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| Open Theism Discussion Board > Public Forums > General Chat > Need a little help on this one... | Forum Quick Jump
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|  Laika Registered Member

Date Joined Mar 2003 Total Posts : 2433 | Posted 7/25/2008 5:03 PM (GMT -6) |   |
Tom said...
How formed would a character be which had loved unfailingly for an eternity? If we go with your rejection of an original necessity that guarantees God loves and just go with the solidifying effects of character formation over time, how solidified do you think God is? And if we add to this the fact that God perfectly perceives all reality and values, etc., I can’t see any grounds for maintaining a real, genuine, existentially viable freedom to ‘sin’ in God. God having developed a nature that can be counted on for making 'good' choices makes sense to me.
God being 'necessarily good' doesn't.
The former lays out a path I can hope to follow. The latter is unattainable.
If angels can dance on the head of a pin,
Don't that tell you something about their skin? Post Edited (Laika) : 7/25/2008 7:06:54 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
  |  Similitude Registered Member
 Date Joined Apr 2004 Total Posts : 4968 | Posted 7/25/2008 7:59 PM (GMT -6) |   | Z: All I've got is the belief that the beings created in God's image have free will, and God calls himself good which seems to imply something moral and therefore free.
J: First of all, Tom and I are not saying that God is not free. We're saying He is not free with respect to whether He is sympathetic or not. Just like I'm not free as to whether I prefer pleasure to pain. All systems are grounded in brute facts. Yours just ground prematurely. There is nothing more rational about setting your brute fact at "God does what He wants" than setting my brute fact at "God is unchangeably sympathetic."
Your ground, though, can't even get you to "God is moral" from "God calls Himself good." Because God can be lying on your assumptions. Why, too, on your assumptions, should you believe that God actually "calls Himself good" to humans if those same humans that wrote that meant, by "good," that God floods, brings plagues, fire from heaven, and judges nations and individuals? Post Edited (Similtude) : 7/25/2008 8:19:45 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Truth Aficionado Registered Member

Date Joined Dec 2003 Total Posts : 1544 | Posted 7/25/2008 9:19 PM (GMT -6) |   |
Similtude said...
Mark: Jeff, how do you work unconditional love, or a gratuitous act, into your view of Consequentialism?
Jeff: I think if there is such a thing as unconditional love, it means that universalism it true. Otherwise, I don't see how there can be such a thing. But if universalism is true, then unconditional love simpy means that God, in the short run, does the best He can for all concerned GIVEN the temporal constraints entailed in those means fitted to attain His temporal ends for creation.
Is there not times when extending unconditional love is actually harmful and not very loving at all?
So once god commits a gratuitous act he is bound to always act gratuitously in the future?
If you’re a good Samaritan and help someone out once and ask nothing in return, no obligation, no compensation, does this necessitate you to always act accordingly?
My point is that after thousands of years, Consequentialism does not seem to show much vicissitude in regards to human morality, aside from restraining and controlling a unregenerate heart (ironically a heart that is freely in bondage to sin). Aristotle pointed out that people have a tendency to acknowledge general moral principles, but go into denial when they personally contemplate committing sin. Afterwards a sense of guilt and remorse set in. I don’t believe one can attribute consequential implications as the central cause of a contrite heart. Animal trainers and law enforcement agents use such stick and carrot tactics in order to get their subject to convey a good outward appearance, but hey, don’t place to much trust in them and turn your back.
I believe our God given moral conscience convicts us of our guilt and draws us near to him. Remove our moral conscience and your left with a typical sociopath. Of course we have the free will choice to repress our moral conscience, but hey, be ready to suffer the consequences of getting your teeth knocked out by the world.
Post Edited (Truth Aficionado) : 7/25/2008 9:32:11 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Similitude Registered Member
 Date Joined Apr 2004 Total Posts : 4968 | Posted 7/26/2008 9:20 AM (GMT -6) |   | | Mark: I don’t believe one can attribute consequential implications as the central cause of a contrite heart.
Jeff: Me either. But some people resent their parents for discipline. Some people thank their parents for it. I'm in the latter category. Similarly, I believe God will judge me for my works one day. I think He is GOOD for that, because it motivates me when I'm not sufficiently motivated on my own as I ought to be (compare 1 Cor: "For if we don't judge ourselves, God will judge us lest we be condemned with the world."). Zach thinks He would be EVIL for that. I have no idea how Greg makes sense of it. Greg's view is completely incoherent to me.
But with respect to universalism, I think for universalism to be true, the role of libertarianism in matters of benevolence vs. malevolence must be finite in time. IOW, unlike Zach, who thinks that even God can desire evil at any time, and that libertarianism with respect to benevolence vs. malevolence is an eternal feature of reality for all volitional beings, I think that God never has been nor ever will be libertarian with respect to those kinds of choices, and that one day we will, as Peter says, "partake of the divine nature" in THAT same respect. Thus, to me, libertarianism is only eternal in matters that are not actually about benevolence vs. malevolence.
I can think of human cases of amoral volition, like learning to drive a standard shift, or getting up from a dead sleep to go fishing. So I suspect God is capable of these.
Post Edited (Similtude) : 7/26/2008 9:57:36 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
   |  Similitude Registered Member
 Date Joined Apr 2004 Total Posts : 4968 | Posted 7/26/2008 3:04 PM (GMT -6) |   | |
J: Similarly, I believe God will judge me for my works one day. I think He is GOOD for that, because it motivates me when I'm not sufficiently motivated on my own as I ought to be (compare 1 Cor: "For if we don't judge ourselves, God will judge us lest we be condemned with the world." ). Zach thinks He would be EVIL for that.
Z: This is not the case. I've gone over it repeatedly, but Jeff will not hear of a distinction between those in bilateral covenant and those without. He consistently forgets that I make such a distinction.
J: What I was saying is that you believe God would be evil for MOTIVATING with negative consequences. What you believe about judgment has nothing to do with God motivating people as far as I can tell. Am I wrong about that? And just to help me out, how do you define bilateral covenant? As I define it, you are not even talking about a bilateral covenant.
J: Thus, to me, libertarianism is only eternal in matters that are not actually about benevolence vs. malevolence.
Z: Would it be fair to say libertarianism is only eternal in trivial matters?
J: Frankly, I can only think of one conceivable libertarian choice for God. And that is to create WITH RISK of temporary suffering. In this case, God has truly conflicted desires, neither of which are malevolent or moral in nature, from which He must choose.
J: I can think of human cases of amoral volition, like learning to drive a standard shift, or getting up from a dead sleep to go fishing. So I suspect God is capable of these.
Z: So while God may be benevolent he is not morally good since his benevolence is an automated program, correct?
J: An automated program would be like a computer program, right? If so, then God is nothing like that. He is conscious, sentient, rational, and volitional.
He is not moral in the sense that we are because He doesn't exist FOR anything as we do. All created things exist FOR the Father and the Son. The Father and the Son don't even exist FOR each other. Hence, their relationship is not one of moral obligation.
This "FOR" relation is what makes us morally obligated to ANOTHER. We have duty grounded in what we are FOR. This can not be true of God. Hence, it is meaningless to say that GOd did something "wrong." His actions can not be contrary to some end for which He exists. What would that even mean to say God does "wrong" except that HE exists FOR something/somebody and violated the ends of His existence?
That being the case, if God was unsympathetic, He would not be immoral. And being sympathetic doesn't make Him moral. It just makes Him naturally interested in our sentient satisfaction. Only we are moral in the sense of duty. Or, to use Christ's words, where much is given, much is REQUIRED, where little is given, little is REQUIRED. God gives FOR purposes. His gifts are not purposeless. They are SUPPOSED to be used to fulfill the ends God intended for them.
Now if you want to say that God gives with no ends/designs/purposes, then I would say that we are not moral either except in the sense of pure relativism. But per relativism, no one can wrong ANOTHER. You can only fall short of attaining your own ends, per relativism. For you don't exist FOR anyone else in that case.
Post Edited (Similtude) : 7/26/2008 3:25:31 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Truth Aficionado Registered Member

Date Joined Dec 2003 Total Posts : 1544 | Posted 8/4/2008 11:26 AM (GMT -6) |   |
Similtude said... Mark: I don’t believe one can attribute consequential implications as the central cause of a contrite heart.
Jeff: Me either.
Jeff,
so then, outside of Consequentialism, what do you attribute it to?
Thanks,
Mark | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Sahid Megistered Rember

Date Joined Jun 2004 Total Posts : 2013 | Posted 8/4/2008 12:49 PM (GMT -6) |   | J: What I was saying is that you believe God would be evil for MOTIVATING with negative consequences.
Z: No I don't. You, again, are not leaving any room for a distinction between those within bilateral covenant and those without.
J: What you believe about judgment has nothing to do with God motivating people as far as I can tell. Am I wrong about that? And just to help me out, how do you define bilateral covenant? As I define it, you are not even talking about a bilateral covenant.
Z: Bilateral covenant is an agreement between two parties. Nothing fancy. If God and I both accept his lordship over me, then negative motivations are fair game. I've NEVER said otherwise. I've ALWAYS prefaced his stuff... I'm not being tricky. If you didn't agree to have God rule over you, then he'd be the moral equivalent of mob enforcer if he used negative motivation. However, this moral problem goes away if God's rule over you is something you've asked for. In either case there may be positive or negative consequences, but the moral question is one of jurisdiction: does God take our hearts and minds by force or does he stand at the door and knock? Once we've opened the door to him, he may use negative motivation.
J: An automated program would be like a computer program, right? If so, then God is nothing like that. He is conscious, sentient, rational, and volitional.
Z: Nothing like that? Nothing? Volitional? When it comes to moral choices, is God free or unfree; is he man or machine? I'll grant that the metaphor of automated program does not extend to every aspect of God as you conceive of him. But when it comes to the issue of this thread, I think 'machine' is one of the most accurate metaphors we can use for your view of God. Maybe 'force of nature' is better. Just as the law of gravity has no freedom to choose, God has no ability to make moral choice. It's hard to think of an example of moral unfreedom that does not have de-personalizing overtones. Maybe that's saying something.
J: The Father and the Son don't even exist FOR each other.
Z: This seems to be an odd claim to make.
J: We have duty grounded in what we are FOR.
Z: And here's another. Why should I believe this one? Seems to have simply and conveniently just appeared out of nowhere. A shovel is FOR digging, and if we say a shovel is 'good' we mean that it accomplishes the goal of digging. But this 'good' has nothing to do with morality or duty. It's an just an amoral object. The concept only applies to persons if we first objectify the persons.
J: This can not be true of God.
Z: Really? God is unable to choose to be FOR something? There's yet another limitation of God's omnipotence.
J: Hence, it is meaningless to say that GOd did something "wrong."
Z: 'Hence' is the key word. After making three ungrounded assumptions, you can say 'hence...'. It's not that I'm stubborn. People who know me will tell you that I have the exact opposite fault. It's just that I can't see any way of convincing myself that these three assumptions ought to be accepted on blind faith.
For us to meaningfully debate, we've got to have some common ground to build from. It also seems that the third should come before the first; the non-FOR-ness of the Trinity does not imply the impossibility of FOR-ness in the Trinity.
J: His actions can not be contrary to some end for which He exists. What would that even mean to say God does "wrong" except that HE exists FOR something/somebody and violated the ends of His existence?
Z: You begin with the assumption that God cannot make moral choice, so of course it is inconceivable that God would make a second moral choice that conflicts with the first. But I begin with the opposite assumption. There is nothing illogical about a supreme being processing the ability to make a choice and changing his mind.
J: That being the case, if God was unsympathetic, He would not be immoral. And being sympathetic doesn't make Him moral.
Z: Agreed. That's not my position.
J: Now if you want to say that God gives with no ends/designs/purposes...
Z: I don't.
J: But per relativism, no one can wrong ANOTHER.
Z: You've confused relativism with nihilism.
Y'all said... Mark: I don’t believe one can attribute consequential implications as the central cause of a contrite heart. Jeff: Me either.
Jeff, so then, outside of Consequentialism, what do you attribute it to?
Yeah. I was under the impression that you boiled all motivations down to consequential attempts to maximize sentient satisfaction. Watch me fly. Freedom like wings and I will use them. Freedom like wings and I will spread them wide. - StavesacrePost Edited (Sahid) : 8/4/2008 1:04:56 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Similitude Registered Member
 Date Joined Apr 2004 Total Posts : 4968 | Posted 8/4/2008 5:56 PM (GMT -6) |   | J: His actions can not be contrary to some end for which He exists. What would that even mean to say God does "wrong" except that HE exists FOR something/somebody and violated the ends of His existence?
Z: You begin with the assumption that God cannot make moral choice, so of course it is inconceivable that God would make a second moral choice that conflicts with the first. But I begin with the opposite assumption. There is nothing illogical about a supreme being processing the ability to make a choice and changing his mind.
J: Why is making a choice and subsequently changing one's mind about it necessarily have anything to do with morality?
When you ask why can't God be FOR something, you are using the word "for" in a different sense than, say, "the eye exists FOR seeing." I mean "FOR" in the latter sense. Apart from entities existing FOR ends AND at least some subset of those entities having free-will to act in accordance with or against these ends, we are left with pure relativism which can not ground the idea of WRONGING ANOTHER. We can harm another, but pain, itself, doesn't constitute the relation of WRONG.
J: But per relativism, no one can wrong ANOTHER.
Z: You've confused relativism with nihilism.
J: Define the 2 so I can see what you mean by relativism. Let me add that existing "FOR" some end is not the only ground for morality. It is ONE of them.
I don't see how either relativism or nihilism can ground the intelligibility/meaningfullness of WRONGING another.
Y'all said... Mark: I don’t believe one can attribute consequential implications as the central cause of a contrite heart.
Jeff: Me either.
Jeff, so then, outside of Consequentialism, what do you attribute it to?
Z: Yeah. I was under the impression that you boiled all motivations down to consequential attempts to maximize sentient satisfaction.
J: A contrite heart seems, to me, to have to do with belief and emotion. Don't really see anything libertarian-causal going on there. I believe 2+2=4. But for the life of me I don't see how I volitionally choose to believe that. Seems to me I'd have to choose NOT to believe it. | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Sahid Megistered Rember

Date Joined Jun 2004 Total Posts : 2013 | Posted 8/5/2008 5:27 AM (GMT -6) |   | J: Why is making a choice and subsequently changing one's mind about it necessarily have anything to do with morality?
Z: If the first choice involves a bilateral covenant, then changing one's mind about that covenant is the very definition of immorality in my view. Apart from bilateral agreement, nothing can be said to be moral. Within bilateral agreement, I propose that all morality is essentially a matter of keeping one's word. I'm fine with calling that 'relativism' but maybe 'subjective' or 'interpersonal' morality might be less confusing.
J: When you ask why can't God be FOR something, you are using the word "for" in a different sense than, say, "the eye exists FOR seeing." I mean "FOR" in the latter sense.
Z: You lost me. I see the former; where's the latter?
J: Apart from entities existing FOR ends AND at least some subset of those entities having free-will to act in accordance with or against these ends, we are left with pure relativism which can not ground the idea of WRONGING ANOTHER. We can harm another, but pain, itself, doesn't constitute the relation of WRONG.
Z: I'm still a little fuzzy on what you mean. Are you saying that God cannot choose an end to exist for?
J: Define the 2 so I can see what you mean by relativism. Let me add that existing "FOR" some end is not the only ground for morality. It is ONE of them. I don't see how either relativism or nihilism can ground the intelligibility/meaningfullness of WRONGING another.
Z: Well, relativism isn't the word I'm most comfortable with because I think it invites confusion. Like I said above, subjective or interpersonal would probably be better. Here goes...
You are right (if I've understood you) that God is different from the shovel which exists FOR digging. The shovel is an object which no decision-making capacity. Since God is a person, or rather three persons, or rather three very exemplars of personhood... Well, I'll say it this way: since God is personal and not just an object, he's got the say in what, if anything, he is FOR.
The same, to an albeit more limited degree, is true of us. We have graciously been give the freedom to choose whether to order our own lives or surrender them. God has made us FOR something; he's got a telos in mind. But he also leaves it to us to accept that telos. So if we happen to agree with God and surrender to his ordering and telos, then it is not accurate to say this is a objectively true and appropriate telos. Rather, this is a telos that is determined by subjects coming and reasoning together. It is thoroughly subjective. To say it's God's will is fine. But to then say that it is our objective telos is to forget that God's will is his subjective will. He is person and not mere object. Furthermore he invites us subjects to join him in this determining of telos, so it is doubly subjective or, now, interpersonal.
So, relativism... Again, I'm not a fan of the term. But in this case our telos is not a matter of objective truth. It is instead a matter of subjective, interpersonal deliberation. Inasmuch as this is the case it can also be said that telos is determined relative to the wishes of certain subjects, rather than established independently of personal wishes as is usually meant with objectivism.
Nihilism to my mind is on the opposite pole from relativism. The nihilist, like the atheist, makes a negative claim, in this case about morality. Whether nihilism is tenable (I think it probably is) is another matter. The main point is that I do not make such a negative claim about morality. I make a positive claim about morality. Furthermore, where the nihilist's claim is typically objectivist (concerned with absolute good and evil or something), mine is firmly non-objectivist.
As to grounding an "intelligibility/meaningfullness of WRONGING another", I think you are correct in saying the nihilist is unable to do this. However, I DO believe in truth and in right and wrong. I'll grant that given a certain language, we can make objectively true claims. I am not a cognitive relativist, just a moral relativist. But there is no objective law beyond God. Like you've said, if God were unsympathetic, this would not be grounds to call him WRONG. I take it even further; if God were overwhelmingly cruel to his creation, even this would not be WRONG in this narrow sense. We might not like it, but WRONG is not yet a fitting word. But what if God were to promise to always love you? So far nothing right or wrong... Until he stops loving you. Now we can look back and see that his earlier claim was in fact wrong. The only rule he could possibly break is his own.
The same applies to us. If we remain uncommitted to any covenant, then there is no possible way of WRONGING anyone. Apart from covenant, nothing is owed. God could impose a law upon us without our approval (and we couldn't call it WRONG), but we could oppose this law (and this too could not be called WRONG). So you could say right and wrong are a function of language, and more specifically promise/covenant language. Apart from this I don't see how we as Christians can legitimate morality.
J: Don't really see anything libertarian-causal going on there.
Z: We must really be speaking different languages. 'Libertarian-causal' makes as much sense to me as 'square-circular'. Watch me fly. Freedom like wings and I will use them. Freedom like wings and I will spread them wide. - StavesacrePost Edited (Sahid) : 8/5/2008 5:36:34 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Similitude Registered Member
 Date Joined Apr 2004 Total Posts : 4968 | Posted 8/5/2008 5:37 PM (GMT -6) |   | J: Don't really see anything libertarian-causal going on there.
Z: We must really be speaking different languages. 'Libertarian-causal' makes as much sense to me as 'square-circular'.
J: Just like I showed by my example. I believe and feel things that have nothing to do with libertarian choice. They are beliefs and feelings that occur independent of choice. My belief that 3 > 2 is one such belief. I have no consciousness of choosing to believe that. It seems to be compelled by my laws of thought. Thus, for all I can tell, a contrite heart is simpy a heart of a certain belief and a naturally resulting feeling. The belief need not have been volitionally caused any more than my belief that 3 > 2 is.
J: Apart from entities existing FOR ends AND at least some subset of those entities having free-will to act in accordance with or against these ends, we are left with pure relativism which can not ground the idea of WRONGING ANOTHER. We can harm another, but pain, itself, doesn't constitute the relation of WRONG.
Z: I'm still a little fuzzy on what you mean. Are you saying that God cannot choose an end to exist for?
J: Are you saying that God has to choose to exist? If not, your question seems to make no sense. If so, I would just say that it seems problematic for me to think of a literally temporally continuous choice to remain in existence. I think of choices as discrete actions. By the view that God has to continually choose to remain in existence, a choice would have eternal duration. I don't see any reason to posit such a state of affairs. I like to remain as analogical as possible so long as analogy can explain what needs explaining. I don't see what an eternally enduring choice explains that is not explicable otherwise. Thus, to be non-analogical when there is no explanatory advantage to it seems arbitrary to me.
Let me try to be a bit clearer. An intended end, to my mind, implies a final cause. That is to say, an end exists because of some original intention that occurred IN TIME. Thus, two things follow:
1) the duration between the intention of the end/purpose and the actualization of the end is FINITE 2) a divine end, or divinely intended result, only occurs BECAUSE of the intention--for there would no existing beings outside of Himself to function as means apart from His intention
So when I say we exist FOR God, I'm saying we exist BECAUSE of His intention/purpose for us AND we have a point of origin, temporally speaking. Neither of these things is true of the Father and the Son. They can not exist for one another in that sense. We can, however, exist for the Father and the Son in that sense. And it is that sense that gives meaning to sin. Sin is the missing of a divine intention for our actions.
Z: Bilateral covenant is an agreement between two parties. Nothing fancy. If God and I both accept his lordship over me, then negative motivations are fair game. I've NEVER said otherwise. I've ALWAYS prefaced his stuff... I'm not being tricky. If you didn't agree to have God rule over you, then he'd be the moral equivalent of mob enforcer if he used negative motivation. However, this moral problem goes away if God's rule over you is something you've asked for. In either case there may be positive or negative consequences, but the moral question is one of jurisdiction: does God take our hearts and minds by force or does he stand at the door and knock? Once we've opened the door to him, he may use negative motivation.
J: I was thinking you had said that Christians are forgiven--i.e., zero negative consequences for their actions. I think I can find that thread. But also, I was thinking you had said that God "honors" man-made covenants even when they are based on misconceptions of what God's will is. If that is not true, then it seems that the only persons that Christ could have been referring to when talking about age-abiding torment is believers. Now it seems that you are saying that bi-lateral covenants only apply to the extent that God WILLS to apply negative consequences to motivate us. But if He wills to do this, then it must not be intrinsically evil TO do it. And if that is the case, why does our consent to such motivation render it good or evil in its consequences. Frankly, when I believed the gospel, I knew nothing of the biblical claim of God's disciplining of sons lest they be condemned with the world. Hence, I didn't bi-laterally agree to it. So does that mean that God won't motivate me thus unless I consent to it? If so, at least it seems that Paul didn't think so. He said if we don't judge ourselves, God will judge us LEST we be condemned with the world. It seems like a purely loving thing to do on God's part, per Paul, independent of my consent. Now Paul could be wrong. But then what parent waits for consent from their children before applying any kind of disciplinary action (corporeal or otherwise) to them? Are parents the moral equivalent of mobs for doing this? Post Edited (Similtude) : 8/5/2008 5:45:21 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Sahid Megistered Rember

Date Joined Jun 2004 Total Posts : 2013 | Posted 8/6/2008 1:15 PM (GMT -6) |   | J: My belief that 3 > 2 is one such belief. I have no consciousness of choosing to believe that. It seems to be compelled by my laws of thought.
Z: Such beliefs are just a matter of using language. For the inequality 3 > 2 to have any meaning, it's elements must first have meaning. Before we talk about the truth value of 3 > 2, we must know what '3', '>', and '2' mean. Then we can see that the truth of the inequality logically follows. But logically follows from what? From the definitions! So belief that 3 > 2 is the same as knowing mathematical language. There is no 'belief' beyond knowing the language here. Similarly, it's not that I 'believe' that a dog is a mammal. It is simply the case that I speak English, and in the English language dogs are mammals. There is no objective truth in this claim, because every element of the claim is a subjective creation. Objectively, there are these things running around. But they are only grouped together and named 'dog' by a subjective act.
Now, you've drawn the parallel from this definitional 'belief' to the contrite heart. I don't know what 'contrite' means to every person and I haven't studied what it might mean to biblical authors. But even if 'contrite' is an unchosen state of being like having two legs and ten fingers, it seems that all open-viewers are committed to at least some actually moral choosing somewhere - the choosen continuation of contriteness. It can't ALL be cause-and-effect determinism or else you've got compatibilism which I think everyone acknowledges is distinct from the open view.
J: Are you saying that God has to choose to exist?
Z: I say that God is all-powerful. He can choose to do anything (so long as that anything is not a logical absurdity). So God, who has no beginning, always possesses the ability to choose to exist or not.
J: If so, I would just say that it seems problematic for me to think of a literally temporally continuous choice to remain in existence. I think of choices as discrete actions. By the view that God has to continually choose to remain in existence, a choice would have eternal duration.
Z: But choosing to exist does not imply 'temporally continuous choice to remain in existence'. A discrete choice can have lasting consequences. For example, I choose to live. There is a possible alternative. So my continued existence is always choosen. This doesn't mean that I am at every instant or continuously choosing not to die.
J: I don't see any reason to posit such a state of affairs. I like to remain as analogical as possible so long as analogy can explain what needs explaining. I don't see what an eternally enduring choice explains that is not explicable otherwise. Thus, to be non-analogical when there is no explanatory advantage to it seems arbitrary to me.
Z: I agree completely. That's why I don't posit any such thing or any thing with these implications.
J: An intended end, to my mind, implies a final cause. That is to say, an end exists because of some original intention that occurred IN TIME.
Z: Why? Why can't God intend an end for himself "before creation"? Is he too weak? Is he too near-sighted to plan ahead? Is divine forethought before creation a logical impossibility? I have no reason to accept your premise. And furthermore, were I to agree with you, my main point would remain unchanged. Self-determination, self-telos-making can be done by God at any time.
J: So when I say we exist FOR God, I'm saying we exist BECAUSE of His intention/purpose for us AND we have a point of origin, temporally speaking.
Z: You've packed a lot of meaning into one preposition. By your definition of FOR, I must agree that the Father is not FOR anything. Because definitionally, you've limited FOR to only created beings. But such a definition does not say anything about the subject of self-telos-making. Sure, I can't apply your FOR to self-telos-making. But I don't see how that's a problem. A person need not be FOR (your usage) something to set one's own goals.
J: And it is that sense that gives meaning to sin. Sin is the missing of a divine intention for our actions.
Z: But this is not the only way to give meaning to sin. As I understand you, you've said that God's fiat provides humans with a standard of good and evil. But it is also the case that covenant provides standards of good and evil. And biblically, this seems to be God's preferred method.
J: I was thinking you had said that Christians are forgiven--i.e., zero negative consequences for their actions.
Z: I do believe that forgiveness is available. And (here I'm going to be very careful with my prepositions) this does mean that there are no negative consequences FOR our sins. Forgiveness is economic language; debts are forgiven. So a forgiven person no longer owes reparations for his sin. Discipleship is another matter. The disciple will suffer. Even apart from sin the disciple will suffer. This suffering IS an essential part of discipleship. This "suffering produces perseverance; perseverance, character; and character, hope." So the forgiven disciple experiences no negative consequences FOR his sins, but instead experiences them FOR the sake of Christ. These sufferings are used FOR both correcting ungodly habits and FOR catalyzing the growth of already godly habits, but not FOR the repayment of sin.
J: Frankly, when I believed the gospel, I knew nothing of the biblical claim of God's disciplining of sons lest they be condemned with the world. Hence, I didn't bi-laterally agree to it. So does that mean that God won't motivate me thus unless I consent to it?
Z: When you sign on the dotted line, you are expected to have read the contract. Jesus says to count the cost before getting started. And regardless I don't hold to the perseverance of saints in a Calvinistic manner, so it's all a moot point. So long as we are alive and possess free will, we can opt out of the deal.
J: If so, at least it seems that Paul didn't think so. He said if we don't judge ourselves, God will judge us LEST we be condemned with the world. It seems like a purely loving thing to do on God's part, per Paul, independent of my consent. Now Paul could be wrong.
Z: I don't think Paul is wrong. I don't think he said "without consent" either.
J: But then what parent waits for consent from their children before applying any kind of disciplinary action (corporeal or otherwise) to them? Are parents the moral equivalent of mobs for doing this?
Z: I think kids and mentally handicapped people are different. Watch me fly. Freedom like wings and I will use them. Freedom like wings and I will spread them wide. - Stavesacre | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Similitude Registered Member
 Date Joined Apr 2004 Total Posts : 4968 | Posted 8/8/2008 10:04 PM (GMT -6) |   | | Zach: Objectively, there are these things running around.
Jeff: Do you know this volitionally or naturally? To my mind, this belief is as non-volitional as the belief that 3 > 2. I have no conscious awareness of choosing to belief there are things existing objectively, independent of my mind. It seems completely natural.
Zach: When you sign on the dotted line, you are expected to have read the contract.
Jeff: I never signed a dotted line. So can I still be saved or sanctified? Post Edited (Similtude) : 8/8/2008 10:16:20 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
  |  Similitude Registered Member
 Date Joined Apr 2004 Total Posts : 4968 | Posted 8/9/2008 9:11 AM (GMT -6) |   | Zach: I'm not sure what you mean. How could anyone volitionally know anything? Are you asking if I choose to know? Same with naturally. What do you mean by "naturally know"? Do you mean knowledge that I'm born with? As far as I understand the question, I think I'd have to say, "Neither".
Jeff: What I CAN do volitionally is apply concentration to a specific object or subject matter. What I can not do volitionally is eradicate the laws of thought that will regulate how my conclusions will be formed once I concentrate thus. Granted, I can volitionally live in denial of the truth of those laws of thought for limited time periods. But I've never known anyone who can continuously believe contradictions about all matters indefinitely. It's too unnatural.
Zach: What do you mean? You've never made the decision to accept Jesus' lordship? I don't mean to imply that there's an actual piece of paper to sign. But for me, I verbally acknowledged that Jesus is Lord.
Jeff: To my memory, I never verbally acknowledged that Jesus is Lord in some statement that I thought was the equivalent of contracting myself to anything. I wouldn't even have known WHAT I was contracting myself to at the time. Thereafter, I read the NT. I believed the NT. Jesus says that "acceptance" of his lordship means DOING WHAT HE SAID. I assumed, and still do, that the gospels and the teachings of his chosen apostles in the epistles are essentially what he is telling me to do (and a lot more additional facts, to boot).
In that sense, I can only "accept" his lordship one choice at a time. I can not "accept" his lordship at one point in time and then disobey him thereafter and still claim to be "accepting" his lordship in that sense. THat's the meaning of Christ's statement as far as I can tell. But it is also true that I can BELIEVE that Christ is lord even IF I disobey him. If one disobedient act to Christ means we're no longer christians, then I suspect there aren't but a handful of christians in the whole world.
Zach: If I did that not understanding what I was getting myself into, then I've got no one to blame but myself. Jesus and the New Testament in general are pretty clear about expecting suffering for disciples.
Jeff: If you didn't know what you were getting into prior to reading the NT, whose fault was that? Not yours. God didn't zap the knowledge of the NT into the heads of pagan Gentiles at the time they believed the gospel preached to them by Paul, did He?
The suffering that goes with obedience is suffering brought on voluntarily by ourselves when experienced in the form of self-discipline and by other humans and created spirits otherwise. It is not God volitionally CAUSING that suffering. What we are talking about is GOD volitionally causing suffering because, per your view, of some contract that someone made with God. That's different. I have yet to hear from you a verse that conveys any such idea.
In man-made bi-lateral contracts, penalties for violations of one's formal commitment ARE agreed to up front. And this is all VERY explicit. I see nothing in the NT that even hints at that. Nor do most humans who believe in the propriety of contracts believe that ONLY that which we verbally commit to doing grounds moral obligation with the possibility of negative consequences for violations. The fact that nearly everyone agrees with the forceful actions of the state without consent is proof of that. So it doesn't seem to be a self-evident belief. So I'm left with nothing, here, so far.
Zach: I'm not sure what you mean. How could anyone volitionally know anything? Are you asking if I choose to know? Same with naturally. What do you mean by "naturally know"? Do you mean knowledge that I'm born with? As far as I understand the question, I think I'd have to say, "Neither". Jeff: What I CAN do volitionally is apply concentration to a specific object or subject matter. What I can not do volitionally is eradicate the laws of thought that will regulate how my conclusions will be formed once I concentrate thus. Granted, I can volitionally live in denial of the truth of those laws of thought for limited time periods. But I've never known anyone who can continuously believe contradictions about all matters indefinitely. It's too unnatural. Zach: What do you mean? You've never made the decision to accept Jesus' lordship? I don't mean to imply that there's an actual piece of paper to sign. But for me, I verbally acknowledged that Jesus is Lord. Jeff: To my memory, I never verbally acknowledged that Jesus is Lord in some statement that I thought was the equivalent of contracting myself to anything. I wouldn't even have known WHAT I was contracting myself to at the time. Thereafter, I read the NT. I believed the NT. Jesus says that "acceptance" of his lordship means DOING WHAT HE SAID. I assumed, and still do, that the gospels and the teachings of his chosen apostles in the epistles are essentially what he is telling me to do (and a lot more additional facts, to boot). In that sense, I can only "accept" his lordship one choice at a time. I can not "accept" his lordship at one point in time and then disobey him thereafter and still claim to be "accepting" his lordship in that sense. THat's the meaning of Christ's statement as far as I can tell. But it is also true that I can BELIEVE that Christ is lord even IF I disobey him. If one disobedient act to Christ means we're no longer christians, then I suspect there aren't but a handful of christians in the whole world. Zach: If I did that not understanding what I was getting myself into, then I've got no one to blame but myself. Jesus and the New Testament in general are pretty clear about expecting suffering for disciples. Jeff: If you didn't know what you were getting into prior to reading the NT, whose fault was that? Not yours. God didn't zap the knowledge of the NT into the heads of pagan Gentiles at the time they believed the gospel preached to them by Paul, did He? The suffering that goes with obedience is suffering brought on voluntarily by ourselves when experienced in the form of self-discipline and by other humans and created spirits otherwise. It is not God volitionally CAUSING that suffering. What we are talking about is GOD volitionally causing suffering because, per your view, of some contract that someone made with God. That's different. I have yet to hear from you a verse that conveys any such idea. In man-made bi-lateral contracts, penalties for violations of one's oath ARE agreed to up front. And this is all VERY explicit. I see nothing in the NT that even hints at that. Nor do most humans who believe in the propriety of contracts believe that ONLY what we verbally commit to doing grounds moral obligation with the possibility of negative consequences for violations. So it doesn't seem to be a self-evident belief.
J: An intended end, to my mind, implies a final cause. That is to say, an end exists because of some original intention that occurred IN TIME.
Z: Why? Why can't God intend an end for himself "before creation"? Is he too weak? Is he too near-sighted to plan ahead? Is divine forethought before creation a logical impossibility? I have no reason to accept your premise. And furthermore, were I to agree with you, my main point would remain unchanged. Self-determination, self-telos-making can be done by God at any time.
J: Nothing I said there is in disagreement with what you are saying in response. "At any time" means "IN TIME." Which is to say, there are no such things as ETERNAL purposes. That seems like nonsense to my mind.
J: So when I say we exist FOR God, I'm saying we exist BECAUSE of His intention/purpose for us AND we have a point of origin, temporally speaking.
Z: You've packed a lot of meaning into one preposition. By your definition of FOR, I must agree that the Father is not FOR anything. Because definitionally, you've limited FOR to only created beings.
J: No Zach. I said there is another SENSE in which the word "for" is used. This is undeniable. And I didn't limit it to created beings, either. It's just that that's how it's used in statements like "FOR whom all things were created."
Z: A person need not be FOR (your usage) something to set one's own goals.
J: How can a person have a goal without being for it? If I say I went to the store FOR milk, then I'm saying I purposed the attainment of milk because, sentiently, I'm FOR it. If God says He creates all things FOR Himself, then He's saying He purposed my existence because, sentiently, He's FOR it. But this latter means, does it not, that I came into existence because of His purpose. This is not true of the Father and the Son simply because they did not come into existence to fulfill anyone's purpose. That's not to say that they can't have purposes FOR each other. For that is just what creation is. All things are OUT of the Father and FOR the Son, e.g.
But note the difference. If I'm created for the Son, then I exist for the Son. But this also means, to the extent that what God means by that is that my choices are meant to be of a certain nature, that I am for the Son in the sense that I am to choose according to God's intent for my choices. But if I say I went to the store to get a gift for my friend, the gift is not to perform any specific choices to fulfil that purpose. Nor did I have to create the gift. So in one case, both my existence and my volitional behavior is what is FOR God's satisfaction. In the latter, neither of these is what is FOR my friend. But in both cases, it's the satisfaction of the one who the thing is for that is the motivation for the means (in some cases, one mean is creation itself) being deployed in the first place.
So the reason why there is sin is because I exist FOR THE PURPOSE OF choosing and acting in certain ways, and yet I am capable of choosing/acting the contrary (which is sin). If that were not the case, sin is meaningless. For, in that case, there is no purpose for my choices to render them right or wrong (or, equivalently, fit or unfit to attain the purpose). No purpose for my EXISTENCE and choices, no sin and no morality.
But relativism is an ethical theory (I'm trying, but probably not successfully, to keep a distinction between ethical and moral, with moral having to do with duty) that doesn't even take into effect that there is purpose to each person's existence/life. Hence, the only thing that renders a relativist's actions right or wrong (as far as he knows) is the extent to which they are fitted to the ends he has proposed for himself. In this scenario, he can't actually wrong another. Because the other has no rights. Because a person that does not exist for some purpose of the creator of the mutual world of both persons can't have rights except those we talk about from government. But these are not certain. Consequently, a "right" (in this sense) in an uncreated world is a virtually meaningless notion. And this is why most people think government is supposed to secure GOD-GIVEN rights.
So if there are no purposes, there are no rights, and therefore no one can be wronged by another, per relativism. Per relativism, each actor can only succeed or fail to attain their own ends. End of story. In this case, humans are just very intelligent beings. But they are amoral in the more conventional sense of the term.
Post Edited (Similtude) : 8/10/2008 3:34:41 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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