; she will choose it because she is not ready to cross the river...
Regarding the article that you posted, it "appears" that the author treats logic as sentences versus propositions and makes the issue one of semantics and deals with the nuance of contraries(both can't be true, but both can be false) versus contradictories(both can't be true or false); the law of bivalence and excluded middle, he also appeals to Buddhist logic which I must admit, I have not studied, I haven't felt the need to explore "multi-valued logic" forgive me, I am one of those western minds that holds to the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, and the law of the excluded middle. If you choose to deny these three laws...be my guest!
Chaz
Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 2/2/2008 10:47:15 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Laika
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| Posted 2/2/2008 10:54 PM (GMT -6) | |
Chaz Finney said...
So according to your reasoning, if I know today that when I offer my dinner guest tomorrow the choice between lobster & steak or cyanide; she will choose the lobster combo... I authored her choice?
Two issues to consider 1. knowledge of something isn't causative 2. To assume that an infinite being is limited to knowledge as you know it(emperical or a priori); is hard to justify. My dinner guest will not choose the steak and lobster combo plate because I or God knew it today; she will choose it because she is not ready to cross the river...
Chaz You may predict that your guest will choose the lobster and you may know her well enough that you are right BUT if she cannot pick the steak, that choice of the lobster was determined for her, she is not the author of it.
And if she does pick the steak, you weren't "omniscient".
>1. knowledge of something isn't causative
No, knowlege of something is not causative in and of itself. I can see someone, not paying attention, is going to run into something. But if I can see that 1000 years hence, I authored a scenario they weren't around to author.
>2. To assume that an infinite being is limited to knowledge
God's infinite future is potential, at this point in time. He hasn't been there yet so it's not actual.
Not knowing what doesn't exist, isn't a limitation.
Does God know all the names of all the unicorn kings on Mars? If He doesn't, is He limited in His knowlege?
Check out my 3 points on the Law of Excluded Middle above.
Romance at short notice was her specialty. Post Edited (Laika) : 2/2/2008 10:02:34 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Laika
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| Posted 2/2/2008 11:03 PM (GMT -6) | |
PotOnWheel said...
Laika said...
So, if God knows what action I take, before I even existed, He is the author of the choice for that action, He brought it into existence. I cannot be the author because I didn't exist when the knowlege of that choice came into existence. I disagree.
Wow, that's an ingenious argument.
Free will says that I author my choices.
So if I don't exist, my choices don't either, there is NOTHING for God to know regarding me or those choices.
He's not limited by not knowing something that doesn't exist.
But let me pre-empt you.... you disagree.
Romance at short notice was her specialty. Post Edited (Laika) : 2/2/2008 10:23:38 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Chaz Finney
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| Posted 2/3/2008 12:57 AM (GMT -6) | | Laika;
Regarding my dinner guest; most would grant that I indeed have "knowledge" of her choice, it may fall short of 100% certainty; none the less it is knowledge. I also have knowledge of necessary propositions as well, of which many would agree is certain (with qualification); yet my knowledge of their truth values is not causative.
So it appears that your issue of causality or the issue of necessity/contingency turns on the "degree of certainty" with respects to knowledge; is this a correct assessment? What I am asking you is why does God's knowledge of a contingent proposition make it a necessary proposition? I think you might be making a modal mistake in that you are saying that "God knows P then necessarily Q"; when in fact it is more accurately "necessarily God knows P then contigently Q".
As a follow up to the issue of the law of the excluded middle; would not this cause problems with logical possibility? Consider the complex propositon "Hillary Clinton will win the election next November or it is not the case that Hillary Clinton will win the election next November". Obviously this complex proposition is made up of two contingent contradictory propositions.
What you are saying is the two propositons that make up this one compound proposition don't have truth values today of either true or false? And if this is so, then this complex proposition is no longer a "necessarily true proposition", because it does not have a truth value of "true" today, and is therefore, unknowable today?
Regarding your comments on God's ontology with repsect to His limitless knowledge and infinite nature, I would be interested in hearing your justification for such claims? How do you know the limits of His knowledge? How do you know that a future contingent is not knowable with absolute certainty to Him in a priori ways unknown to us? Chaz Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 2/3/2008 10:04:31 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 2/3/2008 4:12 PM (GMT -6) | |
Laika said...
PotOnWheel said...
Laika said...
So, if God knows what action I take, before I even existed, He is the author of the choice for that action, He brought it into existence. I cannot be the author because I didn't exist when the knowlege of that choice came into existence. I disagree. Wow, that's an ingenious argument.
Free will says that I author my choices. I noticed the similarity to a D & T discussion. (Check it out.)
Underlying your discussion is the question of whether one can have free will and still have only ONE option to select "from." The answer is that you CAN have/use free will and only have one option.
So.......you, yourself, choosing from within potentialities God has prepared, can choose from your own will the ONE option available to you, and you yourself would/will be the author of that action.
Breath! (Gotcha. Case in point.)
React! (Another case in point.)
(o) Post Edited (PotOnWheel) : 2/3/2008 4:43:44 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Laika
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| Posted 2/3/2008 5:23 PM (GMT -6) | |
Chaz Finney said...
Laika;
Regarding my dinner guest; most would grant that I indeed have "knowledge" of her choice, it may fall short of 100% certainty; none the less it is knowledge. I also have knowledge of necessary propositions as well, of which many would agree is certain (with qualification); yet my knowledge of their truth values is not causative.
Because before the person ever exists, it is known the action they take. They aren't around to determine that route of
action, yet the determination exists. That means someone else determined that route of action.
The future does not exist. Do you understand that?
There is nothing to observe.
Romance at short notice was her specialty. | | Back to Top | | |
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Laika
Registered Member
Date Joined Mar 2003
Total Posts : 2433
| Posted 2/3/2008 5:30 PM (GMT -6) | |
Chaz Finney said...
As a follow up to the issue of the law of the excluded middle; would not this cause problems with logical possibility? Consider the complex propositon "Hillary Clinton will win the election next November or it is not the case that Hillary Clinton will win the election next November". Obviously this complex proposition is made up of two contingent contradictory propositions.
What you are saying is the two propositons that make up this one compound proposition don't have truth values today of either true or false? And if this is so, then this complex proposition is no longer a "necessarily true proposition", because it does not have a truth value of "true" today, and is therefore, unknowable today? LEM doesn't necessarily hold in all situations is how I read those references.
What if Hillary dies before the election?
Saying a dead person loses an election is vacuous.
Let's use a real dead person:
Abraham Lincoln will win the election next November.
Abraham Lincoln will not win the election next November.
Are these truly contradictory? Do they both have the possibility of obtaining?
If not, there's a gap in our truth values and LEM doesn't hold for these propositions.
Romance at short notice was her specialty. Post Edited (Laika) : 2/3/2008 4:50:30 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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