Daniel,

Excellent way to put this under the microscope. Thanks so much! And so Christmasy too (given the birth of God)!

There are probably many Christians who would agree with you and say the incarnation is a genuine violation of LNC. Jesus is divine and not divine in precisely the same manner; that is, Christ is A and ~A in the sense LNC forbids.

Of course, I don’t agree that this is the case, and I don’t think that many Christians would continue to agree that it is a violation of LNC once they properly define things. In the end, LNC means that IF TRUE, the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation are intelligible because reality is intelligible (non-contradictory and one).

The question (for both postmodernists and non-postmodernist believers) is What’s it mean to claim intelligibility for some belief X? Does it mean explaining X without remainder? If so, then partial explanations violate LNC. Not only that, but if I have to explicate the reality behind a truth-claim (i.e., explicate its truth grounds) without remainder, then not even plausibilities will save LNC. I have to demonstrate how the nature of reality grounding a particular truth-claim is in fact the case. Showing how it CAN in fact be the case (i.e., plausible explanations) won’t do. I have to reveal the entirety of the truth, nothing but the truth, so help me God.

I submit that this is not a smart thing to LCN to do. The Eastern tradition at least has dealt with this explicitly. The via negativa (qualifying all positive claims about God with corresponding negatives and visa versa), Pseudo-Dionysisus argues, does not mean positing both A and ~A in the case of God:

“What has actually to be said about the Cause of all things is this: Since it is the Cause of all beings, we should posit and ascribe to it all the affirmations we make in regard to beings, and, more appropriately, we should negate all these affirmations, since it surpasses all being. Now we should not conclude that the negations are simply the opposites of the affirmations, but rather that the cause of all is considerably prior to this, beyond privations, beyond every denial, beyond every affirmation.”

It might look at first (with his “we should posit and ascribe all the affirmation we make in regard to things AND…we should negate all these affirmation”) that he’s saying we’ve got to give up LNC with regard to all our talk about God (not JUST the incarnation by the way, but EVERY claim about uncreated reality). But he immediately lets us know this is NOT what he means. He means to qualify himself by reminding us that our God-talk, however true a map, never exhausts the reality. No map does. There will always be more to God than our language can capture, and even where it captures the truth about God, the language isn’t ITSELF the reality it seeks to describe. Propositional truth is the flimsiest KIND of apprehension of things. All LNC means is that where truth claims contradict, the contradiction cannot have accurately mapped reality as it is. You would disagree. You would say contradictory claims each express what is in reality the case.

Daniel: I’m not arguing that Jesus wasn’t fully human or fully God.

Tom: Not exactly. If you’re saying the incarnation is an instance of the failure of LCN, then you’re saying:

“Jesus isn’t God” is true AND “Jesus is God” is also true. And this amounts to a violation of LNC because Jesus is the same person in both instances and “is God” ascribes the same divinity in the same manner to Jesus.

Just so that we’re clear. If you think the Incarnation violates LNC, you believe “Jesus is not divine” is true.

Daniel: I think they are necessary for the Christian narrative to be intelligible (ha ha, see what I did there?). However, the LNC forces us to understand it as a contradiction, thus not intelligible. It’s usually articulated as a “mystery” and, you know what? I'm fine with that.

Tom: I’ve never equated “mystery” with a failure of LNC. I equate mystery with the finitude of human being in much the same way I find quantum mechanics “mysterious” without supposing reality is actually self-contradictory. In other words, “mystery” is about epistemology and not ontology. How many different interpretation of QM are there? I catalogued 16 at one point—sixteen different narratives on what reality is really doing at the quantum level? No two interpretations were compossible. They all made contrary and/or contradictory claims. What LNC means is that ‘truth be told’, there is a single, non-contradictory explanation of what’s going on. It might be that one of the sixteen are correct and fifteen are wrong. It might be that all sixteen are wrong and we’ve yet to discover the truth. But what it doesn’t mean is that reality itself (as God knows it to be) is self-contradictory.

Daniel: If the foundation of our belief (God incarnate) cannot be rendered intelligible by the LNC, then WHY is the LNC held as the foundation of intelligibility?

Tom: But it can be rendered intelligible IF one takes intelligibility to permit plausibility in the face of human finitude. If we’re free to produce an explanation or a diversity of explanations (and we can in the case of the Trinity and Incarnation) which are not obviously contradictory, then we’re fine. But if, as you suppose, we have to explicate the truth without remainder, then we're in trouble. But why should we have to explicate truth without remainder?

Tom

Post Edited (Tom) : 12/27/2010 12:30:46 PM (GMT-6)

OK.  This is a really good starting point--the use of the Incarnation.  I would have to jump on board with Tommy here.  Cool stuff. 

But it seems that it is precisely at THIS point that I would have problems with (especially) modernism and to a lesser extent postmodernism and I think this is part of Jamie's criticism of modernism. That not only does it submit the Incarnation and the Trinity to something like the structures of rational thought ie., Law of Non-Contradiction, (LNC) and what I said with regard to our every experience being intersubjectively verified before we can accept it but that it does this necessarily so which entails violence towards the Other.  In other words, modernism it seems, by necessity does not allow for mystery, and paradox.  That it says that it will eventually figure it all out.  If modernity allows for pre-rational thought/(supra-rational thought?, which post-modernism does, which is why Jamie said it has "moved in the right direction") then it is possible that other "modes of thought" or structures of rationality could possibly be entertained with regard to other communities.  It seems Tommy, Asher and Jeff, want to say though that pushing God and the supernatural out of the picture or out of an account of reality are not by necessity modernistic.  That that is an abuse of modernism.  I wouldn't agree with that.  I think it is a necessary outcome of the modernist project.

Post Edited (BBBCanada) : 12/26/2010 8:57:57 AM (GMT-6)

Tom: There are probably many Christians who would agree with you and say the incarnation is a genuine violation of LNC. Jesus is divine and not divine in precisely the same manner; that is, Christ is A and ~A in the sense LNC forbids.

Daniel: Which is another way of saying Jesus is God and man in precisely the same manner. Jesus fully contains the being of man, and fully contains the being of God.

Tom: A-ah-ah. You moved the claim from A vs ~A (divine and ~divine) to Jesus being 'God' vs 'human'. Let’s say d = divine and h = human. It’s one thing to say one and the same person cannot (given LNC) be d and ~d at the same time or to posit the prop It is the case that the Logos (L) is divine (viz., [L is d]) and its contradictory It is not the case that the Logos is divine (viz., ~[L is d]). Those seem to violate LNC to me. But It is the case that the Logos is human (L is h) is NOT logically equivalent to It is not the case that the Logos is divine. That is, (L is both d and h) is not an obvious violation of LNC (nor does (L is d and h) entail ~(L is d) just because h is not d). You have to argue that divine and human being per se (or the properties d and h) are contradictory states of being and so cannot be instantiated by a single bearer of properties. You’re free to attempt it, but you can't just assume it.

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Tom: What’s it mean to claim intelligibility for some belief X?

Daniel: This might be an important point of discussion. I think intelligibility is tied to meaning. Something is intelligible only if it is meaningful. Hence, when you and Jeff decided to disengage yourself from discussion from either myself, or Zack on the grounds that the discussion has become unintelligible is simply a way of claiming that the conversation is meaningless.

Tom: We only disengaged discussion of the prop (A ^ ~A), for the simple reason that we don’t know what it means. It’s not intelligible.

Daniel: However, as I think should be obvious, the concepts that are meaningful to a particular belief-community are not meaningful to universalized humanity.

Tom: It’s not obvious to me that A ^ ~A is meaningful to anyone. But I have nothing to go on but someone’s claim that it is. They cannot demonstrate the meaningfulness they find in A ^ ~A. So it’s kind of a conversation stopper.

Daniel: For example, discussing the intricacies of reincarnation might be very meaningful to some Eastern culture, but it is very non-meaningful to us.

Tom: On the contrary. I find the discussion very meaningful. There’s nothing contradictory (or meaningless) about reincarnation.

Daniel: Indeed, it’s [reincarnation] unintelligible.

Tom: I find reincarnation a perfectly intelligible notion. Mind you, it may be false, but false doesn’t mean unintelligible.

Daniel: However, for us to discuss the intricacies of the resurrection might be very meaningful to us, but it is very non-meaningful to other belief-communities who think the concept of the dead rising is unintelligible (one of those communities would be modernity, which is, or has become, hostile towards religion). Intelligibility is linked to meaning…

Tom: Daniel, I think you’re conflating intelligibility with believability. Resurrection may be a bold thing to believe in (given that we don’t witness it every day of the year), that is, it may be difficult to believe in, but there’s nothing logically contradictory about it. It’s an intelligible notion, however unusual it might in fact be. If someone were to claim resurrection was an impossible notion because it was unintelligible (i.e., incoherent), I’d simply ask them to tell me where the contradiction was. I can’t imagine anyone successfully demonstrating the incoherence of the notion of theism or resurrection.

Daniel: I might be able to understand the intricacies of reincarnation, but they are unintelligible to me…

Tom: Look at this Daniel. You just described understanding what is unintelligible. I find THAT unintelligible. I don’t know what it means to understand what one admits is unintelligible. If it’s unintelligible, it’s not understandable; and if it’s understandable then it's intelligible.

Daniel: …I don't believe they have any link to reality.

Tom: Reincarnation may in fact be false, but conceiving it (analogously, as we conceive of pretty much everything) doesn’t involve any contradictions. Being born and living and dying are perfectly intelligible notions. It’s not a contradiction to conceive of being born and living and dying repetitively.

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Tom: Does it mean explaining X without remainder?

Daniel: This reminds me of Critical Theory. Adorno and Horkheimer wrote Dialectic of Enlightenment and in that book they discuss the impossibility of an object going into its conceptual category without remainder. IOW, our concepts, while necessary, fail to capture the whole of reality. Our language blocks us from some sort of true knowing. However, this impossibility leaves a gap of non-identity in identity. So to try to speak of the identity AS IF it was not shaded by all sorts of particulars that fill up the non-identity, is delusional. There is always a gap between epistemology and ontology, and we tend to fill that gap with all sorts of baggage while pretending that it doesn't exist. IOW, something like the LNC might accurately explain reality, however our employment of the LNC, and indeed our understanding of it as a artifact of language, forces us to admit that 1) it is a practical measure that doesn’t capture ontology and 2) we might be wrong about how it works. This isn’t epistemology skepticism, it’s the acknowledgement that we cannot access pure reason.

Tom: I think they make good points. But I wouldn’t say language blocks us from true knowing. I’d say true knowing can be ineffable. That is, some things we know and experience cannot be reproduced without remainder in language. Take the aesthetic satisfaction of eating something sweet, or of hearing a classical piece of music, or of experiencing the best sex ever—can we reproduce this knowledge (of sweetness or beauty or intimacy) without remainder in ANY description of the experience? No, we can’t. But this is a failure of language and not of experience or knowing per se. Being unable to reproduce an object without remainder via describing it doesn’t mean one can’t experience or truely know the object.

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Tom: All LNC means is that where truth claims contradict, the contradiction cannot have accurately mapped reality as it is. You would disagree. You would say contradictory claims each express what is in reality the case.

Daniel: But there is a ghost of modernity hidden here. The idea that the LNC is just some sort of neutral, objective structure that makes the world intelligible (meaningful). The LNC, for you, asher, and jeff, is the appeal to pure, unbiased, impersonal rationality.

Tom: Well, for me it’s not an appeal to anything impersonal. I think the a priori nature of LCN (and other a priori truths and concepts) points ultimately to the personal (sentient, intelligible) nature of reality itself. I don’t think there’s an impersonal ‘thing’ or ‘entity’ out there called ‘reason’. I think there’s the Logos—the thinking, feeling, and volitional ground of all created being. But I don’t mind the connection to modernism. To the extent that I think modernism (though I don’t like ‘isms’) is right, I don’t mind saying so.

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Daniel: But yes: Jesus was divine and not divine in the same place at the same time. Jesus was God and man at the same time in the same place.

Tom: That’s not controversial—logically speaking. A thing can instantiate several attributes simultaneously. L can be d and h in the same place and at the same time. What’s controversial (what’s meant by “in the same sense”) is that L is d and ~d. It’s a violation of LNC to claim that [Jesus is God] and ~[Jesus is God]. But that’s NOT what the incarnation claims.

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Tom: Just so that we’re clear. If you think the Incarnation violates LNC, you believe “Jesus is not divine” is true.

Daniel: Yes, which is another way of saying Jesus was human. Human is not God, thus human is not divine.

Tom: I think you’re confusing the categories. It’s an open question as to whether one and the same subject can have both a divine and a human mode of being. That is, it may be that ‘divine’ and ‘human’ describe different but compossible states of personal being. It’s another thing to argue that they are contradictory states or modes of being. The Logos may be divine but not MERELY divine, and also human but not MERELY human. Two states may be different states of being without being contradictory states. We need to be careful how we’re employing the sign of negation (~). Human is not the same as divine, obviously. Be careful about just saying 'human' = 'not divine' in the sense of “contradictory to.” It’s one thing to be ‘other than’ something. It’s another to be ‘contradictory to’ that something. You seem to be taking ‘other than’ as ‘contradictory to’ and then saying the incarnation violates LNC since Jesus is fully human and what's human is not also divine. If Jesus not human but not merely human then there's no obvious violation of LNC. My feeling is that if divine and human being are straight up contradictory modes of being then the incarnation in fact never happened.

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Tom: I equate mystery with the finitude of human being in much the same way I find quantum mechanics “mysterious” without supposing reality is actually self-contradictory.

Daniel: But some of quantum theory suggests that the LNC doesn't account for the way in which reality is. Maybe reality can be intelligible with the LNC being false. IOW, the LNC doesn't account for the whole of reality. Schrödinger's cat is a great example of this. Ontologically the cat is either dead or alive. But the gap between epistemology and ontology is recognized so that the cat must be understood to be both alive and dead at the same time in the same way. Remember, I'm not arguing that reality IS self-contradictory or unintelligible because I'm not sure that's something we can KNOW. It's something we can believe. I'm arguing that to claim that the LNC doesn't have a gap between epistemology and ontology is epistemological pride. There is false certainty in such a claim without the proper amount of empirical evidence (because it is, at its basis, an empirical claim) and the proper amount of evidence would be to analyze the whole of reality, which simply is not possible. I don't know how to understand the LNC as anything but a faith claim.

Tom: If one’s reasons for believing in some a priori truth don’t include an omniscient scan of the whole cosmos must mean that one’s belief is a ‘faith claim’ (and so not rational) then postmodernism wins by virture of conrolling the definitions. But why in the world think that in order to be justified in believing that some truth or proposition is a priori one must have the full weight of omniscience behind the claim?

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Tom: If we’re free to produce an explanation or a diversity of explanations (and we can in the case of the Trinity and Incarnation) which are not obviously contradictory, then we’re fine. But if, as you suppose, we have to explicate the truth without remainder, then we're in trouble. But why should we have to explicate truth without remainder?

Daniel: I don't think we CAN discover truth without remainder, which is why I'm critiquing the LNC as a neutral force. There is definitely a tension with there being a remainder and the LNC. What if the non-identity of a concept IS contradictory to the remainder of another concept that we have linked together?

Tom: Then we go back to the drawing board. We keep thinking and experimenting. We refuse to conclude that contradiction is the truth of the matter, that reality is in fact self-contradictory. But it’s this belief that reality isn’t self-contradictory that justifies our confidence that when our best evidence presents us with ostensibly contradictory beliefs, the fuller truth is out there and it will resolve the conflict.

I don’t know why you think that since we cannot discover the truth without remainder we cannot discover any of the truth (and know that we’ve discovered it).

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Daniel: You haven't even tried to show how Jesus can be Omniscient, or Omnipresent (traits of infinite) at the same time as being human, which is defined as finite.

Tom: It is not an orthodox claim that Jesus in his human consciousness had to be omniscient and omnipresent, so I won’t try to defend it. What orthodoxy claims is that the divine person of the Son, the eternal Logos, ceased not his divine mode of existence while also having a human experience. In other words, the Son is not reduced to the human Jesus. The divine Son did not cease to be omnipresent and omniscient while Jesus was in the grave. The Logos sustains the entire cosmos the NT tells us. All things hold together in the power of his word.

Gotta run!

Hugs,

Tom

Post Edited (Tom) : 12/28/2010 8:45:09 PM (GMT-6)