Post Edited (Daniel M) : 12/20/2010 3:08:26 PM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Similitude) : 12/21/2010 8:20:50 AM (GMT-6)

Thanks for the link Daniel. I enjoyed listening.

I guess I’m caught between two critiques (or claims). When the postmodern critiques the Enlightenment by saying, “There is no pure objectivity or rationality that we can access and thereby gain a perspective on the world that is free from the conditions of our own subjectivities (and histories, and traditions, stories, etc.),” I don’t disagree. It seems obvious to me that none of us can step outside her own subjective perspectives and history and traditions. If claiming that we can have unrestricted access to pure reason is essential to modernity, then I’m not a modern.

But what are the options? And it’s here I wonder if postmoderns go too far in the other direction and make basically the same mistake (i.e., absolutize one or several ‘conditions’ under which we live and so make too strong a case for themselves). It seems to me that just as it is clear that we all “live in a story [we tell ourselves]” it is equally clear that all stories assume certain things to be true, aim at certain satisfactions, abide by certain constraints, and propagate themselves by similar or identical rules. Even Jaime in his lecture said he didn’t think anything he had said about our each living in a particular story “precluded dialogue.” “We can,” he says, “understand one another’s story.”

But it’s THIS feature, Daniel—the communicability of particulars—that I and Asher and Jeff keep pointing to, not as modernists who claim to have stepped outside their subjective skin and accessed pure reason, but as observant story tellers. What accounts for THIS feature? I don’t see that you (or postmoderns, or Jaime) are addressing it. Postmoderns seem SO beholden to their own narrative (that we all live in our own story, and that communities of us create our own stories to manage our lives together) that they may be missing SOME of the virtue of the modernist story. As abusive and mistaken and despised a story as modernism might have been, it seems that SOMETHING relative to its claims yet abides, like vestigia, even within postmodernism IF it’s the case that all our particular stories are bound together by commonalities and are thus communicable. HOW is meaningful dialogue between stories possible if all stories are not part of a larger story that grounds the communicability of particulars between diverging and competing stories? I reason that if this communication takes place, then we are all (indeed the entire cosmos included, since it also behaves rationally and teleologically) living within a larger, single story, a metanarrative if you will (though I'm not at the moment laying claim to identifying my personal narrative with this metanarrative). Is it “modernist” of me to reason this way? I don’t think so.

Tom

Post Edited (Tom) : 12/22/2010 11:23:47 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Similitude) : 12/22/2010 11:52:39 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Similitude) : 12/22/2010 1:07:08 PM (GMT-6)

What up Brandon? Can you see if you can get Canada to stop sending us Minnesotans their excess cold and snow?

Brandon: I don't understand why the particulars have to be a part of a larger metanarrative in order to have meaningful communication.

Tom: Asher, Jeff, and I are just saying that communication can only occur because there is SOME shared context, either assumed a priori truths or intuitions or whatever. As competitive as our stories are, the fact is we DO all communicate them with each other. HOW’S that possible if all these stories are not also part of a larger meaning or narrative (even if it’s just something as simple as the laws of logic that make meaning possible, or teleology, or categories of right/wrong, justice/injustice, etc.)? I think Jeff, Asher and I want to say that some of these categories are pre-linguistic, perhaps they lie within the image of God, even if they eventually get expressed and conditioned through language and context.

Brandon: I really don't even understand why we have to communicate. I think that’s Jamie’s point. I think he or one of his other peeps spoke about this…

Tom: You mean they “communicated” something about it? I can’t believe Jaime doesn’t think we can, do, and must in fact communicate. How many books and articles has he published? How many languages has he learned (at least German and French besides Enlish, right?). Not communicate?

Brandon: There are differing communities and particularities. All are necessarily tribal. All are necessarily proclamatory. I think this was one of Jamie's problems with Grenz's use of metanarrative. Why must one have to have a metanarrative at all in the sense that I think you are using it Tom.

Tom: Yeah. First, I didn't mean to suggest that one has to believe one's own individual story is THE all-inclusive metanarrative in order to communicate. What I'm suggesting is that the reality of universal communication among all these stories assumes SOME underlying story (some set of categorical laws or givens that make such communication possible and that ground all the universal aspects of our stories), otherwise one has to assume that all the similarities behind human experience are mere coincidental. But secondly, what does it mean to proclaim one’s own narrative universally (and we Christians do proclaim our story universally) if not to claim that its truth is efficacious universally, i.e., universally true? This is what I don’t see postmodern Christians showing us. Assuming they have any sense of mission at all, then a) explain to me what assumptions motivate them to proclaim their narrative universally at all—ever—and then b) explain to me how proclamation/communication is universally possible apart from some universally shared category (of truths or intuitions).

Brandon: Each community and particular is its own metanarrative not that there is one that encompasses all metanarratives.

Tom: Then there’s no omniscient God. For surely God’s knowledge of the universe at any given point in time constitutes a metanarrative which encompasses all our narratives.

Brandon: A metanarrative that encompasses all so that we can have genuine meaningful dialogue?

Tom: Oh, I didn’t mean to suggest a full-blown metanarrative. My bad. A metanarrative would be a more complex set of beliefs or even a worldview. I only meant that we can discursively reason our way from within the shared givens of our irreducibly subjective stories/narratives what is categorically the same about them all (if even assumed), and that this is a KIND of objectivity (it’s at least inclusive of all known stories). What can be gleaned may not be a full-blown narrative; it may be just a handful of a priori truths, but let’s at least admit that much and ask what this tells us. But postmoderns it seems will allow nothing, no categorical truth, that underlies and makes possible our own individual stories.

I appreciate how oppressive modernism was and is. But there are plenty of modernist philosophers (i.e., analytic philosophers who reasoned discursively from a priori truth) who were VERY open-minded, tolerant, and pluralist. Charles Hartshorne comes to mind. So I’m suspicious of condemning a piori truth because others who believe in such truth acted violently.

Brandon: It seems to me the ghost of modernism (something that has to ground the communicability of all metanarratives) is hiding in your question Tommy and it is this ghost that must legitmate itself against all the other stories.

Tom: Oh, it’s not hiding. I admitted to it being there. I want it there. I don’t mind it. Like I said, I’m not prepared to flush everything ever believed by Enlightenment moderns down the tube for all the oppressive things done since the Enlightenment. I do think there are a priori truths. I do think the image of God expresses itself categorically in all our stories. And I do think Christian ‘mission’ (‘vocation’ is fine if ‘mission’ is to offensive) and proclamation means nothing if it doesn’t mean we’re inviting people in other stories to come live in our story. Now, if postmoderns admit to such an invitation but don’t want to call the Christian story we invite other to join us in a “metanarrative,” then I might say they’re splitting hairs, because what does proclaiming a story to others ‘universally’ mean if I don’t believe the story is ‘meta-’ in the sense of all-inclusive (in its offer, in its efficaciousness, in its salvation, etc.) by virtue of having its origins in God.

Brandon: What is problematic (with Lyotard) and postmodern theorists is that each metanarrative has to prove its claims or its stories via rationalistic thought and science (its not as if science is pure objectivity or isn’t a story itself which isn’t all encompassing, like Jamie says, “is there a bigger story than “On Origin of the Species?) Why can't they simply proclaim?

Tom: Let’s just proclaim. That’s cool. Let’s say I just proclaim the gospel and then sit down. Others who HEAR this proclamation then do what? They hear it. They think about it. Some are “convinced” by it and come to faith. But then let's ask, How do they become convinced? By what mechanisms within the human heart and mind does the proclamation engage existing narratives and overcome them to establish itself within peoples’ hearts volitionally? I say it only happens if what’s proclaimed is JUSTIFIED to the mind and heart of those who hear it. That’s how and why we THEN choose to accept it. Now, I wouldn’t say this happens by means of PURE reason and science. Why should I have to reduce myself to that? As you know I think aesthetics is as or more powerful a categorical argument for God’s existence than anything else. And I’ve met Muslims who came to faith through visions or dreams, some through miraculous healing—anything but pure reason and science. But not postmodernism either. I guess that makes me other than a modern. But I don’t at all see myself as postmodern either.

Brandon: And this is my issue. Each one has a right to sit at the public round table and proclaim. And I say this from within my specifically CHRISTIAN (how can a Christian allow for other stories to exist)?

Tom: Dude, maybe I’ve been out of the loop for a while, but this is utterly surprising. Of course everybody has a right to sit at the public table and proclaim. (I’ll not challenge the universal a priori nature of this claim of yours which is, strictly speaking, more modern than postmodern, but never mind that.) One doesn’t have to be a postmodern to agree with this. And who thinks other stories don’t exist? Of course other stories exist. And of course all stories are a mixture of truth and fiction. Do postmoderns think moderns don’t believe other stories exist or that non-postmodern Christians think non-Christians don’t have a right to proclaim their own stories? That’s amazing.

Brandon: So for me, the question is not so much, “Are we going to have good communication?” but rather, “How do we live and let live?”

Tom: That’s not my question. For anybody proclaiming any story they believe in, the question has to be how to best communicate/proclaim their story. I mean, one doesn’t proclaim a story universally who does not believe the story ought to be believed universally and so ultimately become the only story in town. That doesn't sound so postmodern to me. Of course we want people of various stories to live together peacefully, but that won’t happen where good communication is lacking either. So we don’t have to choose between communicating and living together. But my end goal isn’t people living in competing stories living together peacefully. That’s not the Christian mission.

I started out by just asking if postmodernism conceded ANY a priori truths. I remember Daniel telling me that he thought the ‘category’ of a priori truth was a priori but that there are no ‘truths’ that are true a priori. I don’t know how to keep track of the debate anymore. It makes no sense to me to say the “category” or “class” of a priori truth is universal but that no particular truths are true a priori; i.e., what’s true a priori changes from tribe to tribe. That’s just to deny that there are any a priori truths.

Brandon: By the way, when I say, that they each have a right to proclaim I'm saying, that they each have a right to say, "I'm right and your wrong." Where is the communicability in that?

Tom: The communicability is inherent in the disagreement over particulars? If I say, “You’re wrong” I’m saying, “I understand your story.”

Tom

Post Edited (Tom) : 12/22/2010 4:19:45 PM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (BBBCanada) : 12/22/2010 3:03:43 PM (GMT-6)

Tom: HOW is meaningful dialogue between stories possible if all stories are not part of a larger story that grounds the communicability of particulars between diverging and competing stories? I reason that if this communication takes place, then we are all (indeed the entire cosmos included, since it also behaves rationally and teleologically) living within a larger, single story, a metanarrative if you will (though I'm not at the moment laying claim to identifying my personal narrative with this metanarrative). Is it “modernist” of me to reason this way? I don’t think so.

Daniel: No, but it’s “modernist” if you assume that no other narrative has such answers.

Tom: Can you clarify that for me, Daniel? I’m perfectly happy to acknowledge God at work in all cultures. I believe vestigia of God’s narrative (his truth and intentions for us, the only metanarrative possible) are likely to surface in many if not all narratives. Christianity, Islam and Judaism and other narratives share many perspectives on things. And D has done a lot to show us how Eastern faiths (Hindu and Buddhist schools of thought) articulate perspectives consistent with claims essential to the Christian story. That's all cool. But what do we do when other narratives make claims that run contradictory to the Christian story?

What I can’t do is proclaim X (say, my experience of God’s story) while believing that X is rightly described as false by those of other narratives to whom I share my story. I reason that if God’s an infallible knower, and his presence and intentions for us find themselves into all our stories on some level, and since all our stories are part of his overarching story, truth isn’t going to be self-contradictory. But is even THIS bit of reasoning on my part a modernist’s last dying gasp? I mean, what is it in me that tells me that reality and truth are not ultimately contradictory? Is that really JUST a piece of modernity broken off and floating in my eye? Or is it the image of a reasoning and self-consistent God within me? I think the latter.

Daniel: In other words, it’s “modernist” of you to assume that other narratives should be interpreted, or compared to your belief set by your own answers to the questions, or the structure of reason that you employ.

Tom: Then I guess I’m a modernist, because I can’t concede that certain categorical truths I hold to are only true SOME of the time. I think there are some a priori truths, and that means all stories get read for consistency in terms of those truths.

But thanks Bro! That’s what I was looking for. I wanted to know if postmodernists could hold to any a priori truths. The answer seems to be no.

Tom

Post Edited (Tom) : 12/22/2010 5:21:12 PM (GMT-6)

Asher: I am not saying that my particular belief set is the ultimate meta-narrative. I am saying however that there is a DEFINITE meta-narrative...

Tom: Yep. Daniel, can you or postmodernists say that much?

I’m thinking postmodernists wouldn’t consciously concede this. But don’t you implicitly concede it when you say that it’s “modernist [of me] if [I] assume that no other narrative has such answers”? It seems implicit in your comment that there is an ultimate meta-narrative that accounts for truth being shared across narratives. Otherwise, what would it mean to criticize or warn one for thinking that answers he had found in terms of his own contextual constraints could not also be found by others in terms of their own contexts? The very warning only gets off the ground if an understanding of truth as universal is assumed.

Of course, the question of whether Christians are willing to live with the fact that God’s truth may be found in non-Christian worldviews is a separate question in my mind. I’d have greater problems with the supposition that NO truth is found outside the Christian story. That would tilt my pinball machine. I’m much more inclined to believe that since God equally loves and pursues us all, and since his image is equally stamped in us all (i.e., given MY narrative), that this image is going to motivate us all in ways that God can then work with variously in our various contexts. So given their narrative (rightly understood), Christians ought to expect elements of their own narrative to crop up and surface in all other narratives. But that would seem to CONFIRM the Christian’s belief in an divine meta-narrative in/under/through/with us all.

Tom