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Tom
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   Posted 6/8/2002 12:22 AM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
If God must be temporal to act in a temporal world, then God must also be physical to act in a physical world. Since God, being immaterial, does act in a physical world, we have no reason to suppose that he could not be absolutely timeless while acting in a temporal world.

Is this a valid argument?

Tom


"Every saint has a history and every sinner a future." Oscar Wilde
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Starkman
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   Posted 6/8/2002 8:24 AM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Okay, thirty days hath Semptember . . . no wait. A bird in the hand is better than . . . um. Oh phooy! Where's my "Fallacies for You Today" book when I need it!

For the confused,

Starkman

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geebob
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   Posted 6/9/2002 12:33 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
I don't think there's enough here. I'd think you'd need to establish enough similarities between physicality and temporility before making this claim. What is it about God's in time such that they imply that God is in time? How is this parallel with God's relationship with the physical world if it is parallel at all?

I will gladly pay you teusday for a hamburger today.

-Wimpy
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Alan Rhoda
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   Posted 6/12/2002 4:18 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
quote:
If God must be temporal to act in a temporal world, then God must also be physical to act in a physical world. Since God, being immaterial, does act in a physical world, we have no reason to suppose that he could not be absolutely timeless while acting in a temporal world.


Geebob is right. Before we can properly evaluate the argument it needs to be fleshed out. As it stands, however, the argument is very weak. Why should we accept the first premise? To refute a conditional premise all one has to do is show that it is POSSIBLE for the antecedent to be true and the consequent false. So here goes:

We assume that God must be temporal to act in a temporal world (i.e., the antecedent is true). Now let's deny the consequent: God, a nonphysical, omnipresent being who sustains the very being of the physical order can act directly on the physical world. This claim is not obviously incoherent, nor does it contradict the antecedent, so it appears that it is possible for the antecedent to be true and the consequent false. Therefore, the first premise is false. Q.E.D.

Whoever is advancing the argument needs to do A LOT more work to defend the first premise by showing that temporality and physicality are sufficiently symmetrical with respect to the conditions they impose on agency that if one imposes a limitation on agency then the other imposes a corresponding limitation as well. Until this work has been done (if indeed it can be), I wouldn't lose much sleep over this argument.

In Christ,
Alan

Lege, lege, lege, ora, labora, et relege.
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Tom
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   Posted 6/12/2002 6:58 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
The argument as I presented it is used by N. Geisler against open theism's claim that God is not absolutely timeless. Perhaps he unpacks it a bit in his latest book. But that's all there is on this particular point on the article I read on his site.

Tom

"Every saint has a history and every sinner a future." Oscar Wilde
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Alan Rhoda
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   Posted 6/13/2002 3:29 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
quote:
If God must be temporal to act in a temporal world, then God must also be physical to act in a physical world. Since God, being immaterial, does act in a physical world, we have no reason to suppose that he could not be absolutely timeless while acting in a temporal world.


Lying in bed last night I thought a bit more about this argument. In my previous post I gave a negative response, arguing that there is really no good reason to think that the first premise is true. I think I can go a step further now and give a positive response. I want to argue that there is good reason to think the first premise is false.

To begin with, let us consider how divine temporality follows from the open view. As I understand it, the open view does not maintain that God must be temporal to act in a temporal world. Rather, the open view maintains that God must be temporal to interact with a temporal world in which the future is not fully settled. Furthermore, the open view does not maintain that God is temporal in all respects. God's character and divine nature are eternal and unchanging and are thus outside time. Divine temporality on the open view is limited to those aspects of his being that genuinely interact with an open world, most specifically his beliefs, plans, hopes, etc. regarding the future. Divine temporality in certain respects is a corollary of the openness of the future in that as the future is progressively settled, God's intentional states regarding the future will change, and change implies time.

Now does divine physicality follow from this? Some people argue that special relativity requires that anything that is in time is also in space. Time and space, it is argued, are so closely related that we need to think of them as a 4-dimensional construct: space-time. But this argument is not very good because there is no reason to think that special relativity would have to apply to God. Special relativity arises for us because we cannot simultaneously determine when two events take place due to the finite speed of light and the epistemic limitations it imposes on us. God, however, transcends the physical world. He is omnipresent and is immediately and simultaneously aware of everything that is taking place because he continually sustains its being. The speed of light, etc. just isn't relevant in God's case. Special relativity does not apply to him.

Nor is divine physicality implied by God's interaction with an open world. The locus of God's openness to the future and his temporality resides in his mental life--his plans, intentions, beliefs, hopes, etc. And minds (despite what modern-day naturalists claim) are not physical (because minds reflect on ideas and ideas aren't physical because they don't have any physical properties like size, shape, position, etc.).

I hope these musings make sense. If anyone finds out exactly what Geisler's argument is for the connection between divine temporality and divine physicality, please post it.

God bless,
Alan

Lege, lege, lege, ora, labora, et relege.
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SeaKayaker
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   Posted 7/21/2002 1:04 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Hello all,

I am new to posting here, but this seems to me a very interesting question worthy of some more discussion. Would anyone else be interested in continuing the discussion if I posted an evaluation of the argument?

Soli Deo Gloria,
Chris

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BJS
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   Posted 7/21/2002 1:21 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Welcome, Chris!

Brett

"Siste viator et memento mori."
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SeaKayaker
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   Posted 7/21/2002 2:06 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
quote:
If God must be temporal to act in a temporal world, then God must also be physical to act in a physical world. Since God, being immaterial, does act in a physical world, we have no reason to suppose that he could not be absolutely timeless while acting in a temporal world.


First of all, I agree that this argument needs some more fleshing out to state some of its propositions. I cannot find quite the right words to do so right now, but I will try to do so a little:

Premise1: There must be a continuity between God and creation in order for God to act within creation.
Conclusion1: God must be temporal to act in a temporal world.
C2: God must be physical to act in a physical world.

This deductive argument is formally valid. We can only question its soundness (the truth of the premise). To do that, this argument uses a reducio ad absurbum.

Reducio ad absurbum assumption (RAA): There must be a continuity between God and creation in order for God to act within creation.
C2: God must be physical to act in a physical world (God acts in the physical world, therefore God is physical)
P2: God is not physical
RA: There does not have to be a continuity between God and creation for God to act within creation.

Notice that C2 and P2 contradict each other, hence disproving the RAA. This argument is formally valid (it uses hypothetical syllogisms, RA, and simplification).

With the RA disproved, the first argument (the one that proved C1) is now proved unsound and not helpful for proving that God must be temporal to act in a temporal world. Does it prove that God is not temporal? I do not think so but some more precise terminology may allow for a stronger conclusion.

Any thoughts?


Soli Deo Gloria,
Chris
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Alan Rhoda
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   Posted 7/25/2002 2:39 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
SeaKayaker:
Premise1: There must be a continuity between God and creation in order for God to act within creation.
Conclusion1: God must be temporal to act in a temporal world.
C2: God must be physical to act in a physical world.

This deductive argument is formally valid.

Alan: The argument is only valid if you by "continuity" you mean "spatio-temporal continuity", so I assume you meant that to be understood.

SeaKayaker: We can only question its soundness (the truth of the premise). To do that, this argument uses a reductio ad absurdum.

Reductio ad absurdum assumption (RAA): There must be a continuity between God and creation in order for God to act within creation.
C2: God must be physical to act in a physical world (God acts in the physical world, therefore God is physical)
P2: God is not physical
RA: There does not have to be a continuity between God and creation for God to act within creation.

Notice that C2 and P2 contradict each other, hence disproving the RAA. This argument is formally valid (it uses hypothetical syllogisms, RA, and simplification).

Alan: Your argument here is actually invalid. The form of your argument is this:

RAA: If God acts within creation, then there is continuity between God and creation.
C2: If God acts in the physical world, then God is physical.
P2: God is not physical.
RA: Therefore, not RAA.

C2 and P2 are not contradictory as your claim. Together they imply

NA: God does not act in the physical world.

This is perfectly consistent with both RA and RAA. We can reconstruct your argument, however, to make it valid. Your statement of C2 includes in parentheses an additional proposition, which you should have listed separately to distinguish it from C2, namely:

C*: God acts in the physical world.

C2 and C* together imply that God is physical, which does contradict P2. Your argument then seems to be that RAA implies C2; and C2 together with an unobjectionable premise (C*) implies that God is physical, which contradicts a generally acknowledged truth, namely P2. Therefore RAA is false. So reconstructed, this is a good argument.

SeaKayaker: With [RAA] disproved, the first argument (the one that proved C1) is now proved unsound and not helpful for proving that God must be temporal to act in a temporal world. Does it prove that God is not temporal?

Alan: No, it does not prove that God is not temporal. All you have argued is that the continuity principle (RAA) is false if we grant that God acts in the physical world and that God is not physical. We could make a parallel argument concerning temporality, but that wouldn't prove that God is not temporal because God's not being temporal would be an assumption in the argument, just as your argument assumes that God is not physical.

Anyway, those are my thoughts. Good work, SeaKayaker. You've got the makings of a good critical thinker, just be careful to keep distinct claims distinct (like C2 and C*).

God bless,
Alan

Lege, lege, lege, ora, labora, et relege.
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