Open Theism Discussion Board

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Seems one of the main motivating arguments for universalism/against traditionalism is:

[P] It is necessarily unjust that S *deserves* an infinite Punishment for S's finite sin/s.

(I think talk of "infinite" punishment is muddled, but the term is frequently used by universalists. But if you too find it muddled, substitute some term like "endless" or "everlasting" for "infinite.") I take that principle, i.e., [P], if it is true, to be necessarily true.

However, in talk of desert, retribution, etc, punishment is simply a subset of things we may be said to deserve. Other members of the set would be praises, rewards, etc.

If [P] expresses a truth, so does this:

[R] It is necessarily unjust that S *deserves* an infinite Reward for S's finite action/s.

If [P] is a necessary truth, so is [R]. Indeed, seems to me that [P] is true iff [R] is true. How could one be true and the other false given retributivist presuppositions about desert? [P] seems to be thought false strictly on the basis of deserving something infinite for something finite, since they are not proportional, and so unfitting. If the proportionality objection holds for [P], then it would seem to hold for [R] too, and vice versa.

I take [P] and [R] to be instances of a general premise about deserts:

[D] It is necessarily unjust for any S to Deserve an infinite X for a finite Y.

This expresses the proportionality objection. It seems ¬[D] is supported by counter examples; for example, where X = a loss and Y = some action/s. We can forever lose out on many things due to our finite actions, and we can be said to deserve the loss. Suppose Peter was going to be given the highest status in heaven a mere creature could have only if he did not deny Christ three times, and he would keep it forever. He did deny Christ, so he loses out on that status. I don’t think many would think this is unjust. Thus [D] as stated is false. Yet maybe [D] could be restored, allowing some to argue that both [P] and [R] are still true.

But I take [R] to have possible counter examples, that is, these things are up for debate and it seems a contingent exegetical fact whether they turn out to be true, here’s two:

[1] Adam would have deserved everlasting (reward) life had he fulfilled the law in the garden—a finite action.

[2] Jesus endlessly deserves glory, honor, titles (reward) for the finite actions he undertook in his active and passive obedience, also earning everlasting life for his people.

So, ¬[R]. Put differently, [1] and [2] may not be true, but whether one thinks they’re true or not doesn’t hinge on [R], just on exegesis or theological presuppositions. Since [1] and [2] are possibly true, then [R] is false, and if [R] is false, [P] is false.

The upshot is: If Adam wouldn’t have failed, “heaven” would eventually be depopulated because it would be unjust for him to deserve an infinite reward for finite actions. And, since Jesus is said to deserve or earn glory, honor, titles, and everlasting life on behalf of his people, and since he did so by finite acts, then he cannot have his rewards in an “infinite” way (“infinite” is the word Universalists have chosen to use, but the above argument goes through if we change it to “unending”). Not only can he not endlessly remain the mediator between God and man (a reward he earned by finite acts), his people cannot have an infinite time in heaven since that reward would need to “run out” too, as it were, so as to ensure proportionality.

KIXYTΘEMTA