quote:

---

____________________________________


Now, what do I see as the benefits of this idea?

---

1) One would not have to posit STRICT DETERMINISM (ala Newtonian worldview) to assert theological determinism.

Granted. This is not the way people generally get to determinism, but it is a possible way of doing so.

2) One would not have to posit a supernaturalistic, interventionist worldview. A naturalistic theism could EASILY be taken.

If by "naturalistic" you mean that it is "normal" for God to control the outcomes of actual occasions then I agree. But this would be a strange use of the word "natural," for what nature are you referring to as having explanitory power? The nature of God's initial aims for each event. One could just as easily call it neo-fatism (new belief in "fate").

3) One can rightly assert that God truly has relationality with Creation at all times.

Yes, but this relation is in no way reciprical. The idea behind love is that it has an element of reciprocity, though it may well be asymmetrical.

4) Like Pierce believed, one can assert that there is only ONE type of causation: TELEOLOGICAL (as opposed to telelogical AND mechanical)

I am not clear on the use of these terms so I pass...

5) One would not have to deny our hardcore beliefs about self-determination...and being efficacious in influencing our own futures.

Here you are equivocating if by the term "self-determination" we naturally assume the power to the contrary.

6) One would not have to collapse this idea into any type of PANTHEISM, because there is sufficient differentiation to separate things divine (eternal, necessary, etc) from those NOT divine (temporal, contingent, etc.)

Maybe, it depends upon what is considered definitive of ultimate reality. If "center of willing" (subject, be it human divine or what-have-you) is considered the fundamental building blocks of reality (as can be argued in process) then much hangs on how you define that. If it is constitutive of the center to prehend and do some measure of self-sorting of what is prehended (counsciously or unconsciously) then this center would need to presuppose power to the contrary. I agree that there is a hypothetical way of postulating what you are saying but it is contrary to the trajectory and intuition that drives the over all system. An element called ambiguity that does indeed carve out space for power to the contrary. Your system would lack ambiguity at least for God. But then it loses much aesthetic power. It would, in effect, be quite boring. Sorry.

7) One could affirm panexperientialism AND pantemporalism.

Yup


"Christianly understood, truth is obviously not to know the truth but to be the truth. Despite all modern philosophy, there is an infinite difference here..." SK

quote:

---

Okay, since you and I have hashed this out before, you know I think the idea is hypothetically viable but implausible[sic] given the revealed aim of creation.

---

Well, you and I know that different people have different concepts of what the "revealed aim of creation" is. And I can think of a FEW of them that would consider this theological deterministic view much more in line with them.

***************************************


Modes:

quote:

---

If by "naturalistic" you mean that it is "normal" for God to control the outcomes of actual occasions then I agree. But this would be a strange use of the word "natural," for what nature are you referring to as having explanitory power? The nature of God's initial aims for each event. One could just as easily call it neo-fatism (new belief in "fate").

---

I use "naturalistic theism" in the way David Ray Griffin does, with a twist thought of by talking to you and listening to your ideas. His quote from his article, "Process Theology and the Christian Good News: A Response to Classical Free Will Theism" in the book Searching For An Adequate God. Pages 5-6.

"Naturalistic Theism. This doctrine involves the point that divine influence in the world is a fully natural part of the normal causal processes of the world, never a supernatural interruption thereof. "

Long story short, divine activity in the world is an EXAMPLE of the metaphysical principles existent in the God/world relation, not some "breaking" of natural laws. The only difference that I see between Griffin's concept here and what you think about this is that you end up giving more unilateral power to God than Griffin would. (Remember your thesis?) Essentially, you guys are saying the SAME thing: God does just interrupt laws in the world. The God/world relation is such that all "natural" laws are truly influenced of divine activity. See what I mean?

And as I said elsewhere, the ONLY person who would be able to consider it "fate" would be God Godself. And who says that God would mind?


*****************************************************


Modes:

quote:

---

Yes, but this relation [Meph's note: God/world] is in no way reciprical. The idea behind love is that it has an element of reciprocity, though it may well be asymmetrical.

---

Here's the issue. The relation would not be fully reciprocal TO GOD. That's why the ENTIRE discussion hinges on whether or not we want to presuppose that God cared about a FUNDAMENTALLY fuller idea of divine/non-divine reciprocity or not. Based on that assumption, EVERYTHING else comes into play. And as you know, there's really no way that someone can say that God DEFINITELY wanted the type of reciprocity you're talking about. We can ASSUME it, sure. But that's about it.


*****************************************************

Modes:

quote:

---

Here you are equivocating if by the term "self-determination" we naturally assume the power to the contrary.

---

I contend that we can allow that Jesus Christ had "self-determination" but was MORALLY CONSTRICTED via any type of metaphysical concern we can conceive of (ie the "could, but WOULDN'T" idea)...but his love for the Father could be considered genuine, then 1) self-determination does not necessitate power to the contrary to be exercised in the FULLEST extent, just present as a "disposition" metaphysically and 2) our love for God can be acceptable to God. And let's not forget, we'd TECHNICALLY have "power to the contrary". It would just be restricted. Heh. What do you think?

*****************************************************

Modes:

quote:

---

Maybe, it depends upon what is considered definitive of ultimate reality. If "center of willing" (subject, be it human divine or what-have-you) is considered the fundamental building blocks of reality (as can be argued in process) then much hangs on how you define that. If it is constitutive of the center to prehend and do some measure of self-sorting of what is prehended (counsciously or unconsciously) then this center would need to presuppose power to the contrary. I agree that there is a hypothetical way of postulating what you are saying but it is contrary to the trajectory and intuition that drives the over all system. An element called ambiguity that does indeed carve out space for power to the contrary. Your system would lack ambiguity at least for God. But then it loses much aesthetic power. It would, in effect, be quite boring. Sorry.

---

Three things:
1) Don't forget. The power of contrary AS A DISPOSITION is genuinely there, ontologically. That's all that's metaphysically needed. So the prehension part is no problem.

2) It's not like God wouldn't experience ANY novelty. God just wouldn't experience novelty ON EVERY LEVEL.

2) About God being bored. Um...come on, man. How is this not being antropomorphic in the worst way? God being bored? While God constantly experiences ever-increasing levels of God's TRIUNE self? While God gets to experience the artistry that is his Creation come to be? I just don't think that's persuasive, dawg.

*******************************************************

Thanks, Modes! A lot, man. To be sure, a LOT of things influenced this stuff (including Doc's works and your great thesis. Thanks for letting me read it.) My whole thing is that this basically ALLOWS for at least the VIABILITY of a theological determinism system without going into rank contradiction. PLUS it shows that most of this stuff hangs on VERY FEW assumptions...primarily whether or not God wanted a FULL SENSE of reciprocity that entails ambiguity FOR GOD GODSELF! Personally, I think it could go either way.

So, Calvinists, I'm throwin' ya a bone here. Take it, if you wish! Maybe I'm NOT so crazy....


Thanks, again, Modes!

Holla,

quote:

---

I use "naturalistic theism" in the way David Ray Griffin does, with a twist thought of by talking to you and listening to your ideas. His quote from his article, "Process Theology and the Christian Good News: A Response to Classical Free Will Theism" in the book Searching For An Adequate God. Pages 5-6.

"Naturalistic Theism. This doctrine involves the point that divine influence in the world is a fully natural part of the normal causal processes of the world, never a supernatural interruption thereof. "

---

Agreed. I even used the world "normal" above if I remember right.

quote:

---

Long story short, divine activity in the world is an EXAMPLE of the metaphysical principles existent in the God/world relation, not some "breaking" of natural laws. The only difference that I see between Griffin's concept here and what you think about this is that you end up giving more unilateral power to God than Griffin would. (Remember your thesis?) Essentially, you guys are saying the SAME thing: God does just interrupt laws in the world. The God/world relation is such that all "natural" laws are truly influenced of divine activity. See what I mean?

---

Yup. We're tracking.

quote:

---

And as I said elsewhere, the ONLY person who would be able to consider it "fate" would be God Godself. And who says that God would mind?

---

Now this is important. The early church fathers railed long and hard against fate in the first 4-5 centuries. I think we'd do well to heed that warning. If fatalism is true from God's perspective, then it is really and ultimately true. We may not realize it, but it does not become less true for that reason. The key issue here is whether we think God is fundamentally deceiving us. If we DO, then the cat is totally out of the bag and ANYTHING goes. God could always be fooling us. The "ambiguity" is only real for us. (As a factor of both the deception of God and the finitude of ourselves and our situation.) But if God is NOT messing with us and we still have ambiguity, we have it because of finitude, for sure, but we MAY also have it because it is real for God as well (meaning that indeterminacy is real ontologically). My understanding of God's love for us, based on revelation, is that God is not trying to deceive us. This is part of what it means to me to trust God. I know this messes with an other wise perfectly reasonable hypothesis, but I am pushing the point that it is ultimately subjects that are real and so the intentions and wills of these subjects are really important in this regard. I am assuming that God is true in revealing that God is truly for us and with us, and to me this entails working with us in this crazy envorinment God created for the sake of glorifying Godself (read "love" for those who prefer it) in the process of uniting totally unequals.

*****************************************************

quote:

---

Here's the issue. The relation would not be fully reciprocal TO GOD. That's why the ENTIRE discussion hinges on whether or not we want to presuppose that God cared about a FUNDAMENTALLY fuller idea of divine/non-divine reciprocity or not. Based on that assumption, EVERYTHING else comes into play. And as you know, there's really no way that someone can say that God DEFINITELY wanted the type of reciprocity you're talking about. We can ASSUME it, sure. But that's about it.

---

The good news is that we don't need to presuppose God's desire for this reciprocity. God tells us point blank that God wants us to be united and so forth. John 17, etc. god wants a relationship. "Choose this day, life or death," and so forth. And it seems that this is not determined. Or if it is, it truly is a deception on God's part that we don't know this. And as you know, there's really no way that someone can say that God DEFINITELY wanted the type of determinism you're talking about. I mean, we could assume this, sure. But that's about it.

But if I am going to assume something, I am going to let revelation weigh in big on that, and trust that the revelation is actually truthful in what it is revealing. Of course the ambiguity doesn't go away, and things must be held to tentatively, but I think its really tought to tow the determinism line through the whole Bible. And after all, something that is only occasionally determined or only partially determined, or whathaveyou, isn't really qualified for neofatism.

*****************************************************

quote:

---

Modes:

quote:

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Here you are equivocating if by the term "self-determination" we naturally assume the power to the contrary.

---

I contend that we can allow that Jesus Christ had "self-determination" but was MORALLY CONSTRICTED via any type of metaphysical concern we can conceive of (ie the "could, but WOULDN'T" idea)...but his love for the Father could be considered genuine, then 1) self-determination does not necessitate power to the contrary to be exercised in the FULLEST extent, just present as a "disposition" metaphysically and 2) our love for God can be acceptable to God. And let's not forget, we'd TECHNICALLY have "power to the contrary". It would just be restricted. Heh. What do you think?

---

You may recall that I don't go that route. I don't think that Jesus was morally constricted in that way. My agrument that he could not sin is ontological. Sin is defined as "against God" and as God that exempts Christ from sin. So this argument isn't persuasive to me. Furthermore, having power to the contrary in such a way that it cannot be actualized in a contrary manner is not really having power to the contrary. This is where the ambiguity must exist ontologically both for us and for God. This is "the mystery of free will" if you will.
*****************************************************
Meph postulates:

quote:

---

Three things:
1) Don't forget. The power of contrary AS A DISPOSITION is genuinely there, ontologically. That's all that's metaphysically needed. So the prehension part is no problem.

---

I am not interested in "power as disposition". I am interest in "power as power". That is, power as true potential for actualizing truly contrary occasions.

quote:

---

2) It's not like God wouldn't experience ANY novelty. God just wouldn't experience novelty ON EVERY LEVEL.

---

Fair enough. God gets to go to the movies and see exactly what God wants to see. the novelty is strictly in the experiencing of what was previously only abstract. That which was conceived in the mind of God actually comes to exist objectively. Cool. But if there is truly no power to the contrary, then it does seem that the pantheism accusation is knocking on the back door....

quote:

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2) About God being bored. Um...come on, man. How is this not being antropomorphic in the worst way? God being bored? While God constantly experiences ever-increasing levels of God's TRIUNE self? While God gets to experience the artistry that is his Creation come to be? I just don't think that's persuasive, dawg.

---

Hey Dude, if aesthetics is important, then boredom is a real problem. Seriously. Think about it. The contrast of God's experience would be the "other," how "other" can God handle that experience as being? Boredom is a simplistic word, but it does contain an important point if we are talking about subjects who are interested in aesthetics.
*******************************************************


"Christianly understood, truth is obviously not to know the truth but to be the truth. Despite all modern philosophy, there is an infinite difference here..." SK

Edited by - ModesofThought on 08/29/2002 1:40:44 PM

Edited by - ModesofThought on 08/29/2002 1:44:10 PM

quote:

---

You may recall that I don't go that route. I don't think that Jesus was morally constricted in that way. My agrument that he could not sin is ontological. Sin is defined as "against God" and as God that exempts Christ from sin. So this argument isn't persuasive to me. Furthermore, having power to the contrary in such a way that it cannot be actualized in a contrary manner is not really having power to the contrary. This is where the ambiguity must exist ontologically both for us and for God. This is "the mystery of free will" if you will.

---

You may recall that tons of people, including Doc, DO go that route. And they do so for what I think are pretty good reasons. So, insofar as someone accept this line of thinking with JESUS, I don't see how they can blatently rule it out in this view of theological determinism. I do notice that you define sin in such a way that the ONLY WAY that sin could ever exist is for some type of EXERCISED "power to the contrary" to be used AGAINST God. This would make ANY type of theological determinism have to negate any concept of sin at all. Heh. You define the problem away, in a sense. Hmmm...you existentialist, you!



***********************************************

Modes:

quote:

---

Hey Dude, if aesthetics is important, then boredom is a real problem. Seriously. Think about it. The contrast of God's experience would be the "other," how "other" can God handle that experience as being? Boredom is a simplistic word, but it does contain an important point if we are talking about subjects who are interested in aesthetics.

---

God IN AND OF HIMSELF without anything else would never be bored! God would be completely satified without Creation, right? So, how could we say that God would get bored? God in his essence would be the ANTITHESIS of boredom. Next, remember the analogy I gave about the Screenwriter finally seeing her script in MOVIE form. There IS some aesthetic appreciation there. And that's all that matters. Between God's estatic experience of Himself, the joy of continuous creation, and the ability to share his love with NON-DIVINE being, how on earth could God be "bored" at all? Hmmm...


************************************************

I'd like to venture an thought about something. Your intuitions seem to me to be existentialist to the core. And correspondingly, it would seem that anything you would perceive to threaten the AUTHENTICITY of your confrontation with reality (ie God) would be quite disturbing, if not downright nightmarish. For you, if God is not affected AT ALL LEVELS by your actions, then the whole thing may be viewed as deception. Moreover, the suggestion that you could exist in a compatibilistic way ontologically may seem to contradict your felt "I" Restated, you may feel that unless the depth of YOUR subjectivity affects the DEPTHS of God's subjectivity (NOT NECESSARILY the God/world interaction) with FELT novelty, then the whole thing is a sham.

(I think I'm right on this. Your dislike of the verbal plenary view, your generally NOMINALISTIC viewpoints, your take on Christ as related to sin, and view of sin itself kind of speak this. )

If this isn't what you think, sorry. If it IS somewhat what you think, I'd like to just suggest something. How about you think about changing your assumptions? Like so:

If God is the definer of reality, then the God/world relations that God has defined can be nothing BUT real.

This view is unashamedly REALISTIC. Reality DOES exists in the particulars, but there ARE universals. Reality is not only descriptive, but PREscriptive. There is subjectivity, and it exists in reality. But that subjectivity is only exerted in its proper domain. Just like you would be making a foolish mistake to attempt become a FATALIST, you would be making an equally bad mistake in trying to become someone who has no "real" subjectivity. The distinctions between Creation and God are REAL as can be. That's all that matters. Revelation reveals a God who creates, loves, redeems, and reconciles us. We feel we are persons..and we ARE. This is all completely workable within a theological deterministic framework...but the hardcore existentialist suppositions would have to be modified a bit.

Now, again, I could be wrong on all of this. But I figured I'd say it anyways.

Mad love, boooy!

Holla back,

quote:

---

Mephi, the view you propose is actually VERY close to the view advocated by Robert Neville. See his early God the Creator as well as his Creativity and God. (But I REALLY hope you don't become a Nevillian!!!).

---

and...

quote:

---

Bottom line: I think it a great compliment to you that you on your own anticipated so much of the creativity and insightfulness of Robert Neville.

---

Sigh....

Do you know what I feel like? Do y'all remember in the first Austin Powers movie when Dr. Evil keeps trying to come up with some nefarious scheme using what he THINKS to be the latest technology...only to realize that it's already been conceptualized and done? I feel JUST like that. First the "Flatland" thing, now this. I don't think I'll EVER come up with an original idea. Am I truly doomed to just be a "Johnny-come-lately" on all kinds of cool theological ideas? Oh well. "Throw me a friggin bone here, people" LOL!

Anyways...


****************************************

Doc:

quote:

---

Whitehead holds that the subjective aim is not only God-influenced, but God-determined. It is HIS aim. But the actual occasion is "free" to confrom to it or not, and in what degree. Neville finds this unintelligible, for it implies that actual occasions create themselves in response to the subjecdtive aim ex nihilo. So he supposes (as I recall... its been nearly 20 years since I read him) that thie subjective aim IS the essence of the actual occasion.

---

I would agree with Neville. And you dealt with this issue via the "dispositions" idea, right? And it was masterfully done, too. This prevents the responses from coming ex nihilo. NOW, this is why I banked so much on that. You've said before that is possible that God could retain the power to "measure" the superpositional disposition such that compatibilistic behavior is possible. If this is the case, then it stands to reason that God can do this for every occasion, yes?


****************************************

quote:

---

Meph: THUS we would have THEOLOGICAL DETERMINISM, in that God could well anticipate future events and predetermine ALL THINGS from his initial decision to create...but this would be in a PROCESS-TYPE frame work with interventional, supernaturalism is not posited.


Doc: True. But why is this an advantage for a biblical theist?

---

This would have the advantage of helping the Calvinistic type person to dodge the metaphysical problems that determinists usually run into. Nice advantage.


****************************************


Doc:

quote:

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If thought through consistently, I would maintain that if God's experience of an actual fact adds anything to God's foreknowledge of that fact, then God's "knowledge" of the fact was "incomplete." (I plan on arguing this at the EPS conference this fall). So you'd yet have to hold to THIS MUCH of the open view.

---

Fine by me.



****************************************

quote:

---

Meph: Another analogy would be the case as well. The Chessmaster who, for all intents and purposes, plays HIMSELF. One who basically takes another person as his opponent, yet constrains that person such that she ONLY makes the plays that the Chessmaster wishes.

Doc: I agree with Modes that this would be boring. At the very least, its far less praiseworthy than a God who actually plays OTHERS, anticipating their POSSIBLE moves, but neither dictating or foreknowing their ACTUAL moves.

---

The "boring" thing to me is quite unpersuasive. God just being God would be the height of esctacy. And the "praiseworthy" thing seems to be a very anthropocentric thing where humans would actually say that God is not worthy of praise...even though he creates and sustains an entire reality! Whew! I don't dig that. Heh.

****************************************

Doc:

quote:

---

All pantheists have said that the world is "real to us." Its just not ULTIMATELY real as a distinct reality over and against God. If this is so, LOVE is real only to us. Now, Aquinas said this. But do YOU really want to say this?

---

This doesn't work. Think about this metaphysically. How is our God/world relation NOT real? It's the EPITOME of what is real. Doc, on what basis can you say that the God/world relation is NOT real...when, by definition, it's "reality"? And with the love thing. The only way that I can see you saying that love is only real to us is to ASSUME that God doesn't accept our love as genuine. Given my Jesus argument above, I can't see how someone could do this coherently if they hold to the "could, but would not" idea of Jesus' impeccability. I would say that love would be real to God AND us.


****************************************

The main benefit of my 7 points is that theological determinists don't have to worry about constantly being attacked for possessing an outdated Newtonian worldview or lacking knowledge of current trends in science. One can hold to these findings...and STILL affirm theological determinism and predestination consistently.

****************************************

Doc:

quote:

---

This doesn't help you escape pantheism. All pantheists concede this much. OR, I would argue, you are not being consistent. If "a" exhaustively determines (viz . reduces options down to one) "b," then "b" is simply "a" all over again. ALL over-againstness presupposes SOME autonomous power.

---

About the pantheism thing. I've thought about that. Let's say I take your idea. I can easily adapt my idea to make this work. Think of Pierce's idea of how ALL causation is really teleological. That mechanical causation is really just low-grade telelogical? What if I were to apply this line of thought to the "dispositional" idea? In other words, I could posit that there is ALWAYS some level of "wiggle-room" in the disposition...but it's negligible. So, God really DOESN'T whittle everything down to one option, meaning ONE POSSIBLE STATE OF REALITY...but sufficiently constrains things to the extent that determinism is largely in effect. What this would entail is that SOME autonomy DOES exist between God and the world. And though it wouldn't really matter as far as the processes of the determinism active in reality, these little negligible actualization of "wiggles" could be observed by God for aesthetic value. So, in short, I could affirm that ALL actual occasions EXHIBIT some level of AUTONOMOUS self-determination, but NEGLIGIBLE for all intents and purposes.

What would this do? It would introduce some genuine ambiguity into this mix for God...but it would be so negligible as to pretty much functionally operate like determinism. This would provide the necessary autonomy to be the "puppet" rather than the "inherent pantheism" you mention! Not that you would think that's much better, right?

[Digression: This should go to show something. It's not necessarily just the existence of "ambiguity" that would do the trick. There would have to be a SIGNIFICANT amount of it to accomplish what open view theists desire.]

****************************************

Doc:

quote:

---

Bottom line: I think it a great compliment to you that you on your own anticipated so much of the creativity and insightfulness of Robert Neville. At the same time, I see no reason to buy it.

---

Preciate that, Doc. Oh, and don't worry about me becoming a Nevillian. I prefer my current brand of trinitarian process. Why? I don't know. Wait. I DO know. I think I like the idea that Creation has a significant amount autonomy from God. That Creation is worth something, in and of itself. So, I don't do it for any highly existentialist reasons, but just because I like the idea of that. Given my theistic bootlicker mentality, I'd accept either view. I really could go either way, but I prefer my trinitarian process idea right now.

This whole thing was pretty much just to show that IF someone really wanted to hold to Calvinistic, theological determinism, they could do so in a manner that would be logical and viable to the modern mind. Good arguments could be given for it, too...generally along the lines in contradistinction to some of the GROSS anthropocentrism found in other relational views. [Note: I personally think that the "glorification idea" prevents this from happening in the open view!!]


****************************************

Now, let's look at some things...

For open theism...

It the case that God can "measure" the superposition of dispositions AT ANY TIME, but chooses not due to covenantal choices made both AT the creative act AND during the emergence of continual creation. In order to have the INTERACTION with the world that God desired, he convented to, FOR THE MOST PART, grant SIGNIFICANT power to the contrary to all experiences. But he reserves the right to reduce that significant power to NEGLIGIBLE levels to do specific things that God sees fit. This has two effects: 1) it allows for God to do significantly UNILATERAL acts in history 2) it presents the ETHICAL problems dealing WITH those specific acts (or choices of inaction).

It is granted that there is an OVERALL "greater good" of God allowing for love to exist. However, this does LITTLE to deal with the theodicy issues of PARTICULAR evils...even with the idea of God's levels of self-limitation. In the end, what must be posited is that for these acts or (omissions of acts) God MUST HAVE had a reason that seemed good to Him...and we have to trust in that God's wisdom about that. This basically means that open view theists do in PART what Calvinists have to do for the WHOLE of their view. This also means that open view theism is different from Calvinistic ideas in degree, not kind, in that open view theism is willing to say that NOT ALL events of death, mayhem, and suffering ultimately come from God.

So, what can MOST GENERALLY be said? God SO desired the existence of reciprocating love and living novelty of AT LEAST one non-God sentient being that God was willing to not only accept the inevitable emergence of "evil" (ie death, pain, suffering) in order to have this idea realized, but also the possibility that God would have to use imperfect "evil" MEANS to sometimes get God's purposes done. Hey, if you want an omellette, ya gotta break some eggs, right?

[Notice this doesn't presume any type of particular religious framework or final state of existence]

Hmmm...I can dig it. I think it's a workable idea that:

--is BROAD enough to encompass ambiguity on many levels,
--grounds our most existentially felt concepts objectively
--gives God the power to speak and act unilaterally
--can be a very positively motivating belief for this life (even in the case of it's falsity)

Cool enough.

**************************************


Modes, I'd STILL like to see what that divine speech would look like!

Thanks again for the kudos, Doc.


Blessings, yo,


Edited by - Mephi2K on 08/30/2002 08:16:33 AM

quote:

---

If this is what you think, then I have one request. I want you to attempt to craft some divine speech that would 1) be "truthful" about God's lack of ambiguity and 2) convey conversational language that is MEANINGFUL to human beings. This can be in the form of commands, prophecies, whatever. See, just like Doc says, we implicitly act upon what we EXPECT from revelation. So, before I can accept the idea that God (in my theological deterministic system) would be explicitly deceitful by acting AS IF ambiguity existed with God...I need you to CONCRETELY show me how divine revelation WOULD possibly look like IF this SAME God were to be utterly "truthful" Give my something that I can contrast. Don't be shy, now!

Take this seriously, yo. This isn't some type of "playing God" thing. This is the ONLY way that I'm going to understand what you are talking about.

---

quote:

---

My response is simply that this is exactly the type of speech the ancients expected and believed that they received from gods through oracles. The non-personal Cassandra-type fortune telling type stuff. What is definitively different about God's communication is that it at least often, though not always, is personal in nature. God's desire for intimacy with creation is the difference that explains this.

So, rather than: [the word of the oracle is:] "X" (insert whoever's name) shall fall upon tragedy at the wedding in which you are about to partake (this is very close to an actual example but is from memory).

That is not negotiable, no real relationship between the speaker and the hearer is needed or posited. Whereas God might say, "If you do not heed my warning, then...." and this is personal and interactive, but also reflects some ambiguity in the future.

Anyway, an honest presentation of communciation in the system you are toying with could basically speak as the oracles and fortune tellers did in ancient times. That would be clear, understandable and truthful.

---

Dangit. I should have made myself much more clear with that word "conversational." I meant PERSONAL conversation. Basically what what divine language sound like IF the God I posit wanted to have CONVERSATIONS with humans where orders and things like that were given. My point was going to be that it's IMPOSSIBLE without speaking in terms of future ambiguity. This was the point that I made way back in the "Anthropomorphism" thread. God would limited to Cassandra-type NON PERSONAL speech. So, this would seem to leave only two types of modification for God to have personal interaction with humans:

1) give them significant autonomy
2) speak to them AS IF GOD WERE HUMAN (WAAAAAAY back in the Anthropomorphisms thread), including possessing ambiguity.

Where YOU may see "deceit", I (AND OTHERS) would see a NECESSARY CONDESCENSION of language that bolsters God's intentions to speak to us in terms we can MORE FULLY understand and deal with. This condescension is expresses God's intentions for the relationship, but does not EMBODY the FULL metaphysical ramifications, as it would hinder the communication itself. Lion-Lamb dug that idea. OTHER Calvinistic types I've talked to dug that idea. So, I contend that it would work fine IF you wanted to be a Calvinistic type.


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Modes:

quote:

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I think a fair response to this question can be stated in that insofar as Meph is holding up "logical tightness" as the highest criterion at this moment, these things do seem to provide some steps in that direction. Doc's questioning of the benefits is under a different criterion: biblical adequacy. Meph, knows that the ideas he's playing with are not biblically adequate, I think perhaps he is just working the ideas through logically, and it may be partially motivated by a testing of the overall adequacy of the system. If the system can adequately provide for the oppositions system, without itself failing to retain coherence, then the encompassing system can be said to be superior in that regard.

---

I think that the whole "biblical adequacy" thing we dealt with largely in the "Anthropomorphisms" thread. This thing CAN be biblically adequate, if one chooses to be so. This thread only shows the plausibility of the theological deterministic worldview. It was NOT MEANT to deal with the exegetical issues of reconciling it with Scripture. We danced that dance long time ago. And if anything, what that dance showed was that, IF ONE IS SO INCLINED, people can have presuppositions that allow for the Biblical God to exhaustively know the future. It largely comes down to this. Because, as I recall, it's ALSO hard to distribute the open view hermeneutic over all Scripture. So, I contend that this thing CAN BE biblical adequate. If you wish, we can just bring ALLLLLLLL those anthropomorphism pages back up again! LOL

Let's not forget that the criterion of biblical adequacy ultimately is driven by PRESUPPOSITIONS and assumptions about reality. If we've learned anything from all this, it's probably that.

******************************************

Modes:

quote:

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Okay, you are applying the criteria of logic to an aesthetic judgment. If beauty is the coming together of form and content, freedom and necessity, the principle of contrast, unity and diversity, etc. then we are saying that the ultimate expression of that is going to be God's bringing together things that are REALLY other than God in as many respects as is coherent. God's reconciling the world to Godself when the world is just a puppet on God's hand or a chess player that God controls is quite boring under these criteria. Not at all beautiful. The form of beauty may be there but the content is still God. The contrast needs to be there throughout the "other." Both in form and content. Anyway, I am really a fish out of water in conversations about aesthetics, so I'll shut up while I am only in this deep. I do think that an aesthetic assessment requires an aesthetic criterion. Boring is a contrast to beauty not "reasonable".

---

When you say "REALLY other than God", basically I hear you saying that you feel it must be significantly so, to the point that a much higher level of autonomy is granted to Creation. But AGAIN, I believe that this is going by your opinion of beauty. One man's garbage is another man's treasure. There's nothing set in stone saying that God HAS to want the significant level of autonomy that you see. Both the form AND content are there...the content is just LESS than you think it needs to be. Who knows? For God, LESS could be MORE in this area.


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Dealing with aesthetics.

Here's the thing. Doc's reconstruction of process theology helps a little TOO much. (Thinking about Doc's ideas) See, as I understand it, process says that the divine experience is maximal can can ONLY be provided by INTENSITY of the experience of the other. To me, this works in two ways: 1)the NUMBER of the others and 2) the AUTONOMY of the others (These two things together form the COMPLEXITY) And from that, process makes sense. It is easy to see why God would give the MAXIMUM amount of autonomy to others, while providing ENOUGH continuous structure to keep it from going to absolute chaos. This would seem, at least to me, to bolster the idea of God's divine agency ALWAYS being persuasive and IN NO WAY coercive. But when Doc posits what he does about God's "need" for felt aesthetic value being met by Godself, then this does a number of things besides remove the NECESSITY of the God/world relationship. It also states that the amount of complexity in Creation CAN be negligible. God would not HAVE to want to maximize felt aesthetic value from Creation.

What THIS entails to me is that, IF GOD WANTED a deterministic world that played out like a movie before a Screenwriter, THAT WOULD BE OK with God.

See, the only thing I think y'all could do is to say that it's part of God's disposition to ALWAYS seek the maximal amount of aesthetic value in WHATEVER God can experience. But guess what? If you were to say that, I'd basically argue that the divine agency would end up JUST LIKE THAT OF process theology, where NO coercive power is ever used...and NO compatibilism is ever considered. Since this whole thing was to make God free, I would contend that God should be "free" to find aesthetic enjoyment with AS LITTLE COMPLEXITY IN CREATION as God wishes. To me, what open view theism states is that God wishes to maximize aesthetic value from Creation WITHIN THE LIMITS OF GOD'S COVENANTAL DECISION of how much unilateral power to exhibit. But this would lie on the same continuum as what the theological determinism could say.

And we should honor that freedom!

This is why at the end, we'll say stuff like what Doc says...

quote:

---

a) I don't see why he WOULD want this world; b) If he DID "create" this kind of world, I would think it would look a whole lot better than it does; c) If he DID create this world, I think the Bible would speak a whole lot differently about it' and d) I don't see any good reason to suppose that this possible world IS the actual world.

---

It becomes VERY subjective, right? Perhaps God has ideas different from Doc. And would be happy with things that Doc wouldn't. Isn't that possible?


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Sweet stuff!



PS: Reading the email...now!

Edited by - Mephi2K on 08/30/2002 2:42:00 PM

quote:

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How about this: I'm wondering if the "longing" for subjective immortality (NOT NECESSARILY unity with God) is not one of the fundamental reasons why people choose to be Christians. I'm wondering if the only reason that some people long for God is the promise of SUBJECTIVELY experiencing a utopian state. I wonder if people would be so enduring if it turned out the unification with God ended up NOT being any type of subjective immortality where SOME people experience unification with God, but some type of "hive-mentality" (for lack of a better term) with God that ALL beings experienced where subjectivity and objectivity are blurred. The "individual experience of total unity" would be such that the experience of ONE is the experience of ALL, and each one experiences the TOTAL EXPERIENCE of the collective...if experience is even a good word for it. (Kind of like my idea of perichoresis, honestly). A condition where DISTINCTIONS may exist without real DIFFERENCE. In this way, subjective immortality as it is conceived by most people (ie mansions in the sky, having 70 virgins, etc) would be grossly inaccurate to describe the situation. It really does fit more with an alternate conception.

---

and...

Meph:

quote:

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Hmmmm...I have an example that might help. Imagine that you are in a room where there is only YOU and one other person. You are both facing one another. Now, further imagine that you are able to EXPERIENCE everything that that other person is experiencing (including thoughts and feelings!). And its the same thing with the other person. So, basically you not only experience YOURSELF, but you also experience the other person's self-reflective experience. Weirdly enough, you get to experience that other person experiencing YOUR self-reflective experience!

What you end up with is a weird state of existence where subjectivity and objectivity are pretty much blurred to obscurity. There are distinctions between you and the other. But they pretty much end up being merely FORMAL. But the experience is somehow MORE than the sum of it's parts because of the ability to experience others experiencing YOU. Your experience of one another is such that neither of you can really extract YOURSELF from it. The Borg, I suppose. This is pretty much what I believe probably happened in the pre-Incarnation Trinity.

To say that you are a PERSON in this scenario is kind of difficult. It would seem that "you" would be God and God would be "you" And it's not to hard to imagine that in the midst of this, a sense of individuality that we are used to is lost.

---

and...

Empiress:

quote:

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Electra wrote:
quote:
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Here’s a hang-up I have. I don’t understand how an “object + object” relationship is intelligible (unless a subject wills their relationship), and I associate “subject + object” relationships with violence (that’s why I used the rape example). Maybe someone can help reframe this for me?
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I think you're having trouble because you're thinking in purely dualistic/dichotomous terms. I am not proposing that we somehow move from a "subject + subject" relationship to an "object + object" relationship. I am claiming that it is possible that the ultimate end of our subject + subject relationship with God culminates in a total unity with the Godhead, one in which such language ceases to have meaning. One in which we are now one with the "subject" of our love, existing in union within God in the Trinitarian relationship without independent subjective experience.

---

and...

Empiress:

quote:

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I'm merely saying I do not believe it is a necessity that we remain subjective individuals in order to participate in, what could be, the ultimate, best, most loving plan for creation: total unity in God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

I want to ask, why, once we have chosen to intermingle our wills totally with God's, do our individual wills continue to remain more meaningful? What necessary distinction is there between our wills' and God's if we are in perfect unity with God? It seems to me that God's will, with ours in unity with God's, becomes all meaningful as -one.-

---

Hopefully, this will kind of illustrate where I'm going. I believe that there can be a state of such interchange between subjects who experience each other that subjectivity and objectivity BLUR into a type of UNITY where though there are MORE THAN ONE centers of willing, there ends up only being ONE CONSCIOUSNESS (more or less) that constantly is enriched by ALL participants of said state, and enhances each "individual". In this state, it would be IMPOSSIBLE to extract the "I" from the "you" and vice versa. They would functionall be one and the same. The distinctions that exists between all the participants would exist, but would be NEGLIBLE and not significant.

In other words, Doc it's KINDA like what you say:

A unity that IS a oneness of intersubjectivity -- a unity of LOVE --is the nature of God and the telos of all reality

...but taken to the ULTIMATE LEVEL! Where there is such an exchange between subjects in the intersubjectivity, that only UNITY remains. We are talking the ULTIMATE expression of unity in diversity, the ULTIMATE experience of love! It's a possible state of reality where subjectivity and objectivity formally exist...but no longer have much potency as concepts.



An example of my idea will help. Look at Jesus. Now you know how Scripture says that when he appears, we shall be like Him? What if this means that LIKE JESUS we will experience SUCH UNITY with God (and subsequently others) in our final states that their will cease to be any meaningful separation between OUR experience and GOD's experience, our thoughts and GOD'S thoughts? And in this way, we experience the divine life and love of God as true PARTAKERS in the perchoretic love of the Trinity.





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Doc:

quote:

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Doc: I think it sounds interesting AND heretical. Seriously, Meph, if I'm understanding you correctly, your proposal constitutes a complete paradigm shift from Christian orthodoxity... in an eastern monistic direction. In the east, the ideal is to loose individuality and become the one. In Christianity, the ideal is to become the perfect instantiation of your individuality by participating in God's internal perfect relationality. The question, ultimately, comes down to this. Is LOVE the ultiamte reality and the goal of created reality, or not?

---

I'll state this boldly. Love IS the ultimate reality and the goal of created reality. I believe that with EVERYTHING that's theistic about me. My issue is that, like Empiress, I think that the nature of this "love" is only APPROXIMATED by our current experience of "love" We have no real means of EXPERIENCING the depth of penetrating intersubjectivity that exists in the Trinity...and because of this, the FEELING of it escapes us. But I believe that it goes BEYOND our current experiences of loving intersubjectivity.

Look at your ideal: "the ideal is to become the perfect instantiation of your individuality by participating in God's internal perfect relationality." I would say what you already believe, I'm betting: the ultimate recognition of one's individuality IN ITS FULLNESS is to completely PARTICIPATE in perfect relationality with all things. One cannot fully know the depths of oneself until that one can see how he/she is experienced by all other things who experience him/her. Once I have this perspective, I am truly instantiating my individuality PERFECTLY. But at the same time, I am experiencing perfect relationality with the triune God all all other beings. See what I'm saying?


This idea is DISTINCT from the idea of LOSING one's individuality to BECOME the one. It implies losing PERSONALITY to become IMPERSONAL...and THAT's what we don't like. I would say that the element of truth in the eastern monistic idea is that one DOES seek to identify so much with the one that individuality AS WE PRESENTLY CONCEIVE IT no longer exists. However, the difference is that with my conception, PERSONALITY is never lost...nor is any sense of RELATIONS between SUBJECTS!



See, I KNEW that some people would look at what I was stating, and figure that I'm going the deep end. But when further explained, I really think this is NOT as unorthodox as some people may think. What do you think, NOW, Doc?


WhoHOOOO,

quote:

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A world that lacked truly autonomous, free agents interacting with each other and with God would, I believe, have less aesthetic value than a world with such creatures... for a world which lacked free agents would be a world incapable of intersubjective love (is there a different kind?), and intersubjective love IS BEAUTIFUL.

Still, you are right, if God's aesthetic satisfaction is fulfilled in his own internal relationality, then there is (in contrast to Process thought) to metaphysical NEED for God to have any particular kind of world, or any world at all. But IF God wants to EXPRESS HIS Unsurpassable Beauty "ad extra," then he must create a certain KIND of world.

---

I agree with this...and frankly, think that this is the STRONGEST ARGUMENT for 1) the existence of free will and 2) relational theological positions (open view theism being one of them). The thought that "intersubjective love" between subjects is the EXPRESSION of unsurpassable beauty...and that for such expression to be EXISTENTIALLY FELT by the objects of divine love, a certain kind of existence needs to exist. Cool stuff. All I'm saying is that your system, in giving God's significant FREEDOM from Creation, implicitly has the idea that whatever "satisfaction" he gets from Creation is veritable "icing on the cake" of his satisfaction with his Triune self. And once we say that, a Calvinistic determinist COULD use this idea to their advantage by defining love DIFFERENTLY from you. I'm just saying this is POSSIBLE if some theological determinist WANTED to do so.

But let me go back to my original thought. Let's look at what I said:

Intersubjective love between subjects is the EXPRESSION of unsurpassable beauty...and that for such expression to be EXISTENTIALLY FELT by the objects of divine love, a certain kind of existence needs to exist.

Now, check this out. I think that we would say that PERFECTION/CONSUMMATION of unsurpassable beauty in ALL existence depends on not only the EXPRESSION of love, but it's RECEPTION AND RECIPROCATION. To the extent that divine love is not completely received and reciprocated by the beloved, said love is not perfect. I would also suggest that to the degree that this is not done we feel more of a SEPARATION OF SELF from others (INCLUDING GOD). The divine triune love IS perfect because there is continuous expression, reception, and reciprocation of life and love. Now, let's do the math. It would seem that the MAXIMIZATION of aesthetic feeling and the CONSUMMATION of the divine intent would only exist if ALL existent subjects constantly expressed, received, and reciprocated love to ALL OTHER SUBJECTS EXPERIENCED. This would include the Triune God who IS love. At this state, said subjects would be participating in the PERFECTION of love found within the Trinity.


Clear as mud???


Holla,



Edited by - Mephi2K on 09/01/2002 3:45:59 PM

quote:

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When Thou shalt come, O righteous Judge, to execute just judgment, seated on Thy throne of glory, a river of fire will draw all men amazed before Thy judgment-seat; the powers of heaven will stand beside Thee, and in fear mankind will be judged according to the deeds that each has done. Then spare us, Christ, in Thy compassion, with faith we entreat Thee, and count us worthy of Thy blessings with those that are saved. (Vesperal Sticheron from the Triodion)

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quote:

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Behold there comes a day of the Lord almighty, and who shall endure the fear of His presence? For it is a day of wrath; the furnace shall burn, and the Judge shall sit and give to each the due return for his works. (Exapostilarion from Matins)

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quote:

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The Lord comes to judge: who can endure the sight of Him? Tremble thou, my wretched soul, tremble and prepare for thy departure.

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quote:

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When the thrones are set up and the books are opened, and God sits in judgment, oh what fear there will be then! When the angels stand trembling in Thy presence and the river of fire flows before Thee, what shall we do then, who are guilty of many sins? When we hear Him call the blessed of His Father into the Kingdom, but send the sinners to their punishment, who shall endure His fearful condemnation? (From the Vesperal Troparion)

---

Of the "The Sunday of the Last Judgment" (Sunday of Meat-fare) one contemporary commentator remarked:

quote:

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". . . In a world where the love and mercy of God are righteously and properly emphasized, but in which fear and dread are seen as negative psychological or social motivators, their emphasis in the holy rites of the Church can strike the contemporary hearer as strange, out of place, dated.

Yet it is perhaps this very distancing of the modern mind from a true and healthy understanding of fear that makes its emphasis in the Church of such importance. In the Sundays that precede the arrival of the Great Fast on the Sunday of Forgiveness, we are gradually--yet firmly--reminded of the human attitudes necessary for a proper relationship to God in Trinity. In the story of Zaccheus, shared in the Church on the last Sunday before the Triodion, we are exhorted to that same sense of longing and desire for union with Christ that drove small Zaccheus to his tree-top: reminded that lest a soul actively search after God, it will devise ways ever to grow further from Him.
www.monachos.net/great_lent/last_judgment.shtml

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quote:

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Fear and trembling beyond all description are there: for the Lord will come and try the work of every man. And who will not mourn for himself? (From the fifth Canticle of the Matins Canon)

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quote:

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I lament and weep when I think of the eternal fire, the outer darkness and the nether world, the dread worm and the gnashing of teeth, and the unceasing anguish that shall befall those who have sinned without measure, by their wickedness arousing Thee to anger, O Supreme in Love. And among them in misery I am first... (From the Vesperal Stichera)

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quote:

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Terror seizes me when I think of the unquenchable fire, of the bitter worm, the gnashing of teeth, and soul-destroying hell; yet I do not turn in true compunction. O Lord, Lord, before the end, strengthen Thy fear within me.

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"We are not called to fear simply to be 'scared,' but to be prompted into action. As we sing at Vespers:"

quote:

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When we hear Him call the blessed of His Father into the Kingdom, but send the sinners to their punishment, who shall endure His fearful condemnation? But Saviour who alone lovest mankind, before the end comes, turn me back through repentance and have mercy on me.

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quote:

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How shall it be in that hour and fearful day, when the Judge shall sit on His dread throne! The books shall be opened and men’s actions shall be examined, and the secrets of darkness shall be made public. Angels shall hasten to and fro, gathering all the nations. Come ye and hearken, kings and princes, slaves and free, sinners and righteous, rich and poor: for the Judge comes to pass sentence on the whole inhabited earth. And who shall bear to stand before His face in the presence of the angels, as they call us to account for our actions and our thoughts, whether by night or by day? How shall it be then in that hour!

But before the end is here, make haste, make haste, my soul, and cry: 'O God who only art compassionate, turn me back and save me!'

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Edited by - Al2Si2H4O9 on 09/01/2002 9:27:48 PM

quote:

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The perichoretic dance presupposes individuation

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Fast forward to the next post and poster if you don't want to spend just a little time with the word "individuation" My purpose here, it not to pick on the word, or what Doc meant. As I said above, I'm just going to lay something on the table -- an idea, with a few accompanying terms -- so that another way to approach the matter can be present for the usefulness of all.

Christos Yannaras has this to say: "Orthodox iconography . . . brings out personal universality without ending in impersonal formalism."

I'm wondering whether "individuation" isn't too Humanistic.

Besides just the contrast between "personal" and "individual" (www.jbburnett.com/yannaras/yannaras-person.html), here are the other terms. See if they are suggestive:

• Personal distinctiveness
• personal immediacy
• self-transcendence
• personal existence

CONTRAST that with this:

• . . . his fall, which was the free subjection of his personal distinctiveness to the necessities and dictates of natural individuality . . .

SO... I like what Yannaras is saying. And I'll chose to consider "personal distinctiveness" over-and-against "individuality."

OBSERVATION: I find strong reason to believe that the Orthodox understanding of the Trinity--in contrast to that of Augustine--is underlying this difference!!! (See Lossky on Trinity {"God in Trinity" http://www.jbburnett.com/lossky/lossky-trinity.html} and Procession {"The Procession of the Holy Spirit in Orthodox Trinitarian Doctrine" http://www.jbburnett.com/lossky/lossky-filioque.html } ) There is no small difference; and how it bears out in our understanding of the Person for humans, and differences in how that bears out, is rooted in our doctrines of the Trinity. (But discussion of the Trinity can be for another night.)


eph, Shall we continue?

I'm going to make a bit of a jump here. Rather than referring to live human beings, or to the Trinity, I'm going to refer to paintings. Yes, paintings. You guessed it! Icons.

quote:

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For the Byzantine iconographer, the only existential reality beyond corruption and death is the person, the dynamic transcendence of individuality which constitutes a transformation in the mode of existence. It is no longer a matter of reducing the concrete to the abstract universality of an idea which is a "metaphysical" datum, accessible to the intellect alone. At issue is the potential existing in concrete reality, in man's individual flesh and the flesh of the world, to participate in the true life of personal distinctiveness, of freedom from any natural predetermination. In the icon, the iconographer sets out the personal mode of existence which is love, communion and relationship, the only mode which forms existential distinctiveness and freedom into a fact of life and a hypostasis of life.

---

• dynamic transcendence of individuality


• the potential existing in concrete reality
• existential distinctiveness and freedom

I suppose in some "Trinitarian" theories "individuation" is deemed necessary. But I dare say that is not Orthodox. (Dare I be so bold here?) Lossky says: "The threefold number is not, as we commonly understand it, a quantity; when it relates to the indivisibly united divine hypostases, the 'sum' of which is always the unity, 3=1, it expresses the ineffable order within the Godhead." (God in Trinity, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, 1976). Lossky says more also: of "... a 'relation of opposition" in the Latin filoque theory in "which the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father and the Son as from one principle of spiration" Lossky makes some POINTED observations and commentary:

quote:

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This triadological principle, formulated by Thomas Aquinas, becomes unavoidable the moment that the doctrine of the procession of the Holy [77] Spirit ab utroque is admitted. It presupposes the following conditions: (1) That relations are the basis of the hypostases,{9} which define themselves by their mutual opposition, the first to the second, and these two together to the third. (2) That two persons represent a non-personal unity, in that they give rise to a further relation of opposition. (3) That in general the origin of the persons of the Trinity therefore is impersonal, having its real basis in the one essence, which is differentiated by its internal relations. The general character of this triadology may be described as a pre-eminence of natural unity over personal trinity, as an ontological primacy of the essence over the hypostases.

The attitude of Orthodox thought, when confronted with the mysterious name of the Holy Spirit, denoting a divine economy rather than a hypostatic mark of distinction, is far from being simply a refusal to define his personal diversity. On the contrary, because that diversity, or (to speak more generally) the diversity of the Three Persons, is presented as something absolute, we refuse to admit a relation of origin which opposes the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son, taken as a single principle. If this were admitted, personal diversity in the Trinity in effect would be relativized: Inasmuch as the Holy Spirit is one hypostasis, the Holy Spirit only represents the unity of the two in their identical nature. Here the logical impossibility of any opposition between three terms intervenes, and the clarity of this triadological system shows itself to be extremely superficial. Indeed, on these lines, we cannot reach a mode of distinguishing the three hypostases from each another without confounding them in one way or another with the essence. In fact, the absolute diversity of the Three cannot be based on their relations of opposition without admitting, implicitly or explicitly, the primacy of the essence over the hypostases, by assuming a relative (and therefore secondary) basis for personal diversity, [78] in contrast to natural identity.{10} But that is exactly what Orthodox theology cannot admit.
(pp. 71-96 in Chapter 4: "The Procession of the Holy Spirit in Orthodox Trinitarian Doctrine" of In the Image and Likeness of God, 1974. www.jbburnett.com/lossky/lossky-trinity.html )

---

My point is NOT to start and arguement as to doctrine of the Trinity. The relevance here is that the concept of the PERSON in Orthodox Trinitarian doctrine and the concept of the PERSON with regards to human being in Yannaras is the SAME. www.jbburnett.com/yannaras/yannaras-person.html

As to whether Doc's comment of "individuation" stems from Aquinas and ultimately from the Filoque, I think that Yannaras and Lossky might say so; but I won't go there.

But notice Lossky's comments about the Trinity versus hiw criticism of the Filoque does fit my opening quot: "...it brings out personal universality without ending in impersonal formalism." (The Orthodox criticize the Filoque for bringing an impersonal element into the Trinity.)


eph, You like these ILLUMINATED fonts?


Yannaras says this, by way of contrasting individual and personal with respect to humans:

quote:

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. . . The individual is the denial or neglect of the distinctiveness of the person, the attempt to define human existence using the objective properties of man's common nature, and quantitative comparisons and analogies.

Chiefly in the field of sociology and politics, the human being is frequently identified with the idea of numerical individuality. . . . In everyday life, too, we generally distinguish persons by applying to individuals the characteristics and attributes common to human nature, with merely quantitative differentiations. When we want to designate a person, we make a collection of individual attributes and natural characteristics which are never "personal" in the sense of being unique and unrepeatable, however fine the quantitative nuances we achieve for designating individuals.

Personal distinctiveness *forms the image* of God in man. It is the *mode of existence* shared by God and man, the *ethos* of trinitarian life imprinted upon the human being.
(pp. 22-23 in Chapter 6, "Person and individual", The Freedom of Morality, 1984)

---

eph,

I'll close this mid-night collage with something about stone and wood -- about architecture. The "distinctiveness" of all of Creation is important. And in Byzantine churches this is no less true. Yannaras has an interesting comparison of these worship houses in comparison to Greek Temples, and to Gothic Cathedrals. Its worth the read. But I'll just leave this much here.

quote:

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http://www.jbburnett.com/yannaras/yannaras-art.html#sec4

For the Byzantine, however, the point is precisely this: the truth of the Church is neither a set ideological system whereby we ascend by analogy to the transcendent– the excessive or the immense– nor a majestic organization with an authoritatively established administrative structure which mediates between man and God. The Church for the Byzantine is the event of the eucharist, the participation of what is created in the true life –- the trinitarian mode of communion and relationship. And this mode is the body of the Church, the flesh of the world which has been assumed by Christ: it is the whole of creation in the dimensions of the Kingdom.

. . . reveals this reality of the worldly flesh of the Word, the fact of God's kenosis [i.e., his 'self-emptying' in the incarnation], and the 'deification' of created things, the way in which by taking on our material nature, God hypostasizes our existence in the divine life of incorruption and immortality. Like the ascetic in his direct encounter with his body, the architect encounters his material with the same freedom of humility and self-abnegation; and he studies the points of resistance and also the potentialities of nature. He looks for the inner principle, the "reason" [logos] in matter which was in abeyance before the incarnation but is now dynamic; that reason which connects the baseness and resistances of the natural material with the amazing potential in that same matter to contain the Uncontainable and give flesh to Him who is without flesh, to be exalted into the flesh of God the Word –- into the Church.

---

Meph, I remember you commenting on how the INCARNATION was more revolutionary than the Resurrection. This discussion reminded me of that comment of yours! (Of course I'll take them both.)






Edited by - Al2Si2H4O9 on 09/02/2002 08:03:07 AM

quote:

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I also want to deal with the end of death.

I said:
"Heaven" would encompass the state of participating in the truine exchange of divine life and love, in the emerging reality of pantheistic monism. "Hell" is diminishing temporary existence into entropy. (This somewhat goes along with Doc's idea of "hell" as seen in Satan and the Problem of Evil)

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WHAT do you mean when you refer to a "pantheistic monism?"

I felt just fine along the lines of "participating in the truine exchange of divine life and love," BECAUSE I know that I can only do that IN CHRIST.

Its the old "God (big-G) became man that man might become god (little-g) BY GRACE. Jesus is God by nature; you and I yearn to be god/deified/participate-in-"eternal-life" by grace.

So its the "monism" part that is bothing me. I'm not planning on becoming the fourth person of the Trinity.

"It's the Christological aspect of soteriology, brother."
____

Otherwise I'm probably with you.....

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Either there really are distinctions that endure, or there are not. After we answer that, we can address the question of what sorts of distinctions those might be (objective/subjective, divine/human, necessary/contingent, etc.). Some seem to be suggesting that these distinctions, some of which seem to be ontological, are actually able to be transcended. That seems a very paradoxical claim indeed. We do claim that Christ was fully God and fully human, but we do not thereby imply that there is no longer a difference between being God and being a human being. We speak of the unity of bride and groom, but we retain the distinction intuitively as well.

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What I am basically saying is that, though distinctions will remain, the DIFFERENCE that those distinctions make could end up being so negligible that they may as well NOT EXIST. Yes, there would be a FORMAL distinction between God and non-God entities...but if what I'm suggesting is true, the perichoretic activity between ALL LIVING BEINGS at the consummation of this thing would end up FUNCTIONALLY being like into a pantheistic monism. Though there would be MANY "centers of willing" in existence, they would relate to one another in such a fashion as to functionally compose ONE CONSCIOUSNESS. (Not unlike the idea of the Trinity with the idea of 3 PERSONS but one ESSENCE) God would TRULY be "all in all" We would be in God (and each other) JUST LIKE CHRIST IS IN GOD. That's saying a whole heck of a lot...ESPECIALLY when we take Jesus as being the Second Person in the Trinity. For all intents and purposes, if we were to partake fully in the PERFECT love existent in the Trinity, there WOULD effectively be more "members" in the Trinity. OF COURSE, the distinctions of necessary/contingent, divine/non-divine, etc would remain...but at the state of life at that time, these distinctions REALLY wouldn't matter all that much.

As I'm seeing it, people are conceptualizing the afterlife such that a person would make this claim.

YOU are God. I am NOT God.

They posit intersubjectivity between God and humanity that still presumes a notable level of separation and ambiguity between the two, such that there is a significantly felt SEPARATION from God presupposed in the interaction. Yes, it may be more intense than what we know experience...but this surely cannot be what the risen JESUS now experiences with God, now can it? If we are to take the claim seriously that we shall be LIKE CHRIST at the end of this thing, then that would seem to entail some very important details and possibilities.


So, what you are saying is QUITE true:

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Its the old "God (big-G) became man that man might become god (little-g) BY GRACE. Jesus is God by nature; you and I yearn to be god/deified/participate-in-"eternal-life" by grace.

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All I'm doing is detailing how I think this may end up working out. What "deification" and "enjoying the PERFECT triune love" may actually be like. See what I'm saying? I think we're on the same page. It's just the pantheism thing that seems to get in the way, I believe.