Chaz: The proposition “the sun will rise tomorrow” is a future contingent proposition…

Tom: How do you know this? What if God has determined unconditionally that the sun should rise tomorrow? If God has determined that he shall continue to sustain the laws that regulate the rising of the sun, then there’s nothing contingent about the sun rising tomorrow.

Chaz: Most Commonsense Realists would agree that we can have knowledge that this is a true proposition.

Tom: On the assumption that...

(a) our knowledge of the natural laws which govern the sun’s rising tomorrow is sufficiently complete, and that...

(b) God is committed to continue sustaining those laws unconditionally...

...then yes, we can know that the sun will rise tomorrow. But in this case, there’s nothing contingent about it.

Chaz: Now as I understand it; the Open View (OV from here forward) would deny that this proposition today is either “True” or “False” but rather indeterminate or “becoming true” or “becoming false”.

Tom: If you read our paper carefully you’d know not all open theists think this.

No need to deal with the three problems you mention. They don’t concern bivalent approaches to the OV.

Tom

Post Edited (HumanHypostasis) : 2/27/2008 9:19:39 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 2/27/2008 11:57:13 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 2/27/2008 12:43:25 PM (GMT-6)

Tom: Again, talk of 'future contingents' isn't talk of necessary vs contingent truth per se. It has to do rather with the causal relationships by which the event under consideration occurs (or not).

Chaz: The heck if it isn't! We are talking propositions and LOGIC…

Tom: We’re talking first of all about the nature of reality, specifically about indeterminism as a feature of the objective world. THEN we’re interested in how best to posit this feature of the world in propositional terms.

Chaz: …you seem to confuse the issues of causality, which is by the way a bit obscure for a proponent of free will.

Tom: What’s obscure about it? What proponent of free will denies causality or has no interest in causality? Why assume causality is only determinative? Causal forces can be determinative, or they may be influential without determining outcomes. Proponents of free will (some at least) are very interested in the nature of causality.

It’s important to the question of the nature of the future and the logic of expressing that future. Where future events are causally entailed, or determined, by present factors, we ought to have propositions that posit that determinacy. Where future events are causally precluded, or determined not to occur, there ought to be clear ways to express this propositionally also. And lastly, where causal factors neither entail nor preclude some event, that is, where the occurrence of some event is ‘historically’ contingent, or indeterminate, with respect to the probability of its occurrence, there ought to be propositions that clearly express this aspect of reality as well.

Chaz: You are trying to say the sun rise is causally necessary and therefore we can know today that it is TRUE that the sun will rise tomorrow…

Tom: I’m not trying to say it. I’m saying it. And what I’m saying is that tomorrow’s sunrise can EITHER be causally entailed by factors that obtain presently OR causally indeterminate. If the forcer is true, then there’s an appropriate proposition that posits that determinate nature of the occurrence of/the obtaining of tomorrow’s sunrise. If the latter, then there’s an appropriate proposition positing its indeterminate nature.

Do you dispute the categories of determinate vs indeterminate with respect to the occurrence of events? I doubt it. If not, then you’ll agree these are objective features of the real world, not just epistemic states of mind. Once the objective nature of determinacy and indeterminacy (and BOTH exist in our world) is granted, then the only question left is what LANGUAGE or semantics best expresses these categories with respect to future events. And once again, here we have two basic options: Ockham and Peirce.

Chaz: …you are saying that this proposition is true today.

Tom: I believe like you that all propositions are either true or false. So <The sun will rise tomorrow>, spoken today, is either true or false, yes. I believe it’s true because I believe it’s causally entailed in the present state of reality. What you and we disagree about, Chaz, is the causal import of the word “will.” You, a good Ockhamist, say “will” has NO causal force. It doesn’t imply anything about the causal relation of the present to the future. But Ockhamism is only one way to construe semantics. It’s not the only way.

Chaz: You are trying to acribe a modality of necessity to a contingent proposition…

Tom: Not ‘logical’ necessity. The sun’s rising tomorrow can’t be a logically necessary state of affairs. All creation is logically contingent. We’re not talking about the logical status of future events. We’re talking about the status of future events with respect to causal relations to the present. Events have a logical status as to necessity and contingency (you’re stuck here) as well as a causal status as to determinacy and indeterminacy (this is where we need to be).

Chaz: You are again employing inductive reasoning and by your assumptions are attempting to treat a contingent as though it is a necessary; but the modal status of this propositon transcends any causal or physical necessity.

Tom: I’m not interested in the logical status of tomorrow’s sunrise. I already know it’s a logically contingent state of affairs. Nobody thinks otherwise. I’m interested in knowing if it’s causally entailed or not. But when it comes to constructing the appropriate proposition to posit WHETHER the sun will rise tomorrow or not, nobody cares about logical necessity (except Ockhamists perhaps!). It’s the historical, or causal, necessity of tomorrow’s sunrise that we want to capture propositionally.

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Tom: Christ's return to earth is not a future contingent event. It's determined to occur ALTHOUGH it's a logically contingent event.

Chaz: What does this have to do with this thread?

Tom: Just another examples of a logically contingent state of affairs which is causally entailed in the present state of reality and so determined to occur and thus not historically contingent.

Chaz: You said it is not a future contingent but it is logically contingent? This sounds a bit contradictory to me...

Tom: Christ’s coming is a logically contingent state of affairs (as is tomorrow’s sunrise). The only logically necessary state of affairs is God’s existence as triune. All other states of affairs, all Creation, is logically contingent. I think you’ll agree.

It follows then that all worldly events, Christ’s birth, future return, the eschaton, all of it, is logically contingent. It didn’t have to be. God didn’t have to create.

But that’s not the end of the discussion regarding determinacy and indeterminacy, which aren’t logical categories per se. They’re ‘ways the world is’. They’re states of being, ways in which states of affairs relate in the act of temporal becoming.

To say Christ’s return is certain, determined to occur, inevitable, as good as money in the bank, to be brought about unconditionally by God…all these describe the determinate nature of Christ’s return. It’s not a future contingent EVENT. There’s nothing contingent about WHETHER Christ will return or not. But the determinate vs indeterminate question (which is what WE are interested in) is different than the logically necessary vs logically contingent question.

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Chaz: What Boyd is saying is God knows nothing more than that a proposition is contingent and true in some possible worlds; but to say that God does not know which worlds will be actualized is nothing but lip-service; and essentially that God doesn’t know all actually true propositions.

Tom: Not really. It’s disagreeing with you that “will” is TRUE in the case of future contingents that eventuate. We think God knows all true props. We just think the scope of propositions regarding the future is not limited to “will” and “will not” (as it is for you and all Ockhamists), but includes “might and might not” propositions as well. Propositions of the latter sort are not other than fully ‘propositions’ which make coherent claims about the world and which either truly or falsely describe the world. If indeterminacy is an objective feature of reality, then to POSIT this indeterminacy propositionally is not ‘nothing’. It’s quite something.

Tom

PS Hi Alan. Glad you stopped in.

Post Edited (HumanHypostasis) : 2/28/2008 12:47:20 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Chaz Finney) : 2/28/2008 10:24:24 PM (GMT-6)

Chaz: Why is every one so fearful of causality, of logical determinism...in that it precludes free will? Because they view life through the eyes of a determinist.

Tom: We don’t view all of life through their eyes. There are significant differences. But on this point, yes, we agree with determinists that foreknowledge (traditionally conceived) and libertarian free will are incompatible. But this doesn’t make us determinists. It just means we agree with determinists on the implications of such foreknowledge. But where determinists reject free will and maintain foreknowledge (traditionally construed), open theists maintain free will and reject such foreknowledge. So though determinists and open theists are both incompatibilists regarding foreknowledge and libertarian free will, we each choose to resolve the incompatibility in different ways.

The sine qua non of theological determinism (as far as this conversation is concerned), is the unconditional determination of all things by God. If you don’t have at least that, you don’t qualify as a theological determinist. So agreeing with determinists on, say, the ‘incompatibility thesis’ doesn’t make one a determinist. One has to take the additional step of rejecting libertarian free will and affirming unconditional divine determination in order to resolve the incompatibility. The incompatibility thesis is just a fork in the road so to speak. It’s which direction one takes at the fork that defines one as a determinist or not. And open theists and determinists each take a different fork in the road.

And then where Molinists and traditional Arminians continue (with determinists) in maintaining EDF, open theists say this has to go. Semantics follows ontology (as determinists understand and open theists agree). Molinists and other Arminians dispute this and try to deny via Ockhamism that there is a fork in the road, but in the end (in our view) it doesn’t fly. I can’t tell you how many Calvinists have said to me, “Tom, YOU get it. You understand that truth follows reality. If the truth about the future is settled, it can only be because the future is settled/determined. But if indeterminism is true and the future can really eventuate this or that way, then you open theists are right. We wish traditional Arminians understood that the correct choice is between either Calvinism or open theism.”

And in my view they’re right. You, Chaz, have an indeterminist ontology but a determinist semantic. You say the future is open to more than one possible way of becoming but insist that the truth about how this future will unfold is a settled fact in God’s mind from eternity. But to me (and others, including those determinists I’ve talked to) this divorces truth from the realities that ground truth.

Chaz: Consider this: I am wearing a green shirt right now; this can be deducible from antecedent causal conditions leading up to my decision to wear a green shirt.

Tom: Are you an indeterminist? If so, then you know that both your choosing to wear and your choosing NOT to wear a green shirt are equally compatible with all the antecedent causal conditions leading up to your choice. In other words, the world leading up to your choice of green is perfectly compatible (logically and causally) with your choosing to wear some other colored shirt. That’s the definition of libertarian free will. So your choosing a green shirt can’t be deduced from the conditions leading up to the choice. They define the context in which you choose, yes. But for indeterminists, the context of a free choice isn’t sufficient to entail or preclude the choice in question. The choice doesn’t ‘follow’ (logically or causally) from the factors that constitute the context. YOU, a free being created in the image of God, ‘created’ that choice. You determined your ‘self’ with respect to the color of shirt you’d choose to wear.

Chaz: Did this chain of causality preclude my free will or force me to wear a green shirt?

Tom: There is no chain of causality that either logically or causally entailed your choosing to wear a green shirt (if the choice was a libertarian one). That’s the definition of libertarianism.

Chaz: No, it is compatible with my free will, if I freely chose to wear a blue shirt today, we could have gone back in time and found another causal chain of antecedent events leading up to this free will decision as well.

Tom: On the contrary, Chaz. Indeterminism is defined as the claim that one and the same history may yield different outcomes. Had you chosen a blue shirt freely, there wouldn’t necessarily be anything different in the causal chain leading up to your choice. You, the self-determining agent, are the final arbiter in transitioning possibility to actuality in choosing one from among a multiplicity of options presented you by one and the same causal history of the world. So it’s not the case (if indeterminism is true) that had you chose blue over green we would find “another causal chain of antecedent events” leading up to the choice. On indeterminism, we may find exactly the same causal chain of events. That’s the definition of libertarian free will. I thought you believed this though.

One more point. Causality is a continuum. Causality isn’t always determinative. It admits degrees of influence. Causal influences may ‘tend’ you to this or that choice, making one choice more likely, more probabilistic, than another, without entailing a particular choice and precluding others.

Chaz: What if God saw these causal events leading up to my decision to wear a green shirt; would this have precluded my free will? Again the answer is no.

Tom: On an indeterminist ontology properly construed, neither the causal history nor knowing the causal history leading up to your choice of green would threaten the freedom of the choice because that history is equally compatible with your not choosing green. The world could have been exactly as it was leading up to your choice of green and you choose, say, blue. So as an open theist, I’d agree that of course God’s knowing the causal history leading up to the choice doesn’t threaten the freedom of the choice. But against you I’d add that neither is this knowledge sufficient grounds for knowing that you’ll in fact choose green. All it is grounds for is knowledge of the possible choices you’ll face. If reality, which is just that causal history leading up to a choice, doesn’t causally entail a particular choice it can’t entail knowledge of a particular choice, since reality grounds truth.

What I’d like to know from you, Chaz, is how you think God comes by his knowledge of the truth that you ‘will’ choose green. Does he come by it via his knowledge of the causal history leading up to the choice? That seems unlikely if you’re an indeterminist, since (a) one and the same causal history is compatible with your choosing otherwise, (b) that causal history is itself made up of events that, like your choice of green, occur indeterministically, and (c) that history isn’t eternal though God’s knowledge of it IS (in YOUR view). So how does God come by his knowledge that you’ll choose a green shirt? Does he come by it via timelessly existing at all points in time? The old ‘eternal now’ theory? That view is fraught with inconsistencies. Does he come by it via knowledge of himself perhaps (as determinists say)? That would entail determinism. How then? What grounds the truth that “Chaz will choose to wear a green shirt on 2/28/08” sans creation? Are you a Molinist? That would save us a lot of time and help narrow the issues.

Tom

Post Edited (HumanHypostasis) : 2/29/2008 6:48:10 AM (GMT-6)

Chaz:   So God knows ALL true propsitions actual & non actual ... Now we have been over this time and time again that knowledge is not causative; if God or you know something to be true, it is true or will be actualized because it corresponds with the facts, not because you or an omnsicient being knows it. ... [T]he future will be what it will be. We of course can change it from what it could have been. For example if I choose to drink 12 shots ot tequila at time t1, at time t2 I will be drunk for various (at least 12) antecedent causal events. I could have chose to not drink at all and changed my future from what it could have been. Now God knowing what decisions I would choose has absolutely no impact on my libertarian free will. I fully have the power to do P or ~P (def. free will).

JET:  Chaz, this is what I’m hearing you say (correct me if I’m wrong):

(1) If at t1 God has knowledge of S (where S is a state of affairs at t2), God’s knowledge at t1 would not be the cause of S’s occurring at t2.

(2) As far as (1) is concerned, it makes no difference whether S is a LFW choice or a state of affairs other than a LFW choice.

(3) Therefore, God’s knowledge at t1 of a state of affairs occurring at t2 is compatible with said state of affairs being a LFW choice.

I disagree with premise (2). God’s knowledge is coextensive with all reality, all truth. God knows all truths and believes no falsehoods. However, by definition, prior to the moment of a LFW choice it is possible that the LFW choice will not be made. Thus, where S is an affirmative LFW choice at t2, then at t1, the proposition "S will occur at t2" is false. Likewise, the proposition "S will not occur at t2" is false. Rather, it is true that "S might or might not occur at t2". Therefore, where S is a LFW choice, an omniscient God would not believe at t1 that "S will occur at t2" is true. Where S is a LFW choice, an omniscient God would believe that "S might or might not occur" is true. It would be nonsense to say both that God is omniscient and that God has knowledge that "S will occur at t2".

Thus, premise (2) above, is false. As far as (1) is concerned, there is a fundamental difference between a LFW choice and a state of affairs other than a LFW choice. While it is true that:

it is true only in the trivial sense that lots of "IF" statements are true.  It makes no sense to say that God actually has such knowledge. If S is a LFW choice, then God (by virtue of omniscience) would not believe at t1 that "S will occur at t2"!

Where S is a LFW choice, Premise (1) would be like saying: "IF at t1 God believes something false, God’s false belief would not be the cause of something occurring at t2."  The premise would be true only in a trivial sense because it is nonsense to say that "God believes something false".

Thus, it makes a difference whether S is a LFW choice or not, and premise (2) is false.