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|  pia†desideria Registered Member
 Date Joined Jun 2001 Total Posts : 301 | Posted 11/27/2001 6:33 PM (GMT -6) |   | I’ve been learning about the theology of the cross in my christology class. I think this approach can offer a powerful critique of classical construals of God’s attributes (esp. impassability), but it can also critique openness methodology (I think you’ll see what I mean).
The biblical roots for a theology of the cross are found in the gospel of Mark and in Paul’s letters (cf. Rom. 3:21–26, 4:24–25, 6:1–11; Cor. 1:18–2:5, 5:1–13; 11:17–34; 2 Cor. 4: 7–15, 5:14–6:2, 13:1–4; Gal. 3; Phil. 3:2–11). The term (theologia crucis) was first used by Luther in his Heidelberg disputation (1518; cf. esp. theses 19, 20, 21), in which he contrasted a theology of the cross with a theology of glory, whose primary metaphor is power. A theology of the cross is a theology of revelation—God is most fully revealed in the crucifixion; and it is highly critical of natural theology. Other theologians of the cross include Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer, Barth (his earlier stuff), Tillich, Niebuhr, Moltmann, Jüngel, and Käsemann.
Mephi, I think you’ll find the theology of the cross interesting because it is very nominalist-friendly, but it also offers a pretty hard-core critique of power.
Tom, I think you’ll find it interesting since you’ve expressed interest in epistemology and realist/nominalist distinctions.
Semeia, I think you’ll find it interesting because a theology of the cross seems to come naturally to you, from what I can tell.
Others, let me know what you think!
Sorry what follows is so long and blocky. I don’t feel like I understand it quite well enough yet to put it in my own words, so I have just copied a bunch of representative quotes below. The quotes come from Charles Cousar’s A Theology of the Cross: The Death of Jesus in the Pauline Letters and Douglas John Halls’s God and Human Suffering: An Exercise in the Theology of the Cross.
Here goes:
The world’s story of seeking God through its own wisdom is a story of failure. God may be revealed in creation, but human wisdom habitually misconstrues the knowledge of God to be found there. In the words of Romans 1:19–25, the world inevitably fails to honor or give thanks to God, but exchanges the truth of God for a lie.…Not even a wholesale reevaluation of wisdom by providing new norms and categories will suffice, since what the preaching of the crucified Christ does is to reveal the radical discontinuity between God and the world.…The gap between the free, transcendent God and a not-knowing humanity is bridged by a message that does not make sense by human standards, but a message that saves. Correspondingly, responders are not described as those who understand, but as those who believe. (Cousar 29–31)
[T]heological reflection begins with the cross. This is what Luther found so compelling in Paul and what led him to oppose the rationalism of the scholastics. To employ an inferential or speculative methodology that starts with the created order or with a presumed understanding of justice and then moves to talk of God is inevitably to fall into idolatry. The one who is drawing the inferences, no matter how astute or well intentioned, is bound to interpret God in his or her own image. God is finally bound by what the inferences and speculations allow. In contrast, a Pauline epistemology beings with the message of the crucifixion, admittedly offensive to some people and sheer folly to others, but the means by which human wisdom is refuted and God’s wisdom and power are made known. (Cousar 179).
[W]hen one begins with the word of the cross, the God revealed turns out paradoxically to be radically free and radically engaged. What we encounter [in the crucifixion] is a free, sovereign God, in no way bound by human categories or expectations. Such a self-revelation exposes human wisdom as idolatrous in its failure to observe either the First or Second Commandment of the Decalogue. The scandalous, even offensive, character of the cross, through which God justifies the ungodly, attests to a God who does not look and act as a respectable God ought to look and act. God’s ways are simply not our ways. (Cousar 181).
At the same time, the even that discloses the free and sovereign God reveals also that God is deeply and lovingly involved with humanity…God’s freedom turns out to be something very different from aloofness and autonomy. What in fact makes God so utterly "different" is precisely the depth of suffering love manifest in the crucified Christ, a love for sinful, helpless, ungodly creatures, and a love that immediately implicates Christ at the very point of human alienation (Rom. 8:3; 2 Cor. 5:21). (Cousar 181)
The terms used for God in 1 Cor. 1:18–2:5; Rom. 3:21–26, 5:6–8 [i.e. power, wisdom, faithfulness, righteousness, freedom, love, etc.] are not markedly different from the terms of classical theology.…But given the epistemology [Paul] employs (i.e. seeing the attributes through the cross of Christ), they bear quite different meanings. They do not derive from general definitions or philosophical traditions, nor from human projections or speculation.…[in which] God is understood in light of human judgments as to what God must be and do if God is to be really God, and in many cases such judgments merely mask the desire for control, for moral superiority, or for the maintenance of the status quo. (Cousar 48)
…God eludes every effort at domestication, every attempt to be captured as the patron or matron deity of a particular ideology, whether liberal or conservative…At the same time, this transcendent God refuses to be disengaged from human life, will not be banished from life’s distortions, hurts, and injustices, in fact chooses the hostility of the far country over the safety of the father’s house. (Cousar 182)
The only power that can address suffering humanity is the power of love, and that is a power "made perfect in weakness" (2 Cor. 12:9). The only victory that is both real and credible in the face of human suffering is a victory visible to faith, not sight, a victory sub contraria specie ("hidden beneath its opposite"—Luther) What Reinhold Niebuhr called "the logic of the cross" (for there is a logic in it; it is not merely irrational) must interpret power in terms the world calls weakness, and victory in terms the world calls failure… (Hall 107)
Hebraic theology manifests very little, if any, interest in the interior life of the deity. Its thrust is always towards God’s relatedness with creation and, though the prophetic tradition of Israel is keenly aware of the divine otherness, its manner of treating God’s transcendence is entirely different from the theme of transcendence pursued in the tradition of Athens. God’s discontinuity with creation is not understood by Judaism in physical (spatial or even temporal) terms but in terms of righteousness…It is part of the divine transcendence that Yahweh wills to be so close to creation, to be immanent, to be "your God," in short, to love. In contrast to the human reluctance to love, and fear of proximity…the God of the Bible goes to unheard-of lengths to achieve communion with us, even union, in a covenant closer than marriage. Not God’s distance but God’s bridging of the distance—this is God’s transcendence… (Hall 112)
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 |  Semeia Registered Member
 Date Joined Aug 2001 Total Posts : 522 | Posted 11/27/2001 7:37 PM (GMT -6) |   | Wow. This is incredible. Is Cousar a contemporary? Does he reference Bonhoeffer at all?
I especially love this: quote: The world’s story of seeking God through its own wisdom is a story of failure. God may be revealed in creation, but human wisdom habitually misconstrues the knowledge of God to be found there. In the words of Romans 1:19–25, the world inevitably fails to honor or give thanks to God, but exchanges the truth of God for a lie.…Not even a wholesale reevaluation of wisdom by providing new norms and categories will suffice, since what the preaching of the crucified Christ does is to reveal the radical discontinuity between God and the world.…The gap between the free, transcendent God and a not-knowing humanity is bridged by a message that does not make sense by human standards, but a message that saves. Correspondingly, responders are not described as those who understand, but as those who believe. (Cousar 29–31)
As I go back in I want to quote it all again... but I'll resist. It looks like Cousar is aiming for the same core as Bonhoeffer, one which, when it lands, changes everything. Cousar's writing seems a lot more accessible than Bonhoeffer's, which is welcome. I'll order these books from Amazon tomorrow. I really look forward to this discussion.
Thanks Pia... this is really good stuff.
Semeia
"The opposite of sin is not virtue, but faith."--Soren Kierkegaard | | Back to Top | | |
 |  pia†desideria Registered Member
 Date Joined Jun 2001 Total Posts : 301 | Posted 11/28/2001 4:03 AM (GMT -6) |   | Cousar is a New Testament scholar. He has written a commentary on Galatians in the Interpretation series. His book on a theology of the cross is basically straight-up exegesis of Paul’s letters, so in that sense it is kind of technical, but overall I found it very accessible. Other than Käsemann, he doesn’t reference hardly any theologians, just other NT scholars. It is an excellent exploration of the biblical basis for Paul’s theology of the cross.
Douglas John Hall is a Canadian theologian who is one of a very few North American theologians of the cross. He appeals to the cross to expose our culture’s obsession with imperialistic notions of power and sovereignty and disdain for dealing with suffering. Great read.
You might also want to check out Dorothee Sölle’s book Suffering, written from the perspective of the cross, but she warns against a tendency toward “theological sadism” which glorifies suffering as an end in itself. I haven’t read this book myself yet, but it has come highly recommended to me.
One final book from a theologian of the cross that I really love is Mary Solberg’s Compelling Knowledge: A Feminist Epistemology of the Cross.
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 |  Modes of Thought Registered Member
 Date Joined Jun 2001 Total Posts : 817 | Posted 11/28/2001 6:28 AM (GMT -6) |   | I am glad to see this material emerge in this context. Of course, at Luther Sem. its pretty prevelant, but I will be very interested to hear what folks here think of it. Some of the biblical intuitions hinted at here are what keeps me friendly with nominalism.
"Christianly understood, truth is obviously not to know the truth but to be the truth. Despite all modern philosophy, there is an infinite difference here..." SK | | Back to Top | | |
 |  PotOnWheel Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 9890 | Posted 11/29/2001 1:07 AM (GMT -6) |   | Sorry, folks. I'm trying to find the thread where this belongs, for Semeia.
This is from Schmemann, and mentions Bonhoeffer. As you can see it does not get heavy on Bonhoeffer, particularly. But interestingly, its criticism of Bonhoeffer might actually parallel what Semeia and ? (sorry) are "feeling" on the-to-church-or-not-to-church thread. (Maybe Semeia is a double agent playing both sides? )
================================ quote: A. Schmemann, "For the Life of the World" - from pages 128-130
The uniqueness of secularism, its difference from the great heresies of the patristic age, is that the latter were provoked by the encounter of Christianity with Hellenism, whereas the former is the result of a "breakdown" within Christianity itself, of its own deep metamorphosis. The lack of time prevents me from dealing with this point in detail. I shall limit myself therefore to one "symbolic" example directly related to our theme. At the end of the second century a Latin theologian, Berengarius of Tours, was condemned for his teaching on the Eucharist. He maintained that because the presence of Christ in the eucharistic elements is "mystical" or "symbolic," it is not real. The Lateran Council which condemned him--and there is for me the crux of the matter-simply reversed the formula. It proclaimed that since Christ's presence in the Eucharist is real, it is not "mystical." What is truly decisive her is precisely the disconnection and the opposition of the two terms verum and mystice, the acceptance, on both sides that they are mutually exclusive. Western theology this declared that that which is "real" is not symbolic. This was, in fact, the collapse of the fundamental Christian understanding of creation in terms of its ontological sacramentality. And since then, Christian thought, in Scholasticism and beyond it, never ceased to oppose these terms, to reject, implicitly or explicitly, the "symbolic realism" and the "realistic symbolism" and the symbolism of reality. It was the collapse of the fundamental Christian mysterion, the antinomincal "holding together" of the reality of the symbol, and of the symbolism of reality. It was a collaps3e of the fundamental Christian understanding of creation in terms of its ontological sacramentality. And since then, Christian thought, in Scholosticism and beyond it, never ceased to oppose these terms, to reject, implicitly or explicitly, the symbolic realism and the "realistic symbolism" of the Christian world view. "As if God did not exist"-this formula originated not with Bonhoeffer or any modern apostle of "religionless Christianity." It is indeed implied already in Thomism, with its basic epistemological distinction between causa prima and cause secundae. Here is the real cause of secularism, which is ultimately nothing else but the affirmation of the world's autonomy, of its self-sufficiency in terms of reason, knowledge, and action. The downfall of Christian thought and experience. And whether the "natural" and the "supernatural" are somehow related to one another by analogia entis, in the Latin theology, or whether this analogy is totally rejected, as in Barthianism, ultimately makes not difference. In both views the world ceases to be the "natural" sacrament of God, and the supernatural sacrament to have any continuity with the world.
Let us not be mistaken, however,. This Western theological framework was in fact accepted by the Orthodox East also, and since the end of the patristic age our theology ad been indeed much more "Western" than "Eastern." If secularism can be properly termed a Western heresy, the very fruit of the basic Western "deviation," our own scholastic theology has also been permeated with it for centuries, and this in spite of the violent denunciations of Rome and papism. And it is indeed ironic, by not at all accidental, that psychologically the most "Western" among the Orthodox today are precisely the ultra-conservative "Super Orthodox," whose whole frame of mind is legalistic and syllogistic on the one had, and is made up, on the other hand, of those there "dichotomies' whose introduction into Christian thought is the "original sin" of the West. Once these dichotomies are accepted, it does not matter, theologically speaking, whether one "accepts" the world, as in the case of the Western enthusiasts of "secular Christianity," or "rejects" it, as in the case of the "Super-Orthodox" prophet of apocalyptic doom. The optimistic positivism of the one, and the pessimistic negativism of the other are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. Both, by denying the world its natural "sacramentality" and radically opposing the "natural" to the "supernatural," make the world grace proof, and ultimately lead to secularism. And it is here, within this spiritual and psychological context, that the problem of worship in relation to modern secularism acquires its real significance.
Edited by - potonwheel on 11/29/2001 06:20:38 AM | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Tom Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 10353 | Posted 11/29/2001 3:00 AM (GMT -6) |   | Pia said to Semeia:quoteSemeia, I think you’ll find it interesting because a theology of the cross seems to come naturally to you, from what I can tell.Hey Pia-
Given the radical discontinuity between God and us evidenced in the cross (as argued by the folks you quoted), how can a theology of the cross “come naturally” to anyone? Ha ha! Just being difficult. 
On the real, I liked it. I don’t poo-poo everything about reasoning out some things from the created order, but I agree that the cross surpasses it all, dropping from the sky like a bomb. We would never have guessed God would do THIS. Is this basically what you’re saying? Question: How would somebody heavy into this end up defining humankind as the “image of God.”
I’m still fuzzy on the nominalist-realist distinctions too. I think I tend toward the realist end of the things. Is anyone surprised?
Tom
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 |  pia†desideria Registered Member
 Date Joined Jun 2001 Total Posts : 301 | Posted 11/29/2001 3:29 AM (GMT -6) |   | Tom: Given the radical discontinuity between God and us evidenced in the cross (as argued by the folks you quoted), how can a theology of the cross “come naturally” to anyone? Ha ha! Just being difficult.
pia: 
Tom: How would somebody heavy into this end up defining humankind as the “image of God.”
pia: Good question. I think hard core theologians of the cross would spend a lot more time talking about depravity than imago dei.
Tom: I’m still fuzzy on the nominalist-realist distinctions too. I think I tend toward the realist end of the things. Is anyone surprised?
pia: Hey, there are worse things to be than fuzzy. 
pia
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 |  Semeia Registered Member
 Date Joined Aug 2001 Total Posts : 522 | Posted 11/29/2001 4:47 AM (GMT -6) |   | Pia & Tom, I am neither a realist nor a nominalist. I would identify myself as an "embodied realist", which is a bridge between the two (while rejecting major aspects of both) based on conclusive research in the field of cognitive science. It is a view that shakes philosophy to its core, but it is itself less a philosophy than an acknowledgement of scientific, non-controversial, non-disputed results in the area of cognition: how the mind works. Once these results are understood, many of the philosophical questions we ask melt away as non-sensical: they are so out of accordance with the way the mind works and the way human beings (and other creatures) apprehend the world.
If anyone is interested in this view, I recommend "Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought", by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. I think it will appeal to nominalist and realist alike.
Pia, I don't at all mean to derail this discussion-- in fact I think this would fit nicely here with the theology of the cross, because the implications of these findings make God's decision to become embodied ever more important. I'd like to throw out material from the first few pages of Lakoff and Johnson's book to try to hook all the philosophers here.
Excerpts from Philosophy in the Flesh:
How Cognitive Science Reopens Central Philosophical Questions
The mind is inherently embodied. Thought is mostly unconscious. Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical. These are three major findings of cognitive science. More than two millennia of a priori philosophical speculation about these aspects of reason are over. Because of these discoveries, philosophy can never be the same again.
When taken together and considered in detail, these three findings from the science of the mind are inconsistent with central parts of Western philosophy. They require a thorough rethinking of the most popular current approaches, namely, Anglo-American analytic philosophy and postmodernist philosophy.
This book asks: What would happen if we started with these empirical discoveries about the nature of mind and constructed philosophy anew? The answer is that an empirically responsible philosophy would require our culture to abandon some of its deepest philosophical assumptions. This book is an extensive study of what many of those changes would be in detail.
Our understanding of what the mind is matters deeply. Our most basic philosophical beliefs are tied inextricably to our view of reason. Reason has been taken for over two millennia as the defining characteristic of human beings. Reason includes not only our capacity for logical inference, but also our ability to conduct inquiry, to solve problems, to evaluate, to criticize, to deliberate about how we should act, and to reach an understanding about ourselves, other people, and the world. A radical change in our understanding of reason is therefore a radical change in our understanding of ourselves. It is surprising to discover, on the basis of empirical research, that human rationality is not at all what the Western philosophical tradition has held it to be. But it is shocking to discover that we are very different from what our philosophical tradition has told us we are.
Let us start with the changes in our understanding of reason:
- Reason is not disembodied, as the tradition has largely held, but arises from the nature of our brains, bodies, and bodily experience. This is not just the innocuous and obvious claim that we need a body to reason; rather, it is the striking claim that the very structure of reason itself comes from the details of our embodiment. The same neural and cognitive mechanisms that allow us to perceive and move around also create our conceptual systems and modes of reason. Thus, to understand reason we must understand the details of our visual system, our motor system, and the general mechanism of neural binding. In summary, reason is not, in any way, a transcendent feature of the universe or of disembodied mind. Instead, it is shaped crucially by the peculiarities of our human bodies, by the remarkable details of the neural structure of our brains, and by the specifics of our everyday functioning in the world.
- Reason is evolutionary, in that abstract reason builds on and makes use of forms of perceptual and motor inference present in “lower” animals. The result is a Darwinism [Semeia’s note: probably a dirty word here, but read on] of reason, a rational Darwinism: Reason, even in its most abstract form, makes use of, rather than transcends, our animal nature. The discovery that reason is evolutionary utterly changes our relation to other animals and changes our conception of human beings as uniquely rational. Reason is thus not an essence that separates us from other animals; rather, it places us on a continuum with them.
- Reason is not “universal” in the transcendent sense; that is, it is not part of the structure of the universe. It is universal, however, in that it is a capacity shared universally by all human beings. What allows it to be shared are the commonalities that exist in the way that our minds are embodied.
- Reason is not completely conscious, but mostly unconscious.
- Reason is not purely literal, but largely metaphorical and imaginative.
- Reason is not dispassionate, but emotionally engaged.
This shift in our understanding of reason is of vast proportions, and it entails a corresponding shift in our understanding of what we are as human beings. What we now know about the mind is radically at odds with the major classical philosophical views of what a person is.
For example, there is no Cartesian dualistic person, with a mind separate from and independent of the body, sharing exactly the same disembodied transcendent reason with everyone else, and capable of knowing everything about his or her mind simply by self-reflection. Rather, the mind is inherently embodied, reason is shaped by the body, and since most thought is unconscious, the mind cannot be known simply by self-reflection. Empirical study is necessary.
There exists no Kantian radically autonomous person, with absolute freedom and a transcendent reason that correctly dictates what is and isn’t moral. Reason, arising from the body, doesn’t transcend the body. What universal aspects of reason there are arise from the commonalities of our bodies and brains and the environments we inhabit. The existence of these universals does not imply that reason transcends the body. Moreover, since conceptual systems vary significantly, reason is not entirely universal.
Since reason is shaped by the body, it is not radically free, because the possible human conceptual systems and the possible forms of reason are limited. In addition, once we have learned a conceptual system, it is neurally instantiated in our brains and we are not free to think just anything. Hence, we have no absolute freedom in Kant’s sense, no full autonomy. [Semeia’s note: I think here of Paul – “I am a slave to sin.”] There is no a priori, purely philosophical basis for a universal concept of morality and no transcendent, universal pure reason that could give rise to universal moral laws.
The utilitarian person, for whom rationality is economic rationality—the maximization of utility—does not exist. Real human beings are not, for the most part, in conscious control of—or even consciously aware of—their reasoning. Most of their reason, besides, is based on various kinds of prototypes, framings, and metaphors. People seldom engage in a form of economic reason that could maximize utility.
The phenomenological person, who through phenomenological introspection alone can discover everything there is to know about the mind and the nature of experience, is a fiction. Although we can have a theory of a vast, rapidly and automatically operating cognitive unconscious, we have no direct conscious access to its operation and therefore to most of our thought. Phenomenological reflection, though valuable in revealing the structure of experience, must be supplemented by empirical research into the cognitive unconscious.
There is no poststructuralist person—no completely decentered subject for whom all meaning is arbitrary, totally relative, and purely historically contingent, unconstrained by body and brain. The mind is not merely embodied, but embodied in such a way that our conceptual systems draw largely upon the commonalities of our bodies and of the environments we live in. The result is that much of a person’s conceptual system is either universal or widespread across languages and cultures. Our conceptual systems are not totally relative and not merely a matter of historical contingency, even though a degree of conceptual relativity does exist and even though historical contingency does matter a great deal. The grounding of our conceptual systems is in shared embodiment and bodily experience creates a largely centered self, but not a monolithic self.
There exists no Fregean person—as posed by analytic philosophy—for whom thought has been extruded from the body. That is, there is no real person whose embodiment plays no role in meaning, whose meaning is purely objective and defined by the external world, and whose language can fit the external world with no significant role played by mind, brain, or body. Because our conceptual systems grow out of our bodies, meaning is grounded in and through our bodies. Because a vast range of our concepts are metaphorical, meaning is not entirely literal and the classical correspondence theory of truth is false. The correspondence theory holds that statements are true or false objectively, depending on how they map directly onto the world—independent of any human understanding of either the statement or the world. On the contrary, truth is mediated by embodied understanding and imagination. That does not mean that truth is purely subjective or that there is no stable truth. Rather, our common embodiment allows for common, stable truths.
There is no such thing as a computational person, whose mind is like computer software, able to work on any suitable computer or neural hardware—whose mind somehow derives meaning from taking meaningless symbols as input, manipulating them by rule, and giving meaningless symbols as output. Real people have embodied minds whose conceptual systems arise from, are shaped by, and are given meaning through living human bodies. The neural structures of our brains produce conceptual systems and linguistic structures that cannot be adequately accounted for by formal systems that only manipulate symbols.
Finally, there is no Chomskyan person, for whom language is pure syntax, pure form insulated from and independent of all meaning, context, perception, emotion, memory, attention, action, and the dynamic nature of communication. Moreover, human language is not a totally genetic innovation. Rather, central aspects of language arise evolutionarily from sensory, motor, and other neural systems that are present in “lower” animals.
Classical philosophical conceptions of the person have stirred our imaginations and taught us a great deal. But once we understand the importance of the cognitive unconscious, the embodiment of mind, and metaphorical thought, we can never go back to a priori philosophizing about mind and language or to philosophical ideas of what a person is that are inconsistent with what we are learning about the mind.
The Cognitive Unconscious
Cognitive science is the scientific discipline that studies conceptual systems. It is a relatively new discipline, having been founded in the 1970s. Yet in a short time it has made startling discoveries. It has discovered, first of all, that most of our thought is unconscious, not in the Freudian sense of being repressed, but in the sense that it operates beneath the level of cognitive awareness, inaccessible to consciousness and operating too quickly to be focused on.
Consider, for example, all that is going on below the level of conscious awareness when you are in a conversation. Here is only a small part of what you are doing, second by second:
Accessing memories relevant to what is being said Comprehending a stream of sound as being language, dividing it into distinctive phonetic features and segments, identifying phonemes, and grouping them into morphemes Assigning a structure to the sentence in accord with the vast number of grammatical constructions in your native language Picking out words and giving them meanings appropriate to the context Making semantic and pragmatic sense of sentences as a whole Framing what is said in terms relative to the discussion Performing inferences relevant to what is being discussed Constructing mental images where relevant and inspecting them Filling in gaps in the discourse Noticing and interpreting your interlocuter’s body language Anticipating where the conversation is going Planning what to say in response
Cognitive scientists have shown experimentally that to understand even the simplest utterance, we must perform these and other incredibly complex forms of thought automatically and without noticable effort below the level of consciousness. It is not merely that we occasionally do not notice these processes; rather, they are inaccessible to conscious awareness and control.
When we understand all that constitutes the cognitive unconscious, our understanding of the nature of consciousness is vastly enlarged. Consciousness goes way beyond mere awareness of something, beyond the mere experience of qualia (the qualitative senses of, for example, pain or color), beyond the awareness that you are aware, and beyond the multiple takes on immediate experience provided by various centers of the brain. Consciousness certainly involves all of the above plus the immeasurably vaster constitutive framework provided by the cognitive unconscious, which must be operating for us to be aware of anything at all.
The Hidden Hand That Shapes Conscious Thought
The very existence of the cognitive unconscious, a fact fundamental to all conceptions of cognitive science, has important implications for the practice of philosophy. It means that we can have no direct conscious awareness of most of what goes on in our minds. The idea that pure philosophical reflection can plumb the depths of human understanding is an illusion. Traditional methods of philosophical analysis alone, even phenomenological introspection, cannot come close to allowing us to know our own minds…
…Conscious thought is the tip of an enormous iceberg. It is the rule of thumb among cognitive scientists that unconscious thought is 95 percent of all thought—and that may be a serious underestimate. Moreover, the 95 percent below the surface of conscious awareness shapes and structures all conscious thought. If the cognitive unconscious were not there doing the shaping, there could be no conscious thought.
The cognitive unconscious is vast and intricately structured. It includes not only all our automatic cognitive operations, but also our implicit knowledge. All of our knowledge and beliefs are framed in terms of a conceptual system that resides mostly in the cognitive unconscious.
Our unconscious conceptual system functions like a “hidden hand” that shapes how we conceptualize all aspects of our experience. This hidden hand gives form to the metaphysics that is built into our ordinary conceptual systems. It creates the entities that inhabit the cognitive unconscious—abstract entities like friendships, bargains, failures, and lies—that we use in ordinary unconscious reasoning. It thus shapes how we automatically and unconsciously comprehend what we experience. It constitutes our unreflective common sense.
For example, let us return to our commonsense understanding of the self. Consider the common experience of struggling to gain control over ourselves. We not only feel this struggle within us, but conceptualize the “struggle” as being between two distinct parts of the self, each with different values. Sometimes we think of our “higher” (moral and rational) self struggling to get control over our “lower” (irrational and amoral) self.
Our conception of the self, in such cases, is fundamentally metaphoric. We conceptualize ourselves as split into two distinct entities that can be at war, locked in a struggle for control over our bodily behavior. This metaphoric conception is rooted deep in our unconscious conceptual systems, so much so that it takes considerable effort and insight to see how it functions as the basis for reasoning about ourselves.
Similarly, when you are trying to find your “true self”, you are using another, usually unconscious metaphorical conceptualization. There are more than a dozen such metaphorical conceptions of the self, and we will discuss them below. When we consciously reason about how to gain mastery over ourselves, or how to protect our vulnerable “inner self”, or how to find our “true self”, it is the hidden hand of the unconscious conceptual system that makes such reasoning “common sense.”
Metaphysics as Metaphor
…We will discuss some of the most basic of philosophical concepts, not only the self but also time, events, causation, essence, the mind, and morality. What is startling is that even for these most basic of concepts, the hidden hand of the unconscious mind uses metaphor to define our unconscious metaphysics—the metaphysics used not just by ordinary people, but also by philosophers to make sense of these concepts. As we will see, what counts as an “intuitive” philosophical theory is one that draws on these unconscious metaphors. In short, philosophical theories are largely the product of the hidden hand of the cognitive unconscious.
Throughout history it has been virtually impossible for philosophers to do metaphysics without such metaphors. For the most part, philosophers engaged in making metaphysical claims are choosing from the cognitive unconscious a set of existing metaphors that have a consistent ontology. That is, using unconscious everyday metaphors, philosophers seek to make a noncontradictory choice of conceptual entities defined by those metaphors; they then take those entities to be real and systematically draw out the implications of that choice in an attempt to account for our experience using that metaphysics.
Metaphysics in philosophy is, of course, supposed to characterize what is real—literally real. The irony is that such a conception of the real depends on unconscious metaphors.
Empirically Responsible Philosophy: Beyond Naturalized Epistemology
For more than two thousand years, philosophy has defined metaphysics as the study of what is literally real. The weight of that tradition is so great that it is hardly likely to change in the face of empirical evidence against the tradition itself. Nevertheless that evidence, which comes from cognitive science, exists and raises deep questions not only about the project of philosophical metaphysics but also about the nature of philosophy itself.
Throughout most of our history, philosophy has seen itself as being independent of empirical investigation. It is that aspect of philosophy that is called into question by results in cognitive science. Through the study of the cognitive unconscious, cognitive science has given us a radically new view of how we conceptualize our experience and how we think.
Cognitive science—the empirical study of the mind—calls upon us to create a new, empirically responsible philosophy, a philosophy consistent with empirical discoveries about the nature of the mind. This is not just old-fashioned philosophy “naturalized”—making minor adjustments, but basically keeping the old philosophical superstructure.
A serious appreciation of cognitive science requires us to rethink philosophy from the beginning, in a way that would put it more in touch with the reality of how we think. It would be based on a detailed understanding of the cognitive unconscious, the hidden hand that shapes our conscious thought, our moral values, our plans, and our actions.
Unless we know our cognitive unconscious fully and intimately, we can neither know ourselves nor truly understand the basis of our moral judgments, our conscious deliberations, and our philosophy.
Thanks, Semeia
"The opposite of sin is not virtue, but faith."--Soren Kierkegaard
Edited by - Semeia on 11/29/2001 11:43:29 AM | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Modes of Thought Registered Member
 Date Joined Jun 2001 Total Posts : 817 | Posted 11/29/2001 6:48 AM (GMT -6) |   | quote:
Given the radical discontinuity between God and us evidenced in the cross (as argued by the folks you quoted), how can a theology of the cross “come naturally” to anyone? Ha ha! Just being difficult. 
The answer I believe is anticipated in the question. Natural theology is out for many theologians of the cross. Revelation is necessary for us to have reconciliation with God. I see that the question was somewhat light-hearted in tone, but it is an important point of distinciton nonetheless.
quote:
On the real, I liked it. I don’t poo-poo everything about reasoning out some things from the created order, but I agree that the cross surpasses it all, dropping from the sky like a bomb. We would never have guessed God would do THIS. Is this basically what you’re saying? Question: How would somebody heavy into this end up defining humankind as the “image of God.”
Yes, that is basically what is being said, and humankind is to be understood as in God's image principly by comparison to Jesus Christ. The clearest revelation we have on the topic.
quote:
I’m still fuzzy on the nominalist-realist distinctions too. I think I tend toward the realist end of the things. Is anyone surprised?
Tom
Not really, but I trust that time will show you the way. 
"Christianly understood, truth is obviously not to know the truth but to be the truth. Despite all modern philosophy, there is an infinite difference here..." SK | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Modes of Thought Registered Member
 Date Joined Jun 2001 Total Posts : 817 | Posted 11/29/2001 7:00 AM (GMT -6) |   | Semeia,
thanks for that informative post. I must say, I agree with pretty much everything that was said, but it didn't strike me as all that new. All of those intuitions seem to have been grasped to various degrees by various thinkers. I think of Whitehead's commetents about the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" and statements like "it is more important that something be interesting than true", for example. Many of the critiques raised have been voiced by post-modernists and since then there has been a large emerging group who call themselves "post-foundational" (as opposed to foundationalists/modernists and non-foundationalists/postmodernists). I see that there a couple of lines of critique toward post-modernism but those too have also been voiced by post-foundationalists. The idea that all language is metaphorical (even metaphysics) is also not new. I don't mean to take any wind out of the sailsm but I am trying to figure out what specifically is so striking about these discoveries. So far as I can tell, many already believe these things by intuition or by running into problems thinking otherwise. When was the book first published and was there something preceeding it that would explain what seems like a widespread awareness of these conclusions in current acedemia?
Don't get me wrong, I think the stuff is great, and you are correct, it is radical in comparison with the polarities created by the elevation of reason in modernity. I just am wondering if the "novelty" hype is legit. I haven't seen something new in this yet, but maybe its becuase my professors have all read this book . I don't know, maybe they have.
Thanks again, it is good stuff. How would you apply this in this conversation? I think that those intuitions are quite friendly to a theologian of the cross in that the theology of the cross roots itself in God's revelatory activity. It grants that that activity both reveals and hides.
Gimme some feedback....
"Christianly understood, truth is obviously not to know the truth but to be the truth. Despite all modern philosophy, there is an infinite difference here..." SK | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Semeia Registered Member
 Date Joined Aug 2001 Total Posts : 522 | Posted 11/29/2001 8:16 AM (GMT -6) |   | Modes said: I agree with pretty much everything that was said, but it didn't strike me as all that new. All of those intuitions seem to have been grasped to various degrees by various thinkers. I think of Whitehead's commetents about the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" and statements like "it is more important that something be interesting than true", for example.
Semeia: What's new about it is that it isn't a mere "intuition", but a science. It is the empirical evidence behind the intuitions that yes, some very bright thinkers have had. It was published in 1999, and cognitive science has only been around since the seventies, so it is indeed new. It is a 600 page book. What I gave you was the briefest of introductory remarks prefacing some of their arguments. Are you saying that you are familiar with the research on cognitive science and have seen this research applied to philosophy before? This is the only book out there that I know of that has applied this empirical evidence to philosophy, at least in this comprehensive a way. If you know of any other books on this topic I would be very interested-- I have been unable to find anything else like it. Whitehead's work was long before cognitive science was even in existence, so intuition or not he certainly did not have this understanding of the mind.
I agree that these thoughts have been brewing in academia. But before this no one has bothered to systematically apply this to philosophy in the way that Lakoff and Johnson do. It is revolutionary in scope, because it changes the nature of the discussion from theory to empirical science, from speculation to proof. If this has been done anywhere else, please let me know because I am looking for more information.
I was pretty sure you would like it and have an affinity for it and already be a long ways down the path. What is new and exciting in it for you is that it presents empirical scientific evidence for many of your views. It seems to me that the realists have been more effective in claiming science on their side in the past.
I would compare this to General Relativity. Einstein's theory was around and discussed and understood in the scientific community. But then there was the independently verified experimental scientific proof that validated the theory, which came later. That's what this is: the scientific proof.
So, if it's not new, share the books with me that connect cognitive science with philosophy! I want them!
For me, sometimes the most exciting new insight is that which incontrovertably confirms what I already suspected was true. I agree that this stuff doesn't feel revolutionary to people like you and me, because we were pretty certain in our bones about it anyway. But I'm telling you, scientific evidence and facts and verifiable observations all speak louder than our intuitions and theories. This book shouts it out in a way which will be very hard to dismiss, because they have the weight of evidence from a broad spectrum of methodologies and disciplines. Read it-- I think you may find it an invaluable tool and source. After all, you are the philosopher, not me.
Semeia
"The opposite of sin is not virtue, but faith."--Soren Kierkegaard | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Modes of Thought Registered Member
 Date Joined Jun 2001 Total Posts : 817 | Posted 11/29/2001 9:45 AM (GMT -6) |   | You speak of this science in a very foundationalistic and rational way. I thought the results include: 1. recognition that language games are largely socially constructed (and deeply rooted in associations/experiences/unconscious facts of various sorts, etc.) 2. we think primarily in metaphors, 3. we do not have unmediated access to reality per se, 4. we whole entities which must be considered wholisticly not as though some helpful distinctions where actually ontological (body/soul/spirit, or "spiritual"/"physical" or what have you), 5. there are (I have heard them called) deep structures at work that we do well to investigate to the best of our ability but inevitably will not be able to exhaust or fully comprehend.
I am glad to hear that there is now conclusive evidence that these intuitions are true but I am puzzled that they can be presented in evidentialist form with little tentativeness. There's a sort of irony here, I think. Maybe I am misunderstanding.
Truly, I am not a scoffer, I agree with the conclusions because I have been educated under these intuitions. In fact, I would keep the intuitions because they are sound pragmatically regardless of the outcome of cognitive science. Its just that there is a pattern in human history of us "finding" precisely what we are looking for regardless of where we look, so long as we are clear about what we "know" we should find there. It just doesn't surprise me that congnitive scientists are finding evidence to support what psychologists and clear thinking people from various fields have known for decades, maybe centuries.
I suppose I should either read the book or shut up. 
Greg's pretty excited about it too, maybe that's what makes me suspeicious. 
"Christianly understood, truth is obviously not to know the truth but to be the truth. Despite all modern philosophy, there is an infinite difference here..." SK | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Semeia Registered Member
 Date Joined Aug 2001 Total Posts : 522 | Posted 11/30/2001 2:07 AM (GMT -6) |   | Modes, George Lakoff has an earlier book from 1987 called "Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things" that covers some of the same material as Philosophy and the Flesh. He also wrote "Metaphors We Live By" in 1979, on conceptual metaphor. But he takes the information from the earlier books and goes a lot further with it in Philosophy in the Flesh. You do not need to read the earlier books first, because much of the material is gone over again. But it is interesting stuff.
Thanks, Semeia
"The opposite of sin is not virtue, but faith."--Soren Kierkegaard | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Modes of Thought Registered Member
 Date Joined Jun 2001 Total Posts : 817 | Posted 11/30/2001 5:32 AM (GMT -6) |   | quote:
Modes, George Lakoff has an earlier book from 1987 called "Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things" that covers some of the same material as Philosophy and the Flesh. He also wrote "Metaphors We Live By" in 1979, on conceptual metaphor. But he takes the information from the earlier books and goes a lot further with it in Philosophy in the Flesh. You do not need to read the earlier books first, because much of the material is gone over again. But it is interesting stuff.
Thanks, Semeia
"The opposite of sin is not virtue, but faith."--Soren Kierkegaard
AHA! That answers my questions. Those previous works, particularly "Metaphors We Live By" have been in the conversation for better than 20 years. No wonder this didn't sound very new. Lakoff's name is also very familiar in acedemic conversations so it seemed strange to me that this stuff came out only a couple of years ago. I am starting to see the connections. So this recent book goes further and adds evidentialist support? Lakoff is not a modernist if I remember correctly. Okay, maybe I'll just grap Greg's copy when he's not looking....
"Christianly understood, truth is obviously not to know the truth but to be the truth. Despite all modern philosophy, there is an infinite difference here..." SK | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Magneton Registered Member
 Date Joined Aug 2001 Total Posts : 132 | Posted 11/30/2001 5:36 AM (GMT -6) |   | Semeia, two questions:
1. Does Lakoff and Johnson's work give any insights on the nature of life after death, which we generally view as a disembodied consciousness?
2. Among the 95%+ of thinking that is unconscious, do they give a significant role to thought patterns that we have developed by the habits of our individual lives, as opposed to those acquired genetically or "evolutionally"? What I'm thinking about are the "automatic responses" that Dallas Willard talks about in The Divine Conspiracy. He describes the war between the mind and the flesh (Romans 7) in terms of automatic responses that have developed over a lifetime of sin, and which we must re-train by practicing the spiritual disciplines.
Magneton
"Human beings are the only creatures on earth that allow their children to come back home." - Bill Cosby
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 |  pia†desideria Registered Member
 Date Joined Jun 2001 Total Posts : 301 | Posted 11/30/2001 5:44 AM (GMT -6) |   | Semeia, We heard a paper at ETS in which the author cited Philosophy in the Flesh. We had a great conversation with him afterward about the nature of truth (he suggested that all truth is metaphorical).
The paper was called, “Classical Theism versus Open Theism: Evidence of Theological Method in Crisis” by David Williams. You can request a copy via email from ETS@Zondervan.com.
Thanks for the reference. pia
~·•·~·•·~·•·~·•·~ The glory of God is the human being fully alive § Irenaeus | | Back to Top | | |
 |  n/a Registered Member
 Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 218 | Posted 11/30/2001 9:21 AM (GMT -6) |   | 
"God cannot be concieved not to exist_God is that,than which nothing greater can be concieved.That which can be concieved not to exist is not God." St.Anslem | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Modes of Thought Registered Member
 Date Joined Jun 2001 Total Posts : 817 | Posted 11/30/2001 9:47 AM (GMT -6) |   | Faithful, my friend, I have no idea what that purple face means but I just about fell over laughing when her jaw dropped to the bottom of the screen.
 Thanks for that.
LOL!
"Christianly understood, truth is obviously not to know the truth but to be the truth. Despite all modern philosophy, there is an infinite difference here..." SK | | Back to Top | | |
 |  PotOnWheel Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 9890 | Posted 11/30/2001 5:38 PM (GMT -6) |   | Pia......I wonder whether this might be interesting:
quote: by Nicholas Cabasilas (later 1300s AD), in "The Life in Christ" -- p.94-95)
The Second Book [557-560] § 18. Baptism as a personal experience of God
Many are the remedies which down through the ages have been devised for this sick race; it was Christ's death alone which was able to bring true life and health. For this reason, to be born by this new birth and live the blessed life and be disposed to health and, as far as lies in man, to confess the faith and take on oneself the passion and die the death of Christ is nothing less than to drink of this medicine. This is the poser of the new law, thus it is that a Christian is born. In this way he arrives at admirable wisdom and undertakes the noblest deeds. His faith is unmovable, since he believes without compulsion and governs his conduct by the power of God, and not be laws. Holding fast both faith and virtue he is formed by both into the blessed likeness of Christ. "The kingdom of God," it is said, "does not consist in words but in power" (1 Cor. 4:20), and "the word of the cross is to us who are being saved the power of God" (1 Cor 1:18).
The new law, then, is spiritual because the Spirit works everything. The former law is written because it goes no further than letters and sounds. Therefore the law is "as shadow" (Heb. 10:1) and an image, the present one is reality and truth. The words and letters are like an image in relation to reality. Before they were realized God foreshadowed them on many occasions by the covenant, not like the covenant which I made with their fathers" (Jer. 31:31-32) What does this mean? "This," He says, "is the covenant which I will make with the house of Israel and the house of Judah: I will put my laws within their mind and in their hearts I will write them" (Jer 31:33) -- that is, not composing them by mere sound of words, but by the Lawgiver's presence, without intermediary. For he says, "no longer shall each man teach his neighbor and each his brother, saying, "Know the Lord," for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest" (Jer. 31:34). Because he had obtained this law David also uttered this blessed saying, "I know that the Lord is great" (Ps. 135:5). He says, "I know," having experienced it himself, not by having heard it taught by others. Wherefore he leads others too to the same experience, saying, "O taste and see that the Lord is gracious" (Ps. 34:9). Even though the blessed man had praised God's graciousness in many and varied words, yet, since the words were not capable of showing the reality, he himself summons his listeners to the experience of the things which he praises.
PotOnWheel
(ISA 64:8 "Yet, O Lord, you are our Father. We are the clay, you are the potter; we are all the work of your hand.")
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 |  n/a Registered Member
 Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 218 | Posted 12/5/2001 7:33 AM (GMT -6) |   | quote: Faithful, my friend, I have no idea what that purple face means but I just about fell over laughing when her jaw dropped to the bottom of the screen.
He modes! Chance gave me a link to a site that had different smileys. I thought this one fit on the board, because of the previous post. God Bless! Paul
Our natural greatness is seen as part of God's image, and that natural greatness has been conferred on us to enable us to achieve our supernatural destiny:to be related to God and to obey him freely.---Diogenes Allen
Edited by - faithfullservent on 12/05/2001 12:35:53 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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