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HOW was Jesus (outside of ALLL OTHER HUMAN BEINGS who have ever and will ever exist) able to exist in a "perfect love" relationship with the Father? Now notice that when you ask this question, the quagmire comes up all over again.

Was it the ontological position of Jesus as God the SON (Second part of the Trinity) that enabled Him to have a "perfect love" relationship with God WHILE he was a human being?

OR...

Was it Jesus' power of willing to CONTINUE the love relationship that he had had with the Father before after the Son became a human being?

You end up coming back to ontological necessity vs actual CHOICE. Always.

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I guess you're asking, "Where is the source of power in Jesus' life?" What I've said above, that the power is in the relationship, doesn't help much; you're asking what makes the relationship powerful. You really know how to hone in on the real issues!

Your first option suggests that the source of power in maintaining a perfect love relationship with the Father is his IDENTITY as the Son of God.

The second option suggests that the source of power for the relationship is his ABILITY as the Son of God. His unique power of willing enabled him. Like the first, it is an internal, and in that sense ontological, characteristic of Jesus.

I think I've got a third option. The source of his power in maintaining a perfect love relationship with the Father was his AWARENESS of the Father. Recognizing the Father in his majesty and glory makes the choice to follow his will the only natural response. His "advantage" over the rest of us was EPISTEMIC rather than ONTOLOGICAL. There is an actual choice, but it is an OBVIOUS CHOICE.

This of course raises the issue of Jesus' degree of awareness of the Father during his formative years. I don't know the theories here, but I suppose the Father made his presence known to Jesus enough to keep him out of trouble.

Magneton

God exists since mathematics is consistent, and the Devil exists since we cannot prove it. Andre Weil


Edited by - magneton on 12/14/2001 4:26:57 PM

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I think I've got a third option. The source of his power in maintaining a perfect love relationship with the Father was his AWARENESS of the Father. Recognizing the Father in his majesty and glory makes the choice to follow his will the only natural response. His "advantage" over the rest of us was EPISTEMIC rather than ONTOLOGICAL. There is an actual choice, but it is an OBVIOUS CHOICE.

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From John Meyendorff's
"Byzantine Theology:
Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes"
Fordham Univ. Press

Chapter 2

The Christilogical Issue

=================== 1 =====================
(pp. 32-33)

Throughout the millennium between the Council of Chalcedon and the fall of Constantinople, Byzantine theological thought was dominated by the Christilogical problem as it was defined in the dispute between Cyril and Nestorius and in the subsequent discussions and concilar decrees. It must be remembered, however, that the central issue in these debates was the fate of man.

Western Christilogical thought, since the early Middle ages, ahs been dominated by the Anselmian idea of redemption through "satisfaction"; the idea that Jesus offered to the father a perfect and sufficient sacrifice, propitiatory for the sins of mankind, has been at the center of Christological speculation. Playing a prominent role in modern historical research on the patristic age. The result is that Christology has been conceived as a topic in itself, clearly distinct from pneumatology and anthropology. But if one keeps in mind the Greek patristic notion that the true nature of man means life in God, realized once and for all, through the Holy Spirit, in the hypostastic union of the man Jesus with the logos and made accessible to all men, through the same holy Spirit, in the humanity of Christ, in his body, the Church, Christology acquires a new and universal dimension. It cannot be isolated any longer from either the doctrine of the Holy Spirit or the doctrine of man, and it becomes a key for the understanding of the Gospel as a whole.

The issue of "participation in God's life" and of "deification" stands at a necessary background to the clash between Alexandrian and Antiochian Christology in the fifth century. When the great exegetes of Antioch - Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuistia, Nestorius, and even Theodoret of Cyrus - emphasize the full humanity of the historical Jesus, they understand this humanity, not merely as distinct from the divinity, but as "autonomous" and personalized. If "deified", Jesus could not longer be truly man; he must simply be the son of Mary if he was to be ignorant, to suffer, and to die. It is precisely this understanding of humanity as autonomous which has attracted the sympathies of modern Western theologians toward the Antiochians, but which provoked the emergence of Nestorianism and the class with Alexandria. For the concept of "deification" was the very argument with which Athanasius had countered Ariaus: "God became man, so that man may become God." The great Cappadocian Fathers also shared this argument, and by it they were convinced, as were the vast majority of the Eastern episcopate, of the truth of the Nicean faith, in spite of their original doubts concerning the term "consubstantial.

Thus, the essential "good news" about the coming of a new life - human because it is also divine - was expressed by Cyril of Alexandria and not by the more rational scheme defended by Nestorius. Cyril lacked the vocabulary, however, and the flexibility to satisfy those who feared the Monophysite temptation of seeing in Jesus a God who ceased to be also man. Cyril's formula of "one nature (or hypostasis) incarnate" in leaving the door open to the Orthodox distinction between the divine nature per se and the "divine nature incarnated" and, therefore, recognizing the reality of the "flesh", was still a polemical, anti-Nestorian formula, not a balanced and positive definition of who Christ is. The Calcedonian definition of 451 - two natures united in one hypostasis, yet retaining in full their respective characteristics - was therefore a necessary correction of Cyril's vocabulary. Permanent credit should be given to the Antiochians especially to Theodoret - and to Leo of Rome for having shown the necessity of the correction, without which Cyrillian Christology could easily be, and actually was, interpreted, in a monophysite sense by Eutyches and his followers.

But the Chalcedonian definition, balanced and positive as it was, lacked the soteriological, charismatic impact which had made the position of the Athanaius and Cyril so appealing. Political and ecclesiastical rivalries, personal ambitions, imperial pressures aimed at imposing Chalcedon by force, abusive interpretations of Cyril in the monophysite sense, as well as misinterpretations of the council by some Nestorianizing Antiochians who saw in it a disavowal of the great Cyril - all provoked the first major and lasting schism of Christendom.

Understandably, the Byzantine emperors tried to restore the religious unity of the empire. In the second half of the fifth century, they made several military attempts to heal the schism, by avoiding the usual issue. But the issue proved to be too real, and the passions high. Thus Justinian : (527-565) the last great Roman emperor, after several attempts to achieve unity by imperial decree again turned to conciliar procedure.

In the age of Justinian, four major theological positions…..



=================== 2 =====================
(pp.38-39)

In Maximian thought, man occupies quite an exceptional position among the other creatures. He not only carries in himself a logos; he is the image of the divine Logos, and the purpose of his nature is to acquire similitude with God. In creation as a whole, man's rule is to unify all things in God, and thus to overcome the evil posers of separation, division, disintegration, and death. The "natural", God-established "movement," "energy" or will of man is therefore directed toward communion with God, or "deification," not in isolation from the entire creation, but leading it back to its original state.

One understands at this point why Maximus felt so strongly that both Monoenergism and Monothelitism betray the Chalcedonian affirmation that Christ was fully man. There cannot be a true humanity where there is not natural, authentic human will or "movement."

But if the human will is nothing but a movement of nature, is there a place for human freedom? And how can the Fall and man's revolt against God be explained? These questions, to which Origin gave such great importance, find in Maximus a new answer. Already in Gregory of Nyssa, true human freedom does not consist in autonomous human life, but in the situation which is truly natural to man's communion with God. When man is isolated from God, he finds himself enslaved -- to his passions, to himself, and ultimately, to Satan. Therefore, for Maximus, when man follows his natural will, which presupposes life in God, God's cooperation and communion, he is truly free. But man also possesses another potential, determined not by his nature, but by each human person, or hypostasis, the freedom of choice, or revolt, or movement against nature, and therefore, of self-destruction. This personal freedom was used by Adam and Eve and, after the Fall, in separation from God, from true knowledge, from all the assurance secured by "natural" existence. It implies hesitation, wandering, and suffering; this is the gnomic will (gnome', opinion), a function of the hypostatic, or personal, life not of nature.

In Christ, human nature is united with the hypostasis of the Logos and, while remaining fully itself, is liberated from sin, the source of which is the gnomic will. Because it is "en-hypostasized" in the Logos Himself, Christ's humanity is perfect humanity. In the mysterious process which started with His conception in the Virgin's womb, Jesus passes through natural growth, ignorance, suffering, and even death -- all of them experiences of the fallen humanity which He had come to save -- and He fulfilled through the resurrection the ultimate human destiny. Christ could thus be truly the savior of humanity because in Him there could never be any contradiction between natural will and gnomic will. Through the hypostatic union, His human will, precisely because it always conforms itself to the divine, also performs the "natural movement" of human nature.

The doctrine of "deification" in Maximus is based upon the fundamental patristic presupposition that communion with God does not diminish or destroy humanity, but makes it fully human. In Christ the hypostatic union implies the communication of idioms (perichoresis ton idiomaton). The characteristics of divinity and humanity express themselves "in communion with each other" (Calcedon definition), and human actions, or "energies," have God Himself as their personal agent. It can be said, therefore, that "God was born," that Mary is the Theotokos, and that the "Logos was crucified" -- which birth and death remain purely human realities. But it can and must be said that a man rose from the dead and sits at the right hand of the Father, having acquired characteristics which "naturally" belong to God alone; immortality and glory. Through Christ's humanity, deified according to its hypostatic union with the Logos, all members of the Body of Christ have access to "deification" by grace through the operation of the Spirit in Christ's Church.

The essential elements of Maximian Christology provide the permanent terminological and philosophical framework for Byzantine thought and spirituality. They were adopted, together with the Trinitarian doctrine of the great Cappadocian Fathers, in The Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith of John of Damascus.(first half of the eighth century), which served as a standard doctrinal textbook in Byzantium. They also provided the most authoritative frame of reference in most of the doctrinal controversies which arose in the East during the Middle Ages.


(skipping a paragraph)

=================== 3 =====================
(p. 39)
Around 1087, a Constantinopoitan monk named Nilus, who was involved in theology discussions with the Armenians, was condemned for holding that the humanity of Christ was united with God "by adoption" ([]i]these) only. The Monophysite Armenians were, of course, maintaining the concept of a union "by nature" (physei). In opposing them, Nilus had apparently weakened the Orthodox doctrine of "hypostatic" union to the point of making it sound Nestorian. In 1117, the Synod of Constantinople dealt with the similar case of Eustratius, Metroploican of Nicea, who, like Nilus, had engaged in polemics with Armineans and had expressed orthodox Christianity in terms very similar to those of Theodore of Moptustia. The humanity assumed by Christ not only was distinct from His divinity but found itself in a position of "servitude"; it was in a position of "worshipping God," of being "purified," and to it along belongs the human title of high-priest, a term unsuitable to God. In condemning the opinions of Eustratius, the synod reiterated the decisions of the Fifth Council against the Christology of the Three Chapters.

=================== 4 =====================
(pp. 40)
The very Cyrillian conclusion of the council against Eustratus led to further Christoloical debates which this time centered on the meaning of the Eucharist. The deacon Sotericles Panteugenos, Patriarch Elect of Antioch, affirmed that the sacrifice could not be offered to the Holy Trinity, for this would imply that the one Christ performs two opposing actions, the human action of offering and the divine action of receiving, and would mean a Nestorian separation and personalization of the two natures. Nicholas, Bishop of Methone in the Peloponnese, a major Byzantine theologian of the twelfth century, responded to Soterichos with an elaboration of the notion of hypostasis based on the ideas of Leontius of Byzantium and Maximus the Confessor. The hypostatic union is precisely what permits one to consider God as performing humanly in the act of offering, while remaining God by nature and, therefore, receiving the sacrifice. To Soterichos, Nicholas opposed the conclusion of the prayer of the Cheroubikon, whose author, as modern research shows, is none other than Cyril of Alexandria himself, but which is a part of both Byzantine liturgies (attributed respectively to Basil and John Chrysostom): "For is it Thou who offerest and art offered, who receivest and art Thyself received." Nicholas, whose views were enforced by the Council of 1156-1157, shows that neither the Eucharist nor the work of Christ in general can be reduced to a juridical notion of sacrifice conceived as an exchange. God does not have to receive anything from us: "We did not go to Him [to make an offering]; rather He condescended towards us and assumed our nature, not as a condition of reconciliation, but in order to meet us openly in the flesh."

=================== 4a =====================
This "open meeting in the flesh" received further emphasis in 1170 in connection with the condemnation of Constantine of Keryra and his supporter John Eirenikos as crypto-Monophysites. There point was to refuse to apply John 14:18 ("My Father is greater than I") to the distinction between the divinity and the humanity in Christ. The test, they said, concerned the hypostatic characteristics in the Holy Trinity, fatherhood being by definition "greater" than sonship, while the humanity of Christ, which according to the Council of 553 is distinguishable from the divinity only "in our mind," is deified and wholly "one" with the divinity. It cannot, therefore, be "smaller" than the divinity in any sense. By rejecting this view, the Council of 1170 reaffirmed once again the decision of Calcedon and Constantenople II. about the divinity of Christ, hypostatically united to a real and active humanity, "created depictable, and mortal." Than such humanity, divinity is certainly "greater."

=================== 4b =====================
(pp. 40-41)
The very technical Christological discussions of the twelfth century, in fact reconsidered all the major issues which had been debated in the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries. The Byzantine Church remained fundamentally faithful to the notion of what George Florovsky once called an "assymetrical union" of God and man in Christ: while the hypostatic source of life -- the goal and pattern -- remains divine, man is not diminished or swallowed by the union; he becomes again fully human. This notion is also expressed in the Eucharistic sacrifice, a unique act in which not single action of Christ's is represented in isolation, or reduced to purely human concepts, such as an "exchange." or a "satisfaction." Christ, as the Synodikon proclaims every year on the Sunday of Orthodoxy, "reconciled us to Himself by means of the whole mystery of the economy, and by Himself and in Himself, reconciled us also to his God and Father, and, of course, to the most holy and life-giving Spirit."

quote:

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Scott: I really appreciate the imagination you bring to the theological enterprise. I in principle strongly agree with your attempt to say (in effect) "well, lets use our imagination on conceive of ways God could have carried things out had the way God IN FACT carried things out failed." Bravo. I think most of the classical objections to Open Theism can be handled with a little imagination! And I admit to sensing the plausibility of your saying Jesus BECAME what we shall BECOME.

But (yes, there's always a but)...

1) In the case of the incarnation I don't think we CAN imagine a plausible scenario of what would have happened had Christ failed... and

2) I remain convinced that the suggestion that Christ could have failed is incurably Nestorian. It suggests that the union of God and man in Jesus is a matter of WILL, not personal identity, and this is precisely what the Church wanted to rule out in ruling out Nestorianism.

Now, having said THAT, I am NOT saying that your view is necessarily wrong for this reason. Creeds are important, but not absolutely authoritative. So, if you say, "Well find, I'm Nestorian. So what?" I don't have a good comeback -- other than pointing out the negative consequences of Nestorianism. And these you feel you can answer.

Best wishes in your move to Sunnyville

Doc

"Three is the magic number, oh yes it is, it's the Magic Number" - De La Soul

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quote:

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But if the human will is nothing but a movement of nature, is there a place for human freedom? And how can the Fall and man's revolt against God be explained? These questions, to which Origin gave such great importance, find in Maximus a new answer. Already in Gregory of Nyssa, true human freedom does not consist in autonomous human life, but in the situation which is truly natural to man's communion with God. When man is isolated from God, he finds himself enslaved -- to his passions, to himself, and ultimately, to Satan. Therefore, for Maximus, when man follows his natural will, which presupposes life in God, God's cooperation and communion, he is truly free. But man also possesses another potential, determined not by his nature, but by each human person, or hypostasis, the freedom of choice, or revolt, or movement against nature, and therefore, of self-destruction. This personal freedom was used by Adam and Eve and, after the Fall, in separation from God, from true knowledge, from all the assurance secured by "natural" existence. It implies hesitation, wandering, and suffering; this is the gnomic will (gnome', opinion), a function of the hypostatic, or personal, life not of nature.

In Christ, human nature is united with the hypostasis of the Logos and, while remaining fully itself, is liberated from sin, the source of which is the gnomic will. Because it is "en-hypostasized" in the Logos Himself, Christ's humanity is perfect humanity. In the mysterious process which started with His conception in the Virgin's womb, Jesus passes through natural growth, ignorance, suffering, and even death -- all of them experiences of the fallen humanity which He had come to save -- and He fulfilled through the resurrection the ultimate human destiny. Christ could thus be truly the savior of humanity because in Him there could never be any contradiction between natural will and gnomic will. Through the hypostatic union, His human will, precisely because it always conforms itself to the divine, also performs the "natural movement" of human nature.

The doctrine of "deification" in Maximus is based upon the fundamental patristic presupposition that communion with God does not diminish or destroy humanity, but makes it fully human. In Christ the hypostatic union implies the communication of idioms (perichoresis ton idiomaton). The characteristics of divinity and humanity express themselves "in communion with each other" (Calcedon definition), and human actions, or "energies," have God Himself as their personal agent. . . .

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quote:

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Doc: There is no chance without risk (the words are synonymous as you're using them), so if the outcome was assured -- and I believe it was -- it was a risk free Incarnation. A risk free incarnation to redeem a risk filled world.

Your honesty and willingness to allow new insights to move your thought in new directions is admirable Scoot. You remind me of my good friend Mephi (who must be in finals because he hasn't been around much lately).

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I don't know about this. If we tie AWARENESS this closely to the RELATIONSHIP, what do we do with Christ as a baby and adolescent? (A question you yourself raise at the end of your post). Don't you think there was a kenotic element even to Christ's awareness? Wasn't he epistemologically limited, as all human beings are? Isn't this part of what it MEANS to be a full human being?

I'd rather submit that the source of power lied in his relationship with the Father maintained by CHARACTER. He had GOD'S Character - the Son of God forever perfectly open to the Father. This character is what allowed his awareness to be - as much as a human can be - perfectly aware of the Father. And THIS (you are right) is what empowered him to always choose to submit to the Father.

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The current for wanting to earn salvation (even Christ earning it for us) seems strong, even in Evangelical Christians. ("Making a decision" takes that form.)

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The current for wanting to earn salvation (even Christ earning it for us) seems strong, even in Evangelical Christians. ("Making a decision" takes that form.)
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Interesting point. I'm not sure if it's totally wrong to say Christ earned our salvation, although that's not the way I'd describe it. I'd say that he did whatever it took to restore our relationship with God, which required forgiveness, which required that he accept the consequences of humankind's sin. (See the forgiveness thread also.)

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