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A DISCUSSION OF ALAN’S FORTHCOMING ARTICLE
http://www.alanrhoda.net/papers/Gratuitous%20Evil%20and%20Divine%20Providence.pdf
Let me post a bit from the article just to show where Alan (Red text) is going with it:
The ABSTRACT:
ABSTRACT: Discussions of the evidential argument from evil generally pay little attention to how different models of divine providence constrain the theist’s options for response. After describing four models of providence and general theistic strategies for engaging the evidential argument, I articulate and defend a definition of ‘gratuitous evil’ that renders the theological premise of the argument uncontroversial for theists. This forces theists to focus their fire on the evidential premise, enabling us to compare models of providence with respect to how plausibly they can resist it. I then assess the four models, concluding that theists are better off vis-à-vis the evidential argument if they reject meticulous providence.
Tom: Then from the INTRO:
Interest in the notion of pointless or gratuitous evil stems from its role in the evidential argument from evil:
(1) Gratuitous evils occur.
(2) If God exists then no gratuitous evils occur.
Therefore,
(3) God does not exist.
Tom: The argument is formally valid. It can be false only if (1) or (2) (or both) is false. Alan argues that (2) is true and that (1) is false. Not all theists take this route, however. Some argue that (1) is true and (2) is false. Part of Alan’s argument is to offer reasons why it’s best for theists to agree on a definition of ‘gratuitous evil’ that would get them all agreeing that no such evil occurs, thus all agreeing that (2) is true (IF such evil occurred, God couldn’t exist, but…) and (1) is false (…no such evils occur, or can occur).
The argument’s soundness therefore hinges on the truth of the premises, and thus on the notion of gratuitous evil. (1) is the evidential premise, giving the argument its name. It is usually claimed by proponents that support for (1) is to be had simply by looking around. When we do, we allegedly find instances of evil, or a distribution of evils, which God would not be justified in permitting. (2) is the theological premise. It is supposed to follow a priori from God’s perfect goodness that he wouldn’t do anything without adequate justifying reasons and so wouldn’t permit gratuitous evil.
To a first approximation, then, we can say that gratuitous evils are evils that God would have no adequate justifying reason for permitting. But if we are properly to assess the theist’s prospects for rebutting the evidential argument, we need to be more explicit about the conditions under which there would be no adequate God-justifying reasons. What we want, I suggest, is a definition of ‘gratuitous evil’ that makes the theological premise uncontroversial for theists and, subject to that constraint, renders the evidential premise as initially plausible as possible. By securing (2), we force theists to focus their fire on (1).
Then from the opening paragraph of METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS
I undertake below to develop and defend a definition of gratuitous evil designed to render the theological premise (2) of the evidential argument uncontroversial for proponents of all four models. Given (2) and the validity of the argument, theists can only resist it by attacking (1), the claim that gratuitous evils occur.
Alan’s definition of gratuitous evil (worked out carefully, which we can talk about):
(9) A gratuitous evil = A token or type of evil which God antecedently knew he could have prevented in a way that would have made the world overall better.
In the light of (9), the theological premise becomes
(2*) If God exists then there occur no tokens or types of evil which God antecedently knew he could have prevented in a way that would have made the world overall better.
Tom: It’ll be clear later that what Alan means by “could have prevented” does not include all or even most evils. Some natural evils may be necessary in a soul-making sort of way (Peterson). The possibility of at least some other moral evils is entailed in factors (the necessity of free-will and an appropriate context for creaturely becoming) that are necessary to an overall better world, so that God’s not preventing them doesn’t qualify them as ‘gratuitous’ under his definition. All these can, arguably, be evils God cannot prevent unilaterally and in so doing instantiate an overall better world.
I submit that (2*) should be uncontroversially true for theists on account of God’s perfect goodness. If God can prevent evils (tokens or types) in a way that would make the world overall better, and if God knows he can prevent those evils in such a manner, then it is hard to see what could justify God’s permitting them. If this is right, then it is incumbent upon theists to resist the evidential premise by denying that we have any good reason to affirm
(1*) There occur tokens or types of evil which God antecedently knew he could have prevented in a way that would have made the world overall better.
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Basically, Alan wants to define gratuitous evil in such a way that (a) all four models of providence he names can agree to it, and (b) no such evils ever occur, so that premise (1) of the evidential argument above is untrue and the argument fails.
It’s important to recognize that by gratuitous evil Alan does not mean an evil which is preventable simpliciter by someone or other. His definition is quite narrow. For example, (2*) leaves room for Peterson’s Soul-Making theodicy, in which some natural evil can justifiably be permitted by God for the development of virtue. Though God CAN prevent such natural evil in the sense that God’s got the muscle to do so, God cannot prevent all such evil in a way that would make the world an overall better place, for natural evil is, arguably, useful for the development of an overall better world. Such evil then isn’t strictly speaking ‘gratuitious’.
Alan also brings up the distinction between type-gratuity and token-gratuity which I thought was really helpful.
(2*) also leaves room for the sort of ‘moral motivation’ that Hasker argues is necessary for creatures to play their role in learning to administrate the cosmos and be a fit partner for God, and that partnerships is a better overall world than one in which we are not such partners with God. If God were to prevent all evil and not leave some evil for creatures to prevent, they could not develop responsibly into the sort of partners God wants, so God has justifiable reasons for not preventing all evils, that prevention sometimes being dependent upon human beings.
I have to reread the article another time, but it doesn’t seem that Alan says anything about what I think is a main reason why God cannot prevent all moral evil, namely, the integrity of the freedom necessary for us to choose love. Presuming the chief reason we exist is to pleasure God by freely loving him and others, it seems to follow that the freedom necessary to this end must have an integrity to it for God as well as for us. If God were to prevent our misuse of freedom EVERY time we intend some misuse it, one could conclude there’s little real integrity to the whole project. If God only doesn’t interfere when we do rightly with our freedom, then did he REALLY give us freedom to begin with? I think not. So, God’s allowing us to inherit the consequences of choosing wrongly is an overall better sort of world than is his allowing every loving use of freedom and preventing every misuse of freedom. This is different than Hasker's moral-motivation argument.
But Alan’s point is: (2*) only applies to evils which God has NO justifiable reason for permitting and those reasons extending to a host of concerns (Peterson’s soul-making theodicy, Hasker’s concerns, and even mine).
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If this is how gratuitous evil is defined, then I agree of course. Like Alan says, what theist would disagree?
This is essentially the same principle I’ve argued here (and back on the Carlie thread years ago): God does all God can do given the creational constraints he has to work within, to maximize good and minimize evil. Alan’s point is that those constraints RULE OUT some sorts of evils (his ‘gratuitous’ evils) because God uniformly prevents them. They can never exist. But those constraints permit or allow for the possibility of other sorts of evils (natural evils, evils the follow from the use of angelic and human free-will).
[RIGHT HERE there’s a big question about what sorts of conceivable evils WOULD qualify under Alan’s definition of ‘gratuitous’. Can he describe one? What sort of sin are we talking about? Do they never happen because they’re definitionally impossible or because they’re possible but just uniformly prevented by God? In other words, are there even any members in the set of ‘Possible Gratuitous Evils’? Alan will have to say the set is EMPTY, for the existence of even one such possible evil would constitute a possible world in which Alan agrees God would not exist, and Alan agrees God exists necessarily (in all possible worlds). Thus, on Alan’s definition, there is no such thing as a ‘possible gratuitous evil’. For it to be possible, some ‘actuality’ would have to be its ground, right? What actuality would that be? So ‘gratuitous evil’ is only as conceivable as is God’s non-existence (for Alan).]
In other words, AFTER all the soul-making and free-will and other creational constraints upon the exercise of divine power are factored in, THEN Alan says an all-benevolent God would prevent all evils unilaterally. I think that goes without saying. But in actuality there’s no REAL preventing going on. There are no ‘possible’ or ‘instantiable’ gratuitous evils whose prevent requires some ‘providential action’ on God’s part.
Given Alan’s definition then, if there are any evils which are uniformily prevented by God via some providential act, they cannot be ‘possible gratuitous’ evils.
Do we want to do that? Do we want to define away ‘gratuitous evil’ into the realm of ‘necessarily not possible’? Isn’t the evidential argument as much about whether God is justified in allowing all the OTHER types of evil Alan grants are not gratuitous? I’m just thinking out loud here.
What if we define gratuitous evil as = any instance of evil actualized in spite of all attempts—divine, angelic, and human—to prevent it?
In other words, define ‘gratuity’ inclusive of all relevant factors. Alan seems to define it exclusive of all non-God factors. That’s why there’s no gratuitous evil for him but there is for me. An evil which (on Hasker’s view, say) was ultilitarianly left by God up to humans to prevent (for justifiable reasons) but which humans failed to prevent is gratuitous given what humans could have done. For Alan, it was non-gratuitous because God could not prevent it unilaterally given all the relevant factors. I don’t see why gratuity should exclude agents other than God though. Most people intuit the gratuity of at least SOME evils and they include all factors into the scope of things God “could have done.” I’d like to articulate my way through that intuition and not around it (so to speak)
In other words, argue that God has justifiable reasons to make the prevention of some evils dependent upon wills other than his own. We have to do that anyhow, whether we adopt Alan’s definition or not, right? Alan takes these evils into consideration too. He just uses them to exclude a class of evils from his definition of ‘gratuitous’ evil. But surely those who employing the evidential argument mean to INCLUDE such evils within the scope of discussion, i.e., they’d want to know whether God has justifiable reasons for making the successful prevention of evil sometimes dependent upon angelic and/or human agents. That seems to be where the argument is. And to say reply that APART from these evils God DOES do just what the proponents of the evidential argument claim God ought to do--namely, unilaterally prevent evil--seems to begg the question. No?
Alan sees this, but wants to address it OUTSIDE the question of ‘gratuitous’ evil. I prefer to address it as part of the issue, partly because (a) evidential argument proponents do so, and partly because (b) I fear that if ‘gratuitous’ evil is said to be impossible and non-existent, less than careful believers will lazily assume that any given instance of evil is already the result of all that possibly could have been done to prevent it and so tend to assume that includes them, and thus never question whether a particular evil is in fact gratuitous given what they could have done. This failure to include ourselves within the explanation of what good might have been isn’t Alan’s intention of course, but I fear it could follow if people are told that there are no gratuitous evils. When some hear “gratuitous evil can evil occur” they think “Oh, well, all evils serve some specific purpose or higher good,” and I’m assuming that’s NOT what Alan wants to say. So there may be a deeper point to Hasker’s concern about motivation which even Hasker doesn’t make explicit and which Alan didn’t address.
Tom Post Edited (Tom) : 8/11/2009 3:14:00 AM (GMT-5) |