 |
| Open Theism Discussion Board > Public Forums > Theological Q&A > Free will | Forum Quick Jump
|
| 
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 5/28/2003 11:12 PM (GMT -6) |   | Brett: I’ll have to keep mulling this over for a bit. I still don't want to really say that God must be less than perfect merely because he is compelled to share his love.
Tom: As far as I’m concerned we’re agreeing that God by nature shares (OK, is “compelled to share” if you want) his love. That’s not in question. Doc’s point is that this “not free to not love” thing we’re talking about (i.e., the love God is “compelled to share”) IS fulfilled in the trinitarian life of God. God cannot but maximize love, and he WAS doing so without creation. There’s nothing about God’s love as love which is lifted to another level (“process”) when he creates.
Mephi on the other hand is arguing that there is something about God (whether disposition, love, infinite intelligence, I haven’t figured out just what it is) which DOES take God to another level in the process he’s on. God’s love IS maximized with creation in a way previously not known to God and in a way it is God’s nature (at this stage in it’s development) to do so. God HAS to actualize this previously unexperienced dimension of loving.
I think there are fewer problems with Doc’s position than with Mephi’s and since my brain is like mush (which, like water follows the course of least resistance), I’ll go with Doc for now. Fewer holes in the dam.
Brett: Nor am I keen on saying that this "neo-process" view has a significantly greater problem of evil than the open view. I agree with Mephi that the difference between evil being a "statistical inevitability" in the open view, and a necessary contingency in this "neo-process" view is a negligible distinction.
Tom: I think you mean “necessary consequence” (not necessary “contingency”). If evil is, in terms of probabilities, for all intents and purposes inevitable because God freely decides to actualize an open world, that does seem different than evil being a necessary consequence of God’s own existence (or rather, of God’s having reached this stage in his process). The difference is in the first God is free not to actualize the circumstances which make sin a statistical inevitability (which I still think is debated, but that’s because I’m naively optimistic!  ), whereas in the second God is not free from evil. Evil and sin must exist of necessity just as God’s love must be shared with a finite world. These two NEED each other. In the second view there is no “statistical probability” that evil will exist. Since evil is now a necessary consequence of God’s existence, it’s certain. Nothing probable about it. How is this a negligible difference?
Brett: How about this. Let's say Person A lines up a thousand people and forces them all to play Russian Roulette with five bullets in the six-shot chamber. Person B does the same thing but fills the chambers with all six bullets. Does Person A really bear a significantly smaller degree culpability for the deaths that will result? True, Person B knows that death will be a necessary contingency of his decision to fully load all of the guns. Person A, however, can be certain that death will be a "statistical inevitability" of his decision to have a thousand people play Roulette with guns that have 5/6 of a chance to cause death.
Tom: Nice. I’d love to hear Doc respond to this. Here’s what I’m thinking. We had a discussion a long time ago about the inevitability of human sin and I was the only one I think standing on my side of the river on this issue. I’m still questioning whether we understand the human situation enough to say that human sin was inevitable. I’m open, but since I define sin and the ultimate irrational act, I don’t see how God would have rationally banked on it happening. I think sin was possible, but not probable. I think God went with creation precisely because it was far more probable that things would turn out the way he wanted.
Not sure I should, but let me concede the statistical inevitability of human sin and see if I can find any answers on our issue here. It still seems to me that there’s a difference between Person A (the open God who faces the statistical inevitability of evil) and Person B (the process God whose existence entails the rise of evil). Person A has freely chosen some noble end which requires us to put the gun to our head and run the ‘chance’ of shooting our brains out. Under certain circumstances we might do the same thing. It all depends on what the end where aiming at is. Is it worth the risk? But Person B doesn’t face this risk. He doesn’t face ANY risk. There IS no risk of evil if evil is a necessary consequence of your existence.
Tom
| | Back to Top | | |
 |
GregBoyd
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 5/29/2003 4:00 AM (GMT -6) | |
Brett: Let's say Person A lines up a thousand people and forces them all to play Russian Roulette with five bullets in the six-shot chamber. Person B does the same thing but fills the chambers with all six bullets. Does Person A really bear a significantly smaller degree culpability for the deaths that will result?
Doc If playing Roulette with five bullets was a viable an option as playing with six bullets with no benefits that outweigh the death of the additional person, Person B is culpable for the unnecessary death of one additional person. But the application of this analogy to the inevitability of sin is questionable on just this ground. To be relevant, the analogy would have to specify WHY they are playing the Roulette "game" in the first place, and WHY person A plays with five bullets while person B plays with six.
There is a weak sense in which having a child is like playing Roullete -- you don't know how things are going to turn out. But its so different from the game in all other respects that most people believe its worth the risk to have a child while all sane people agree playing Russian Roulette is NUTS.
I see no problem in affirming that God created free beings (his children) knowing that statistically there WOULD BE, sooner or later, a screw up and that he'd have to suffer for humanity.
But, I also see no problem in affirming with Tom that aGod could create free beings where the entrance of sin was unlikely, though still possible.
The issue hangs on a) our exegesis and b) our metaphysics of freedom and understanding of the statistical predictability of human nature in an unfallen state. I'm not certain we can attain anything better than an educated guess on these two issues.
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
|
BJS
Registered Member
Date Joined Dec 2001
Total Posts : 587
| Posted 5/29/2003 4:41 AM (GMT -6) | | Tom: As far as I’m concerned we’re agreeing that God by nature shares (OK, is “compelled to share” if you want) his love. That’s not in question. Doc’s point is that this “not free to not love” thing we’re talking about (i.e., the love God is “compelled to share”) IS fulfilled in the trinitarian life of God. God cannot but maximize love, and he WAS doing so without creation. There’s nothing about God’s love as love which is lifted to another level (“process”) when he creates.
Brett: Gotcha. Good explanation. But isn't love that is shared with MORE beings a love that is "maximized" farther than love that is shared with FEWER beings?
Tom:I think you mean “necessary consequence” (not necessary “contingency”).
Brett: Oops! Yes, that's what I meant. 
Tom:If evil is, in terms of probabilities, for all intents and purposes inevitable because God freely decides to actualize an open world, that does seem different than evil being a necessary consequence of God’s own existence (or rather, of God’s having reached this stage in his process). The difference is in the first God is free not to actualize the circumstances which make sin a statistical inevitability (which I still think is debated, but that’s because I’m naively optimistic! ), whereas in the second God is not free from evil. Evil and sin must exist of necessity just as God’s love must be shared with a finite world. These two NEED each other. In the second view there is no “statistical probability” that evil will exist. Since evil is now a necessary consequence of God’s existence, it’s certain. Nothing probable about it. How is this a negligible difference?
Brett: Well, it's not that I don't see a difference at all, but if sin was a "statistical inevitability" then I think the difference is negligible. Actually, I think you probably agree with me on this, because you find yourself wanting to deny that God thought sin was a "statistical inevitability", right?  Which probably means that you see that it makes God look pretty much as bad as if sin was a certainty.
Doc: I see no problem in affirming that God created free beings (his children) knowing that statistically there WOULD BE, sooner or later, a screw up and that he'd have to suffer for humanity. But, I also see no problem in affirming with Tom that aGod could create free beings where the entrance of sin was unlikely, though still possible.
Brett: Well, if I can be persuaded that God in the open view did not think sin was a "statistical inevitability", it would help me appreciate your argument that this "neo-process" view presents us with a particularly acute problem of evil. But if God, in God's infinite knowledge and understanding, knew that sin was a "statistical inevitability", I'm still unconvinced that it is anything other than a negligible distinction from the problem of evil posed by the "neo-process" view.
Thanks for the interaction, guys. Hope I'm not slowing your discussion down too badly! 
Brett
"Siste viator et memento mori." | | Back to Top | | |
| 178 posts in this thread.
Viewing Page : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 |
| Forum Information | Currently it is Monday, November 09, 2026 2:51 PM (GMT -6)
There are a total of 97,718 posts in 6,040 threads.
In the last 3 days there were 0 new threads and 0 reply posts. View Active Threads
|
Forum powered by dotNetBB v2.42EC SP3
dotNetBB © 2000-2026 |
|
|