Here’s what I’m thinking. Define ‘nature’ and ‘hypostasis’ in dispositional terms.

‘Nature’ is just a dispositionally defined scope of possibilities. A thing’s ‘nature’ is its capacities (dispositions, powers, etc.) to determine the concrete form of its existence. That’s all ‘nature’ is. It’s all the dispositional tendencies that delimit the scope of future becoming for that thing (that ordinal of dispositional capacities for self-determination).

Let's move on to a dispositional definition of ‘hypostasis’ or 'person'? All hypostases (both biological-hypostases and person-hypostases) are concrete instantiations of natural capacities. Some are merely contributions to some aesthetic satisfaction (inanimate objects) while others are contributions to and experiencers of aesthetic satisfaction (persons). Human beings are the latter because their ‘nature’ (their set of dispositional capacities) include sentience and the capacity for aesthetic evaluation and enjoyment (i.e., what we'll call 'spirit').

So, human being in its fullest dispositionally determined concrete form, i.e., a ‘person’, is an ordinal of dispositions to aesthetic satisfaction whose satisfaction is the result of two ‘moments’ of personal becoming; one inward moment of negation of self and grounding in God and one outward movement of concrete self-determined expression.

I still like describing ‘person’ in terms of ‘meaning’, so the final concrete form of the two moments is the consequent ‘meaning’ of my concrete existence, which is simply the apprehended enjoyment of the significance/meaning of both moments of personal becoming.

There’s just one thing left—define ‘spirit’ dispositionally.

Tom

Post Edited (Tom) : 11/9/2009 4:12:59 AM (GMT-6)

How do we define the human ‘spirit’ dispositionally?

The human spirit is the created complex of dispositions that aim at relating to God in the perception and enjoyment of aesthetic satisfaction. The human spirit is thus how we participate in the life of God. It’s a particular kind of relationality. It is dispositional openness to apprehend and experience the beauty of triune love. The human spirit includes the disposition to self-perceive (i.e., construct a ‘self’, the meaning of one’s existence in the world) and to relate one’s self to oneself and then ground that self in God. The resulting identity or meaning which the concrete determinate form that these dispositions take is what we can the 'person'.

One is spiritually dead just so long as one’s constructing a meaning or self not grounded in God. But the capacity to ground one’s self in God, to relate to God, remains. Spiritual death doesn’t mean the capacities for relating to God are non-existent. Spiritual death is existential despair and angst, which are the necessary consequence of any attempt to construct a meaning for one’s existence (a view of the ‘self’) outside the ground of one’s being—God. So spiritual death is the experience of ungrounded existence.

Now, what about the relationship between the human spirit and the human person? I don’t want to equate them (D objects to that), but they’re definitely related. I’ll try to be careful.

What I want to say is that the dispositional capacities unique to human being which equip it for communion with God aim at a concrete actualization of aesthetic satisfaction. These unique capacities are what we call the RWE complex (reason, will, emotion/evaluative capacities). But being dispositions, they ‘aim’ at a particular actualization of aesthetic satisfaction. They MUST world-construct, self-construct. It is their nature to coalesce into some definitive express of uniqueness and meaning in the world. But only when they aim at achieving their aesthetic appetite in God does their concrete determinate form coalesce into a true personal identity. So ‘person’ (in the full, theological sense) becomes the concrete form of dispositional tendencies at rest in their God-given subjective aim of participating in God.

So then, while the dispositional tendencies per se are ‘nature’ (RWE complex), what they are is a tendency and longing for some unique identity, some place in the world, some concrete determinate form of existence,  i.e., some ‘person’. Like I’ve always said, we dispose of our natural capacities in an attempt to either secure of express personal identity. Every choice (exercise of nature) is an attempt at or expression of personhood. So ‘person’ is just the concrete determinate form of ‘nature’. This is standard EO thought. So while ‘spirit’ isn’t ‘person’ (i.e., ‘person’ isn’t equivalent to ‘nature’), person is some particularized, concrete determinate form of nature.

So, how do we deal with Jesus’ having a ‘human spirit’? Does this mean we have to posit a “human person” in addition to the divine person of the Son? That’s Nestorianism. Let’s not do that. So how does Jesus have a “human spirit” (i.e., the same human dispositional capacities for relationship with God that we do) whose fulfilled concrete form does not coalesce into a human , i.e., non-divine, personal identity but rather into being an expression of the very Person of God the Son?

Stay tuned.

Tom

Post Edited (Tom) : 11/9/2009 4:13:35 AM (GMT-6)

If Christ is God the Son incarnate and we want to affirm a Nicean one subject/two natures Christology, then we have to see our way through to ascribing to the one divine person an experience of non-divine nature. We either keeping exploring the possibilities in an attempt to get clarity, or we affirm the orthodox line in a leap of faith and play the mystery card, or we reject Nicea.

Let’s try to explore the possibilities first.

D’s been sharing Loder for a couple of years now. Loder’s end state is that the human spirit is related to God’s Spirit in a bipolar asymmetrical relational unity. That’s Loderian for, “we become all we can be only by relating to God as the ground of our being.” There’s the asymmetry. God defines us. We don’t define God.

What posed problems for me was an additional claim Loder would make: “Christ defines the manner in which the Holy Spirit and the human spirit are to relate.” The problem for me was this. I can see how this asymmetry grounds our being personally distinct from God. But I couldn’t see how it didn’t ground the same in Jesus. And if the our spirits related to God in exactly the same manner that Jesus’ human spirit relates to God, I couldn’t see how to avoid the conclusion that each of us is God the Son incarnate. Consequently, there has to be SOME difference in HOW the Holy Spirit and the human spirit relate in Christ over and against HOW they relate in us. That difference is what accounts for his being a divine person incarnate and our being simply non-divine persons.

What I’d like to suggest now is that what marks the difference between Christ and us is that in Christ the relationship between the divine and the human IS symmetrical while in us it’s asymmetrical. Each of us is united to God in bipolar asymmetrical relational unity. But the hypostatic union is an instance of bipolar symmetrical relational unity. This symmetry is what accounts for Christ’s being the divine person of the Son while the asymmetry in our case is what accounts for the emergence of non-divine personhood.

God is free to open Godself up to created entities on whichever level he wants, i.e., to grant created entities various levels of access to his own life. Rocks and plants have limited dispositional capacities. The can (as Greg shows) aim toward a concrete actualization that contributes to aesthetic satisfaction. But they can’t themselves experience this satisfaction. Sentient animals enjoy a greater dispositional range of aesthetic satisfaction. Hartshorne wrote that some birds sing not as a mere function of some manner of species propagation, but “because the like to.” That may or may not be true of birds. I don’t know. But certain in the case of humans we have the capacity to participate in God's life in a unique wa. Sentience together with self-relationality and evaluative capacities for perceiving and enjoying beauty all together define the dispositional requirements for a unique participation in the life of God. These dispositional capacities would be what the human spirit is.

In Christ’s case, “symmetry” would just mean that in this one individual, God the Son opens WHO he is as Son up to this one ordinal of human dispositional becoming (this one human spirit), so that the concrete form of this human being becomes an expression of the SON. This is accomplished by the free choice of God to extend the Son hypostatically to being defined by as well as defining (symmetry) a concrete human being.

This is perfectly compatible with orthodoxy’s claim that the Son suffered “in his human nature” (if that distinction is important to you). Yes, but the PERSON of the Son is WHO is thus defined by these sufferings. The SON is having this human experience. Thus person-first subjective suffering becomes part OF THE MEANING (the personal identity) of the Son of God.

But in OUR cases, God does NOT so open himself up. The relationship remains asymmetrical. God isn’t any less present in/to/with the human spirit in our case as he is in Christ’s case. He only is making a different offer. In Christ the human spirit is taken up into the Son’s own self-perception (i.e., related to symmetrically), so the Son understands himself as the Son as now including this experiences as his own, as disposing of his own identity through a new set of dispositional capacities (human ones).

In our case the human spirit, those dispositions that tend toward some concrete form of aesthetic satisfaction, are simply NOT taken up into the life and identity of the Son in a symmetrical way. Our dispositional tendencies (our spirits) are left to self-determine, to concretize on their own, and thus to ground the emergence of non-divine persons/identities. This choice of God (to relate asymmetrically) is what directs the concrete form our natures takes in self-determining fashion to achieve a non-divine personal identity. But in Christ the human spirit is not “let go” in this sense.

Hence, non-divine personhood is where God stands and says "Let there be..." (persons other than me). But in Christ God stands and says, "I am that I am. I am Emmanuel." Both happen in the same "place" we call the human spirit (those human dispositional tendencies toward seek out an identity and meaning for one's self in the world). God just chooses to relate differently each time (in Christ's case and in our cases). 

It might not work. I’m just thinking out loud.

Tom

Post Edited (Tom) : 11/9/2009 9:52:00 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Tom) : 11/9/2009 10:21:36 AM (GMT-6)

(Redone)

Post Edited (One Love) : 11/9/2009 10:39:20 AM (GMT-6)

Ooops.  I misplaced the "NOT" above.  Sorry. 

Did I happen to say "I agree."?