Modes: I know of no logical way of determining if God is necessary or contingent outside of our preference for the former over the later.

Tom: Are there no good reasons for preferring one other the other in God’s case? I mean, I agree that “logic” itself doesn’t tell us that necessary existence is better than contingent existence. We have to decide whether God exists necessarily or contingently on other grounds (theological, biblical, philosophical, etc). Can you not think of any reasons along these lines for believing that God, the God of Scripture, the God who created all that is, is self-existence, or self-sufficiently existent (which I think by definition means “necessarily existent”)? You really just believe God is self-existent because you FEEL that's a better mode of existence? The alternative to necessary (self-sufficient existence) is that God owes his existence to someone or something outside himself, in which case he exists “contingently.” He was "created by...." True, logic itself doesn’t tell us one mode of existence is better than another, but do we not have other grounds for believing that the God described in the Bible and in whom we believe is herself a ‘created’ being? Can you not think of any good reasons for rejecting the claim that God is a created being?

Modes: I understand logic as strictly a tool that is only as good as the data you give it. Like a calculator. The sort of data you can put into logic doesn't have the possibility of "proving" God exists. How could we prove that an infinite being exists? You can't punch infinity into the calculator.

Tom: Right. Which is why Hartshorne’s argument begins with the presupposition: “IF God exists, THEN God exists necessarily.” He’s interested in debating the existence of THIS God, not a God who was created, who came into being, who was ‘caused’ to exist by some other thing or being. If we suppose the God of Scripture was created by some other god, then the debate would be about THAT god, and so forth, until we get to the first cause, the uncaused cause of it all. The argument would apply to THAT cause of all contingent being.

Is there any good reason to suppose there is such a being, an uncaused cause of it all? The Kalam Argument I think is a great argument for the existence of such an uncaused cause. Hartshorne’s argument is intended as an argument for THAT God. And the Kalam argument is more than a mere ‘anthropocentric preference’ for necessary existence over contingent existence. It’s a well-reasoned, critical, and thoughtful inquiry into the origin of all that exists. Can we really posit (as Jeff thinks) an infinite series of contingent causes? Is that meaningful? I don’t think so. As the Kalam Argument shows, eventually you have to get off the merry-go-round and posit an uncaused cause of all else. It’s my understanding that the Christian faith equates THIS cause with "God." God is not a contingent, created being, not because contingent being is a “logically inferior” way of being (or a weaker anthropocentric preference). It’s not. But necessary being is, it seems, the one form of being which we have to posit to account for all other contingent being that exists (which takes us into a different argument, i.e., that Kalam argument).

Modes: Logically speaking, can we prove that anything in actuality is "logically necessary"? In the realm of ideas and abstraction, "necessity" is easy to come by, but we are trying to prove that God exists in actuality right?

Tom: Unless you want to argue that it makes sense to suppose that ALL being is contingent being, you have to posit SOME necessary existent that serves and the explanation for all contingent being.

Modes: I may not be getting this right, but even if we grant that "if God exists, God exists necessarily". That still leaves the question of whether God actually exists open right?

Tom: Not really. That’s what’s neat about Hartshorne’s argument. IF someone agrees that “IF God exists, then God exists necessarily,” then he gets sucked down the vortex! And it works pretty simply:

The four categories are jointly exhaustive (there are not other possible categories) and mutually exclusive (everything falls into one and only one of the four categories).

(1) The necessarily existent (that which exists, and exists necessarily; viz., the Necessary)
(2) The necessarily non-existent (that which does not exist, and does not exist necessarily; viz., the Impossible)
(3) The contingently existent (that which exists but which might not have)
(4) The contingently non-existent (that which does not exist but which might come into existence).

Once a person agrees to “IF God exists, he exists necessarily” he’s agreeing that the sort of being God is can’t be the sort of being that falls into categories (3) or (4). We’re talking about that being who is not created but who creates all else, who is self-existence, who can get us out of Jeff’s infinite regress. That seems to be the God that Scripture presents—the Creator, the One. This God either exists or not. If he exists, he exists necessarily. So (3) isn’t where he belongs IF HE EXISTS. And (4) isn’t where he belongs IF HE DOESN’T NOW EXIST. That leaves (1) or (2). Either he exists necessarily or his existence is IMPOSSIBLE. If the latter, then saying “A self-sufficient God exists” is logically equivalent to saying “Married bachelors exist” or “Square circles exist.” God's existence would be logically impossible.

But, Hartshorne asks, where are those atheists arguing the IMPOSSIBILITY of such a God? There are none. Atheists may believe he doesn’t in fact exist, but they’ll at least admit his existence is logically possible. But this turns out badly for the atheist. Saying the existence of a self-existent necessary cause of all contingent beings is POSSIBLE, and that if such a being exists he exists NECESSARILY, leaves them no option but (1) in which to place him.

Hartshorne basically does this: He proves that if a person wishes to deny the existence of a Creator-God who is not herself a created being, the ONLY logically consistent way they can do so is to argue for the IMPOSSIBILITY of such a being. And that, Hartshorne says, is a TALL order. Nobody has ever come close to demonstrating the impossibility of such a being. So he adds that the reasonable person who wishes to remain logically consistent in her beliefs but who cannot make a case for the IMPOSSIBILITY of a self-sufficient cause of the universe is logically bound to concede the actual existence of such a being. The only logical option to "Necessarily God" is "Impossibly God." If you concede the possibility of such a God, then you have to concede his actual existence. That's what Hartshorne proves. And I think he does it.

He’s not arguing that a necessary God in fact exists. He’s arguing that the only way such a being doesn’t in fact exist is if such a God NECESSARILY DOES NOT EXIST. One MUST argue the necessary non-existence (i.e., the impossibility) of such a God if one wishes to be a consistent atheist. It's a logical proof of categories, or categorical options. If on other hand somebody opts to place their faith in and worship a 'created God' whose existence was called into being by some cause, then Hartshorne's argument would mean nothing to them. It only works for people who are debating that ULTIMATE Creator-God, the ultimate cause of all that exists.

Make better sense?

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 3/1/2006 12:15:35 PM (GMT-6)

Given these facts, no good theologizing can really happen outside the existence of beer.

Beer is the necessary cause of most theology.

Is that sound?

Post Edited (Modes of Thought) : 3/1/2006 5:28:24 PM (GMT-6)

I’m not very knowledgeable about process metaphysics. I’m still learning.

But while you wait for me to learn more, try on the Kalam Argument:

1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause.

2) The universe had a beginning.

3) Therefore the universe has a cause.

It was assumed from the time of the ancient Greeks on (up to the last century) that the material universe was eternal. Those crazy Hebrews (and Christians after them, and Muslims after them) were the exceptions, harping on about God being the creator, speaking the universe into existence. But the 20^th century saw the emergence and establishment of the Big Bang model of origins. And it is now for all intents and purposes and established fact that the universe had a beginning.

Nobody questioned (1) until it began increasingly established by empirical evidence that the universe had a beginning. If yall wanna argue about (1), we can. But for the moment let’s assume it, in which case the universe had a cause.

Can it be deduced that the cause of the universe was personal and sentient? Bill Craig thinks so. He believes the Kalam argument implies a personal sentient creator. He says:

“There are two types of explanations—scientific and personal…Scientific explanations explain a phenomenon in terms of certain initial conditions and natural laws, which explain how those initial conditions evolved to produce the phenomenon under consideration. By contrast, personal explanations explain things by means of an agent and that agent’s volition or will.

“Imagine you walked into the kitchen and saw the kettle boiling on the stove. You ask, ‘Why is the kettle boiling?’ Your wife might say, ‘Well, because the kinetic energy of the flame is conducted by the metal bottom of the kettle to the water, causing the water molecules to vibrate faster and faster until they’re thrown off in the form of steam.’ That would be a scientific explanation. Or she might say, ‘I put it on to make some tea.’ That would be a personal explanation. Both are legitimate, but they explain the phenomenon in different ways.

…there cannot be a scientific explanation of the first state of the universe. Since it’s the first state, it simply cannot be explained in terms of earlier initial conditions and natural laws leading up to it. So if there is an explanation of the first state of the universe, it has to be a personal explanation—that is, an agent who has volition to create it. That would be the first reason that the cause of the universe must be personal.

“A second reason is that because the cause of the universe transcends time and space, it cannot be a physical reality. Instead, it must be nonphysical and immaterial. Well, there are only two types of things that can be timeless and immaterial. One would be abstract objects, like numbers or mathematical entities. However, abstract objects can’t cause anything to happen. The second kind of immaterial reality would be a mind. A mind can be a cause, and so it makes sense that the universe is the product of an unembodied mind that brought it into existence.

[Break: Craig believes God is atemporal sans creation. He believes this because he believes temporal eternity involves an actual infinite and so is impossible. That’s why he mentions the cause transcending time. I’m not sure this is necessary. It’s enough to say that if the material universe had a beginning and there a cause, that the cause cannot itself be material, since it’s agreed that the material universe had a beginning. The cause must be other than physical. The question of its temporal relation is moot.]

“Finally, let me give you an analogy that will help explain a third reason for why the first cause is personal. Water freezes at zero degrees Centigrade. If the temperature were below zero degrees from eternity past, then any water that was around would be frozen from eternity past. It would be impossible for the water to just begin to freeze a finite time ago. In other words, once the sufficient conditions were met—that is, the temperature was low enough—then the consequence would be that water would automatically freeze.

“So if the universe were just a mechanical consequence that would occur whenever sufficient conditions were met, and the sufficient conditions were met eternally, then it would exist from eternity past. The effect would be co-eternal with the cause.

“How do you explain, then, the origin of a finite universe from a timeless cause [Tom here: again, it’s not the ‘timeless’ character of the cause that’s important; it’s the finite nature of the sufficient conditions that bring about the creation of the material universe that’s important. But Craig’s point is still a good one, though for different reasons]? I can only think of one explanation: that the cause of the universe is a personal agent who has freedom of will. He can create a new effect without any antecedent determining conditions. He could decide to say, ‘Let there be light,’ and the universe would spring into existence. I’ve never seen a good response to this argument on the part of any atheist.” [Craig’s chapter in Lee Strobel’s The Case for a Creator, a very handy book.]

Happy syllogizing!

Tom

I posted something saying essentially the same thing as Tom (far less elegant, mind you), but it didn't take on this thread!

 

Whatever it is that breaks the concept of infinite regress must, in my opinion, be personal and, perhaps, possess a will. It is true that no one can prove there is a god simply by use of the OA. However, what one must prove, if one wants to avoid the strength of the OA argument, is that there is not a first cause; that inifinite regression is not only plausible but should also be able to explain all that was, is and will be. Otherwise one is left with two explanations: 1) denying god exists (who's got proof for that?); 2) or that it cannot be known that god exists. To me, agnosticism is the only explanation that begins, with some sort of weight, to get around dealing with the OA (which has already presummed the existence of a god). But one must then prove why it cannot be known that a god exists.

 

So in that I see Mode's desire to not leap directly into the biblical concept of god (and that's not a problem), and that it is true that the OA starts with the premise that there is a god (Process affirms this despite Hartshornes flirt with infinite regression), it is in the after-the-fact logical deduction (via the bankruptcy of infinite regress) that there must be a god, and that that this god must be personal and possess a will—we don't have adequate explanation for what was, is and will be if this "god" does not possess will.

 

So, Modes, you seem to argue against both the idea that the OA proves there is a god (that's acceptable) and (if I'm reading you accurately) against the idea that there is a personal entity as the first cause. Yes, I know you believe in God and are not an atheist or agnostic, but what, then, if you believe there in God, is your logical reasoning for doing so (personal and subjective experience aside)?

 

Thanks much, 

 

Starkman

 

Post Edited (Starkman) : 3/2/2006 2:30:51 PM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Modes of Thought) : 3/2/2006 10:13:08 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Modes of Thought) : 3/2/2006 10:18:49 AM (GMT-6)

Behind this discussion looms the question of just how far reason and logic can get us, and I’ve never thought that they alone can get us all the way to the triune God of Scripture and to salvation. But I do think they deliver something.

Modes: That doesn't strike me as compelling unless I already believe in God.

Tom: I was just reading the story of an atheist scientist who came to faith upon reading Bill Craig’s Ph.D. thesis on the kalam argument. Sure, some will not find such arguments very helpful, but some will (and do).

Sure, that doesn’t mean that people who find such arguments convincing are believers or have “found” the God of Scripture just because they recognize an argument is valid. They still have to believe. But some arguments help people move toward faith in a personal Creator-God by demonstrating that belief in such a God is reasonable, plausible, defensible, and coherent.

Modes: I guess I thought we were looking for stronger arguments that might move a person who truly doesn't believe toward belief. Don't get me wrong, I can see how this could be used as a form of persuasion, but as is admitted in the argument itself, it is not a scientific argument.

Tom: Well, by not being a scientific explanation he only means that it doesn’t explain things in scientific terms, not that it’s not a conclusion based on premises.

Craig’s stuff about why the first cause should be a ‘personal’ cause doesn’t claim to be a purely logical argument, like Hartshorne’s argument. But Craig’s argument for a necessarily personal/sentient being is an argument. I meant, it has premises and a conclusion.

Modes: Which is truly less paradoxical:

1. There is an atemporal immaterial mind that somehow has the ability to create temporal material universes via "let their be light" (Speaking being into existence from the almighty immaterial mouth?)

2. This whole thing just happened, like water freezing under the proper conditions.

Tom: If by “just happened” in (2) you mean the material universe just appeared “uncaused” out of absolute nothingness, then that’s the height of paradox. There is no evidence for believing such a thing (quantum fluctuations don’t qualify) and good reasons to think things don’t just pop into existence “uncaused.”

I don’t find (1) at all paradoxical (except perhaps for the temporal part of it, which isn’t necessary really). The idea that a necessary personal/sentient being caused the material universe to come into existence--where's the ‘paradox’? It makes perfect logical sense. It breaks no known laws we know of. It's no incoherent or paradoxical. It just means there's a necessary first cause (most likely a personal/sentient mind of some sort). And THAT, I suggest, is what people don't WANT to be true about our origins.

Modes: Dealing with the paradox of an actual infinite (implied by #2) is not more problematic than the actual suspension of all known laws of causation so God can create ex nihilo.

Tom: Hmmm. I’m not following exactly. Saying some necessary being caused the material universe to come into existence ex nihilo is not to say he suspended the law of causation. It is to insist on the law of causation. The law of causation is the main reason why people argue there has to be a cause of the universe’s coming into existence (assuming it came into existence).

The whole actual infinite thing, I confess, is unsettled for me. I totally understand the argument and I see how it entails a beginning for time (and that in the absence of creation God is atemporal). But the problem is that when I assume this I still run into problems (never mind what they are now). But the point is, all this talk of the temporal status of that first cause in the absence of creation is kinda beside the point for me. We are still facing the necessity of a necessary first cause for our universe.

Modes: You cannot mentally wrestle someone into believing that Christ is Lord.

Tom: Of course we can’t do this. Nobody is trying to do this. What I’d be interested in doing is demonstrating the coherence and plausibility of belief in a necessary personal/sentient first cause of the universe.

Modes: …we can provide an occasion, and our testimony can surely encourage the moment, but God is the necessary condition.

Tom: For sure. I just think that among the sorts of “encouragements” that help provide an occasion for belief are arguments like Hartshorne’s and the kalam argument. They don’t save anybody, but they have helped unbelievers come to faith.

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 3/4/2006 9:30:41 AM (GMT-6)

My view of the role of apologetics is that it's most useful as a shield than a sword.

Post Edited (Corey) : 3/4/2006 9:34:32 AM (GMT-6)

Corey: Shouldn't the faith/reason problem be understood dialectically? Isn't it Both/And rather than Either/Or?

Tom: Speaking of Either/Or, meet me tomorrow after 2^nd service in the lobby and I’ll give you your copy. If not, I’ll pass it on to Tyler.

Corey: I liked Modes intuition that we ought to seek the least paradoxical position.

Tom: Where paradoxical positions are the only available type of position, sure. I agree.

Corey: But right now I can't agree with his assessment that "Dealing with the paradox of an actual infinite is not more problematic than the actual suspension of all known laws of causation so God can create ex nihilo."

Tom: Well, the latter isn’t even an accurate portrayal of the position. Creation ex nihilo is NOT a “suspension of all known laws of causation.” What law did God suspend to call the material universe into existence? None that I can think of. On the contrary, the law of causation is WHY we insist on a necessary first cause for the material universe.

Corey: To my way of thinking, it may not be "a suspension of all known laws of causation" to hold that God created all time, space, whatever, not of pure "nothing"…

Tom: Right.

Corey: …but out of his power. Physics doesn't have a problem saying that energy is directly convertible to mass, and in a way of thinking, I think this is just what happened.

Tom: I’m fine with ex theo instead of ex nihilo. What ex nihilo is good for is making clear that point the God didn’t make this universe out of previously existing matter, and that’s still a good point to make. But is God equivalent to the sort of “energy” that scientists talk about when they discuss matter/energy? Doesn’t that materialize God? Or maybe he’s the supreme energy!

Tom