I’m having a wonderful email conversation with a 16 year old girl, daughter of missionary friends of mine who live in Turkey. We’ve been corresponding for a while re: UR. She wrote me to confess her struggles with the traditional view (ECT: eternal conscious torment).

Here’s part of her last note me:

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Just reading the 6th objection from Lee Strobel's The Case for Faith, “Loving God Would Never Torture People in Hell.” Here are a few quotes I'd like you to chew on. Lee Strobel is interviewing J.P. Moreland.

Strobel: “The Bible says explicitly that people are destined to die once and then face judgment. Yet if God is really loving, why wouldn't he give people a second chance after death to make the decision to follow him and go to heaven? If people tasted hell, wouldn't it give them a strong motivation to change their minds?”

Moreland: “This question assumes God didn't do everything he could do before people died, and I reject that...God is fair. He isn't trying to make it difficult for people. I believe it's certainly possible that those who respond to the light from nature that they have received will either have the message of the gospel sent to them, or else it may be that God will judge them based on his knowledge of what they would have done had they had a chance to hear the gospel.”

Strobel: “Wouldn't death and the awareness of the presence or absence of God after you die be a very motivating thing for people?”

Moreland: “Yes, it would, but in a negative way. First, you've got to realize that the longer people live separated from God, the less likely they are able to exercise their free choice and trust him. This is why most people who come to Christ do so when they're young. The longer you live with a bad habit, the harder it is to turn that habit around. So what would make people think that, say, a ten-year incubation period of being separated from God would get their attention?

“Besides, that would make life before death utterly irrelevant. Then the question would be, why didn't God create people from the beginning of the incubation period? Why did he create them on earth for seventy-five years and let them die and then put them in the incubation period if it was the incubation period that they really needed in the first place? Here's the truth, Lee: this life IS the incubation period!

“The next thing you have to keep in mind is if people saw the judgment seat of God after death, it would be so coercive that they would no longer have the power of free choice. Any 'decision' they made would not be a real genuine free choice; it would be totally coerced...any apology would not be a real apology, it would just be avoidance. And people who would 'choose' in a second chance would not really be choosing God, his kingdom, or his ways-nor would they be suited for life in his kingdom. They'd be making a prudent 'choice' to avoid judgment only.”

Post Edited (Tom) : 11/2/2008 1:08:41 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Tom) : 11/2/2008 2:31:20 AM (GMT-6)

Dang Rachel! Don't you go to school? Ha!

I just wanted to toss out some thoughts. Any one aspect of it can develop into something more, and I know we’ve been over all this terrain before too, in old posts. I’d like to track those down. But for the time being…

Strobel: “The Bible says explicitly that people are destined to die once and then face judgment. Yet if God is really loving, why wouldn't he give people a second chance after death to make the decision to follow him and go to heaven? If people tasted hell, wouldn't it give them a strong motivation to change their minds?”

Moreland: “This question assumes God didn't do everything he could do before people died, and I reject that...God is fair. He isn’t trying to make it difficult for people. I believe it's certainly possible that those who respond to the light from nature that they have received will either have the message of the gospel sent to them, or else it may be that God will judge them based on his knowledge of what they would have done had they had a chance to hear the gospel.”

Tom: First, Strobel’s question. By framing his question with that “yet if” Strobel mistakenly assumes that the ‘judgment’ we come into after death is incompatible with there being further opportunity to respond to God. But why assume that? Can it not be that leaving us to suffer the just consequences of our choices is compatible with it also being the case that mercy extends to those who respond properly to what that judgment is designed to accomplish? Can ‘judgment’ not be remedial? We know it can be. In fact, isn’t this what we ought to assume from the Old Testament? Isn’t it the case at least much (maybe most) of the time that judgment of Israel is meant to elicit repentance?

Moreland’s answer. Strobel’s question does NOT assume that God did not do everything he could before people died. Moreland’s just wrong on that. Strictly speaking the question only assumes that a loving God would do all God can do BOTH before AND after people die, i.e., at all times and in all possible worlds. What’s interesting is that Moreland’s answer clearly assumes that God is loving and that a loving God WOULD DO all he COULD DO to make it possible for people to respond positively. Moreland just thinks that hell isn’t a place where God CAN DO for people any more than he DID DO prior to their dying. He thinks such responses are impossible in hell because the conditions required for such a response to even be possible are naturally absent in hell. That’s fine so far as it goes. If such conditions were absent, Moreland would be right and no response would be possible in hell. But what if it’s shown to be possible that those conditions CAN obtain in hell without jeopardizing the notion that hell is a place of ultimate ‘judgment’? If that’s possible, then wouldn’t Moreland’s assumptions about what a loving God WOULD do entail God’s extending to people in hell the conditions necessary for their responding favorably? I should think so. So the only question is, can hell be BOTH appropriately painful as a place of judgment AND a place where the conditions necessary to free choice are sufficiently met?

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Strobel: “Wouldn’t death and the awareness of the presence or absence of God after you die be a very motivating thing for people?”

Moreland: “Yes, it would, but in a negative way. First, you’ve got to realize that the longer people live separated from God, the less likely they are able to exercise their free choice and trust him. This is why most people who come to Christ do so when they’re young. The longer you live with a bad habit, the harder it is to turn that habit around. So what would make people think that, say, a ten-year incubation period of being separated from God would get their attention?”

Tom: This whole line of reasoning, if followed consistently, turns out to work against Moreland and in favor of some sort of UR, for while it is true as far as we know that the longer one lives with a bad habit the harder it is to turn from that habit, it’s JUST AS TRUE that as far as we know, people hardened in poor habits DO break those habits and change under certain circumstances. Moreland’s assuming that the solidification process continues unabated in hell and people ultimately solidify irrevocably into evil. But that assumes the whole question of debate—viz., that such solidification is possible given the extreme suffering which those same ‘habits’ now constitute in hell. That’s the whole point. During this life solidification in evil progresses because there’s at least some perceived sentient satisfaction which people get from their habits. But take that satisfaction away and leave the person with nothing but the stark emptiness of what such habits can offer in a new context (viz., hell), and what then? Well, there’s at least as much (and more in my view) reason to suppose that people will become increasingly disenchanted with their lies as to suppose they’ll solidify irrevocably into evil.

Moreland: “Besides, that would make life before death utterly irrelevant. Then the question would be, why didn’t God create people from the beginning of the incubation period? Why did he create them on earth for seventy-five years and let them die and then put them in the incubation period if it was the incubation period that they really needed in the first place? Here's the truth, Lee: this life IS the incubation period!”

Tom: Moreland’s right in a sense. This life IS the incubation period, though I prefer “probation” to “incubation.” UR proponents have to avoid emptying this life of significance and consequence; they have to better describe how this life functions consequentially in relation to the afterlife. I can see how SOME would misread UR simply because it seems to make hell JUST a continuation of the same scenario that this life is, and that leaves one wondering with Moreland, “Well, what’s the point of this life then? If hell is just a continuation of this life’s opportunities, what’s the deal with this ‘probationary’ period at all? Why set things up like this?”

I wanna pull this aside and discuss it in a separate post because I think it’s important.

Moreland: “The next thing you have to keep in mind is if people saw the judgment seat of God after death, it would be so coercive that they would no longer have the power of free choice. Any ‘decision’ they made would not be a real genuine free choice; it would be totally coerced...any apology would not be a real apology, it would just be avoidance. And people who would ‘choose’ in a second chance would not really be choosing God, his kingdom, or his ways-nor would they be suited for life in his kingdom. They’d be making a prudent ‘choice’ to avoid judgment only.”

Tom: I’ve already commented on this. I’ll just add that I do think some epistemic distance has be characterize the choice for God if it’s to be free in the required sense (libertarian). So whatever the judgment of hell is, why should it mean having God overwhelm us with the truth about all things? Like Moreland said, that WOULD overwhelm us. So why suppose it? If we don’t suppose an overwhelming information level for the wicked in hell, we don’t have to face the problem that it generates. And I don’t see that UR requires that the wicked be so enlightened. Secondly, I agree with Moreland that whatever choice we suppose people in hell eventually make, it has to be more than mere opportunism. It has to be real repentance for the right reasons. But why suppose that will be impossible then?

T

Post Edited (Tom) : 11/2/2008 2:42:08 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Tom) : 11/2/2008 4:02:36 AM (GMT-6)

Rachel: “Why are people punished infinitely for finite crimes?”…Here's Moreland's thoughts:

Strobel: “How can any wrongs we've committed in this life merit ETERNAL punishment? Isn't it unfair to say that a FINITE life of sin warrants INFINITE punishment? Where's the justice in that? Wouldn't a loving God make the punishment fit the crime by not making hell last forever? How can we do anything in this life that would warrant eternal torture?”

Tom: That’s the right question.

Moreland: “First, we know that the degree to which a person warrants punishment is not a function of the length of time it took to commit a crime. For example, a murder can take ten seconds to commit…My point is that the degree of someone's just punishment is not a function of how long it took to commit the deed; rather, it's a function of how severe the deed itself was….”

Tom: I know that buried in all the discussion we’ve had about UR there's a good bit on this question. If God is infinitely holy, is not any sin against him deserving of infinite punishment? I’m not so sure. To begin with, Moreland discounts the attempt (which he evidently thinks is the universalist’s) to ground warranted judgment on the “time it took to commit a crime.” But who makes that argument anyhow? Nobody I know of. No universalist I know of thinks judgment is appropriately merited based on the amount of time it takes us to sin. So I don’t even know who Moreland’s talking to.

Moreland counterclaims that judgment is merited on the basis of “how severe the deed itself was.” But that begs the further question, ‘What determines severity?’ Moreland thinks the severity of sin is determine solely on the basis of the character of the one offended—God. Nothing else matters (certainly not “how long it took [us] to commit sin”). But surely we take into account the state of mind and knowledge of the offender. Can any finite creature generate an infinite offense against God if severity is partly determined by the capacities and knowledge of the offender? I don’t think so. It’s just not the case that our sin deserves an infinite judgment SIMPLY BECAUSE God is infinitely holy. One could also agree that God is infinitely loving and gracious, certainly more than any finite creature is able to be offensive, and that therefore we ought to assume God’s love will infinitely pursue sinners. That seems just as logical to me as Moreland’s argument.

But more to the point, we take into account the offender’s capacities (state of knowledge and perception) in determining the severity of his crime. That’s not to say that we don’t suffer at all for our misrelating even though we don’t realize who we’re sinning against in some cases. And this line of approach seems to be confirmed by Christ’s own comments about differing levels of punishment in the afterlife. Some are to be whipped with many lashes, some with few lashes, etc. But Moreland’s reasoning would demand an equal number and severity of lashes for all offenders regardless of the circumstances of their offense simply on the basis that they all offended one and the same God. But Christ doesn’t reason that way. So I think Moreland’s wrong in reasoning that simply because the God we offend is infinitely holy we therefore deserve an infinite judgment.

Moreland: “And the only punishment worthy of that is the ultimate punishment, which is everlasting separation from God...the nature of the OBJECT against which the sin is committed, as well as the nature of the sin itself, must be taken into account when determining the degree of heinousness.”

Tom: Well, at least here he admits that the “nature of the sin itself” ought to be taken into account when determining what an appropriate punishment would be. But he doesn’t actually take the nature of creaturely sin (say, its finiteness) into account. He absolutely dismiss it when he says the infiniteness of God’s holiness as the OBJECT of our offense itself grounds the infiniteness of the punishment. But it still remains a moot point whether or not we’re justified in holding up other essential attributes of God (like love) as infinite also and thus concluding—given Moreland’s logic—that this infiniteness of love, for example (far more ‘essential’ to God than his wrath or judgment) ought to mean sinners will be infinitely pursued and invited. Moreland essentially abandons the infinity of God when it comes to God’s ‘love’ and upholds that infinity when it comes to God’s ‘judgment’.

I mean, consider this, Rachel. What Moreland wants to say is that God is the sort of being who cannot be satisfied by ANY amount of suffering on our part for the offenses we commit once we die. Just think about that. After 100 gazillion gazillion years of unspeakable anguish by those in hell, God’s sense of justice will be no more satisfied than it was the moment their suffering began. In fact, God’s justice, Moreland believes, will NEVER be satisfied. Wow. I’m sorry to say that Moreland’s defense of this on the basis of God’s infinite holiness just doesn’t fly. In other words, I don't at all see divine 'holiness' being compromised if God in love decided to continue to find a way to extend grace to those in hell. I see such love as itself a very HOLY thing in fact.

Tom

Post Edited (Tom) : 11/2/2008 8:35:26 AM (GMT-6)

Mark and Rachel, if the ‘epistemic distance’ argument is bogus, it ain’t for any of the reasons Laika mentions.

Laika: It assumes the only reason people rebel against God, disobey and sin is because they are ignorant, they merely lack information about God.  If only they knew God better, they wouldn't do these things. This is false for numerous reasons…

Tom: The argument doesn’t assume that the “only” reason people rebel against God is because they merely lack information about God. With ‘epistemic distance’ what one knows is just as important to making free and responsible choices as what one does not know. The emphasis isn’t upon ignorance per se, it’s upon justifying one’s choices to one’s self, that is, having a ‘reason’ to act as one does. It’s basically about forming intentions and being motivated, something most people think is part of what it means to act freely and responsibly. So when it comes to acting sinfully in free and responsible ways, we are (and have to be I think) a mixture of perceiving enough to be held accountable for what we do on the one hand and not perceiving enough to be able to rationally intend to misrelate as we do on the other hand. Responsible choice is a rational affair. Sure, we can all it irrational when considered from the point of view of the whole truth God knows about the world. Nobody who shared God's perspective and brought it to bear upon determining their choices would ever sin. But we're not omniscient and don't perfectly perceive and evaluate life. It's that capacity that makes choosing wrongly rational given what we know and don't know and therefore something we can rightly be held accountable for. We don't hold mentally deranged people responsible for what they do BECAUSE they do not reason their way though to intending their actions in a sufficiently rational manner. Were we DO hold people accountable, we assume such rational intentionality. And sinful choices can only be rationally intended if one believes the choice can be a means to some perceived benefit/value (on the one hand) AND if one fails to perceive enough to believe that THAT particular choice can really produce the desire result (on the other hand), when in truth it cannot. THAT is what epistemic distance is about.

So, to take Laika’s examples.

First, of course doctors smoke despite being aware of the dangers. It’s being aware of the dangers which makes their smoking a form of misrelation (a stupid thing to do). But they don’t ‘intend’ to ruin their health per se as much as they do intend to enjoy the fleeting pleasure that smoking temporarily provides. That’s the whole point. There’s SOME sentient satisfaction they ‘value’ in, or ‘get’ from, smoking; they 'perceive' some value in smoking that's found in the pleasure it provides. What is that if not ignorance? What is it to value that pleasure at the expense of one’s health but to MISPERCEIVE the true nature and value of life? So while there’s knowledge or epistemic closure sufficient to render the choice responsible even though wrong, there’s also enough epistemic distance (or ‘failure of value perception’) to render it free. So yes, as Laika notes, where there is genuine sin and misrelating going on we’ll always be able to point to something the person DID KNOW (or perceive) in pursuing what they wanted. But this doesn't discount the 'epistemic distance' argument, because we’ll equally, I think, be able to point to something the person DIDN’T KNOW (or perceive) in pursuing what they wanted. Both are necessary.

Second, if Satan’s epistemic distance is only “virtually” zero, then Laika’s offered a reason for agreeing with me.

Lastly, I don’t follow Laika’s third proof. Maybe you can rephrase that so I can adequatey dispose of it.  

Tom

Post Edited (Tom) : 11/2/2008 10:09:20 AM (GMT-6)

Romans 1:

18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who by their unrighteousness suppress the truth.

19 For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them.

20 For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse.

21 For although they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking, and their foolish hearts were darkened.

22 Claiming to be wise, they became fools,

23 and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man and birds and animals and creeping things.

They have the knowlege of God (verse 19, 20, 21a) BEFORE they become futile in their thinking (verse 21b).  Rejection of truth precedes any "misrelating".