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What doesn't really occur to me is why it matters.

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Good question. What's the big deal? Just this. One thing that most evangelicals, and probably most orthodox Christians, will NOT give up ground on is the idea that Creation was a essentially FREE VENTURE. In other words, they want to say that God's existence doesn't ENTAIL a creation of any type. That Creation was COMPLETELY contingent. They also want to argue that God could have easily chosen between creating a completely determined Creation or an "open" Creation.

If one agrees with the thinking we are putting forth here, that one would have to deny both of those ideas. We would be saying that, given God's essential existence as we have defined time and again (omnibenevolent, infinitely intelligent, omniscient, necessary, etc):

1) Creation is a necessary consequent God's existence, meaning that God was not free to NOT create a non-divine reality.

2) God would only desire the existence of an "open" non-divine reality, as the existence of an exhaustively determined reality would go against God's disposition...meaning that God was not free to create an EDF world.


Now, there is something that also makes these claims, in a way. That some type of creation was necessary...AND that it could not be exhaustively determined.

Yep. That's right. PROCESS THEOLOGY.

This is what Tom was hinting at before. If what I'm arguing is true, then open view theism's suppositions, CONSISTENTLY APPLIED, leads to saying that the neither God/world relationship nor the so-called risky venture were "free" choices of God in the sense that we usually mean when we talk about a "free choice".

Needless to say, this wouldn't really go over well with many evangelical free will theists. hehe. And this is why I'm harping on this so much. This is serious business. A completely contingent Creation is pretty much a NON-NEGOTIABLE for many Christians...and what we're doing here is denying it completely.

So, THAT's the big deal, Brett. Again, good question. Thanks for the kudos.



"Smile. It could be worse." --from a good friend.

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So what I'm hearing you say is that an omnibenevolent being would possibly create a deterministic world just for someone's amusement, whether Godself or another creations? Hmmm... Iconoclast, what do you think about this suggestion?

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Good question. What's the big deal? Just this. One thing that most evangelicals, and probably most orthodox Christians, will NOT give up ground on is the idea that Creation was a essentially FREE VENTURE. In other words, they want to say that God's existence doesn't ENTAIL a creation of any type. That Creation was COMPLETELY contingent. They also want to argue that God could have easily chosen between creating a completely determined Creation or an "open" Creation.

If one agrees with the thinking we are putting forth here, that one would have to deny both of those ideas. We would be saying that, given God's essential existence as we have defined time and again (omnibenevolent, infinitely intelligent, omniscient, necessary, etc):

1) Creation is a necessary consequent God's existence, meaning that God was not free to NOT create a non-divine reality.

2) God would only desire the existence of an "open" non-divine reality, as the existence of an exhaustively determined reality would go against God's disposition...meaning that God was not free to create an EDF world.

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What’s a stake in the whole question of God’s freedom, Brandon, is Process theism. Is the God-world (ANY conceivable type of world) relationship a necessary or a contingent one. That’s the question.

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not-Brandon

As I said before, Tom, I understand that if we say that God needed to create the world because his love compelled him to, it begins to sound a lot like that aspect of process theism. All I'm asking is: so what? Why are we afraid of that? All I've heard is: "well, that sounds too much like process theology, and that's scary."


I just don't see the scary part yet. I mean what's the big deal about whether this aspect of process theology is true? It's not like we are required to accept all of process theology's tenets, right?

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Tom

I think Doc’s three points are right on too. I really was gonna say the same things. Rats. Being rejected, hurt, and so sacrificing for love is not essential to love. It’s characteristic of love in relation to a fallen world. Love will sacrifice when it’s rejected. But it doesn’t follow necessarily from the essential nature of love that it must be rejected and wounded or that it must create the circumstances that either may or must lead to such rejection.

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Tom

PoW-

I said something as an open theist you agreed with. I believe that's a first and that we should CELEBRATE!

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.






Edited by - PotOnWheel on 05/24/2003 11:28:23 AM

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) Is SACRIFICE the essence of love, or is DEFERRING the essence of love? Is sacrifice simply a contingent expresion of what love looks like in a contingent world that involves sin and rebellion?

If deferring is the essence, we can conceptualize an eternal, self-sufficient, trinitarian love. If sacrifice is the essence, we must posit a necessary world. But note, the cost of such a postulation is rather high. For this necessary world must a) be eternal -- unless one can explain why God waited an eternity to create it, and b) must include sin, for only then can sacrifice happen. So we end up with necessary sin as well as a necessary world.

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Uh, oh.

First, it looks like I've been misread! I don't think that I said that sacrifice was the ESSENCE of love. I think that I said that sacrificial love was a DIMENSION of love that may be experienced by God ONLY IF morally free non-God beings were created. HUGE difference.

Second, what is "waiting an etenity"? It is a long period of time? Hehe. And this doesn't even really matter, because I'm framing this whole thing such that Creation may NOT be eternal, but definitely be EVENTUALLY and INEVITABLY created by God AT SOME POINT.

Third, as far as the "necessary sin" idea, remember what we've said time and again about the sheer INEVITABILITY of some type of sin eventually emerging in a context of googles of morally free beings. If you recall, this made good sense of how the work of Jesus was FORETHOUGHT...because God knew about the very real and very substantial probability that sin WOULD emerge. Basically, what we ended up saying was that the eventual emergence of sin was a NECESSARY EVIL that God had to endure in order to have morally free beings to have relationship with God. (Y'all DO remember this, right??) So, what's the problem? It would be one thing if God could have had oodles and oodles of free willed beings with NO CHANCE of sin emerging. Then the concern of "necessary sin" would be on point. But it's not that way. Sin was an inevitablility that the INFINITELY INTELLIGENT God knew that God had to endure. And God prepared for it.

And for Tom:

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You’re whole argument as I understand it (and as I was arguing it too; I’m just taking this side for the moment) is an omnibenevolent God’s inability to avoid WANTING to experience in terms of loving and being loved that which he had NOT experienced before. So this would include employing sacrificial love. If an omnibenevolent God is free to not want to be hurt and rejected (and so add this formerly unexperienced dimension to himself), then there’s nothing left to discuss.

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An omnibenevolent being is not free ultimately to NOT want to be hurt and rejected, if...

1) the Being ascertained, by way of infinite intelligence, that the creation of morally free being will INEVITABLY result in experiencing being hurt or rejected AT LEAST ONCE.

2) the Being, because of it's disposition, desired the existence of morally free beings MORE THAN the Being desired avoiding being hurt and rejected.


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Doc:

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It seems like part of this discussion revolves around this question: Are there an infinity of possible expressions of God's loving disposition that can occur without creating a contingent world? If so, we can say the world was not in any sense necessary to God. If not, it seems we have to say the world is in some sense necessary to God. I hold to the former.

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If it is true that God's disposition would be further followed by EXPERIENCING a God/world relationship, then the implication is that the world is in some sense necessary to God. I see no reason, as of yet, to say that God's disposition of expressing and maximizing love would NOT HAVE BENEFITED from Creation. And again, if the infinitely intelligent God KNEW this, I see no reason why God WOULDN'T HAVE created, if it was in God's power (which it was!) If you can argue that God's disposition would not have BENEFITTED meaningfully from experiencing a God/world relationship, then maybe you've got me.



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Doc:

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If God is self-sufficient, in the sense that God doesn't need the world, does this imply that the world holds no value to God. My answer, again, is that it holds value AS EXPRESSION. An artist doesn't NEED to paint a particular painting in order to find value in the painting, and joy (or perhaps grief) in what is painted.

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I don't think these simple analogies are helping. They just don't take into account the important elements of God's essential existence with which we are dealing. But I will go along. Let's say that an artist is DEFINED BY her disposition of ALWAYS wanting to express her thoughts, feelings, and impressions in art. Let's also say that she is a very reflective person who has many thoughts and feelings. Further, let's say that she has all the tools at her disposal to create any type of art that she chooses...and there is no external constraints barring her from creating art. What are the odds that she will NEVER, EVER create ANY type of art. How about dang slim! For the artist to NOT create art, under these conditions, would be completely self-contradictory on an essential level. Moreover, the value that the art holds for the artist is the CARRYING OUT of her disposition that she actively perceives.

Now, notice how different this would be if we were NOT to define the artist by the posited disposition. What if we said that an artist is just someone who MAY SOMETIMES create art. There is NO motivating disposition. NOW, what you are saying would have some weight. Not only would the artist not NEED to create any type of art, but it would be genuinely possible that she could ARBITRARILY decide to create art instead of watching Gilligan's Island (which we presume she values EQUALLY with creating art)...and then, for whatever reason, decides that she has expressed something well and VALUES her work on that basis.

See, Doc? The difference is the disposition!

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BJS:

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Okay. Just saw The Matrix. Holy Schnikees. That was good. I'm surprised that Doc thought it was weaker on the philosophy/theology front. I actually thought it was even fuller of those themes. What a brilliant concept it was that the Architect used humanity's inherent rebel streak against them by incorporating this "legend of the One" into the program, so that they would direct their free will in a direction that the Architect had planned for. The Architect's entire goal was to lead mankind through his orchestrated messianic "legend" into a final catch-22. Because if your the Architect, and you know free will is out there, you want to control it with catch-22s, right? So I think the final choice between the two doors is just that --- a catch-22 (or so the Architect thinks! Just wait until November, you white-bearded foo!). I don't think he thinks it matters which door Neo chooses. SWEET concept. SWEET. SWEET. SWEET.

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HAYell, yeah!


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BJS:

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As I said before, Tom, I understand that if we say that God needed to create the world because his love compelled him to, it begins to sound a lot like that aspect of process theism. All I'm asking is: so what? Why are we afraid of that? All I've heard is: "well, that sounds too much like process theology, and that's scary."

I just don't see the scary part yet. I mean what's the big deal about whether this aspect of process theology is true? It's not like we are required to accept all of process theology's tenets, right?

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I feel ya on this. It really wouldn't bother me none at all. But it's like Tom says:

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Anyway, the thing with agree with the Process folk on this specific point is that it amounts to a denial of God's self-existence, that his perfections are self-contained and that God needs nothing (or at least that's what some think it amounts to).

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This is a BIGGIE to a lot of people.

Love,


Edited by - MephEternal on 05/24/2003 11:43:12 AM

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Sorry, Brett, about getting your name wrong again. Stink. I just see BJS and think BBB (Brett and Brandon). Close.

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I know. I just like giving you a hard time about it.

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Anyway, the thing with agree with the Process folk on this specific point is that it amounts to a denial of God's self-existence, that his perfections are self-contained and that God needs nothing (or at least that's what some think it amounts to).

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I guess I just don't see how the idea that God's love compelled him to create us means that his "perfections aren't self-contained." His love is so integral and essential to his nature and being that he can't help but express it. Isn't that a GOOD thing? How does it make him less perfect? Sorry, guys, but I'm not seeing it.

Brett

"Siste viator et memento mori."

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If the Mother of God at the moment of the Annunciation is a true icon of human freedom, of authentic liberty and liberation, then her actions and reactions in the events that follow shortly afterwards in St. Luke’s Gospel illustrate three basic consequences of what it means to be free. Freedom involves sharing, silence, and suffering.

http://www.stnina.org/97s/97s-ware-freedom.htm An Icon of Human Freedom, Bishop Kallistos (Ware) of Diokleia -- Adapted from the University Sermon for Lady Day (Annunciation), Oriel College, Oxford, 10 March 1991.

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His love is so integral and essential to his nature and being that he can't help but express it. Isn't that a GOOD thing? How does it make him less perfect?

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BEAUTIFULLY STATED. What is so wrong about God being constrained by his loving disposition, and an open Creation of morally free beings being a NECESSARY consequent of that disposition???



Edited by - MephEternal on 05/24/2003 11:48:20 AM

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BJS: His love is so integral and essential to his nature and being that he can't help but express it. Isn't that a GOOD thing? How does it make him less perfect?

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I also wanted to say, Mephi, and I think Doc got this too, is that we open theists aren’t the only ones who fall down this dark hole if it’s true that God’s nature is such that creating (a world compatible with that nature) was a necessary consequence. The determinists face the same problem, except in their case God’s essential nature would be understood as necessarily entailing the creation of an exhaustively determined world. So they’d be stuck in the process belief of a necessary God-world relationship except it would necessarily be deterministic relationship. Yuck.

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Nope. The determinists would dodge this bullet, because of one thing...

Determinists do NOT hold that love REQUIRES libertarian freedom.

Ah, but this is a NON-NEGOTIABLE for open view theists, now, isn't it? If we take this out of the equation, then a WHOLE bunch of things change!

Just to let you know.

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...so here is a quote from a first-order theologian, Prof. John Zizioulas, Metropolitan of Pergamon in the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, from the book "Being as Communion, pp. 40-41."

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But there was also a second "leavening" which led to an even further reappraisal of Greek ontology. Not only was the being of the world traced back to personal freedom, but _the being of God Himself_ was identified with the person. This "leavening" was effected through the disputes on the Holy Trinity, mainly through the theology of the Cappadocian Fathers and above all by St. Basil. This theology does not concern us here except for one basic point, which unfortunately is usually overlooked. As a known, the final formulation of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity speaks of "one substance, three persons. One would therefore have said that the unity of God, the "ontology" of God, consists in the _substance_ of God. This would bring us back to the ancient Greek ontology: God first _is_ God (His substance or nature, His being), and then exists as Trinity, that is, as persons. This interpretation in fact prevailed in Western theology and unfortunately entered into modern Orthodox dogmatics with the arrangement in the dogmatic handbooks of the headings "On the One God" followed by "On the Trinity." The significance of this interpretation lies in the assumption that the ontological interpretation lies in the assumption that the ontological "principle" of God is not found in the person but in the substance, that is, in the "being" itself of God. Indeed the idea took shape in Western theology that that which constitutes the unity of God is the one divine substance, the one divinity; this is, as it were, the ontological "principle" of God.

But this interpretation represents a misunderstanding of the Patristic theology of the Trinity. Among the Greek Fathers the unity of God, the one God, and the ontological "principle" or "cause" of the being and life of God does not consist in the one substance of God but in the _hypostatasis_, that is, _the person of the Father_. the one God is not the one substance but the Father, who is both the "cause" both of the generation of the Son and of the procession of the Spirit. consequently, the ontological "principle" of God is traced back, once again, to the person. Thus when we say that God "is," God is not an ontological "necessity" or a simple "reality" for God--but we ascribe the being of God to His personal freedom. In a more analytical way this means that God, as Father and not as substance, perpetually confirms through "being" his _free_ will to exist. And it is precisely His Trinitarian existence that constitutes this confirmation: the Father our of love--that is, freely--begets the Son and brings forth the Spirit. Thus God as person--as the hypostasis of the Father--makes the one divine substance to be that which it is: the one God. This point is absolutely crucial. For it is precisely with this point that the new philosophical position of the Cappadocian Fathers, and of St. Basil in particular, is directly connected. That is to say, the substance never exists in a "naked" state, that is without hypostasis, without "a mode of existence. And the one divine substance is consequently the being of God only because it has these three modes of existence, which it owed not to the substance but to the person, the Father. Outside the Trinity there is no God, that is no divine substance, because the ontological "principle" of God is the Father. The personal existence of God (the Father) constitutes His substance, makes it hypostases. The being of God is identified with the person.

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A determinist wouldn't need to hold that love requires freedom to be struck square in the chest with this bullet because in their case creation is entailed not by virtue of omnibenevolence, but by virtue of the corresondence between God's essence and God's purpose in creating as THEY understand them.

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I don't think so. Show me what you mean.

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Third, as far as the "necessary sin" idea, remember what we've said time and again about the sheer INEVITABILITY of some type of sin eventually emerging in a context of googles of morally free beings. If you recall, this made good sense of how the work of Jesus was FORETHOUGHT...because God knew about the very real and very substantial probability that sin WOULD emerge.

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