Open Theism Discussion Board
  HomeLog InRegisterSearch the ForumHelp
   
Open Theism Discussion Board > Public Forums > Theological Q&A > (No Subject)
 
Forum Quick Jump
 
New Topic Post Reply Printable Version
[ << Previous Thread | Next Thread >> | Show Newest Post First ]

OrthodoxBerean
Registered Member


Date Joined Oct 2001
Total Posts : 82
 
   Posted 4/29/2004 5:28 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
If there is can you hepl me understand what Gilson is saying here? How is he distinguishing between "being, essence, substance, and quiddity". Here it is below. Thanks in advance.

"Beginning as St Thomas himself does, with the entia, or beings which come to us in sense experience, we shall designate them by the terms "substances." Each substance form a complete whole which has a structure that we shall ananlyze and which constitues an ontological unit capable of being given a definition. In so far as substance can be conceived and defined, it is called "essence." Essence, therefore, is only substance asa susceptible of definition. To be exact, the essence is what the definition says the substance is. This is why, following the terminology of Aristotle, St Thomas introduces a third term into his description of the real. To signify what a substance is, is to reply to the quiestion quid sit (what is it?), and so, to the extent that it is expressed in the definition, the essence is called "quiddity." Substance, essence, quiddity; that is, a concrete ontological unit taken in itself, then taken as susceptible of definition, and finally takenas signified by the definition, such is the first group of terms which we shall be constantly using. They are too closely related not to be sometimes employed one for the other, but we should know, whenever it become necessary, how to reduce them to their primary meaning."
Back to Top
 

Alan Rhoda
Registered Member




Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
 
   Posted 4/29/2004 7:03 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
quote:
Originally posted by OrthodoxBerean

If there is can you help me understand what Gilson is saying here? How is he distinguishing between "being, essence, substance, and quiddity"? Here it is below. Thanks in advance.

"Beginning as St Thomas himself does, with the entia, or beings which come to us in sense experience, we shall designate them by the terms "substances." Each substance form a complete whole which has a structure that we shall ananlyze and which constitues an ontological unit capable of being given a definition. In so far as substance can be conceived and defined, it is called "essence." Essence, therefore, is only substance asa susceptible of definition. To be exact, the essence is what the definition says the substance is. This is why, following the terminology of Aristotle, St Thomas introduces a third term into his description of the real. To signify what a substance is, is to reply to the question quid sit (what is it?), and so, to the extent that it is expressed in the definition, the essence is called "quiddity." Substance, essence, quiddity; that is, a concrete ontological unit taken in itself, then taken as susceptible of definition, and finally taken as signified by the definition ..."
Well Orthodox, I'm not exactly a Thomist, but I did take a couple classes on Aquinas in grad school. I will try to restate what I think Gilson is saying in a manner that may be clearer.

Thomists use the word being in different senses. In one sense, the sense in which Gilson uses it above, it denotes an ens (plural: entia), a being, a particular existent individual substance. Thus a substance is an individual being (like Fido the dog). Thomists also like to use the word 'being' in another sense, to denote not ens or entia but esse, the existing of a thing. Thus we can say that the being (ens) Fido has being (esse), which is to say that Fido exists. Of things that exist (have esse), substances are the most fundamental. All other existents, like properties and relations, exist in substances or between substances or are in some other way dependent on substances.

Whereas a substance is a particular individual, the essence of a substance is something general that can be common to many different individuals. For example, Fido the dog and Rover the dog are two substances that have a common essence, caninity or dogness. The essence of a substance is what makes it the kind of substance that it is. As general, the essence can in principle at least be captured by a definition. All we have to do is consider what is common to all dogs (the genus) and what sets them apart from all non-dogs (the difference). If we can identify that then we can set forth the essence in a definition, a quiddity (lit. 'whatness'). Thus it has been said that humans are 'rational animals' - that's our quiddity, an expression of our essence, of what kind of beings we are. But the quiddity is not the essence, since humans had an essence long before anyone ever thought to express it in a definition.

Hope that helps.

Alan
Back to Top
 

OrthodoxBerean
Registered Member


Date Joined Oct 2001
Total Posts : 82
 
   Posted 4/30/2004 5:12 AM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
quote:

"Beginning as St Thomas himself does, with the entia, or beings which come to us in sense experience, we shall designate them by the terms "substances." Each substance form a complete whole which has a structure that we shall ananlyze and which constitues an ontological unit capable of being given a definition. In so far as substance can be conceived and defined, it is called "essence." Essence, therefore, is only substance asa susceptible of definition. To be exact, the essence is what the definition says the substance is. This is why, following the terminology of Aristotle, St Thomas introduces a third term into his description of the real. To signify what a substance is, is to reply to the question quid sit (what is it?), and so, to the extent that it is expressed in the definition, the essence is called "quiddity." Substance, essence, quiddity; that is, a concrete ontological unit taken in itself, then taken as susceptible of definition, and finally taken as signified by the definition ..."
Well Orthodox, I'm not exactly a Thomist, but I did take a couple classes on Aquinas in grad school. I will try to restate what I think Gilson is saying in a manner that may be clearer.

Thomists use the word being in different senses. In one sense, the sense in which Gilson uses it above, it denotes an ens (plural: entia), a being, a particular existent individual substance. Thus a substance is an individual being (like Fido the dog).


Ok, so being first is not defined it is just something that exist. An existing thing. An substance is that thing defined? Like dog, or man?

quote:
Thomists also like to use the word 'being' in another sense, to denote not ens or entia but esse, the existing of a thing. Thus we can say that the being (ens) Fido has being (esse), which is to say that Fido exists.


Ok so the thing as a verb. So when he uses "esse" such as the dog he is referring to the dog as existing? I think I got it.

quote:
Of things that exist (have esse), substances are the most fundamental. All other existents, like properties and relations, exist in substances or between substances or are in some other way dependent on substances.


What do you mean by properties and relations?

quote:
Whereas a substance is a particular individual, the essence of a substance is something general that can be common to many different individuals. For example, Fido the dog and Rover the dog are two substances that have a common essence, caninity or dogness.


Ok, got it.

quote:
The essence of a substance is what makes it the kind of substance that it is. As general, the essence can in principle at least be captured by a definition. All we have to do is consider what is common to all dogs (the genus) and what sets them apart from all non-dogs (the difference). If we can identify that then we can set forth the essence in a definition,


Ok, clear on this.

quote:
a quiddity (lit. 'whatness'). Thus it has been said that humans are 'rational animals' - that's our quiddity, an expression of our essence, of what kind of beings we are. But the quiddity is not the essence, since humans had an essence long before anyone ever thought to express it in a definition.

Ok, so the quiddity is simply the essence defined?

Hope that helps.

Alan
Back to Top
 

rossfadeinout
Registered Member




Date Joined Oct 2002
Total Posts : 428
 
   Posted 4/30/2004 8:29 AM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Alan,

Just wanted to tell you that that was a very clear answer to Orthodox's question. I just got done reading Gilson's "God and Philosophy" and thoroughly enjoyed it... Its strange, although I would consider myself an Open Theist, Thomistic philosophy really interests me.

Ross


"Let us remember how common the folly is of going from one faulty extreme into the opposite." -Thomas Reid

Back to Top
 

Alan Rhoda
Registered Member




Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
 
   Posted 4/30/2004 10:54 AM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
quote:
Originally posted by rossfadeinout

Alan,

Just wanted to tell you that that was a very clear answer to Orthodox's question. I just got done reading Gilson's "God and Philosophy" and thoroughly enjoyed it... Its strange, although I would consider myself an Open Theist, Thomistic philosophy really interests me.
I hear you, Ross. I think the categories of Thomistic metaphysics do a fairly good job of making sense of the world as we experience it. Like Aristotle, Aquinas was clearly a genius of a high order. It was grappling with his thought that kept me from embracing the open view earlier than I did. When I was in the midst of studying Aquinas I found his arguments for absolute divine simplicity, absolute immutability, etc. quite compelling. I even wrote a essay for one of my classes defending the Thomistic doctrince of divine simplicity. As anyone who has studied it knows, the Thomistic philsophy of God, like the Calvinist system of theology, is a fairly tight conceptual package. If you reject one part of it you eventually have to rethink the whole package. Early on I perceived the deterministic implications of the system, which bothered me greatly, but I didn't know how to break out of the conceptual framework. The initial break came when I realized that his Platonic preference for stasis over change is a metaphysical assumption of the system that can reasonably be denied. Nowadays even his Five Ways, which provide the theoretical unpinnings of his doctrine of God as Pure Act, etc., seem to me to be obviously deficient as proofs for theism. So I would say that the system has lost its hold on me. I still have great respect for Aquinas, though. There is a lot to be learned by studying him.

Regards,
Alan
Back to Top
 
New Topic Post Reply Printable Version
   
Forum Information
Currently it is Monday, November 09, 2026 5:27 PM (GMT -6)
There are a total of 97,718 posts in 6,040 threads.
In the last 3 days there were 0 new threads and 0 reply posts. View Active Threads