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Sahid
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| Posted 7/27/2010 10:26 PM (GMT -6) |   | I think it would be better to deal with the idea of necessity itself. I don't think anyone or anything exists necessarily. I think that any such claim is unsupportable. And (to avoid confusion) this does not mean that I reject all necessary truths. A claim can be necessarily true, but an actual entity cannot exist necessarily.
My thinking goes like this: First, we must define necessity. I hope we both agree that X is necessary if it could not be otherwise. Tweak that as you will. Let's first take propositions. For a proposition to be necessarily true, it could not be false. In geometry, I teach my kids about good definitions. A good definition must be necessary (in a different sense) and sufficient, that is, I can't just define a circle as a shape with no straight edges. I'm must add sufficiency; I must rule out all non-circles. So a circle is a shape where every point is equidistant from the center. That's a good definition. So then I look at classical necessary truths: "All husbands are married" for instance. It turns out that this is definitionally true. It's not a good definition itself: saying that husbands are those who are married gives a necessary but not sufficient condition. To claim that "all husbands are married" is true, but it's also trivial. Anyone who says this only shows that he/she knows (some of) the definition. To my knowledge, all necessary truths fit this pattern: they say no more than the definitions of the incorporated terms.
By extension, the same can be said of a priori knowledge. A priori knowledge is nothing more than an acquaintance with the definitions of the terms one is using.
Extending necessity to existing entities is tricky, First of all, for the sake of argument, we must dispense with determinism. In a fully deterministic world everything is necessary, so the word extends to uselessness. To we are talking about a world that has some non-deterministic quality. What does it mean for an entity to exist necessarily? It means that this entity could not be otherwise (i.e. must exist). Already language stretches to it's limits to accommodate this shift from grammar to ontology, from symbolic to real. Whereas with language necessity reduces to definition, with real entities necessity forces use to invent such exotic terms as "all possible worlds" or "all conceivable worlds." We try to figure out how something can definitionally exist (which is the same thing as necessarily existence).
The easy way to show that there are (and can be) no necessarily existing beings is to conceive of a void world. Such a world is conceivable. We earlier appealed to LNC to decide whether a world is conceivable. And despite there being no thinkers in a void world, there are thinkers in this one, and we can conceive of it. We can take any meaningful proposition, apply to the void world, and we find that it is either true or false but not both. QED the void world abides by LNC and is therefore conceivable. The absence of any entities in the void world shows that there are no necessary beings.
T: As I remember, you deny that God exists necessarily.
Z: Correct.
T: Instead, God exists contingently...
Z: Yes. Existence implies contingency.
T: because he has always chosen to exist.
Z: Uhh... yes and no. His existence is chosen, yes. But the contingency of his existence is just definitional, a priori, trivially true. All existing beings exist contingently. I am assuming that "contingent" is equivalent to "non-necessary." If you use the term in the same way then. It's not a matter of God's choice that his existence is contingent, rather it's a matter of semantics and definitions. It's like saying Socrates chose to be a bachelor who was not married. The grammar is problematic, it's confusingly redundant. The same goes for "God exists contingently." Existence implies contingency.
T: There never was a time he did not exist and though God could commit suicide if he wanted to, he CHOOSES TO EXIST.
Z: Yes.
T: So for you, God's existence is the result of God's choice. Is that your view?
Z: Yes and no. I could take your question two different ways.
First, "God's present existence is the result of God's choice." Yes, I agree with this. Disclaimer: I'm open to arguments, but I lean strongly away from a theory of meticulous providence. And so I'd say there is a kind of inertia to things like existence. It's not that God must "hold himself (and all creation) in existence at every moment."
Second, "God's initial existence is the result of God's choice." It's hard to say if I agree with this because it's not clear that this is even a meaningful proposition. First of all "God's initial existence"?!? As Christians, we have already committed to denying that there is any initiating of God (yeah I know there are rare exceptions to this, but bear with me). Next, why must be assume causation? Only the full determinist is committed to causation at all points, and we have already ruled out determinism from the discussion. Lastly, how is it meaningful to say God is causally prior to God? The very concept of causal priority rules out any X being causally prior to itself. I'm tempted to answer "No," but I'm not sure the nonsensical nature of the question even permits an answer.
Now, I think I've adequately begged the real question long enough. "So by your view, Zach, where is God from/what caused God/how did God come to be/what preceded God." The traditional Christian answer is just as elegant (or infuriating, depending on your point of view) as mine. "Nothing." God was, is, and is to come. Nothing requires that this be true, i.e. it is not a necessary truth, but it is in fact true (according to those Christians). Christians have this annoying habit of faith. They got it from Abraham who believed he would get his son back, when he had no certainty that it was the case (in fact the odds appeared to be stacked against it). A world with certainty is not the real world that we live in. All necessary truths are trivial claims. Validity is doable, but certain knowledge of an argument's soundness is beyond our reach. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 7/27/2010 11:15 PM (GMT -6) | | So, there are no necessarily existing beings but there are necessarily true propositions. All BEINGS exist contingently, God included. He may pass out of existence. But there ARE some necessarily true propositions, i.e., propositions that cannot be false, propositions whose truth cannot be other than what it is.
Enter God. God can do all things. He's almighty.
Can God falsify a necessarily true proposition? Truths that CANNOT be other than they are--CAN God make them false? Can God make them other than true?
If God CAN falsify such truths, then they're not necessarily true. You've defined necessary truth as truth which cannot be other than true (a fine definition of necessary truth). But you've insisted that God can do anything, even flpowoiflwenfiefe, event commit suicide, even sin, even anything. That includes falsifying necessarily true props. But if a true prop can be falsified, then it's a contingently true prop, not a necessary truth.
So, don't you have to give up necessary truth OR give up your notion that God can do ANYTHING? If God can do anything, he can falsify necessary truths. But if any necessary truth can be falsified, then it's contingently true and not necessarily true. And if it truly cannot be other than true, then not even God can render it false, in which case there's something God can't do.
Which you gonna give up? Necessary truth OR your belief that God can do anything?
Tom
KIXYTΘEMTAPost Edited (Tom) : 7/27/2010 11:23:04 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
Registered Member
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Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 7/28/2010 10:03 AM (GMT -6) | | Let me try asking it this way.
You believe God exists contingently. But I think, given your views, that the proposition "God can do anything" is necessarily true (in a non-tautological way; i.e., it's not JUST a analytic/definition of God). So the question is, can God falsify "God can do anything"? If God commits suicide, as you suppose he can, then it seems God can falsify this truth, since God would then no longer exist and thus not be able to do anything. The problem is attributing to God both contingent existence and also making God the ground of necessary truths about himself (like the necessarily true "God can do anything" ). You've got 'contingent grounds for a necessary truth' which is, by definition, self-contradictory.
Then there's the question of the status of your necessary truths in this void world you're supposing is possible (i.e., absolute nothingness). Are all these necessary truths you believe in true alongside this world of absolute nothingness? Do they exist as propositions? If not, then they're definitionally speaking 'contingently' true and not necessary truths at all, for you suppose it possible that they not exist. But if they remain true, then you don't really have absolute nothingness. You have all these necessary truths (which are not absolutely nothing) which THEN brings up the question of what a proposition even IS and how propositional truth-value obtains. Can propositions exist (or their truth-value be said to "obtain" ) apart from any perceiving MIND or sentience whatsoever? I think not. Propositions are, after all, essentially the furniture of some mind, apart from which propositions don't even exist. Propositions are essentially "belief states" and thus require a mind to even be said to obtain or exist at all. But if all minds (including God's) exist 'contingently', then all propositions and all truth exist contingently, for there might be no propositions at all just in case there are no minds at all.
Tom
KIXYTΘEMTAPost Edited (Tom) : 7/28/2010 11:42:54 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
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Total Posts : 2013
| Posted 7/28/2010 1:23 PM (GMT -6) | | T: You believe there are necessary truths. Let's take ANY one of them as an example. You supply it. It's a simple question. For any truth you believe to be a necessary truth, can God falsify it?
Z: Ok. "All husbands are married." Your standard necessary truth. Can God make an unmarried husband? Or can God make a married husband simultaneously unmarried? No matter how it's phrased, these are nonsense questions. Let's assume you, Tom, have omnipotence when it comes to establishing and dissolving marriages: Do you now have the ability to make an unmarried husband or a married husband simultaneously unmarried? Before answering yes or no, it must be pointed out that the questions are meaningless. They require a break from LNC to be asked. They correspond to no real (or even conceivable) act or event. God can do anything, but proposed things/events/acts that break LNC are not things/events/acts at all! Do you disagree? Do you think that a LNC-breaking act is a conceivable act? If not, then asking if God can contradict necessary truth is a red herring.
T: But I think, given your views, that the proposition "God can do anything" is necessarily true (in a non-tautological way; i.e., it's not JUST a analytic/definition of God).
Z: I disagree. In the void world there would be no God, and as such he could not do anything. Thus "God can do anything" is a contingent truth. It only hold in worlds where God exists. You can tweak it to make it a necessary truth. You could say "All omnipotent beings can do anything." In removing particular entities from discussion, we allow for abstract concepts, definitions, and thus necessity. So take "All omnipotent beings can do anything." In the void world this remains true; in any conceivable world this remains true.
T: So the question is, can God falsify "God can do anything"? If God commits suicide, as you suppose he can, then it seems God can falsify this truth, since God would then no longer exist and thus not be able to do anything.
Z: "God can do anything" assumes God. Yet God is an entity and is thus contingent, which makes the proposition contingent. You'd need something like "All unable-to-kill-themselves beings can do anything." This IS easily falsifiable. If I had claimed something like this, then your critique would be dead on.
T: The problem is attributing to God both contingent existence and also making God the ground of necessary truths about himself (like the necessarily true "God can do anything" ).
Z: Then, it's good that I did no such thing. This is why I when to great lengths to be very clear about necessity in propositional truths.
T: Then there's the question of the status of your necessary truths in this void world you're supposing is possible (i.e., absolute nothingness). Are all these necessary truths you believe in true alongside this world of absolute nothingness?
Z: Yes.
T: Do they exist as propositions?
Z: That's another thing entirely. The question doesn't makes sense. "Exist as propositions"?!? What does that mean? Are you claiming that propositions have existence? This seems to me a extremely radical view and one that flies in the face of all common sense. People, objects, and (according to some) spiritual entities have existence. Abstractions, propositions, claims do not. If you want to include such abstractions within the set of that which has existence, then you must broaden the meaning of the term unto uselessness. Now you can ask me if propositions have truth value in the void world - to which I will answer yes. But to ask me about the existence of truths and propositions (in any world) puts you out on a strange philosophical limb.
T: But if they remain true, then you don't really have absolute nothingness. You have all these necessary truths (which are not absolutely nothing) which THEN brings up the question of what a proposition even IS and how propositional truth-value obtains.
Z: Yes, you do really have absolute nothingness. Necessary truths do not exist or not exist - the category of existence does not apply. We don't even conceive of propositions as having existence. I guess we must define terms like "anything" and "nothing." I'm happy to admit that I limit these terms to the conceivably, LNC-abiding, real. This is a point that you and Jeff hammered home so frequently that I didn't expect I needed to defend it to you. When talking about necessary and contingent truth and beings, we are asking a question about whether or not they can obtain in all conceivable, LNC-abiding worlds. When you venture out beyond that, you get nonsense, so of course my terms are limited by nonsensical-ness. But if that's not cool, then I'm happy to adjust my claim. How about "God can do anything conceivable" or "God can do anything that does not require an inconceivable LNC-breaking world?"
T: Can propositions exist (or their truth-value be said to "obtain" ) apart from any perceiving MIND or sentience whatsoever? I think not. Propositions are, after all, essentially the furniture of some mind, apart from which propositions don't even exist.
Z: They don't exist at all. Synapses exist. So maybe you can make a case for thoughts existing. But propositions, no. If you are aware of good arguments to the contrary, let me know and I'll track them down and buy on Amazon (if I can afford it).
T: Propositions are essentially "belief states" and thus require a mind to even be said to obtain or exist at all.
Z: Even minds cannot make propositions exist. What is a proposition? The omniscient wikipedia says it is either (A) content/meaning of a meaningful declarative sentence or (B) the symbols, marks, and sound that make up a meaningful declarative sentence. (Notice that the meaningfulness of the sentences rules out asking if nonsensical propositions are true of God since nonsensical propositions are not propositions at all.) If we take meaning (A), then no, propositions cannot not exist. They are abstractions. Their very definition moves them to a semantic place (notice it's not a real, existing place) which resides fully apart from questions of existence. Asking if a certain proposition exists is like asking what the number R smells like. It's not a meaningful question to begin with. If we take meaning (B), then you are correct, propositions do not exist in a void world, because in a void world there are no symbols, marks, or sounds. But nonexistence of symbols does not imply that, the content to which they would have referred has no meaning. Yes, there is no thinking or communicating in the void world. But we can hold propositions up to the void world (from the outside so to speak), and we can see that those proposition do have truth value.
You offered a fine example of this: "God can do anything." This has truth-value in the void world: false. Therefore it is not a necessary truth.
T: But if all minds (including God's) exist 'contingently', then all propositions and all truth exist contingently, for there might be no propositions at all just in case there are no minds at all.
Z: This is only true if truth-value depends on minds. It does not. Thinking depends on minds, but "The sky is blue" remains true without anyone thinking it.Post Edited (Sahid) : 7/28/2010 1:39:05 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 7/29/2010 9:05 AM (GMT -6) | | Didn’t mean to shut you down Zach. Sorry. It’s just that we see things pretty differently at a fundamental level and I doubt we’re going to convince each other.
In my view, truth maps reality (or truth supervenes upon being). It’s that simple. Yes, that’s basically a correspondence theory of truth, but I appreciate much about coherence theories of truth too, and their view would support my point. But anyhow, for me ‘truth’ and ‘ontology’ are related and the former maps or tracks with the latter. What’s ‘said’ or asserted (i.e., propositions) is true if what ‘is’ is as the proposition claims. So if absolutely nothing exists (if there is no ontology, nothing real, nothing obtains, etc.) then there are no propositions, no truth.
On propositions, it seems pretty self-evident to me actually that they exist in some thinking/reasoning mind, apart from which there simply are no such things as ‘assertions’ or ‘truth claims’ or ‘propositions’. There is no truth de dicto apart from diction or language (intelligent speech or utterance), and that is the work of minds. Truth supervenes upon or maps reality by means of perceiving minds apprehending that world and its relations and then forming valuations in terms of propositions/truth. The notion that propositions exist apart from apprehending minds, just floating about as propositions, is rather fanciful. What language do they float around in? Truth is map, maps are language, language implies mind.
So, for me: if there is absolutely speaking no reality, no ontology, there’s nothing to map, nothing to supervene upon, and thus no maps (no truths). For truths derive their content and truth value from the realities of which they speak. Absolute nothingness is just that. This is why if absolutely nothing really is possible, then there are no necessary truths, for the truths of logic like LNC would not obtain. As logical ‘laws’ they express some “way the world is.” They reflect the underlying/fundamental motion of reason. That reason is the reality they map and their truths express. No reason? No laws. No laws. No laws of logic. No laws of logic. No LNC or any other so-called necessary truth. Thus: because ‘truth’ tracks ‘ontology’, it follows that IF there are necessary truths there must be some necessarily existing thing(s). Necessary truth GETS its necessity from the reality(ies) it maps/tracks. So if you deny all necessary existents (entities), you deny all necessary truth.
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T: Do they exist as propositions?
Z: That's another thing entirely. The question doesn't makes sense. "Exist as propositions"?!? What does that mean? Are you claiming that propositions have existence? This seems to me a extremely radical view and one that flies in the face of all common sense. People, objects, and (according to some) spiritual entities have existence. Abstractions, propositions, claims do not. If you want to include such abstractions within the set of that which has existence, then you must broaden the meaning of the term unto uselessness. Now you can ask me if propositions have truth value in the void world - to which I will answer yes. But to ask me about the existence of truths and propositions (in any world) puts you out on a strange philosophical limb.
T: This is when I get tempted to give up the discussion. You lay it out there so confidently and speak of some reigning agreement among philosophers across the ages who all agree with you. But it is certainly not useless to speak of the existence or truth or proposition. Philosophers do it every day, and several cogent theories of propositions and truth are out there. They may be abstract (as all abstractions are) entities, as opposed to concrete material entities, sure. But that doesn’t make ‘truth’ or ‘propositions’ UNREAL. That’s my point. WHATEVER truth is, whatever propositions are, apart from some reasoning mind doing the ‘proposing’, propositions wouldn’t obtain “out there,” and they certainly wouldn’t obtain in a supposed “absolute nothingness.” Absolutely nothing would be true or false in/about absolutely nothing, since truth maps ontology.
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T: Can propositions exist (or their truth-value be said to "obtain" ) apart from any perceiving MIND or sentience whatsoever? I think not. Propositions are, after all, essentially the furniture of some mind, apart from which propositions don't even exist.
Z: They don't exist at all. Synapses exist. So maybe you can make a case for thoughts existing. But propositions, no.
T: I hope my point on this is clearer.
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T: Propositions are essentially "belief states" and thus require a mind to even be said to obtain or exist at all.
Z: Even minds cannot make propositions exist.
T: Minds are the only thing that can form propositions.
Z: What is a proposition? The omniscient wikipedia says it is either (A) content/meaning of a meaningful declarative sentence or (B) the symbols, marks, and sound that make up a meaningful declarative sentence.
T: And none of that, Zach, can occur outside a reasoning mind. Rocks and trees can’t engage in such meaning-making. Fish and cows may, on a very rudimentary level, communicate, yes. But that proves my point—sentience is at work wherever there is MEANING. Meaning is the business of minds, and minds alone.
Z: (Notice that the meaningfulness of the sentences rules out asking if nonsensical propositions are true of God since nonsensical propositions are not propositions at all.) If we take meaning (A), then no, propositions cannot not exist. They are abstractions.
T: I get all that, Zach. I’m not disagreeing on nonsensical stuff. I don’t think God can make square circles.
Z: Their very definition moves them to a semantic place (notice it's not a real, existing place) which resides fully apart from questions of existence.
T: That’s not entirely accurate. Abstracts exist in the sense that they are the objects of a contemplating/reasoning mind. They’re not unreal in that sense. And that’s the only sense we need.
Z: Asking if a certain proposition exists is like asking what the number R smells like. It's not a meaningful question to begin with.
T: I hope you see how it can be and has been meaningful to speak of for a very long time.
Z: If we take meaning (B), then you are correct, propositions do not exist in a void world, because in a void world there are no symbols, marks, or sounds. But nonexistence of symbols does not imply that, the content to which they would have referred has no meaning. Yes, there is no thinking or communicating in the void world. But we can hold propositions up to the void world (from the outside so to speak), and we can see that those proposition do have truth value.
T: No, Zach. WE cannot do that IN a world of absolute nothing because WE do not exist. WE can do that FROM OUR WORLD of substance. We’re playing a game in which we “speak about” absolute nothing. But apart from our concrete world where we’re doing this thinking and speaking and meaning-making about absolute nothing there is no WE, no thinking, no meaning-making, nothing to refer to and nothing to do the work of meaningful reference, no meaning-makers and no meaning-making. Were there absolutely nothing, there’d be absolutely no meaning, no truth, no propositions, no LNC, nuttin.
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T: But if all minds (including God's) exist 'contingently', then all propositions and all truth exist contingently, for there might be no propositions at all just in case there are no minds at all.
Z: This is only true if truth-value depends on minds. It does not. Thinking depends on minds, but "The sky is blue" remains true without anyone thinking it.
T: Really? Tell me, apart from any observing apprehending mind, what language would “The sky is blue” be expressed in? English? Chinese? What?
Tom
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Sahid
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Date Joined Jun 2004
Total Posts : 2013
| Posted 7/29/2010 12:06 PM (GMT -6) | | T: In my view, truth maps reality (or truth supervenes upon being). It’s that simple. Yes, that’s basically a correspondence theory of truth, but I appreciate much about coherence theories of truth too, and their view would support my point. But anyhow, for me ‘truth’ and ‘ontology’ are related and the former maps or tracks with the latter. What’s ‘said’ or asserted (i.e., propositions) is true if what ‘is’ is as the proposition claims.
Z: I agree (assuming I understand you). I'm new to the terminology, but as I understand it, I hold to a correspondence theory of truth as well. Which means something like "It's only true, if it matches reality."
T: So if absolutely nothing exists (if there is no ontology, nothing real, nothing obtains, etc.) then there are no propositions, no truth.
Z: That is problematic. You are making a truth claim about 'absolute nothingness.' The proposition "Nothing exists" is true concerning a void world. (Unless you take propositions to have being - which as I understand it, is not a question for the correspondence theory. The theory deals with the status of truth, not truth's supposed existence.)
T: There is no truth de dicto apart from diction or language (intelligent speech or utterance), and that is the work of minds.
Z: Perhaps that is the entirety of our misunderstanding. I am making no claim at all about truth de dicto. I'm dealing with simple truth de re. I don't think truth is a being - I hold that it is an abstraction in a similar way to how the word "God" is an abstraction of the real being: God. The truth in the void world that "There is nothing" is in fact true - de re, according to a correspondence theory of truth. The nonsense ideas of how nonexisting thinkers might think about this truth de dicto is beside the point - I'm not making an assertion one way or another (because there is nothing to assert when it comes to such nonsense.)
T: The notion that propositions exist apart from apprehending minds, just floating about as propositions, is rather fanciful. What language do they float around in?
Z: I fully agree. I am absolutely not arguing otherwise.
T: Truth is map, maps are language, language implies mind.
Z: That seems problematic too. I'd say language needs mind in order to be comprehended. But concepts can be true de re without be comprehended or articulated by anyone - the truth of a proposition does not rely on any awareness of the proposition. Minds do not"create" propositions, but merely articulate them. The proposition (or meaning behind the proposition to which we assign truth value) "All husbands are married" is not true with respect to a certain language, it is true independent of it's articulation in any language. It is true even when there are no subjects who understand that language. It is true even if there were, are, and never will be any husbands.
T: So, for me: if there is absolutely speaking no reality, no ontology, there’s nothing to map, nothing to supervene upon, and thus no maps (no truths).
Z: Why not say instead, if there is no reality, there's nothing to map against, and thus the map only records propositions with respect to nothingness. Saying truth maps reality says nothing about the medium of the map itself. That takes a logically independent assertion about the existing-ness of abstractions and not just the minds that have access to them.
T: Necessary truth GETS its necessity from the reality(ies) it maps/tracks.
Z: ... and NOT from those who happen to view the map. Which is what prevents us from saying as you do:
T: So if you deny all necessary existents (entities), you deny all necessary truth.
Z: When teaching about sets in mathematics we have what some call "Pink Elephant Logic." Take the proposition "All pink elephants shoot guns." (Or "all pink elephants are gun shooting pink elephants." ) This is true, because it's contra-positive is true: "No pink elephants do not shoot guns." (Or "No gun shooting pink elephants are non-pink elephants." ) Or in other words, "In order to contradict the word 'all' you've got to find one counterexample."
In the case of abstractions like pink elephants and void worlds, in order to determine the truth-value of an 'all-claim' you just have to see if there are or could be a counterexample. A claim to necessary truth is such an 'all-claim.' The standard test of necessity makes reference to all conceivable worlds - an abstraction if there ever was one! We don't require that these conceivable worlds actually exist before we test truths against them. Nor do we ask the conceived-of inhabitants of these conceived of worlds about their de dicto take on our tested truths. So why require such a thing of me when I entertain the void world as a conceivable world?
T: Philosophers do it every day, and several cogent theories of propositions and truth are out there. They may be abstract (as all abstractions are) entities, as opposed to concrete material entities, sure. But that doesn’t make ‘truth’ or ‘propositions’ UNREAL.
Z: But it does make them at most a qualitatively different sort of REAL: abstract reality if you like.
T: That’s my point. WHATEVER truth is, whatever propositions are, apart from some reasoning mind doing the ‘proposing’, propositions wouldn’t obtain “out there,” and they certainly wouldn’t obtain in a supposed “absolute nothingness.”
Z: I don't see the connection. Correct me if I'm wrong, but what I'm reading is: "Truths are in some sense real, therefore they rely on minds for this reality." The argument is missing a premise, namely the one that says in essence: "real things rely on minds for their reality." Now you have a valid argument. And it seems to me that such a premise is less intuitive than the alternative. Don't the vast majority of us assume that "There is furniture in my house" is true even when we are not in the house to experience it or even at those moments when we are not even thinking about it? You could consistently argue that truth relies on a mind, but it seems to be one of those Matrix or evil demon scenarios that we begin by ruling out for the sake of argument. I guess the question is "WHY assert that propositions depend on minds for their 'abstract existence?' Why not say that they abstractly exist/obtain insofar as they correspond to reality? Isn't that the gist of the correspondence theory - that it's the actual correspondence that makes for truth and not just someone's awareness of the correspondence? Do you rule out by definition the possibility of unknown truths?
T: And none of that, Zach, can occur outside a reasoning mind. Rocks and trees can’t engage in such meaning-making. Fish and cows may, on a very rudimentary level, communicate, yes. But that proves my point—sentience is at work wherever there is MEANING. Meaning is the business of minds, and minds alone.
Z: But, are all worlds without sentience inconceivable to us? I thought that was the implied meaning of the question of necessity. It's not "...in all worlds that are conceivable to their respective sentient inhabitants." If such a thing were implied... well... I'd expect it to be made clear at the outset. But (for what it's worth since I have no degree in Philosophy or anything) I know of no dictionary or textbook that makes such a stipulation in it's definition of necessity. If all that is wrapped up in the standard definition of necessity, then I am surely wrong about all of this.
It all seems silly though, we know what we mean don't we? I say, "(de re) a void world is conceivable" and you say, "(de dicto) not to its nonexistent inhabitants" and I say, "well, of course (insofar as it's meaningful to talk about the mindset of the nonexistent)." Can we move on to agree that God's existence is not necessary from our point of view as beings who can conceive of void worlds? At the same time I will stipulate that God's existence is necessary when taking into consideration the point of view(or lack thereof?) of nonexistent beings.
Z: Asking if a certain proposition exists is like asking what the number R smells like. It's not a meaningful question to begin with.
T: I hope you see how it can be and has been meaningful to speak of for a very long time.
Z: I see your point. But you yourself admit that the existence of propositions is of a different kind than common objective existence. It is this non-abstract existence I've been speaking of.
Z: But we can hold propositions up to the void world (from the outside so to speak), and we can see that those proposition do have truth value.
T: No, Zach. WE cannot do that IN a world of absolute nothing because WE do not exist.
Z: Well that's why I said "from the outside."
T: Were there absolutely nothing, there’d be absolutely no meaning, no truth, no propositions, no LNC, nuttin.
Z: Well let's be charitable. I defined existence in such a way as to exclude abstractions, then you defined existence is a way that included abstractions. I'm happy to use you definition (but understand that my previous comments must be understood in relation to my previous definition.) You also accept a distinction between abstract things and concrete material things. I'd like to amend that a little to avoid future confusion. The dichotomy as you state it leaves a gap that spiritual reality (being potentially both non-abstract and non-material). The distinction I'd like to draw is between abstract things and non-abstract things. I called that dividing line 'existence,' but we can call it whatever you like so long as we both understand that it is this line and not some other to which I'm referring.
T: Really? Tell me, apart from any observing apprehending mind, what language would “The sky is blue” be expressed in? English? Chinese? What?
Z: None. The concept does not require vocabulary or grammar to be true. The frequency of the light is unaffected by minds. First the thing happens, then a mind may or may not perceive of an associated concept, but the thing happening still happen regardless. Even if there's no one around to observe the light, it has whatever frequency it has. I understand that there is no truth de dicto, but there is de re truth (which I would call the purest, most truthiest, least defiled by non-truth).Post Edited (Sahid) : 7/29/2010 12:20:29 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 8/4/2010 9:25 AM (GMT -6) | | |
Hi Zach,
This is ridiculously long. Sorry.
Let me try to stand back and make a few comments and the respond to a few specifics:
THREE QUICK COMMENTS
First, my primary interest in starting this thread in general was the relationship between ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ and then more specifically the ‘grounding’ relation (within a correspondence theory of truth) so that you’d consider whether or not it makes sense to claim, as you do, that there are necessary truths but no necessary existents (forgetting whether or not truth requires a mind or not).
We say that truth is ‘grounded’ in some state of affairs or reality. This usually gets explained by saying some proposition is true ‘by virtue of the fact’ that the world is the way the proposition describes. So for every true proposition, there is some state of affairs that makes the proposition true, or by virtue of which the proposition is true. Now, if we say there are truths that are ‘necessarily true’, we’re saying they’re true in every conceivable world, i.e., they can’t possibly be false. But if all true props are true by virtue of some reality or state of affairs, then the concept of necessary truth entails necessary realities/entities/states of affairs (whatever you’d like to call them) which constitute that by virtue of which the supposed truths are necessarily true. Hence, you can’t have necessary truths apart from corresponding necessary realities that ground those truths. And the ‘props’ get their necessity from the state of affairs to which they correspond. Otherwise correspondence and grounding are denied.
OK, secondly then, you’re now explaining that you’re not even talking about ‘propositions’ but rather are “making no claim at all about truth de dicto,” and that you’re “dealing with simple truth de re,” and explain “I don't think truth is a being; I hold that it is an abstraction in a similar way to how the word ‘God’ is an abstraction of the real being: God. The truth in the void world that ‘There is nothing’ is in fact true - de re, according to a correspondence theory of truth.”
This helps clarify things for the conversation. So let me thirdly suggest to you, Zach, that the de dico/de re distinction is not a distinction between two kinds of ‘truth’ as you’re arguing but between two ways of ‘knowing’ or ‘understanding’ some truth. Essentially they’re two different modalities of ‘belief ascription’. If you’re talking about de re knowledge, you’re talking about the “knowledge of a thing,” something believed “concerning the thing itself.” De re knowledge might be knowledge of what the sweetness of a pear tastes like, what it’s like to differentiate between red and blue, or what the pleasure of a piece of music is like, etc., but it’s not used to describe a kind of ‘truth’. It describes a way of believing or ascribing truth to claims. Thus, we have de re and de dicto beliefs.
But it doesn’t really matter which modality we’re discussing (de dicto or de re), neither modality functions or obtains where there is absolutely nothing. For in the absence of things, there are absolutely no re—things, entities, realities, states of affairs, etc.—or relata. And if you have no re, you can have neither apprehenders nor apprehension of things and thus no de re knowledge. So either way, by definition, both de dicto and de re modalities are modalities of knowing and as such require minds/sentience of some minimal kind to instantiate. Even if truth is not a being as you say, truth by correspondence requires being to which correspondence is made and truth grounded.
You seem to think that not attributing ‘existence’ to propositions as concrete entities establishes the fact that the de re modality would obtain even were absolutely nothing to exist. But not only is there nothing to ‘assert’ (de dicto) were absolutely nothing to exist, neither would there any re (no-thing = no-res) and thus nothing de re.
So I’m suggesting that if there are any re (things or realities), then there are things about which truth claims may be made and of which experiences may be had (de re knowledge). And if there are concrete entities in a world but no sentient experience of those things, those entities would exist, sure, but there would be neither ‘knowledge’ (dicto or re) nor truth of them. Of course, if there are no entities at all, if there were absolutely nothing, then there would be nothing “to speak of” (de dicto) and nothing “to experience” or “know” (de re) in any possible sense.
So my main question for this thread is what ought correspondence theorists infer from the supposition of ‘necessary truths’ regarding the necessity of the grounds for those truths? And the answer, I think, ought to be that since the line of influence (or grounding) runs from ontology to truth (that’s the heart of the correspondence view), it follows that truth derives its contingency or necessity from the corresponding contingency or necessity of those realities to which it corresponds and that where there is no reality, there is no corresponding truth. So if “All bachelors are single” is true, it’s true because it corresponds to SOME concrete reality that grounds its truth. It may be that there need be no actual bachelors for it to be true, but there must be SOME reality that renders this definition true.
I hope that helps clarify even if it doesn’t convince. All the stuff that follows is just working these points out in response to some of your comment.
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'about' ABSOLUTE NOTHINGNESS
T: So if absolutely nothing exists (if there is no ontology, nothing real, nothing obtains, etc.) then there are no propositions, no truth.
Z: That is problematic. You are making a truth claim about ‘absolute nothingness’.
T: I’m making a claim ‘about’ it, yes. But that’s not contradictory to my point. The truth value of my claim isn’t grounded ‘by’ absolute nothingness. Such nothingness grounds nothing. My claim is grounded upon the reality and meaningfulness of reason and logic in this world from which I’m having this discussion. We can talk ‘about’ absolute nothingness from where we are. We just can’t talk about it if there were absolutely nothing.
Z: The proposition “Nothing exists” is true concerning a void world.
T: If you mean ‘true in this world about the concept of absolute nothingness’, then I agree. If however you mean that were there absolutely nothing, the proposition “Nothing exists” would remain true, then I’d disagree, for that contradicts your “It’s only true if it matches reality.” If absolute nothingness is the absolute absence of all reality, then the absence of all truth is the match you’re looking for. So if there are no realities, there can be nothing to which supposed truths can ‘match’. But you seem to be saying that were there absolutely nothing, the proposition “Nothing exists” (as well as props like “All bachelors are unmarried”) would still be true because they are de re ‘matches’ to absolute nothingness. Given the absoluteness of absolute nothingness, there are no matchings, matchers or matched. There’s nothing. No re (plural of res, ‘thing’) and so no DE re.
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STATUS OF TRUTH
Z: Unless you take propositions to have being - which as I understand it, is not a question for the correspondence theory. The theory deals with the status of truth, not truth’s supposed existence.
T: It’s not really a question of attributing existence to propositions (though we could debate this separately; I’d argue propositions do exist in the same sense that belief states and other mental states exist—but I don’t need to argue this right now). Correspondence theories of truth are theories about what truth IS, and by that is meant how truth obtains, i.e., what the truth relation (between truth and ontology) is. But the point remains that truth is known or apprehended in one of two modalities (de re or de dicto), neither of which can be said to establish truth were absolutely nothing to exist.
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TRUTH AS MAP/LANGUAGE
T: Truth is map, maps are language, language implies mind.
Z: That seems problematic too. I'd say language needs mind in order to be comprehended.
T: So languages float around independent of minds? The English, French and Chinese languages existed before the English, French and Chinese people existed, indeed, before any human beings existed?
Z: But concepts can be true de re without being comprehended or articulated by anyone - the truth of a proposition does not rely on any awareness of the proposition.
T: That’s to misunderstand the de re modality, to forget that it is a modality of knowing.
I take a ‘proposition’ to be (roughly speaking) a “unit of meaning” or an “assertion of fact.” It’s roughly equal to ‘meaning’. And you don’t have any of that apart from minds. Minds are the only meaning-makers around.
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TRUTH ENTAILS CONCRETA I
T: So, for me: if there is absolutely speaking no reality, no ontology, there’s nothing to map, nothing to supervene upon, and thus no maps (no truths).
Z: Why not say instead, if there is no reality, there's nothing to map against, and thus the map only records propositions with respect to nothingness.
T: Listen to what you’re saying, Zach. You want to say that “All bachelors are unmarried” is one of the propositions recorded as true with respect to nothingness. What is it about nothingness that makes this proposition true? That’s the point. Truths logically entail the reality/existence of their grounds. What reality would ground any truth were nothing to exist?
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TRUTH ENTAILS CONCRETA II
T: Necessary truth GETS its necessity from the reality(ies) it maps/tracks.
Z: ... and NOT from those who happen to view the map.
T: Who and what are the map-makers, Zach? A proposition ‘proposes’ some meaning and some ‘proposer’ does the proposing. It’s sentience at work all the way down. As soon as you remove all sentience/minds, you’ve got none of the component parts definitive of ‘knowing’, ‘truth-making’, ‘meaning-making’, etc.
But let me just take you response at face value. You agree with me that “necessary truths get their necessity from the realities they maps/track.” Fine. So, doesn’t it follow that if there are necessary truths, there must be some necessary realities that these truths map/track? If so, then there must be at least ONE necessarily existing thing. But you deny that there are any necessarily existing things. You argue that absolute nothings is a genuine possibility. So by your own concession here, I think you have to agree that were absolutely nothing to exist, there would be no truths. And if that is possible, then all truths, on your view, must be contingent truths.
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TRUTH: THE MEANING WHICH MINDS ASCRIBE TO THEIR EXPERIENCE OF THE WORLD
T: That’s my point. WHATEVER truth is, whatever propositions are, apart from some reasoning mind doing the ‘proposing’, propositions wouldn’t obtain “out there,” and they certainly wouldn’t obtain in a supposed “absolute nothingness.”
Z: I don't see the connection. Correct me if I'm wrong, but what I'm reading is: "Truths are in some sense real, therefore they rely on minds for this reality." The argument is missing a premise, namely the one that says in essence: "real things rely on minds for their reality."
T: No, that’s not what I’m saying. I’m saying that the TRUTH about real things relies on minds. ‘Truth’ (whether via de dicto or de re knowing) is the sense or meaning which minds ascribe to the world. I’ll grant for the sake of argument that there may be a WORLD apart from all minds, but there can be no MEANING grounded in, ascribed to, or derived from that world apart from minds.
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TRUTH IN THE ABSENCE OF MINDS?
Z: Don't the vast majority of us assume that "There is furniture in my house" is true even when we are not in the house to experience it or even at those moments when we are not even thinking about it?
T: Very carefully examine what’s going on here. If there were no minds at all in the universe but there was some non-sentient thing that existed, then a STATE OF AFFAIRS would obtain, namely, the state of affairs we call ‘there being that one thing’. But there would be no propositions describing this thing, no meaning-making going on in the world, no correspondence of truth or language or apprehension or experience of this state of affairs. Nothing would be true OR false about this thing since truth and falsity describe the correspondence between assertions/propositions made and the world to which those props would or would not correspond or some experience of this thing.
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ABSTRACT EXISTENCE
Z: I guess the question is "WHY assert that propositions depend on minds for their 'abstract existence?' Why not say that they abstractly exist/obtain insofar as they correspond to reality?
T: Because if you don’t posit minds but you do distinguish between abstract concepts (on the one hand) and reality (to which props and other abstract concepts correspond, on the other) then props and abstract entities are utterly unaccounted for ontologically. They’re true or false (by your account), but they don’t really exist (by your account). They’re not really real (by your account) yet they are the bearers of truth depending upon whether they correspond to reality. I can’t make heads or tails of what you’re describing, Zach. Abstract entities (props and concepts) that exist apart from any mind? What does the abstracting? By definition an abstraction is a concept formed by withdrawing (analogically) step by step from some concrete reality. We abstract "out of" or "from" this or that reality to envision or picture some aspect of reality in non-concrete terms. Dude, abstractions are the work of minds.
Z: Isn't that the gist of the correspondence theory - that it's the actual correspondence that makes for truth and not just someone's awareness of the correspondence?
T: Correspondence between WHAT AND WHAT? Correspondence theorist (to my knowledge) all say truth is the correspondence between ‘assertions’ (truth-claims) and the world of reality. You want to deny that this correspondence requires ‘assertions’ (for assertions are only made by ‘minds’). So I don’t at all understand what you think of the correspondence relation even is. Just what is corresponding to the world?
Z: Do you rule out by definition the possibility of unknown truths?
T: Truth that obtains in the absence of any mind? Yes, I’d deny this. Truth (via either de dicto or de re modalities) can’t exist apart from sentience. You and I (as finite knowers) may fail to perceive the world rightly and so mis-construe our view of things and speak falsley. But what WE fail to perceive rightly, God (the perfect knower) does perceive. So for theists who believe God knows all things, nothing escapes apprehension. All reality is perceived and so all truth is known by God. So there are no absolutely unknown truths in my book. All truth is known by SOME knower, even if only God.
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ABSOLUTELY NOTHING, A GENUINE POSSIBILITY?
Z: Can we move on to agree that God's existence is not necessary from our point of view as beings who can conceive of void worlds?
T: If you can conceive of absolute nothing as a genuine possibility, then it follows that God’s existence is not necessary in your view. I’ll grant that philosophers disagree about whether absolute nothingness is genuinely possible. However, I don’t know of any Christian (or Jewish or Muslim) theist/philosopher who thinks absolute nothingness is a genuine possibility. All agree that God exists in all possible worlds; i.e., God exists necessarily. I think Hartshorne argued why this is so pretty consistently. Talk of absolute nothingness they way you and I are doing here doesn’t itself establish the genuine possibility of such a thing. Just because we can express it in a sentence doesn’t really prove anything about the metaphysics of what we’re talking about. We can say “God could decide to love evil and hate goodness” or “God could decide to commit suicide,” but this isn’t a demonstration of the truth of these assertions.
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TRUTH FROM THE INSIDE
Z: But we can hold propositions up to the void world (from the outside so to speak), and we can see that those proposition do have truth value.
T: They only have truth value in our world though they are ‘about’ absolute nothingness. But no such truths would obtain were there absolutely nothing.
Z: Well that's why I said "from the outside."
T: Great. How about from “from the inside” then? Were there absolutely nothing, would there be any truths? If yes, then how? By what means of correspondence? What realities would serve as truth grounds? But if not, THEN you have no truths, and that means you’re denying all necessary truth, for you’re positing the genuine possibility of no truths.
This is my whole issue with you: You say there are necessary truths, truths that could not possibly be false, but you believe absolute nothingness is a genuine possibility and you now seem to agree that were nothing to exist at all, nothing would be true “from the inside” of that nothingness, and that means no necessary truths. Which is it?
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WHAT IS ABSOLUTE NOTHINGNESS?
Z: Well let's be charitable. I defined existence in such a way as to exclude abstractions, then you defined existence is a way that included abstractions.
T: Let’s try defining “absolute nothingness.” I take it that means no concrete or abstract entities, zip, zilch, nada, nuttin’.
Z: You also accept a distinction between abstract things and concrete material things.
T: Right. But were there absolutely nothing, then there’d be neither concrete nor abstract entities. Would you agree?
Z: I'd like to amend that a little to avoid future confusion. The dichotomy as you state it leaves a gap that spiritual reality (being potentially both non-abstract and non-material). The distinction I'd like to draw is between abstract things and non-abstract things. I called that dividing line 'existence,' but we can call it whatever you like so long as we both understand that it is this line and not some other to which I'm referring.
T: Like I said, tell me whether “absolute nothingness” means no entities or any kind (abstract, concrete, whatever). It’s more important that we agree on what absolute nothingness is. But you seem to think that since abstract entities don't 'exist concretely' they can be said nevertheless to exist in the absence of all concrete entities, but that doesn't follow. Define an abstraction for me and I'll show you a mind at work. Abstractions are the work of some concrete entity, namely, a mind.
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ABSTRACTA
T: Really? Tell me, apart from any observing apprehending mind, what language would “The sky is blue” be expressed in? English? Chinese? What?
Z: None. The concept does not require vocabulary or grammar to be true. The frequency of the light is unaffected by minds.
T: A ‘concept’ that is ‘true’ apart from any language? It holds zero meaning to me. The frequency of light, Zach, is NOT a ‘concept’ anyhow. It’s a natural phenomenon. And realities like light waves or sound waves, as other natural phenomena, can be neither true or false.
It’s a category mistake to call a ‘property’ (like the frequency of light) a ‘concept’ and say the ‘concept’ is out there, true or false, independent of any mind. On the contrary, the ‘concept’ of light and phenomenon of ‘light’ are not the same things. Light is light. A concept is just a concept. And ‘concepts’ are abstract entities. Light isn’t an abstract entity.
Maybe we should say what abstracta are. Abstraction, as I understand it, is a thought process by which ideas are distanced from concrete objects [picked that up somewhere on the web]. Abstracta are the resulting ideas, thoughts, or images envisioned by the mind which capture some aspect of meaning grounded in an experience of the concerete world. How would YOU define abstracta Zach?
Z: First the thing happens, then a mind may or may not perceive of an associated concept, but the thing happening still happens regardless.
T: Again, you’re talking about ‘state of affairs’ or natural phenomena and not the ‘truth’ about those state of affairs. What you want to say, I think, is that light’s frequency is what it is whether or not we perceive or apprehend it. Fine. But don’t say “The sky is blue” is true whether or not any mind apprehends the reality. That’s entirely different. Say, “If the sky is blue, it’s blue whether somebody perceives it or not.” Two different things.
Z: Even if there's no one around to observe the light, it has whatever frequency it has. I understand that there is no truth de dicto, but there is de re truth (which I would call the purest, most truthiest, least defiled by non-truth).
T: Again, the de re modality is a modality of ‘knowing’ and as such requires sentience. It seems to me, Zach, that what you’re trying to say is that actual realities, or states of affairs, are what they are even if nobody apprehends them. I can get with that (never mind the qualifications for now). But saying that some reality is what it is apart from our observance of it (a) has nothing to do with de re modality, and (b) doesn’t entail that the truth about that reality obtains apart from any observant mind.
Sorry for the length!
Tom
KIXYTΘEMTAPost Edited (Tom) : 8/4/2010 5:38:38 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
Megistered Rember
Date Joined Jun 2004
Total Posts : 2013
| Posted 8/16/2010 3:26 PM (GMT -6) | | First your comments (taking them all at once):
It is my position that there are no necessary truths except trivial, definitional truths. For example: "All husbands are married." It doesn't matter if there was, are, or will ever be any husbands - it is true in all conceivable worlds, definitionally. I don't know how this works with a correspondence theory of truth. But I think most of us believe the statement is true, not because we have polled all husbands from eternity past and found the claim to correspond with reality, but because we know what the word 'husband' means. Apart from such trivial, definitional necessary truths and breaks with LNC, what can we honestly say is inconceivable?
Absolute Nothingness
I understand you, and I think you understand me. The question is: what is the point? We are the ones doing the conceiving of these conceivable worlds. And we can say of a void world that it lacks all (real not abstract) things. The void world is a conceivable world. Sure, not to it's inhabitants, but since when is that the issue? If necessary truth is that truth which is true in all conceivable worlds, and you insist that nothing is true in the void world, then your list of necessary truths is much shorter than mine.
Status of Truth
"But the point remains that truth is known or apprehended in one of two modalities (de re or de dicto), neither of which can be said to establish truth were absolutely nothing to exist."
But something DOES exist. When we conceive of these conceivable worlds, we are not required to transport ourselves to them and inhabit them. They are not even required to be inhabitable. And if such a requirement does exist, then we need to redefine what we mean by necessity.
Something does exist. And we, having conceived of the possible state of nothingness, can make true statements about this conceivable world. That is what is required to address the idea of necessity. To require that we take up the point of view of the inhabitants of the worlds we conceive of is to add requirements ad hoc. It is to rewrite the definition of 'necessity' after the fact. Instead of conceivable worlds, your use of necessity deals with worlds conceivable to their possible inhabitants. If the latter is to be used, then we need to specify that in the definition of necessity. As I seen it every time, the former is used. Appeals to the latter are (in my experience) always made after the fact.
Truth as Map/language
"T: So languages float around independent of minds? The English, French and Chinese languages existed before the English, French and Chinese people existed, indeed, before any human beings existed?"
No, languages are abstractions. They don't have 'ontological' existence at all, even now. If they have any existence, it is only your 'abstract existence.' Every heretofore unconceived and unused language could be said to have this 'abstract existence.'
"That’s to misunderstand the de re modality, to forget that it is a modality of knowing. I take a ‘proposition’ to be (roughly speaking) a “unit of meaning” or an “assertion of fact.” It’s roughly equal to ‘meaning’. And you don’t have any of that apart from minds. Minds are the only meaning-makers around."
Fine, but you know what I'm talking about. It seems to me you are making your dichotomies in such a way as to rule out what I'm talking about. There are 'ontologically' existing things (seems redundant to me and Mr. Webster) and there are abstractly existing things (seems oxymoronic to me and Mr. Webster) which require minds. But I'm talking about abstractly existing things (to use your concepts) that do not require minds. I think I've made that pretty clear. And you only avoid talking about them. I'm talking about propositions that are true but not necessarily expressed or thought by anyone. That's not some wild, too-crazy-to-entertain idea. It's no more crazy than saying there are bugs we haven't seen or stars we haven't discovered. So 'de re' isn't technically the way to put it... you still get what I'm talking about, don't you?
Take for instance the ideas no one has yet had. You can define 'truth' in such a way as to deny it any bearing on such ideas. But that's just to avoid addressing the issue. Such ideas do have truth value (they already abstractly exist) - we just don't know what it is. There is a category of propositions to which truth-value does apply but to which the inhabitants of this world cannot apply it. The ignorance of the inhabitants of a world has no bearing on the 'existence' of truths concerning that world. If such unentertained-yet-abstractly-existing propositions stretches your terminology to breaking, then feel free to label the concept however you'd like. But it's the concept itself and not the semantic dodging that I'm interested in.
Truth entails concreta 1
"Listen to what you’re saying, Zach. You want to say that “All bachelors are unmarried” is one of the propositions recorded as true with respect to nothingness. What is it about nothingness that makes this proposition true? That’s the point. Truths logically entail the reality/existence of their grounds. What reality would ground any truth were nothing to exist?"
"All bachelors are unmarried" requires no referent. It addresses no concreta even in our world. It addresses an idea. If you want to say Tom or Zach is unmarried then you've got your concreta. But bachelor is defined as that which is unmarried independent of any actual bachelor. I can make true claims about the philosopher's stone too despite a lack of concreta. I can make true claims about the next world series despite it's nonexistence. We are here dealing with truth claims about abstractions. These are the only kind that can said to have necessity. Necessity = definionality. Associate necessity with 'concrete' truth and I'll just conceive of it's negation.
Truth entails concreta 2
"Who and what are the map-makers, Zach?"
Who cares? It's not at issue. The issue is conceived-of worlds, not the conceptions of those within them. There are perhaps undiscovered planets that have no thinking inhabitants - no map-makers, yet these planet are still conceivable despite there being no one actually conceiving of them, they are mappable despite there being no one around to do the mapping.
"But let me just take you response at face value. You agree with me that “necessary truths get their necessity from the realities they maps/track.” Fine. So, doesn’t it follow that if there are necessary truths, there must be some necessary realities that these truths map/track? If so, then there must be at least ONE necessarily existing thing. But you deny that there are any necessarily existing things. You argue that absolute nothings is a genuine possibility. So by your own concession here, I think you have to agree that were absolutely nothing to exist, there would be no truths. And if that is possible, then all truths, on your view, must be contingent truths."
One step at a time. "Necessary truths get their necessity comes from the realities they map." It follows that if there are necessary truths, there must be some necessary realities to map. Fine so far. But then you slide from "realities" to "existing things." The conceived-of void world has reality, but it does not have things. It's hypothetical reality is not dependent on it's thinghavingness.
Also, I apologize for not making this clear. We must be charitable and understand each other when we say "Necessary truths get their necessity from the realities they map." It goes without saying, does it not, that there is more than this. There are 'unreal' conceived of worlds to take into account when dealing with necessity.
Truth: the meaning...
"‘Truth’ (whether via de dicto or de re knowing) is the sense or meaning which minds ascribe to the world."
If you define truths as a function of minds, then of course you are right. You talked about propositions MADE. I'm just talking about propositions - the truth of which does not depend on being made. But just like the undiscovered planet - we can make claims and then later, after discovering it, we can test those claims to see if they we true ALL ALONG. The truth-value 'existed' all along even before we were aware of it. Again if this doesn't jive with your terminology, you are better suited than I to say what terminology it does jive with. But I do insist that it does make sense in one way or another to speak of 'truths' that are not yet conceived of.
Abstract Existence
"Because if you don’t posit minds but you do distinguish between abstract concepts (on the one hand) and reality (to which props and other abstract concepts correspond, on the other) then props and abstract entities are utterly unaccounted for ontologically. They’re true or false (by your account), but they don’t really exist (by your account). They’re not really real (by your account) yet they are the bearers of truth depending upon whether they correspond to reality. I can’t make heads or tails of what you’re describing, Zach. Abstract entities (props and concepts) that exist apart from any mind? What does the abstracting? By definition an abstraction is a concept formed by withdrawing (analogically) step by step from some concrete reality. We abstract "out of" or "from" this or that reality to envision or picture some aspect of reality in non-concrete terms. Dude, abstractions are the work of minds."
I think you are jumbling distinct categories. Truth value of a proposition does not imply the proposition's existence. The bearers themselves unreal correspond to reality. What's wrong with that? They are abstractions after all - definitionally non-existent and unreal. Actual thoughts might be said to be real or existing if we equate thought to electrical pulses in the brain. But that's physical stuff. Even then, the propositions are unreal. Even once we say that proposition X is conceived of by real people, still the proposition remains fully unreal. The "conceiving-of" processes can be said to be real in terms of brain chemistry and synapses, the effect such conceiving has on our physical brain is real, but the proposition itself remains fully abstract and unreal. Otherwise what does real mean? You can talk about abstractly real things (and squarely circular things for that matter), but I think such categories do violence to rational thought by breaking the one cardinal rule: LNC. Propositions can't be said to exist non-existently or non-ontologically or abstractly. And even if they can, how is appropriate to arbitrarily limit those things that are abstractly real further to those things that are abstractly real and also actually thought about?
I can bend the meaning of 'exist' for the sake of argument, so that it's easy to label the categories, but I think you've got to admit that there is a third category. Not only do we have your "ontologically real" and "abstract-and-actively-thought-about real," but there is also the "abstract-and-NOT-actively-thought-about real."
Absolute Nothing: A Genuine Possibility
"If you can conceive of absolute nothing as a genuine possibility, then it follows that God’s existence is not necessary in your view. I’ll grant that philosophers disagree about whether absolute nothingness is genuinely possible. However, I don’t know of any Christian (or Jewish or Muslim) theist/philosopher who thinks absolute nothingness is a genuine possibility."
Sure you do. You're reading him right now. What I say here in no way makes me non-Christan or non-Theist. Hume's denial (which I am only echoing) of the ontological proof did not rely at all on his non-Christianness or his atheism. It relies only on our ability to conceive of things differently. Pick any thing - it can be conceived of as not existing while leaving LNC intact. The only inconceivable 'things' are abstractions such as non-X X's, or married bachelors. The only way to break LNC is to have a definition breakdown, and thus it is only these abstract definitions which can stand up to necessity. Nothing 'ontologically' real is necessary.
"Talk of absolute nothingness they way you and I are doing here doesn’t itself establish the genuine possibility of such a thing. Just because we can express it in a sentence doesn’t really prove anything about the metaphysics of what we’re talking about. We can say “God could decide to love evil and hate goodness” or “God could decide to commit suicide,” but this isn’t a demonstration of the truth of these assertions."
Sure, but that's not what's going on here. I'm not arguing for the position that the void world might obtain in the future (and I'm not ruling it out either). That's entirely beside the point. I'm arguing that the void world is itself a conceivable world - not merely conceivable as an extension of our own world. If we are talking about conceivable extensions of our world then we are firmly within the realm of contingency or maybe relative necessity or something. If you say "Given what we know about this world (or it's God), we can say that there can be no future that does not..." Then you aren't talking about necessity. For necessity the only given we can bring is conceivability which (I thought we all agreed) boils down to LNC. The void world does not break LNC, thus it is conceivable, thus only truths about the void world stand as candidates for necessary truth. Even if you say that there are no truths in the void world, that still does not amount to breaking LNC. LNC still holds for the void world since there would be to truths to contradict.
Truth from the Inside:
"Great. How about from “from the inside” then?"
How about not? "From the inside" has nothing to do with necessity. I agree with what you've got to say about "from the inside" except for the idea that it's pertinent to this discussion. The question of necessity is NOT: is it true to a thinker living within all conceivable worlds. The question is: is it true OF all conceivable worlds or GIVEN any conceivable world. If you want to bring into discussion the thinkers within the worlds then you've got to have a much more elaborate definition of 'necessity' than we have.
"This is my whole issue with you: You say there are necessary truths, truths that could not possibly be false, but you believe absolute nothingness is a genuine possibility and you now seem to agree that were nothing to exist at all, nothing would be true “from the inside” of that nothingness, and that means no necessary truths. Which is it?"
No. I say that nothing would be true FROM THE POINT OF VIEW of the inside inhabitants, precisely because no such point of view exists. Recall that while entertaining discussion of "from the inside" I made it clear that this is all built upon a non sequitur: the point of view of non-existent thinkers.
Abstracta:
"A ‘concept’ that is ‘true’ apart from any language? It holds zero meaning to me. The frequency of light, Zach, is NOT a ‘concept’ anyhow. It’s a natural phenomenon. And realities like light waves or sound waves, as other natural phenomena, can be neither true or false."
Fine, but the concept "This light is blue" is true or false. It's truth value depends on natural phenomena and NOT the existence of thinkers. It would be true that the sky is blue even if no one realized it. It was true that there were eight planets in the solar system even before we discovered them, even before humans existed, even before we kicked out Pluto. The abstract proposition was true - our existence, our capacity to observe, and our language changed - but the abstract proposition was entirely unaffected by any of this. No thinker "created" the proposition that the sky is blue or that there are eight planets. They just stumbled upon these already true propositions. Thinkers my have created the corresponding brain chemistry and synapses, but the fully abstract proposition has truth value independent of such things.
No reread the paragraph and replace "proposition" with whatever terminology you think is appropriate. The concept I've labeled "proposition" is not crazy or unthinkable. Give it whatever name you like.
"It’s a category mistake to call a ‘property’ (like the frequency of light) a ‘concept’ and say the ‘concept’ is out there, true or false, independent of any mind."
I agree fully. I didn't do that. By "the concept" I was referring to the concept to which "the sky is blue" refers - not the property of 'blueness' itself.
"Abstracta are the resulting ideas, thoughts, or images envisioned by the mind which capture some aspect of meaning grounded in an experience of the concerete world. How would YOU define abstracta Zach?"
The same way as you without the words "by the mind" and "an experience of." Whether or not a mind happens to experience them does not determine their abstractness. They are abstract either way.
"Again, you’re talking about ‘state of affairs’ or natural phenomena and not the ‘truth’ about those state of affairs. What you want to say, I think, is that light’s frequency is what it is whether or not we perceive or apprehend it. Fine. But don’t say “The sky is blue” is true whether or not any mind apprehends the reality. That’s entirely different. Say, “If the sky is blue, it’s blue whether somebody perceives it or not.” Two different things."
You are right. I do say light's frequency is what it is whether or not we perceive or apprehend it. But that's not all that I'm saying. In addition to this I also say that the truth about this light's frequency is what it is whether or not we perceive or apprehend it. You conflate truth-value and apprehension - you make apprehension a prerequisite for truth. I don't. A proposition is true or false apart from any thinkers. Even without God thinking it, it was true that the world was round before any other thinkers realized it.
"Again, the de re modality is a modality of ‘knowing’ and as such requires sentience. It seems to me, Zach, that what you’re trying to say is that actual realities, or states of affairs, are what they are even if nobody apprehends them. I can get with that (never mind the qualifications for now). But saying that some reality is what it is apart from our observance of it (a) has nothing to do with de re modality, and (b) doesn’t entail that the truth about that reality obtains apart from any observant mind."
I apologize for misusing the terms. I contend that truth precedes knowing. Change must terminology if you must. Instead of 'truth' call it 'guacamole' or whatever. Guacamole - the state of relationships between abstract concepts - precedes anyone becoming aware of the state of those relationships. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 8/16/2010 4:54 PM (GMT -6) | | Zach: You conflate truth-value and apprehension - you make apprehension a prerequisite for truth...
Tom: I take truth to be a property of propositions, yes, and propositions are, to my understanding, truth-claims or assertions made by some mind about the world. But that's not to "conflate" apprehension and truth-value. I clearly distinguish between them.
Zach: ...I don't. A proposition is true or false apart from any thinkers. Even without God...
Tom: I think our differences are irreconcilable. But I got the clarity I was looking for, so thanks on that. We're pretty much opposite on most things--ontology, language, correspondence, truth, propositions, existence, necessity/contingency, and on and on. And in heaven it won't matter...so have a nice day Bro!
Tom
KIXYTΘEMTAPost Edited (Tom) : 8/16/2010 11:32:19 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 8/16/2010 9:25 PM (GMT -6) | | | Z: The void world is a conceivable world. Sure, not to it's inhabitants, but since when is that the issue? If necessary truth is that truth which is true in all conceivable worlds
J: I see some issues here. "Void world" seems like a contradiction in terms. Let's say "absolute nothingness." Now, we can say that we know what we mean by "absolute nothingness." But if there "were" "absolute nothingness," nothing would be conceivable, because there would be no conceivers. That's the difference. Thus, I hear Tom saying necessary truth is truth which is true in all conceivable worlds--not in "absolute nothingness." For a world, by definition, is not "absolute nothingness."
A world, by definition, is some set of beings holding relations to one another. If we were beings in any such world, while those relations were supra-categorical to us, we couldn't apprehend or conceive of them in the first place. If they were counter-categorical to us (like "I wept next week"), we still couldn't apprehend or conceive of them. In either case, it would be true that WE WEREN'T DESIGNED TO APPREHEND THE WORLD WE INHABITED. And when that's the case, there is no grounds for arguing about anything, seeing's how, in that case, we can't even know if there are "others" at all. We can only meaningfully argue when:
1) each debater similarly apprehends the relations and concepts being communicated by language, and
2) each debater agrees to the epistemological axioms/assumptions that are to be taken for granted in the debate.
When either debater finds that one of these is not true, they can either re-group to see if they can re-establish a new agreed upon common ground from which to start anew, or just give up and bid one another peace. All else is futility and, therefore, a pointless waste of time for each debater.
Most of the time when debate is futile, it is because 1) is false BECAUSE 2) is false.
But note that if we aren't libertarianly free, it makes no difference at all. Because then we might debate futilely regardless. But if we're volitional, it makes no rational (i.e., consequential) sense to act futilely.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 8/17/2010 6:32:06 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
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Date Joined Jun 2004
Total Posts : 2013
| Posted 9/29/2010 4:22 AM (GMT -6) | | You guys are changing the rules mid-game. Necessity originally implied obtaining in all possible worlds, but now you want to change it. You want necessity to imply obtaining AND being perceived in all possible worlds. You therefore attempt to nest the concept of 'being perceived' within the concept of 'obtaining' which seems to do violence to the concept of 'obtaining.' It is perfectly conceivable for some X to obtain unperceived, and so the proposition 'X obtains' could be true without being conceived of. You can close your eyes and say no it's not conceivable. But to literally everyone outside of this board who I've discussed it with it is.
Jeff, you are playing a grammatical game. Listen to yourself: "If they were... we still couldn't... it would be true... [and here comes the slight of hand]... when that's the case, there is..." Hypothetical, hypothetical, hypothetical... then an entirely arbitrary switch to actual. It's the same thing Tom does more subtly. When dealing with the concept of necessity, we are dealing with that which is hypothetical.
Finally Jeff, a world is not by definition some set of beings holding relations to one another. It's this sort of arbitrary, out-of-left-field stuff that muddies the waters - not supposed deep epistemological issues. It is helpful, however, to think in terms of set theory.
The empty set (void world) is a subset of every set (i.e. all conceivable worlds). This is basic logic. For you to say that x (God) is an element of any set A (i.e. all conceivable worlds), then the simple counterexample is the empty set. This is why I say that there exists no x such that x an element of all (conceivable) sets. The only thing that is true of all sets is the grammar of set theory itself. There is no element that exists in all sets since it the empty set is a set.
"But wait! The empty set has no self-aware elements! Therefore, it must not be a true set!"
Therefore? No! You've got a minor premise followed by a conclusion. "Therefore" doesn't belong. To say that something is a set is NOT to imply that it has self-aware elements. Likewise, to say that a world is conceivable is NOT to imply that it includes conceivING beings. Both the empty set and the void world are conceivable, namely TO US. And that's all that's required. When we speak of conceivable worlds, we mean conceivable to rational beings such as those who do exist in this world and have they ability to conceive of other worlds.
The major premise is that for a world to be conceivable, it must be conceivable to it's inhabitants. Yet, that's simply not what the word means. Are undiscovered planets inconceivable simply because no one has actually conceived of them? Once they are discovered do they spring into conceivability? With as much humility as I can muster, I submit that you've both confused the concepts 'conceiv-able' and 'conceiv-ed' to the point that you use them interchangeably. Necessity makes use of the former and not the latter. Sure, the void world would be unconceived - but that is entirely beside the point when we are dealing with necessity. Despite being unconceived, it remains conceivableable to us, which is precisely what is at issue with necessity. I think it's overstating things to say that my insistence on distinguishing the two is some kind of unbridgeable epistemological divide.Post Edited (Sahid) : 9/29/2010 4:27:38 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 9/29/2010 10:03 AM (GMT -6) | | | Zach: The empty set (void world) is a subset of every set (i.e. all conceivable worlds). This is basic logic.
Jeff: I don't see how that's true. An empty set is not a "world" as I think of the term. Indeed, there are plenty of sets that aren't "worlds" as I conceive of the term. But for there to be a set, there has to be a conceiver. Can we at least agree with that? I have no idea what it means to speak of "sets" except in terms of particular intellectual states of an intelligent being. For sets seem like abstract ideas of a sort. They are not what I would call true beings.
E.g., I think it is coherent to speak of God thinking about a set of imaginary members without that set or its members actually existing, per se. Maybe thoughts are like line segments and triangles. They are conceivable in such a way that we have to use nouns to communicate our knowledge of them, but maybe they are not "persons, places, or things." E.g., a triangle is like a collection of points. And points are places. But then we have the added difficulty that a triangle doesn't even consist of a finite number of points. And though we have some idea of what we mean by a triangle, no one has ever actually contemplated every point on any given triangle since there is no finite number of them.
As I conceive of it, our conscious experience, at any given time, is an accidental attribute of an intelligent being's more permanent attribute of the capacity to be conscious and/or think. I.e., it is the capacity that is more like the non-accidental attribute. Any particular momentary conscious state is an accidental attribute.
As for my gobbledly-gook language, when I get time, I'll try to see which statements you were talking about and explain what I was getting at more clearly, if possible.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 9/29/2010 10:18:22 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 10/1/2010 9:40 PM (GMT -6) | | | Z: The major premise is that for a world to be conceivable, it must be conceivable to it's inhabitants.
J: Only in the sense that once we go the route of counter-intuitive "worlds" (e.g., one of uncaused events, etc), we are also implying our own modes of inference and seeming apprehension may be bogus, in which case what difference does it make what we can conceive? Conceiving, in that case, may have no implications about what is possible.
E.g., we can conceive of worlds where all apparent memories are not actually memories at all. But can we assume the possibility that we are in such a world and still make sense of how to choose aright? I can't. So what practical difference does that make? The only way debate, etc, has any meaningul relevance to volitional beings is if we can choose aright. That implies we believe something to be true that serves as a normative criteria for choice.
But if we don't believe in the same normative criteria, and we reject the knowability of any grounds that could get us to a common inference as to what IS the true normative criteria, why debate? If such grounds have to be chosen by blind faith (i.e., arbitrarily), then we can have meaningful debate precisely if we choose the same grounds and modes of inference by PURE CHANCE. If we don't, there is no point in getting upset about it, because there never was a non-arbitrary way to go about it in the first place, per the blind faith approach to epistemology.
In short, we either have the same fundamental grounds/modes of inference/etc, or we will be talking past one another. So here's what I think: God is a necessary being in these two senses:
1) God has always existed, having never come into existence.
2) God, as both competent and benevolent, must be intuitively believed to exist to ground the belief that we are designed to apprehend at all. Otherwise, one merely chooses to believe one apprehends. And without an intuitively-known normative criteria for that choice, the choice to believe one does not apprehend is not knowably a worse choice. This means we can't even get off the ground non-arbitrarily. But if literally all belief is arbitrary, literally no belief or action is knowably worse than another.
In short, blind faith and intuition are not the same thing. One is groundless, volitional belief. The other is non-volitional belief.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 10/1/2010 9:52:28 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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