Laika: Universalism says that in all possible worlds where God creates beings with free will, these supposedly free beings always choose Him.

Tom: Right. That’s what I said too. But this is different from the earlier unqualified statement you made, that universalism says “universalism is true in all possible worlds” which I understood to mean you were saying universalism obtains in all possible worlds. But it doesn't, obviously. It’s true, Mephi is arguing, in SOME possible worlds. And those ‘some’ are all the worlds that contain sentient, freely loving creatures.

Laika: This is a contradiction of "free will". If all "free" beings choose Him in all possible worlds where "free" beings have been created, then "free" beings choosing Him is necessary, according to the "possible worlds" definition.

Tom: I don’t think so. In possible world semantics, something is ‘necessary’ if it obtains in all possible worlds, period, absolutely. Nothing that obtains in only some possible worlds can be strictly speaking ‘necessary’. But if in those possible worlds that do include sentient beings, universalism is true, then yes, universalism necessarily follows the creation of sentient moral creatures. I’m having difficulty squaring this with LFW too, but more so because of my understanding of creaturely/contingent personal relations.

But I found Reitan’s Pennies in the Box analogy interesting. I don’t know how to falsify the point it makes. Read that carefully. Forget this discussion for the moment, and just think about the box of pennies. Each always faces the genuine indeterminacy of turning up heads or tails, but in spite of this I have to agree that eventually, with enough shaking, all the pennies will turn over. Taken on its own (aside from this discussion), wouldn’t you agree?

Laika: Throwing in possible worlds where there are no free beings is just confusing the issue…

Tom: I was just trying to be faithful to possible world semantics. Accurate. I’m an anal INTP!

Laika: …I'm talking about all possible worlds that contain free will beings…

Tom: I gathered that from the whole post, which made your initial statement inaccurate (strictly speaking that is). No biggie.

Laika: Universalism guarantees the outcome of one of the two combinations with the least likely odds, this is deterministic and not probabilistic.

Tom: Can’t probabilistic outcomes narrow to zero under certain circumstances? OK, let me post Reitan’s Penny analogy for those who haven’t read Reitan’s article:

“Imagine a box of pennies, spread out heads-side up. Suppose that the heads-side of each penny is covered with a thin film of superglue, such that if the penny were to flip over in the box it would stick to the bottom and remain heads-side down from thereon out. Imagine that this box is rattled every few seconds. For the sake of argument, let us suppose that there is no chance of the pennies getting stuck to the walls of the box or anything like that. Let us suppose, further- more, that for any penny that is heads-side up at the time that the box is rattled, there is exactly a fifty percent chance that after the box is rattled the penny will land heads-side up, and a fifty percent chance that it will land heads-side down. Once a penny lands heads-side down, however, it sticks to the bottom of the box and remains that way, regardless of how much the box is subsequently rattled. Let us imagine, furthermore, that the box is rattled every five seconds indefinitely, stopping only once all the pennies have landed heads-side down and become stuck that way. In this situation, we would expect that eventually the rattling would stop, because eventually every single penny in the box would become stuck heads-side down. We expect this outcome even though every penny started out heads-side up, and even though at any given time a heads-side up penny has a fifty percent chance of staying head-side up. If the rattling continued forever, we would be inclined to say that this outcome is inevitable.”

I have to agree with Reitan that eventually all the pennies would turn. The rattling over time would guarantee it also the probability of any single penny’s turning at any particular shaking remained 50/50.

The problem with this as an analogy for universalism and human freedom is that Reitan and Talbott both take human freedom to be infinite in duration. It never “runs out.” And that’s a big departure from Doc’s reconstructed process metaphysics (which is Mephi’s as well). Like Mephi said, God doesn’t have eternity to shake us. LFW in finite. It necessarily solidifies itself and runs out.

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 1/5/2006 9:48:15 AM (GMT-6)

(For the administrator.  This will be my LAST CORRESPONDENCE on this particular "ad hominem" issue.  You ain't gotta worry about me on that!)

And I humbly apologize to all those in the Kierkegaard love discussion group.

Jeff:  Thanks for your comments, Alan.

Alan:  In my view, we do not literally have "infinite worth", though our worth is considerable. What is it for something to have worth or value? Well, value can be either intrinsic or extrinsic (instrumental). Extrinsic goods are only good as means to an end, ultimately something that has intrinsic worth. Intrinsic worth seems to have something to do with being desirable.

Jeff:  Yes, the "being desirable" certainly rings true.  This coincides with the statement in Revelation that says all things were created for God's wish/pleasure.  But this ALSO seems to imply that our very existence is a means to God's pleasure.  Which in turn implies that our worth IS extrinsic worth, in that sense.  Until eternal life is secured, it would seem that any intrinsic worth we have is mutable.

Alan:  God as Perfect Love, the greatest possible being, and the ultimate source of all other goods is, I think, infinitely desirable and infinitely worthy. Insofar as we are reflections of God's great-making qualities, we possess intrinsic worth. Thus, a person who is morally virtuous has, all other things being equal, more objective intrinsic worth than a morally corrupt person because such a person more fully reflects the goodness of God. But some of our worth is essential, hence no person (however corrupt) can completely efface the image of God in himself. No one could ever lose all intrinsic worth.

Jeff:  What I hear you saying is that no one can EVER be completely DEVOID of some degree of the divine image.  I think this is true, also.

Alan:  We have finite intrinsic worth. Hence, it seems plausible to me that there comes a point when God simply writes off his losses. And I think the Bible concurs with that.

Jeff:  Yes, this is where the hard part comes in for me.  The part where worth and worthiness/fittedness relates to death.  Paul says that people can be WORTHY of death and that death is the WAGES of sin.  Now, the reason why I see this as problematic, from a biblical perspective, is that most of us have no qualms with people being punished for their evil works.  But why should people be punished for their works except for the fact that they DESERVE (= they are WORTHY of) punishment.

I think one COULD argue that the fear of punishment exists ONLY as a strategical means to a "greater good" in the here and now.  But that would mean that we really don't DESERVE punishment, but that punishment merely WORKS for a greater harmony in the moral order.  But this would mean that our BELIEF in ill-desert is a false belief.  That's fine, too, if we can reconcile this with our legitimate fundamental intuitions.  That would be a philosophical problem.  And if the bible indicates that punishment is deserved, it would be a biblical problem, too.

But Paul seemingly leaves us no way out on the "worthiness" of death idea.  So what do we make of it?  Is Paul really saying that a person can deserve ETERNAL cessation of life?  If not, then what IS he saying?  It certainly seems from his reasoning about Adam and ressurection that death WOULD be eternal apart from Christ's work.  And this would apply whether we consider death spiritual, physical, or both, I think. 

Post Edited (jefscott) : 1/7/2006 10:50:43 AM (GMT-6)

http://www.romanity.org/htm/flo.01.en.the_ascetic_ideal_and_the_new_testament.01.htm

Containing...

THE INADEQUACY OF THE CRITIQUE BY ANDERS NYGREN

. . . The Christian is commanded to love his enemies, not because the other side teaches hatred of them, but because there is a basis and motive for such love in the concrete, positive fact of God’s own love for evil men. ‘He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and the good’. That is why we are told: ‘Love your enemies ... that ye may be children of your Father which is in heaven’." What Nygren writes here is accurate. But it neglects the significance of human ontology; that is, that we are commanded to love our enemies because there is a spiritual value within the very fabric of human nature created by God, even fallen nature, and that that spiritual value is to be found in each and every man, however dimly we may perceive it. If we begin to love our enemy, we will begin to perceive in that enemy characteristics, aspects that were veiled, that were dimmed by the blindness of our hatred. We are commanded to love our enemy not only because God loves mankind, not only because God "maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good" but God loves mankind because there is a value in mankind.  . . .

I suggest everyone read that whole entire section: http://www.romanity.org/htm/flo.01.en.the_ascetic_ideal_and_the_new_testament.01.htm#s3