Tom: Ah, I see. I didn’t know this was where you were going.

The problem here is that I want to say that compatibilistic goodness in finite humans has to be the result a process of libertarian “becoming” (unlike God). It’s one thing to say that God is a final cause of choices that are necessarily loving because no ‘other’ non-God factors determine which choices God makes. He’s still self-determining. It’s the idea that our choosing rightly would be guaranteed by factors other than ourselves that I resist.

Jeff: Having thought a bit more, I think I'd have to say that Jesus' right-relating, when that entailed suffering, was actually some kind of FC3. It had components of both FC1 and FC2. The only way I can explain it is by positing that God and Christ's teleological perspectives are perfect at all times, though I can't fully explain it.

Part of what I'm trying to do for Zach, is demonstrate how we can be final causes in other senses than FC1 so as to avoid the notion that we will one day be "compatibilisticly" loving. Compatibilism means compatible with determinsm. I think we want to avoid true determinism insomuch as determinism seems to deny final causes of every conceivable kind. E.g., philosophers even distinguish between indeterminism and determinism even when they posit that indeterministic events may not even BE caused.

Tom: If God guarantees that all ultimately choose God by simply closing the epistemic gap and so precluding the possibility of a psychologically viable rejection of God, the process of becoming required by finite creatures like us is by-passed. That, I don’t think, can result in loving relations.

Jeff: That is certainly correct if, by loving relations, we mean loving relations of the kind that require FC1. But that is exactly what I think persons of the godhead do NOT have. I think they have either FC2 or FC3. Thus, for the sake of argument, I'm merely arguing that it is a mere logical possibility that loving relationality of the kind that involves FC1 may have truly been intended for the temporal ends of the creational project, and yet still be irrelevant after the TIME that those ends have been attained. This is not proveable. It's just a logical possibility.

But even you and D argue that something changes about epistemic distance or something, post-mortem, to render rejection of God MUCH less probable, right? Otherwise, our open theism would compel us to believe that post-mortem chances of rejecting God are the same as now. And that would seem to refute UR.

Tom:  Necessary being can “be” necessarily loving—i.e., doesn’t have to “become” loving.

Jeff: But I'm not sure that a necessary being needs to be loving at all merely because it is a necessary being. That's why I'm arguing that the love of the godhead is non-deterministic simply because it functions lovingly according to FC2 and FC3, rather than FC1.

Tom: But contingent being has to “become” loving. So our being finally compatibilistically loving doesn’t undermine our also being final causes of our choices only because we also determined ourselves libertarianly over time to ‘become’ that. It’s still the case that no ‘other’ non-Tom factors entailed my choosing rightly. But I don’t think God can just—poof—overwhelm us with information sufficient to exclude our being psychologically/intellectually able to imagine some reason to reject God. In removing the libertarian nature of choice at that point God would also close to door to our being/becoming “loving.”

Jeff:  I agree that God can't just POOF us into a loving relationship, even if it is merely an FC2/FC3 one. But what I mean by that is that each person must at least fulfill the temporal end of their existence, which is to SOMEHOW give glory/honor to the Son. Christ said that all judgment was given to him that he MIGHT BE HONORED. Thus, I envision the judgment resulting in an intellectual assent associated with ALL confessing with the tongue and bowing the knee. I.e., the judgment may bring the minds of those who were not yet subject to God into an FC2 relationship with God/Christ that was accomplished, in that process, by true intellectual assent and, hence, repentance.

And this is where degree is involved in my eschatology. God PREFERRED that there had never been a Fall or rejection of Himself at all. But all He can do now, given that those SOFA's are now impossible, is act unto the highest DEGREE of honor and glory for the Son. God prefers VOLUNTARY loving suffering with Christ, and we will receive a finite, but age-abiding, glory that renders that suffering UNWORTHY to be compared with those voluntary sufferings. But He will take the intellectual repentance associated with judgment if that's all He can get. And that will cause each person to fulfill, however minimally, the temporal end of their existence. Thus, God will have been perfectly competent in bringing about the end(s) of creation--for all the temporal suffering will have been WORTH it for all once the project "is finished."

Hence, the relevance of DEGREE in the final evaluation of the competence of the Designer. God can not be considered incompetent because more suffering occured than He had wished. He is competent because He will successfully bring the project to fruition in such a way that ALL will be glad that the project occured!! And this is joy itself to a perfectly sympathetic being like God.

I'm not saying this view is proveable. I'm just saying that it, too, seems like a logical possibility. And I'm trying to see if Zach can see that UR doesn't have to rule out non-determinism in either my case or yours. Once we posit any post-mortem state that is not revealed perspicuously in scriptural texts (and virtually all Christians do), I say go for the gusto on what seems most consistent with God's benevolence and scripture. And for me, that gusto means UR.

Post Edited (Similtude) : 1/25/2009 8:04:21 AM (GMT-6)

Zach: I don't believe God is bound to ultimately force people into this. God is strong. He can do whatever he wants. He can even lie IF he wants. It's not his programing that we praise for being faithful but he himself - the person. If that takes the certainty out of faith, that's fine with me. If we can no longer claim to KNOW the truth of all prophecy, then I say it's good for us to come to this realization - it's better late than never. May God be gracious by destroying the false certitude which leaves no room for faith.

Jeff: We've covered the ground of God's power vs. motivation before. Because God has the sheer power to do a thing doesn't mean He can be motivated to do it. I have the power to walk in to my living room and kill my wife. But I can't be motivated to. Thus, I can't do it--even though I have the POWER to do it.

But as for faith, if whether God will, or already has, become evil is ultimately reduceable to a probability of 50%, I have no idea what it means to have faith in God. I have difficulty believing you even believe that either. And yet what can account for a difference in expectations of a person's volitions except the specific character you infer the person has, and the motivations that seem possible for such a character?

I think where Zach would disagree with "synergism within limits" has to do with the nature of free-will itself. If a bona-fide volition has a probability of the reciprocal of the number of possible choices, then you see how open theism would virtually rule out any warranted certainty as to a UR conditioned upon "synergism within limits."

IOW, we need to really get our definitions clear as a bell about how volition is related to epistemic distance and whether any future decreasing of epistemic distance by God will happen and whether it will be of the right kind to increase the probability of a volition UNTO God . It is a difficult subject to be sure. I can see how Zach is still confused about the details, because I still am. That's why I go with the minimalist position for now. That seems to work sufficiently to get me to UR. The whole DEGREE thang makes it seem conceivable to me.

The whole basis for me distinguishing between FC1 and FC2 (and a possibly divine FC3) is to account for a non-deterministic state of affairs that can allow for true final causality functioning in cases where the probability of an event is virtually 1, for all practical purposes. But insomuch as true final causality is involved, determinism is NOT the case in such states of affairs. This, if valid, undermines Zach's argument that God's acting as final cause entails a probability for any given divine choice of the reciprocal of the number of possible choices.

Indeed, taking a given divine choice as a mere possibility by virtue of the fact that God is STRONG and has the sheer POWER to do kazillions of things, it would seem that by Zach's probabilistic view, the probability that God chooses any particular action/event is 1 divided by a kazillion. Surely God's motivations, constrained as they must be, by His intended ENDS, render the probability of His acting in a manner FITTED to those ends to WAY higher than 1 divided by a kazillion.

Indeed, unless God is unwise or incompetent, the probability that God would choose in a manner FITTED to His own ends would be exactly 1. Of course, we could posit the possibility that He might have abandoned His previously purposed ends for some reason, but what would be the evidence for such an hypothesis? I can think of none. And this is where my epistemology constrains me. I seek the highest generalizations from the data at hand.

There are myriads of MERELY logical possibilities. The question is always, "Do we inductively argue as analogically as possible, or not?" And if not, "why not?" I'm clueless as to why we wouldn't. IOW, what more fundamental epistemological principle informs us as to WHEN to seek the most analogical/generic viable explanations if we are not to ALWAYS do so? I'm ignorant of any such principle by which to adjudicate that question unless it be the principle that any generalization that renders God malevolent or non-sympathetic is irrational.

For if God is not benevolent, we have no reason to believe we are designed to apprehend in the first place. But so long as greater generalizations do not contradict the benevolence of God, they are to be embraced as MORE rational than the less general alternatives. This is the essence of logical induction.

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Jeff: You do see what I'm saying about epistemic distance, don't you Tom? If there is no change in epistemic distance post-mortem, what would ground our confidence that the "becomings" of volitional humans would be any different, statistically speaking? That's what I don't understand.

Tom: Yeah, I see your point. Here’s a possible analogy. Think of the change in epistemic distance that occurs in, say, a criminal who when left undisturbed in public continues his criminal behavior without remorse. But when he’s thrown into prison, the discomfort and pain of incarceration creates a situation in which he does come to consider his actions. Prison closes the gap so to speak, and forces his consideration of life from a new perspective.

True, not all criminals are changed by prison life. Some are, some aren’t. The point is, suffering the painful consequences of wrong choices is remedial and instructive. If might not always have that effect in this life. But I can easily imagine hell being a suitable place that, given its potential unending nature, makes the eventual reformation of the wicked an inevitability.

So yes, I agree with you. Hell has to amount to a significant change in epistemic distance if it makes inevitable what no change in distance or context in this world can make inevitable in this short life span. But I think it’s easy to imagine hell being just such a place. My only points are: a) libertarian free will is metaphysically required for creaturely becoming, period. So I can’t jettison that. And b) the exercise of freedom relative to good/evil requires some minimal epistemic distance. I can’t say how much is too much or too little. But I’m confident that it can become too much, in which case we’re overwhelmed with truth which is forced upon us and leaves us incapable of constructing any rational justification for freely rejecting God, nor can we be too deprived of truth, for then we’d have no way to construct a rational justification for freely choosing God. The distance has to constitute the “space” in which we determine ourselves freely. The question for UR is whether hell can be conceived as a place where such freedom is in place AND where we’re able to say with confidence that everybody will eventually exercise that freedom in choosing God.

If the BEST I can manage in the end is just saying, “Hey, God will continue to pursue the wicked eternally with no guarantee that all eventually choose him,” fine. I’ll say that. But I think this directly undermines the NT eschatological hope in the assured finality of God’s victory over evil. There doesn’t seem to be any doubt in the early Church’s mind that all creation will eventually be won (Phil 2 and Col. 1). In the absence of any clear proof that my hope in eventually UR as impossible, I’ll go with the NT and affirm that all creation will be redeemed through Christ.

Jeff: And I'm thinking the claim that “every mouth will be stopped” is evidence that there WILL be a change in epistemic distance. If not, it seems to mean that God merely FORCEFULLY shuts their mouth. What would a third meaning of that phrase be?

Tom: A third meaning might be simply that persons will eventually reason their way out of rejecting God and into choosing God (without having to suppose that the possibility of rejecting God has been precluded because God has overwhelmed us with the facts and made relating to him inescapable). The only reason we’d need to appeal to an absolute closure of epistemic distance to make rationally rejecting God impossible would be to secure the universal redemption of all humankind within a restricted period of time. But if God’s got all the time he needs, what’s the rush?

Some have objected that hell can’t possibly be anything BUT full epistemic disclosure, so rational libertarian choice regarding good/evil couldn’t possibly prevail. But why think that? I mean, think of Lucifer and the angels. They must have had a LOT of light and knowledge. Far more disclosure than we presently have as human beings. But still there was enough distance to make the wrong choice rationally possible. All that has to be true is for creatures to be limited in their perspectives or less than omniscient. That’s all.

I don’t have to points in mind, but I think several reputable scholars argue that Paul’s use of “bowing the knee” and “confessing Jesus as Lord” in Philippians refers exclusively to the free surrender of one’s will to God. In other words, to confess "Jesus is Lord" is not the confess the objective truth of the claim irrespective of one's personal relationship to Christ. To say "Jesus is Lord" is to say "Jesus is MY Lord," and given the nature of the relationship, it has to be freely embraced.

Tom

Post Edited (Tom) : 2/8/2009 8:31:51 AM (GMT-6)

Jeff: And I'm thinking the claim that “every mouth will be stopped” is evidence that there WILL be a change in epistemic distance. If not, it seems to mean that God merely FORCEFULLY shuts their mouth. What would a third meaning of that phrase be?

Tom: A third meaning might be simply that persons will eventually reason their way out of rejecting God and into choosing God (without having to suppose that the possibility of rejecting God has been precluded because God has overwhelmed us with the facts and made relating to him inescapable). The only reason we’d need to appeal to an absolute closure of epistemic distance to make rationally rejecting God impossible would be to secure the universal redemption of all humankind within a restricted period of time. But if God’s got all the time he needs, what’s the rush?

Some have objected that hell can’t possibly be anything BUT full epistemic disclosure, so rational libertarian choice regarding good/evil couldn’t possibly prevail. But why think that? I mean, think of Lucifer and the angels. They must have had a LOT of light and knowledge. Far more disclosure than we presently have as human beings. But still there was enough distance to make the wrong choice rationally possible. All that has to be true is for creatures to be limited in their perspectives or less than omniscient. That’s all.

I don’t have to points in mind, but I think several reputable scholars argue that Paul’s use of “bowing the knee” and “confessing Jesus as Lord” in Philippians refers exclusively to the free surrender of one’s will to God. In other words, to confess "Jesus is Lord" is not the confess the objective truth of the claim irrespective of one's personal relationship to Christ. To say "Jesus is Lord" is to say "Jesus is MY Lord," and given the nature of the relationship, it has to be freely embraced.

Jeff: OK, I think we're on the same page about epistemic distance. My main concern is to render however we explain it consistent with open theism. As I've described FC2, true FC2 seems to be consistent with PRE-known probabilities of virtually one. But my FC2 doesn't seem to fit the post-mortem SOFA's we're talking about. So for now, I feel confident that Paul is right when he says all mouths WILL be stopped by a true change of mind, HOWEVER that happens. And that's enough to get me to a conceivable UR.

Post Edited (Similtude) : 2/8/2009 9:27:53 AM (GMT-6)

Jeff: And this is where degree is involved in my eschatology. God PREFERRED that there had never been a Fall or rejection of Himself at all. But all He can do now, given that those SOFA's are now impossible, is act unto the highest DEGREE of honor and glory for the Son. God prefers VOLUNTARY loving suffering with Christ, and we will receive a finite, but age-abiding, glory that renders that suffering UNWORTHY to be compared with those voluntary sufferings. But He will take the intellectual repentance associated with judgment if that's all He can get. And that will cause each person to fulfill, however minimally, the temporal end of their existence. Thus, God will have been perfectly competent in bringing about the end(s) of creation--for all the temporal suffering will have been WORTH it for all once the project "is finished."

Tom: I forgot which thread I cut this quote of yours from! But I like this too. I think we’ve agreed on something like this before. God’s going for the “most glory/good achievable.” And at one time I argued that those who are reconciled to God via faith in Christ from hell, by the very nature of the degree of epistemic disclosure that defines hell (i.e., there's less distance in hell than there is in this world), necessarily have a narrower scope of perceived glory to enjoy consequent to their choice. Perhaps I should say that having come to God via fire, there’s less of them to reflect God’s glory back throughout creation. By choosing to come through judgment, they've permanently decreased their capacity to perceive, enjoy and reflect God's glory. An example might be Peter’s pronouncement of “blessing” upon “those who have never seen and yet believe.” See what I mean? What’s Peter describing if not the abiding consequences of believing from within relatively greater and lesser degrees of epistemic disclosure/distance? So I can get with what you’re saying.

When I talk about varying degrees of capacity for enjoyment of God (and thus reflection of glory) I think of degrees of music enjoyment. Some people, through study and exposure to music, have enlarged their capacity to enjoy music. Others enjoy it as they can, but their appreciation of it doesn't include the depth of perception characteristic of the former group. You see my point. So I've wondered if the context in which people come to faith and grow in faith is a kind of sowing, while their final capacity to enjoy/appreciate and reflect divine beauty is their reaping. Those who come to faith through the judgment of hell would represent the barest minimum in terms of human capacity for perception and thus appreciation and reflection of glory.

I balked at this for a while because it seemed unfair to say that, say, Hitler, saved by grace through faith, would be permanently handicapped--so to speak--in his capacity to perceive and enjoy God throughout eternity in comparison to, say, Mother Teresa. I'm undecided. But I have to admit that the NT does speak of rewards and endowments for service, of a greater blessing for those who "have not seen and yet believe," etc. So perhaps it's no denial of grace to admit such degrees. It would make UR more...palatable?

But STILL, for me, there’s a metaphysical line to be drawn with respect freedom and creaturely becoming. SOME minimal amount of epistemic distance is required for a minimally free choice regarding the Good. Remove all that distance—viz., dump full disclosure of the truth upon a person—and you remove the capacity for rationally rejecting love. And that in turn makes responsible, creaturely becoming impossible. So if you agree that this line has to be drawn, I can agree that there are degrees of disclosure that make available various degrees of experienced intensity and reflected glory possible for creatures.

T

Post Edited (Tom) : 2/8/2009 10:09:13 AM (GMT-6)

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Post Edited (Tom) : 2/9/2009 4:07:08 PM (GMT-6)

Heh. Science fiction. Wow.

I'm not offering the worker's complaint in your parable. If it's the case that Hitler and Mother Teresa (indeed all persons) wind up with the same capacities to reflect glory, and there are no abiding consequences of our use of freedom and character development, no rewards, fine. I'm not looking to "get more than" or end up "better off than" someone else as if that's the whole point. I'm just looking to "make sense" of the things we say about freedom/consequence, character solidification, and rewards.

Everybody will be equally redeemed and glorified. And we have to say we'll all be like him for we shall see his face. But it's clear that not all receive the same reward. And though little is said about rewards, we do know they're a part of the eternal Kingdom. And rewards are by definition discriminatory. That is, some get this and not that. Does this mean some are "better off" than others? Well, define "better" for me. "Better off..." than what? In what respect? Certainly those who receive a reward are not better off than those who don't in SOME respects. We're all redeemed and glorifed after all. But unless rewards are meaningless, those who receive ARE "better off" than those who don't in other respects, i.e., in respect to the substance of the rewards received.

Combining all these, it makes sense of why there even IS a hell, of the integrity of character solidification, and of the NT emphasis upon rewards to suppose that rewards are abiding, not ephemeral, and discriminating as opposed to equal across the board, and to suppose that rewards are keyed to character development as consequences of freedom (we have to say what rewards are a reward for). I'm suggesting that in a sense we BECOME our reward, or if you like, our rewards are the shape of our particularities. But if rewards are discriminatory, then we can't all BE the same thing, cookie cutter reproductions in terms of abilities, capacities, perceptions, etc., like Obi Wan, Annakin, and Yoda. That's Sci-fi. This is real life.

T

Post Edited (Tom) : 2/10/2009 2:46:01 AM (GMT-6)