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POW said:

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May I jump in?
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You’re always welcome. :)

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Thanks!

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EVDOKIMOV Paul. GYTHIEL Anthony. trans.: SACRAMENT OF LOVE ; ORTH

This book is heartily recommended to every paster who; seeks a vocabulary that will provide a "vision" for and a "vocation" to the married estate in terms of the one theological reality articulated by the scriptures, entered by Holy Baptism and nourished by the "Eucharist" This is the best work available in English on the Orthodox view of marriage. paper. 192 pp.

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Iconoclast:

Now, POW wants to argue that OK maybe it’s not sin to be homosexual but it IS sin to choose to act homosexually. To which I would say, yes, but just as we don’t choose to feel shame we DO choose to wear clothes. Now, if POW wants to say that choosing to wear clothes is a sin then I will just have to agree with him that choosing to act homosexually is, in the same way, also a sin.

My conclusion is that gay monogamous marriages are NOT sin at all and should be sanctioned by the church to prevent gay people from burning with passion – just like Paul said.

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the argument goes something along the lines that gay people had attempted to change, they tried to change, they couldn't change, they were unable to change so they debunked the idea of change.

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Brandon: Why is it that you determine whether something is loving or not whether it is detrimental/destructive/harmful or not? On what basis, do you make this assumption? Why should ANYONE follow this? What makes this an adequate basis for ethics?

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This "sense" (sensus fidelium) should be contrasted with "consent" (consensus fidelium). That is, sensus refers to the active discerning, or capability of discerning, the content of faith, whereas consensus is the consensual result of that discerning.

Cardinal Newman's use of "phronema" alluded to Aristotle's virtue of "phronesis" (prudence). That is, the process of moral discernment could never be fully thematized or formulated or justified in theoretical form. For Aristotle, criterion for moral judgement was the virtuous person. Mouw goes on to say that this means "that there resides deep in the bosom of Christ's mystical body, a profound moral wisdom."

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I have been studying ethics lately and I understand the Judeo-Christian ethic to be based on the revelation of God as to what constitutes right or wrong, good or not good, loving or not loving, not on the bases of what results in the greatest good. That sounds more like a Utilitarian ethic to me.

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I also agree with you that God does not set up rules “just because” either, if by that, you mean “arbitrary” as if he is capricious. But again, when you say you don’t believe that God sets up rules “just because” and that he sets up rules for our own good, so we won’t get hurt, you are still assuming something that you have not proved.

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But there is one thing that I have never from my youth up been able to understand. I have never been able to understand where people got the idea that democracy was in some way opposed to tradition. It is obvious that tradition is only democracy extended through time. It is trusting to a consensus of common human voices rather than to some isolated or arbitrary record. The man who quotes some German historian against the tradition of the Catholic Church, for instance, is strictly appealing to aristocracy. He is appealing to the superiority of one expert against the awful authority of a mob. It is quite easy to see why a legend is treated, and ought to be treated, more respectfully than a book of history. The legend is generally made by the majority of people in the village, who are sane. The book is generally written by the one man in the village who is mad. Those who urge against tradition that men in the past were ignorant may go and urge it at the Carlton Club, along with the statement that voters in the slums are ignorant. It will not do for us. If we attach great importance to the opinion of ordinary men in great unanimity when we are dealing with daily matters, there is no reason why we should disregard it when we are dealing with history or fable. Tradition may be defined as an extension of the franchise. Tradition means giving votes to the most obscure of all classes, our ancestors. It is the democracy of the dead. Tradition refuses to submit to the small and arrogant oligarchy of those who merely happen to be walking about. All democrats object to men being disqualified by the accident of birth; tradition objects to their being disqualified by the accident of death. Democracy tells us not to neglect a good man’s opinion, even if he is our groom; tradition asks us not to neglect a good man’s opinion, even if he is our father. I, at any rate, cannot separate the two ideas of democracy and tradition; it seems evident to me that they are the same idea. We will have the dead at our councils. The ancient Greeks voted by stones; these shall vote by tombstones. It is all quite regular and official, for most tombstones, like most ballot papers, are marked with a cross.

I have first to say, therefore, that if I have had a bias, it was always a bias in favour of democracy, and therefore of tradition. Before we come to any theoretic or logical beginnings I am content to allow for that personal equation; I have always been more inclined to believe the ruck of hard-working people than to believe that special and troublesome literary class to which I belong. I prefer even the fancies and prejudices of the people who see life from the inside to the clearest demonstrations of the people who see life from the outside. I would always trust the old wives’ fables against the old maids’ facts. As long as wit is mother wit it can be as wild as it pleases.

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