quote:

---

Alan,

You once had some interaction with an old friend of mine on this site (jlreed) over Aquinas' doctrine of analogy.

---

quote:

---

Let me say at the outset that I think much of what Aquinas has to say is very good. His Christian appropriation and refinement of Aristotelian ethics is excellent, as is his hylomorphic understanding of human nature, his understanding of the relation between faith and reason, his existence/essence distinction, etc.

---

quote:

---

The difficulty I kept running into was trying to define the act/potency distinction precisely without conflating it with the active/passive distinction, which doesn't seem to me to be the same thing.

---

quote:

---

I've been working off and on on a response to Boyoms. The difficulty I kept running into was trying to define the act/potency distinction precisely without conflating it with the active/passive distinction, which doesn't seem to me to be the same thing. What does it mean to say that God is "Pure Act"? Thoughts anyone? I'll try to post today or tomorrow a couple definitional suggestions.

However defined, my thinking is that the Pure Act doctrine (under any recognizably Thomistic construal) is incompatible with Open Theism because the latter implies that God change in some respects.

Alan

---

quote:

---

What does it mean to say that God is "Pure Act"? Thoughts anyone? I'll try to post today or tomorrow a couple definitional suggestions.

However defined, my thinking is that the Pure Act doctrine (under any recognizably Thomistic construal) is incompatible with Open Theism because the latter implies that God change in some respects.

Alan

---

quote:

---

jlreed

To avoid metaphors we can only use predicates which signify (that contain no limitation) and can be predicated of the Divine Substance itself.

---

from Gregory of Nyssa, On "Not Three Gods"


We, on the other hand, following the suggestions of Scripture, have learnt that that nature is unnameable and unspeakable, and we say that every term either invented by the custom6 of men, or handed down to us by the Scriptures, is indeed explanatory of our conceptions of the Divine Nature7 , but does not include the signification of that nature itself. And it may be shown without much difficulty that this is the case. For all other terms which are used of the creation may be found, even without analysis of their origin, to be applied to the subjects accidentally, because we are content to denote the things in any way by the word applied to them so as to avoid confusion in our knowledge of the things signified. But all the terms that are employed to lead us to the knowledge of God have comprehended in them each its own meaning, and you cannot find any word among the terms especially applied to God which is without a distinct sense. Hence it is clear that by any of the terms we use the Divine nature itself is not signified, but some one of its surroundings is made known. For we say, it may be, that the Deity is incorruptible, or powerful, or whatever else we are accustomed to say of Him. But in each of these terms we find a peculiar sense, fit to be understood or asserted of the Divine nature, yet not expressing that which that nature is in its essence. For the subject, whatever it may be, is incorruptible: but our conception of incorruptibility is this,-that that which is, is not resolved into decay: so, when we say that He is incorruptible, we declare what His nature does not suffer, but we do not express what that is which does not suffer corruption. Thus, again, if we say that He is the Giver of life, though we show by that appellation what He gives, we do not by that word declare what that is which gives it. And by the same reasoning we find that all else which results from the significance involved in the names expressing the Divine attributes either forbids us to conceive what we ought not to conceive of the Divine nature, or teaches us that which we ought to conceive of it, but does not include an explanation of the nature itself. Since, then, as we perceive the varied operations of the power above us, we fashion our appellations from the several operations that are known to us, and as we recognize as one of these that operation of surveying and inspection, or, as one might call it, beholding, whereby He surveys all things and overlooks them all, discerning our thoughts, and even entering by His power of contemplation into those things which are not visible, we suppose that Godhead, or qeo/thj, is so called from qe/a, or beholding, and that He who is our qeath/j or beholder, by customary use and by the instruction of the Scriptures, is called qeo/j, or God. Now if any one admits that to behold and to discern are the same thing, and that the God Who superintends all things, both is and is called the superintender of the universe, let him consider this operation, and judge whether it belongs to one of the Persons whom we believe in the Holy Trinity, or whether the power extends8 throughout the Three Persons. For if our interpretation of the term Godhead, or qeo/thj, is a true one, and the things which are seen are said to be beheld, or qeata/, and that which beholds them is called qeo/j, or God, no one of the Persons in the Trinity could reasonably be excluded from such an appellation on the ground of the sense involved in the word. For Scripture attributes the act of seeing equally to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. David says, "See, O God our defender9 ": and from this we learn that sight is a proper operation of the idea10 of God, so far as God is conceived, since he says, "See, O God." But Jesus also sees the thoughts of those who condemn Him, and questions why by His own power He pardons the sins of men? for it says, "Jesus, seeing their thoughts11 ." And of the Holy Spirit also, Peter says to Ananias, "Why hath Satan filled thine heart, to lie to the Holy Ghost?12 " showing that the Holy Spirit was a true witness, aware of what Ananias had dared to do in secret, and by Whom the manifestation of the secret was made to Peter. For Ananias became a thief of his own goods, secretly, as he thought, from all men, and concealing his sin: but the Holy Spirit at the same moment was in Peter, and detected his intent, dragged down as it was to avarice, and gave to Peter front Himself13 the power of seeing the secret, while it is clear that He could not have done this had He not been able to behold hidden things.

quote:

---

I object to this because, as some modern Thomists like Norris Clarke have pointed out, receptivity does not necessarily imply potency/passivity. Clarke's counterexample, which I find persuasive, is that in "welcoming" we are both receptive and active at the same time. In welcoming I actively open myself up to be influenced by another. My point is that this should not be seen as compromising God's status as Pure Act because God's responsiveness to us is an active posture on his part. Thus orthodox Thomism is wrong in supposing that impassibility is a necessary consequence of God's perfection.

---

quote:

---

For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. (I.q2.a3)

The first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in God there should be any potentiality. (I.q3.a1)

---

quote:

---

Yo...

PS as a side note to jlreed, you went to Southern Evangelical to do your grad work, right? The reason that I ask is that I have been just starting to look at the possibility of studying Philosophy of Religion at the graduate level-just been recently turned on to Philosophy-wondering what you thought about the program...

Anyway... on with the discussion!

Ross

"Let us remember how common the folly is of going from one faulty extreme into the opposite." -Thomas Reid

---