Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 2/29/2008 4:42:48 PM (GMT-6)

It’s my turn for a long post!

Chaz-

First, I want to mention the only three BOLD parts of this post. Those are the questions I’d like answers to.

OK then…

I suggested that the conversation move from discussing ‘logical’ possibility and necessity to discussing ‘causal’ possibility and necessity since the latter is the concern of ‘future contingents’. You doubted this and told me to check with Alan. Alan didn’t confirm your contention, so you disagreed, moved on, and here we are.

I made a number of comments in my last post regarding claims you made, Chaz, and got little or no response. And several of your most recent comments make me wonder whether, in spite of indications to the contrary, you get it. But you may already share that opinion of me, so maybe we’re even! I do respect you view and don’t mind continuing IF we can find a way to actually converse profitably one step at a time.

You’ve repeatedly made erroneous claims about the open view (like our not believing in bivalence or that God can know all truths). But when corrected you don’t acknowledge it or adjust your conversation to take account of the correction. You just plow ahead as if you’re still correct and nothing was said. It’s a bit frustrating.

You keep reminding me of your definition of omniscience (God knows all true propositions), with which I’ve been perfectly happy to agree several times now. But you still seem either oblivious to my agreeing with it or intent on convincing me that I can’t really agree with your definition as an open theist.

So why don’t you give me a proposition, Chaz, ANY proposition about which YOU think I as an open theist cannot agree either that it has a truth value or that God knows its truth value. ANY proposition at all. Hopefully this will show you where the real conversation ought to be. So fire away Bro—what’s your proposition?

 [Prediction: What will happen is Chaz and I will disagree on what the truth value of his proposition is. Chaz may claim this means I don’t agree with his definition of omniscience. But hopefully he won’t make that move (because it doesn’t follow from his definition).  Chaz and I disagree over WHICH propositions are TRUE and which ones are FALSE. Hopefully this will nudge us toward opening a new conversation about what’s really behind this whole debate.]

You said I “was a determinist” and didn’t know it. When I called you on that you replied by just acknowledging what I had already said, that open theists and determinists agree on incompatibility, and added that my belief in incompatibility “is a determinist attitude.” Now that’s not very logical, Chaz. You tell me I’m a determinist. Then you say ‘no’, I just have a “determinist attitude.” But even IF I had a determinist attitude, that doesn’t make me a determinist and still leaves me wondering why you thought I was a determinist.

It’s these kinds of remarks that make me wonder whether or not you grasp the issues at stake. You post the logical notation (which indicates something) but then converse sometimes quite illogically. For example, being an incompatibilist is no more a “determinist attitude” for me than it is an “indeterminist attitude” for John Piper who’s also an incompatibilist. And it’s academically—what’s the word?...a bit cheap—to attach an attitude to a philosophical belief like ‘incompatibilism’. And it doesn’t follow that I should be characterized as “thinking like a determinist” on account of being an incompatibilist any more than it follows that Piper should be characterized as “thinking like an open theist” for sharing the same belief which open theists do. Your characterizations are illogical. There’s no attitude that need accompany the belief in incompatibility. And then there’s your repeated reference to there being no “need to fear causality.” Nobody fears causality, Chaz. What makes you think that? Just because we’re incompatibilists? What’s that got to do with “fear”? John Piper is an incompatibilist; does that mean he’s afraid of causality?

Lastly, about your claim that “God's knowing what choices [we] make have no impact on [our] choosing.” You’re quite right. But unfortunately this doesn’t go very far in securing our freedom. The incompatibilist’s claim is not that God’s knowledge causes the choices or events God knows. Nobody thinks that. Knowledge doesn’t ‘cause’ the object known. The incompatibilist’s claim is quite the opposite, namely, that truth (and knowledge of the truth) follows from the realities (events, choices, objects, etc.) known. It’s more appropriate to say the realities known (or the events or choices) are responsible for causing the knowledge. I don’t much like that way of describing it, but perhaps turning your objection around will help you see the point. It’s my typing this note to you that grounds the truth of the proposition <Tom is typing a note to Chaz>. God directly apprehends the state of affairs of my typing this note to you and of course knows the proposition we use to posit that state of affairs truthfully (if God even thinks in terms of propositions, which is another debate altogether—but let’s just say God does know the prop; I don’t have a problem with that). God’s knowledge of the proposition follows (logically, not temporally) as the effect of his apprehending the realities known and referred to in the proposition.

Now, what of the truth of propositions? I’m of the opinion that truth (and with truth, all semantics) follows ontology/reality. But this brings up the question which IS at the heart of the incompatibilist’s beef: What realities ground this or that truth? If it’s true that <Tom is typing a note to Chaz>, surely there’s some reality, some objective state of affairs responsible for this prop’s truth value. Surely this truth is not just a metaphysical surd hanging out there in space disconnected to any actual state of affairs. Without getting into debates over correspondence and theories of how truth supervenes on reality, I hold (the not irrational belief) that there is (a) some manner of relation between ‘truth’ and ‘reality’, and (b) the relation runs FROM the reality apprehended TO the truth describing that reality. So the question to ask of ANY proposition is: What REALITY (or realities) accounts for its being true? Where there is a true proposition, I say, let it point us to some actual state of affair(s) that accounts for the prop's being true.

This is what I was asking you about when I asked you how you think God comes by his (eternal) knowledge of the truth that <Chaz will choose to wear a green shirt>? You said you don’t know ‘how’ God comes by his knowledge, as if I wanted an explanation of the workings of the divine mind from the inside out, the nuts and bolts of God’s mind. That’s not my question. My question is: What REALITIES ground the truth that <Chaz will choose to wear a green shirt>? You believe this proposition is true before the foundation of the world. So I’d like to know what makes it eternally true that you will choose to wear a green shirt on the day in question. What realties stand behind this being true?

I don’t have any doubt as to what your answer will be (if you stick to your Ockhamist guns). But hopefully this will move the conversation to where it needs to be—on a debate over Okhamist vs Peircean semantics. Bill Craig’s answer to this question was: “Propositions describing what we shall do have no grounds in reality. Nothing makes them eternally true. They’re just eternally true and have no explanation whatsoever. They’re just a metaphysical surd.” Yep. My guess is that’s where Chaz will go as well. But if not, I’d like to know what eternal realities/actualities he thinks do ground those truths.

This is the problem, Chaz. In order for us to be responsible for our choices, it’s not enough for it to be true that “God’s knowledge doesn’t cause us to choose.” Big deal? So ‘knowledge’ doesn’t cause us to choose. The question is not 'What knowledge is causing me to choose?'. The question is (crudely), 'What reality is causing God to know eternally that I'll choose this or that?' That is, what eternal realites does God apprehend which ground the truths he knows? Saying 'knowledge doesn't cause the foreknown choice' is beside the point. To be responsible, I suggest, it must be the case that WE ground the truth of the propositions describing our choices. But if the truth about our choices eternally precedes us, it cannot be the case that WE, the actual US, are the ones responsible for that truth since we’re not eternal. God is the only eternal reality there is. If there are any eternally true propositions, God’s the only one who can be responsible for making them true (or for grounding their truth value).

Now, this doesn’t bother determinists because they WANT God to be the eternal ground of all those truths describing our choices. But indeterminists don’t want responsibility for our choices attributed to God. We want them attributed to US. So what to do?

Well, if you’re indeterminist Bill Craig, you know God CANNOT be the grounds for determining the truth about what we choose. That would make GOD responsible. And Craig knows we’re not around eternally to ground the truth about our choices. So Craig does the only other thing he can do—he (to borrow your phrase)  throws the relatedness of truth and reality under the bus. He denies that truth has any grounds whatsoever. Just deny that the truths which describe all that we shall do, all that God holds us accountable for, have any reality at all which is responsible for their being what they are. As Craig admitted a couple years ago in debating Greg: Nothing grounds those truths. Nothing at all, not even God, accounts for them.

That’s not a position to which I can hold. It’s counter-intuitive, unnecessary, and inconsistent.

But I’m open to your suggestions Chaz. What would YOU suggest are the eternal grounds for the truths describing all the choices we make (and don’t make but should make)?

Tom

Post Edited (HumanHypostasis) : 2/29/2008 8:17:58 PM (GMT-6)

Chaz: OK here is a proposition…

Tom: Before I get to it I just want to remind us that Chaz claims an open theist must either (a) deny that the proposition he’s supplied has a truth value or (b) deny that God knows its true value. I have to resort to (a) and (b) in responding to Chaz.

Chaz, serve up that prop!

Chaz: Necessarily God has always known, and it has always been true (by means other than induction or His ordaining the event) that Joe Shmoe will freely choose to do X at some future time Tf. Fill in the blanks…

How's that?

Tom: Well, looks like bad news for you.  (a) I do believe this proposition has a truth value, and (b) I do believe God knows its truth value. I happen to believe this proposition is false and that God knows that it’s false.

Wanna try another?

As I predicted, Chaz and I will disagree over what truth value his prop has and he will take that as evidence that I don’t think that “God knows all true propositions.”

Let me offer an analogy of the present disagreement. Suppose you and I are standing in a large room full of several hundred people. You study the room and say that there are two hundred fifty people in attendance. I say there are only two hundred people present. What are we disagreeing about? We’re disagreeing about how many people are in the room. But we both agree that God knows the exact number of people in the room. You believe God knows there are two hundred fifty people present while I believe God knows there are only two hundred people present. You believe God knows there are more people present than I do.

You believe that the proposition <There are 250 people present in the room> is true. I believe it’s false. But Chaz, you cannot say on the basis of this disagreement that you believe God knows all true propositions but I don’t. I could just as equally respond by saying YOU don't believe God knows all true propositions because you think <There are 200 people present in the room> is false. But I believe God knows it's true. But should I read the content of God's knowledge right off MY belief about what is true in this case and judge you as not believing that God knows all truths? Saying God knows all true propositions doesn't entitle any one of us to claim infallibility regarding our beliefs about WHICH propositions are in fact true and which are false. I do believe God knows all true propositions. I just disagree with you that your proposition is true. I think it's false.

Will you grant that I in fact believe that God knows all true propositions?

Chaz: By the way; Your red letter comments are received as a preemptive attempt to discredit my response.

Tom: Just an attempt to save time. Thanks for being a good sport! I wrote it sometime around 3 AM here in Iraq, so I’m kinda out of it.

Tom

Post Edited (HumanHypostasis) : 2/29/2008 9:23:09 PM (GMT-6)

Chaz: Regarding the bivalence issues; many OT's do indeed claim that propositions are "becoming true or false"…

Tom: Some do. Some don’t. I’m one that doesn’t. I think those that do are wrong.

Chaz: ...and I am not so sure that you view gets you off the hook either because you say essentially the same thing.

Tom: Ah, come on Chaz. Where’s your logic when you’re not typing in notation? I don’t say “essentially the same thing.” I essentially say a CONTRARY thing. Ugh. (Hey, it’s 6 AM and I haven’t slept all night.)

I’m not looking to get off your hook. Don’t really care if I’m on the hook of views I don’t believe in. To me, that’s no hook at all. What you want to do is get others on hooks that are embedded in views they already hold.

Chaz: For you say that these propositions do have truth values only that God doesn't know which ones will be actualized.

Tom: OK, given English grammar, your “which ones” refers back either to “propositions” or to “truth values.” My hunch is you’re referring back to “propositions.” You’re confused I think about what “gets actualized” in the world. Propositions aren’t the things “getting actualized.” “States of affairs” get actualized. Propositions aren’t said to “actualize.” They’re just either true or false depending on the actual state of reality at some point in time.

My view is simple (famous last words). Actuality first. Truth after that. The actual world determines what is true. What propositions are true? Well, first ask what states of affairs are actual? That’s it. Do you think a prop is true? Fine. Tell me what actualities in the world at the time you assert the proposition which ground the truth of the proposition. Nothing to ground the proposition’s true? Then it’s false.

Was <Chaz will choose to wear a green shirt on Monday> (let’s assume it was Monday) true before Monday? I say no, because given libertarian free will, there is no actuality in the world at any time prior to Monday that could render it the case that you ‘will’ make the choice in question. The only actualities available before Monday to ground any truth regarding your choice are realities that neither entail nor preclude your choosing to wear a green shirt. That IS reality’s ground floor. That’s the objective matter of fact. Indeterminism isn’t a figment of our imagination an abstract concept detached from the real world. It’s an objective feature of the real, concrete world. It’s the way the world actually is. And if “actuality first, then truth” is right, then the truth about future contingents is that they “might and might not” happen.

Hope that helps.

Tom

PS Chaz, please call me Tom. HumanHypostasis is just a nick-name I came up with to annoy another good friend on the board!

Tom: Well, looks like bad news for you.  (a) I do believe this proposition has a truth value, and (b) I do believe God knows its truth value. I happen to believe this proposition is false and that God knows that it’s false.

PS: Tom wrote: My question is: What REALITIES ground the truth that <Chaz will choose to wear a green shirt>? You believe this proposition is true before the foundation of the world. So I’d like to know what makes it eternally true that you will choose to wear a green shirt on the day in question. What realties stand behind this being true?

Chaz: What you are really asking is how could God know this? How is knowledge grounded is the real question here.

Tom: No no no. Don’t reinterpret my question. I know exactly what I want to ask, and it is definitely NOT how knowledge is grounded. Not at all. My question is What grounds the TRUTH of the proposition? What ‘makes it true’ (eternally) that <Chaz will choose to wear a green shirt>?

Tom

Post Edited (HumanHypostasis) : 2/29/2008 11:09:55 PM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 3/1/2008 3:11:14 PM (GMT-6)

Tom: Don’t reinterpret my question. I know exactly what I want to ask, and it is definitely NOT how knowledge is grounded. Not at all. My question is What grounds the TRUTH of the proposition? What ‘makes it true’ (eternally) that <Chaz will choose to wear a green shirt>?

Chaz: THE SHORT ANSWER: "CHRST WAS CRUCIFIED FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE WORLD" WAS TRUE IN ETERNITY PAST, IT WAS TRUE DURING AND AFTER CHRIST WAS CRUCUFIED, EVEN THOUGH IT REFERENCES AN HISTORICAL EVENT…

Tom: That’s not an answer to my question. Not even close.

Chaz: "CHRST WAS CRUCIFIED FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE WORLD" WAS TRUE IN ETERNITY PAST, IT WAS TRUE DURING AND AFTER CHRIST WAS CRUCUFIED, EVEN THOUGH IT REFERENCES AN HISTORICAL EVENT. Truth is eternal, it has alway been true that 2+2=4 even before anyone knew it…

Tom: Chaz, I’m not sure you know what a huge problem you’ve just gotten yourself into here. You’re essentially saying that “Christ was crucified from the foundation of the world” is a necessary truth, like 2+2=4. Yes, the truth of 2+2=4 (and other mathematical truths, so far as we know) is ‘eternal’. Its truth is temporally invariant. It’s true at all times. That’s precisely why we say it’s a ‘necessary truth’ as opposed to a ‘contingent truth’. It’s necessarily true because whatever objective states of affairs account for, or ground, its meaning and truth necessarily obtain. It’s logically necessary. It’s true at all times because whatever makes it true exists/obtains at all times, or eternally if you will. It’s not floating around in space detached from all concrete realities. Some actuality exists, necessarily, in all possible worlds, that makes it necessarily true that 2+2=4. Of course, that something is a someone—God.

But this is NOT the case with Christ’s crucifixion. Christ is not crucified in all possible words. This is a contingent state of affairs and so is contingently true.

Chaz: …and this truth is not grounded in experience.

Tom: What is it grounded in Chaz? That’s what I want you to tell me.

Chaz: Any trouble with this or do we have to start making exceptions? It has always been true that the contingent proposition that water freezes at 32 degrees even before water first froze or anyone knew it. It was eternally true that I would wear a green shirt on February 29 2008. God knew in eternity past that I would freely choose to wear a green shirt on this day. If I had chose to wear a blue shirt; then the proposition about my wearing a green shirt would have always been false…

Tom: See what you just did? You just LINKED the actual event of your wearing a green shirt TO the truth that <Chaz will wear a green shirt on day X>. See that? You reveal your hand again when you admit that IF you had actually worn a blue shirt, THEN it would have always been true that <Chaz will wear a blue shirt on day X>. You are grounding the TRUTH in the ACTUAL event of your wearing the shirt.

Now, tell me HOW the effects of the temporal event of your choosing green reach back in time? How does what you ACTUALLY do (at a particular time) manage to GROUND truth at all times, eternally. How is the ACTUAL temporally bound YOU the ETERNAL grounds for the eternal truth that you’d wear a green shirt?

Well, the answer is, you CAN’T be the ground for what is eternally true. Your claim that if you had actually worn a blue shirt that it would then have been eternally true that you’d wear a blue shirt if vacuous. It’s just science fiction.

If something is eternally true. Some eternal state of affairs grounds that truth.

Chaz: Yes yes yes we can't speak about truth without discussing the issue of how knowledge is grounded…

Tom: I’m not asking about how knowledge is grounded. I’d like to know what realities, what actual states of affairs eternally ground the truth that you’d wear a green shirt.

Chaz: …so this might be the answer to your question with regrads to how truth/knowledge is grounded with regards to God's foreknowledge.

Tom: The grounding of truth per se and the grounding of our knowledge of that truth are two different issues. I’m only asking about the former. What grounds TRUTH. Forget about what grounds our knowing that truth for the moment.

Chaz: As a side bar what Tom was trying to get me to do is claim that truth is grounded in experience "like the crafty little empiricist that he is"…

Tom: Chaz, I don’t think that truth is grounded in experience. I think truth is grounded in object states of affairs. I think KNOWLEDGE is grounded in experience, yes. But that’s an entirely different question for us. If it’s true that the chair I’m sitting on is black it’s not because I’m experiencing it to be so. It’s true because it IS so. The truth of the prop <The chair Tom is sitting on is black> is, we’d say, grounded in, true on account of the chair’s being black, not my experiencing the chair.

Chaz: …and then I would have to explain how something could be true before it actually happens and correspondingly how God could know it...But we don't need to go there.

Tom: That’s exactly where we need to go. For a brief moment you actually perceive the issue, (“How something could be true before it actually happens” or more specifically, “How it could be true before something happens indeterministically that it will happen?”). And how God (or any knower) KNOWS this true is a corresponding question, yes, but not the same question.

So let me ask you again: What actual realities, obtaining eternally, make it true that <Chaz will wear a green shirt> is eternally true? It’s can’t be YOU. You’re not eternal. So what is it?

Chaz: By the way I am surprised Tom would try to slip in ths sort of "Molinist" explaination of Jesus' knowledge of Peter's denial. I think Tom is restricting God's knowledge to the domain of human knowledge.

Tom: My explanation is Jesus’ prediction of Peter’s denial isn’t Molinist. No Molinist would like my explanation. But why be surprised that Jesus knows something inductively? We make such inductions every day.

If you want to delve into the biblical evidence for the open view, fine. It’s one thing to quote this or that passage and declare victory. It’s another to be consistent with all the evidence.

Chaz: To know of Peter's denial or Judas' betrayal would require a perfect guess…

Tom: I didn’t suggest Jesus was guessing. I don’t suppose he was. Look, we can start a separate thread on Peter if you’d like. You comments about what “I” must believe regarding Peter are far off what I actually think. I don’t want to get off my question: What makes it eternally true that you’d wear a green shirt?

Chaz: What makes my wearing a green shirt true is that God's knowledge is divine and this knowledge and truth are grounded in something similar to revelation knowledge…

Tom: What? God’s knowledge and truth are grounded in something similar to revelation knowledge? So God’s knowledge is grounded in knowledge? And TRUTH is grounded in KNOWLEDGE too?

Thanks for trying Chaz. You did come back on to offer your answers. If that’s it, thanks for taking the time.

Chaz: Do you deny that 2+2=4 has always been true? If not when does it become true? So as you see we do agree that at least "some" truth is timeless, some truth existed prior to a physical universe and time. Not to mention that the bible says that it was true in eternity past that Christ would be crucified...

Tom: Of course some truths are timelessly true, as it were—either timelessly true or true at all times. Point is, yes, necessary truths are necessarily true. Nothing new there.

“Slain from the foundation of the world” is perfectly (to my view) explainable as a non-necessary truth grounded in objective states of affairs that obtain “from the foundation of the world” and which are responsible for this truth. This is actually a pretty easy passage to deal with.

Chaz: The philosopher Quine wrote: "...That each statement be true once and for all and false once and for all, independently of time." All I can do is suggest that you study some theories of truth and of propositions.

Tom: I’ll do that Chaz, yeah. Thanks! ;o)

Tom

PS There are things to disagree about regarding most empiricist theories nowadays. I’m not an empiricist, Chaz. I’d agree with rationalists in some of their criticisms of empiricism. But I will admit this, it’s only ‘experiencers’ who ‘know’. Rocks don’t know. Table’s don’t know. To be a “knower” is to be an “experience.” I don’t side with empiricists per se over rationalists. I think ‘reason’ apart from experience informs our knowing in ways independent of sense experience, so I can’t be an empiricist. But there’s definitely no knowing per se apart from existing as a center of experience per se.

Post Edited (HumanHypostasis) : 3/2/2008 2:44:14 AM (GMT-6)

Chaz sent me a paper (evidently part of a larger work in process) about determinism and free will. The author actually makes a few great comments about truth being grounding in reality which I hope Chaz will embrace.

Mystery Writer (MW): Right now I am wearing a blue shirt. My wearing a blue shirt constitutes the truth-grounds of the proposition that I am wearing a blue shirt. My wearing a blue shirt accounts for that proposition’s being true. Colloquially, we are inclined to put the point by saying that my wearing a blue shirt ‘makes’ the proposition true. Yet this ‘makes’ is not a causal relationship, but a semantic one. It cannot possibly be causal because the truth of the proposition is not an event; it is not the sort of thing that could be caused.

Tom: Never mind whether the relation between reality and truth is causal or whether propositions are the sort of things that can be ‘caused’ to be true—I think they are. Some propositions do ‘become’ true and their becoming true can be said to be an ‘event’. But that’s neither here no there.

The interesting point is that MW accepts the proper order: It’s reality first, THEN truth. I wear a blue shirt, and this reality, this state of affairs, makes the proposition true. Truth supervenes upon being.

Chaz, do you accept this? You sent me the paper. Are you in agreement so far?

Mystery Writer:  But if my wearing a blue shirt does not cause the truth of the proposition, even less does the truth of that proposition cause or ‘necessitate’ my wearing a blue shirt. What is necessitated is only the identity proposition, “If the proposition that I am wearing a blue shirt is true, then I am wearing a blue shirt.”

Tom: Excellent. For every true proposition, there is some ‘identity’ to make between the truth and some actual state of affairs which (in MW’s words) ‘accounts for’ or ‘makes’ the proposition true. This identity enables the us to conclude either FROM some actual state of affairs TO the truth of the proposition positing that state of affairs OR equally FROM the true proposition TO the actual state of affairs that accounts for, or grounds, the prop’s truth.

Excellent so far. Chaz? Are you on board with this?

Mystery Writer:  Aristotle made much the same point in the Categories. His writing “is in a way the cause of,” I take to be his denial that the relationship is genuinely causal, but is instead, as I have chosen to characterize it, semantic: “If ... [a man] ... exists, then the statement in which we assert his existence is true, and conversely, if the statement in which we assert his existence is true, he exists. But the truth of the statement is in no way the cause of his existence, though his existence is in a way the cause of the truth of the statement.5” (Aristotle 1963, sections 1015-20)

Tom: Right. Aristotle is making the same point. If proposition P is true, then there exists some state of affairs that grounds P’s truth. Equally, if some state of affairs S obtains, then the proposition positing that state of affairs is true.

Chaz? You good with this?

Mystery Writer : No runner, bullet, rocket, electron, or indeed any physical object, travels beyond the speed of light. That this is so ‘makes’ it a grand physical truth (physical law) that no massy object travels beyond the speed of light. The latter proposition does not ‘constrain’ massy objects, any more than the true proposition that I am wearing a blue shirt necessitates my wearing a blue shirt, or that its being true that a man exists necessitates or causes that man to exist. Events ‘make’ (but do not cause) propositions to be true…

Tom: Chaz, are you in agreement with the claim that propositions are made true by events (or actual states of affairs)? I am. Are you?

I’m not going to agree with everything MW says in his article, because he confuses some points. But thus far, given what I’ve posted here from this article you sent me—do you agree with him (and me) that truth supervenes on being, that the truth of propositions is grounded in actual states of affairs, that for every true proposition there is some actual state of affairs that makes the proposition true?

Yes or no? If ‘no’, then why did you praise the article so highly and send it to me? If ‘yes’, then…

Well, just let me know if you agree with his comments thus far. I’ll ask my follow up question later.

Tom

Chaz: So as you see we do agree that at least "some" truth is timeless, some truth existed prior to a physical universe and time. Not to mention that the bible says that it was true in eternity past that Christ would be crucified...

Jeff: We need to be careful as to how we use the word "truth." To my mind, if there were no beings, there would be no truth. And yet, to my mind, time and space are not beings. But apart from the temporal and spatial frames of reference we call time and space, I don't know what it means to talk about "2+2=4." For there to be "truth," there must be a being that apprehends. That would include the ability to abstract the idea of "quantity" from non-zero dimensional frames of reference like time and space.

In short, the noun "truth" is virtually a metaphor. Literally, what we can say is that a proposition is true or not. But propositions are originated in a mind. It is impossible, for me at least, to conceive of an eternally-existing proposition. If a proposition was eternal, it would exist independent of God's mental activity. Hence, it would not be a proposition "of" God.

And Revelation does NOT say that it "was true in eternity past that Christ would be crucified..."

Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 3/2/2008 5:15:22 PM (GMT-6)

Here's hoping Chaz's wife is out of the house while he's home!

Chaz: I have signed off on further comments due to my schedule. The Mystery Writer that you disagree with and claim is confused on some points is Norman Swartz Phd. in Philosophy, Physics undergrad from Harvard.

Tom: Where did I disagree with those portions of Swartz that I posted, Chaz?

I do have some disagreements with him. But I didn’t mention them at all. It was my agreement with him that I thought was significant. Where are you Chaz? I asked you if YOU agreed with him on the portions I quoted.

Chaz: I must look at his credentials and yours; and side with his views.

Tom: Really? Before even hearing my arguments? I never took up a single point of disagreement with Swartz. That’s not very credible of you. A man’s credentials determine the truth of his arguments? What do you do when two equally credentialed proffesors disagree?

Chaz: I have conversed with Norman on topics similar to these argument that we are currently debating as well as the arguments for the Open View.

Tom: Will you answer my questions put to your regarding Swatz’s claims (with which I agreed) regarding how truth is grounded?

Chaz: The issues he raises would imply that the Incompatibility Thesis is somewhat a false dichotomy. In short we can create the antecedent events today that causally impact our future tomorrow; logical determinism as well is not a threat to free will.

Tom: So any particular choice is causally impacted (entailed?) by antecedent events which we "created." Tell me about these "creations" Chaz. Would they not also be causally impacted (entailed?) by further antecedent factors? Yes, the would be. And those factors? They’d be equally entailed in antecedent causal influences that “impact” what followed. And so forth back to…to what, Chaz?

But this can come later. What about your agreement with Swartz on how truth is grounded in reality? Do you agree or not?

Chaz: Tom, You comitted a "sin of ommision" in your post with regards to Swartz's comments on truth; for he explicity states that truth is omnitemporal (eternally true); what you posted would give one the impression that he teaches that truth is temporal because it is grounded in reality.

Tom: We’re not concerned with impressions, Chaz. I posted Swartz’s own comments. He explicitly says the truth of the proposition that he’s wearing a blue shirt is grounded in his actually wearing a blue shirt. I’m not omitting anything. What consequences this has for his also believing that the proposition is eternally true isn’t my concern right now. That will become his problem, and I’d like to get to that. But for now I just wanted to know whether you agreed with him or not: Is the proposition that he’s wearing a blue shirt grounded in his actually wearing a blue shirt?

Chaz: You didn't fairly handle his comments on Aristotle either in that Swartz notes that Aristotle missed the boat on his famous sea battle…

Tom: The quote of Aristotle doesn’t regard the sea battle analogy. It regarded the relationship between truth and fact, that’s all. And I agreed with Swartz. Are you even reading what I write?

I’ve read Aristotle on the sea battle. It’s well-known. I’m aware that Swartz disagrees with Aristotle. That wasn’t my point.

Chaz: But Swartz does indeed claim that it is TRUE TODAY that there will be a sea battle TOMORROW; in fact he claims it is eternally TRUE. Even if from a "human" propsective this is grounded in the reality that it will happen.

Tom: What reality is it that grounds the eternal truth that there will be a sea battle tomorrow? You must have SOME notion of what it is.

Chaz: But I would add, how I this truth grounded from God's propsective? I have made the claim in my post that even though we humans are limited in our knowledge of how truth is grounded; this limitation doesn't preclude that the truth exists in some a prior fashion for God.

Tom: Chaz, it looks like you’re saying truth is grounded FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE in one reality but FROM GOD’S PERSPECTIVE the same truth is grounded in a different reality. This can’t be, and there’s no way Swartz thinks this. One truth. One reality that grounds it.

You’re supposing there is some reality that exists eternally and grounds all truths eternally because you’re assuming all props are eternally true. But this isn’t fair. You can’t assume your position is true based on the assumption that there’s SOME explanation or defense of it out there somewhere.

Chaz: I menitoned John's revelation of the future of this world as one example of how God or Spirit beings might know things and events and how these events might be grounded.

Tom: It might surprise you to know that open theists have no qualms with God’s right to determine how or when he wants to return to this world and wrap things up. And there are good arguments for believing a good bit of it WILL happen this way and not that way. We’ve never gotten to any of that however. You assume a lot about what open theists must think and believe, most of it incorrectly.

Chaz: Now the wife is fuming, I really got to go, Thanks for the discussons everyone, especially Tom.

Tom: Take care.

Chaz: PS: Tom, you have been arguing with me in that the OV doesn't claim that propositions are "becoming true", a statement that has come up in discussions on bivalence; and then you post this in response to Swartz's book: Tom: “Never mind whether the relation between reality and truth is causal or whether propositions are the sort of things that can be ‘caused’ to be true—I think they are. Some propositions do ‘become’ true and their becoming true can be said to be an ‘event’. But that’s neither here no there.” What????

Tom: Props do become true (and false) when the states of affairs they describe obtain or fail to obtain. Do you deny there is true ‘becoming’ in the actual world? Probably not. So the ‘becoming’ of actual states of affairs in the real world isn’t a problem for you. Then the becoming true of propositions shouldn’t be a problem either. I don’t think propositions become true bit by bit, partially, over time as it were so that the proposition is partially true or partially false per se. That’s not what I’m saying. I’m saying (in agreement with Swartz) that the proposition “Swartz is wearing a blue shirt” is false when he’s wearing a green shirt and true when he’s wearing a blue shirt. Well, there’s no getting around the notion of “becoming” here. So when he wears the blue shirt, it “becomes true” that he’s wearing a blue shirt. And when he takes off his blue shirt, it “becomes false” that he’s wearing a blue shirt. How long does it take the prop to become true or false? As long as the reality that is ‘Swartz’ takes to putt on and take off his shirt. You tell me, Chaz. From picking the blue shirt up to put it on to having it buttoned and be walking about the door, WHEN would YOU say Swartz enters the state of ‘wearing a blue shirt’? I don’t know exactly. Define “wearing” for me and I’ll tell you exactly when it happens. The point is, there is some ACTUAL state of affairs which grounds the proposition that asserts his wearing a blue shirt. When that state of affairs BECOMES actual, Chaz, the proposition positing that state of affairs BECOMES true.

Similarly, the prop “Tom is 48 years old” is true at some times and false at others. When I was 47 it was false. When I became 48 the prop became true. How long did the prop take to BECOME true? As long as it took me to BECOME 48; instantaneously I imagine. How long will it take the prop to become false? As long as it takes me to stop being 48 and become 49. That’s the point: TRUTH FOLLOWS REALITY.

Tom

Post Edited (HumanHypostasis) : 3/3/2008 2:37:55 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 3/3/2008 12:31:49 PM (GMT-6)

Whippppiiieeee! Sorry for the length and animation!

Tom: Props do become true (and false) when the states of affairs they describe obtain or fail to obtain.

Chaz: This is double talk.

Tom: No it’s not.

Chaz: When I have challenged you on this concept of propositions “becoming true or false” you told me that “some open theists believe this but not you”.

Tom: I said some open theists believe that propositions positing future contingents are neither true nor false and that they become true with the obtaining (or not) of the contingent events they describe. I do not believe this. That is, I don’t agree that these propositions move from being neither true nor false to becoming either true or false. I believe in bivalence. Every prop is at all times either true or false, but props may CHANGE truth value, moving from false to true or true to false. This is the “becoming” I have in mind, not the “becoming” proponents of multi-valued logics have in mind.

No double talk. You just misunderstood.

-------------------------------------

Chaz: You defended your view by stating that your position doesn’t violate bivalence in that propositions are true or false (currently) and God knows all of the possible worlds in which they are currently true or false…

Tom: I affirm bivalence. All propositions are either true or false. If you doubt it, offer up a prop about which you think I can’t agree that it has a truth value.

Chaz: …only God doesn’t know what worlds will be actualized.

Tom: What “world” (singular) will be actualized (from among those possible worlds). Right.

Chaz: Now you are saying that a proposition is only true if it is actualized…

Tom: I don’t say propositions are “actualized” at all. I don’t talk like that. States of affairs are actualized. Propositions are either true or false, at all times, and their truth value depends upon the actual state of reality. Not all open theists believe THIS. But SOME do.

Props making claims about the future are all either true of false.

I don’t know what else to say. You don’t get it. I’m not saying you should agree. It’s fine if you don’t. But you should UNDERSTAND the view you’re disagreeing with. And in this case, you don’t.

Chaz: …and grounded in the actual world…

Tom: Right. Just as Swartz said that its being true that he is wearing a blue shirt is grounded or made true by his actually wearing a blue shirt (about which statement you won’t come near, though it’s Swarts’). I’m not saying anything different Chaz. I argue that all propositions are so grounded in some actual state(s) of affairs that makes them true.

Chaz: …it gets it’s truth from its correspondence of the actual world…

Tom: Right.

Chaz: …call this (T2); So now your initial defense (T1) is false in that you contradict yourself.

Tom: You misconstrued my earlier claims about what SOME open theists believe and what THIS open theist believes. I think I was pretty clear, but you’re stuck on ONE way of understanding the sense in which a proposition may ‘become’ true. For proponents of multi-valued logics, for a proposition to ‘become true’ is for it to transition from having NO truth value to being true. I deny this Chaz. When I talk of a proposition ‘becoming true’ I mean (as I explained) the proposition transitions from being false to being true. This is no denial of bivalence, for there’s no time at which the proposition fails to have a truth value. And bivalence does not, as you seem to think, entail the temporal invariance of truth, so that a change in truth value amounts to a denial of bivalence.

--------------------------------------

Chaz: Based on this grounding in the actual world (T2); propositions cannot be true or false in all these non-actual possible worlds (T1) that God knows…

Tom: No proposition is made true except by some ACTUAL state of affairs. Possible worlds are not actual worlds which make the propositions describing them true of false.  I’m not a modal realist. If a prop describing a possible world is true, it's true by virute of THIS world's actualities.

Chaz: …and you are again violating bivalence in that a future contingent proposition is not true or false today.

Tom: Come on Chaz. We went through this. There is NO proposition you can suggest about which I will not agree that it has a truth value; not a single proposition, props positing future contingents included. They are absolutely either true or false.

Talk of possible worlds, and the propositions that are true or false in them, is not talk of ACTUAL worlds. The propositions we suppose to be true and false in these “possible worlds” we talk about are nothing but an abstract way of our imagining ways our actual world either might or might not have been or might or might not yet be (unless like David Lewis you’re a proponent of modal realism and you think possible worlds really are as actual as our world).

So let’s say there’s a possible world in which JFK is not assassinated. There’s no actual world, parallel to ours but causally independent of ours, in which JFK is not assassinated and which grounds the truths which we in our world use to express this possible world. No. The possible world in which JFK is not assassinated is nothing more than a description (true or false based on THIS world’s actuality) of a way OUR world might have been but was not.

I’d say check it out with Alan whose credentials give his judgments far more weight than mine, but you’d dismiss him as well.

----------------------------------------

Chaz: Again double talk my friend. Simply put: your initial defense against the charge that your view violates bivalence was that propositions are currently true in some possible worlds…

Tom: Wow.

I hope you’re clear on this now. Bivalence just means that all propositions are either true or false. I don’t deny this. If you think I deny it, then produce a proposition about which you think my view obliges me to deny that it has a truth value. We did this already. You offered a prop about which you believed I could not agree that it has a truth value. You lost.

Chaz: …and now you say that a proposition is only true the actual world because it depends on the actualized state of affairs for its truth value.

Tom: That’s what I’ve always said. I keep asking you what YOU think grounds the truth of propositions. I’ve been asking for several days now and you’ve offered nothing.

Chaz: They can’t be true in several non-actual possible worlds and then only be true in the actual world.

Tom: I hope my comments about possible worlds clears this up for you. My view is that actuality makes props true, that truth supervenes on being. When we talk about contingently true props being true in some worlds and false in others, all we mean is that there are ways our world might or might not have been such that the truth of our actual world might or might not have been what is actually is. And what grounds all these truths describing the way our world might or might not have been (or might and might not yet be)? The sum total of actual reality—divine and created—as it now obtains.

-------------------------------------

Tom: Similarly, the prop “Tom is 48 years old” is true at some times and false at others. When I was 47 it was false. When I became 48 the prop became true. How long did the prop take to BECOME true? As long as it took me to BECOME 48; instantaneously I imagine. How long will it take the prop to become false? As long as it takes me to stop being 48 and become 49. That’s the point: TRUTH FOLLOWS REALITY.

Chaz: Most logicians would agree that this proposition needs to be disambiguated.

Tom: Most Ockhamists would insist on such a thing. No Peircean would think there’s anything ambiguous about it. You need to suppose some such ambiguity to introduce your Ockhamist worldview, a worldview which slips in without ever having to justify its own credentials.

Watch, you’ll do it right now…

Chaz: Here's one example: “Tom is 48 at t1”…

Tom: Enter…Ockhamism! Told ya. With “at t1” begins the abuse of tense.

“Oh are the shades of Pimberly to be thus polluted!” (Jane Austin; sorry, just losing it there for a sec.)

Chaz: This would state that…

Tom: Yes yes, I know the script. Ockhamism.

Chaz: Tom is 48 when he is indeed 48 and is an eternally true proposition if indeed Tom is 48 at t1. If you don’t like this answer than you will have to argue with the received view of propositional logic and not me.

Tom: Received view? I doubt belief in the temporal invariance of truth is the “received view” in philosophy. I’m not even sure philosophers would all agree on what it even means for a view to be “the received view.” Does that just mean a majority of all philosophers? How is that judged? A majority of published philosophers? Published philosophers who’ve taken the time to publish an opinion on this specific question? What? What do you even mean Chaz?

------------------------------------

Chaz: No surprise, we do disagree, you and the Determinists believe that what John saw of the future was what God has predetermined; I don’t.

Tom: Actually all an open theist would say is that events that are determined to come to pass will come to pass, not that GOD is (as determinists believe) the one determining all those aspects of the future which are determined to occur.

Chaz: I believe that much of what John saw were contingent future events caused by free moral agents.

Tom (ripping his blue shirt, throwing dust into the air, beating my chest and wailing loudly toward heaven  ): When did the agents of John’s vision cause the events he predicted?

Chaz: Again this is another reason for calling the Open View “free will determinism”…

Tom: Call it whatever you like. Calling something a name doesn’t constitute an argument, and I’m interested in arguments.

--------------------------------------------

Tom: You can’t assume your position is true based on the assumption that there’s SOME explanation or defense of it out there somewhere.

Chaz: Sure I can…

Tom: OK, how?

Chaz: Do you deny that there is truth in the universe?

Tom: No.

Chaz: …truth in God’s domain that is unknowable to man?

Tom: No, I don’t deny this.

Chaz: I do…

Tom: Do what? Deny it? Wait a sec, you mean you don’t deny that there is truth in the universe that is unknowable to human beings.

[I should start charging you for the editorial work! ]

Chaz: …most secular philosophers will agree that there is truth that is unknowable from a human prospective. Man is limited to his senses and reason; God isn't.

Tom: I don’t have a problem with there being truth that is either unknown or unknowable to us. I have a problem with you ASSUMING that this unknown/unknowable truth supports your theories. That’s arrogant and academically inexcusable. Imagine submitting a thesis for which your main lines of defense were truths no one could possible know but which you nevertheless claimed confirm your arguments. “Hey everybody, in defense of my theory of future contingents I offer as evidence truths that we can’t possibly know, but which I DO know support and confirm my theories.” You’re whole PhD thesis could be one page!

Honestly, Chaz.

-------------------------------------

Tom: What reality is it that grounds the eternal truth that there will be a sea battle tomorrow? You must have SOME notion of what it is.

Chaz: Again Tom you are arguing as an empiricist in that all truth is grounded in experience or the actual world…

Tom (long sigh): Uuughhhh. I was clear about empiricism vs rationalism and where I stood on that. I’m not an empiricist. All true propositions are grounded in ACTUALITY. That’s my claim.

Chaz: Honestly, I have to leave this thread and will not anwer anymore questions.

Tom: What questions HAVE you answered?  

---------------------------------------

Well, Alan. See what we’re up against? But I will not despair! No, I will have hope and confidence!

Peace out all.

Thanks Chaz. I appreciate your time. Thank your wife for loaning you to us for a spell too! And stop in to see us again.

Tom

Post Edited (HumanHypostasis) : 3/3/2008 1:10:45 PM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 3/3/2008 3:05:51 PM (GMT-6)

Chaz: Here is another example of Tom's double talk. Post one (P1) is from the thread "three laws of logic" in which Tom is defending bivalence and stating that he believes that all propositons are true or false today or prior to their occurance.

Tom: What in the world are you talking about Chaz? Propositions true or false “prior to their [the propositions’] occurrence”? I never talk about “propositions occurring.”

But let’s see whatcha got.

Chaz: P1 Tom: It might interest you to know that in our article we endorse bivalence. So yes, all propositions are either true or false, including future-tense propositions. I encourage you to read the first of the above articles.

Tom: So far so good. Future-tense propositions are either true or false at all times. That is, they are bivalent.

What else ya got?

Chaz: Now in post 2 (P2) Tom is now saying that a proposition about the future cannot be true prior to it's occurance…

Tom: Clear your mind Chaz. (1) I don’t think propositions “have an occurrence” so I’m sure I never said just that. And (2) I didn’t say no proposition about the future can be true. Propositions about the future are either true or false. In my view propositions making the claim that some future contingent WILL occur are not in fact true. But that doesn’t mean I think they don’t have a truth value. They do. They’re false.

So go ahead and finish introducing P2:

Chaz: … since the events that correspond to it have not occured as of yet…so if the future event hasn't taken place, it isn't true and neither is the proposition true yet. So he is now saying that future contingents are not true or false prior to their occurance.

Tom: I don’t want to conclude that you’re willfully misconstruing this, so I’ll try to clarify this for you once more.

Let’s see my P2:

Chaz: P2 Tom: Props do become true (and false) when the states of affairs they describe obtain or fail to obtain.

No misunderstanding on my part.

Tom: Yes, there is misunderstanding on your part.

In P2, Chaz, by “states of affairs” I mean those states of affairs that GROUND THE TRUTH of the proposition in question. That should clear things up for you. In the case of future-tense propositions the states of affairs that GROUND the truth of the prop are NOT the future states named in the prop. I can see how “describe” might lead you to think this, so I’ll take responsibility for not being clear enough.

Hopefully you’re clear on my meaning now. The states of affairs that decide whether a prop is true (or not) are those present realities which obtain (or not) at the time the proposition is asserted. If those states obtain, the prop is true. If not, it’s false. I don’t know how to be any clearer.

In the case of a future tense prop, say, <Chaz will do S in Y at time t>, this prop is true or false at the time I assert it depending NOT on the states of affairs named in the prop (your doing S in Y at t), but rather on states of affairs that obtain right now which either causally entail or preclude (or leave indeterminate) your doing S in Y at t. Truth grounds are not necessarily the same states of affairs as appear in a prop. They’re in fact NEVER the same in the case of past or future tense props.

So…

…distinguish between two different states of affairs, those states predicted or named by a future tense proposition (your doing S in Y at t) and those states that GROUND the truth value of this prop at the present moment. I was discussing the latter. SO: a prop may become true when there the state of affairs sufficient for GROUNDS its truth obtains, otherwise it’s false.

Chaz: By the way this has been my contention all along viz. what you call bivalence is really double talk lip service.

Tom: I hoped for better for you. I have no qualms with bivalence. I wish you well and hope you gain understanding.

Chaz: "It is true today (not becoming true) that there will be a sea battle tomorrow.”

Tom: How do you know it's true? It might be false I mean. I think you mean to say it is today/now either true or false that there will be a sea battle tomorrow.

I agree. It’s either true or false right now that “There will be a sea battle tomorrow.” It’s not now becoming true or false whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow.

I told you. I have no problem with bivalence. Do you have any other props you think I can agree are either true or false?

Now...

Let’s say that “There will be a sea battle tomorrow” is false right now, today, March 4th. OK? No sea battle tomorrow on the 5^th.

Imagine us now at tomorrow, March 5^th. And let us suppose that the next day, that is, the 6^th, there IS going to be a sea battle. Now what of the prop “There is going to be a sea battle tomorrow”? Yesterday it was false. Today it’s true. So the proposition “There will be a sea battle tomorrow” went from being false to being true. It was false on one day. It was true on the next. THAT is the sort of ‘becoming’ I’m talking about when I say props become true or false given the states of affairs that ground them. That’s my meaning. I do NOT mean that the prop becomes true when there’s a sea battle. Not at all.

Now, you, being a good Ockhamist, will feel compelled to disambiguate this proposition by making it tenseless and then indexing it to particular times so that each is a different proposition that is eternally true or false, given the events of the day it’s indexed to. I don’t do that. And if you’ll read our paper (very slowly this time) you will see why. No wait. I said ‘will’, and I kinda doubt that. So I’ll just say, you might and might not see why.

Your bivalent friend,

T

Post Edited (HumanHypostasis) : 3/3/2008 4:12:12 PM (GMT-6)