HB: The problem I have, though, is that I can't see how if the reflection is not identical - what you call "tautological" - how it can constitute perfect knowledge and qualify God as truly omniscient. It's a long story to explain the reasons for this, but take the following illustrative example. Suppose I knew every true proposition about Africa, and had multiple fully accurate abstract representations of Africa in my mind (that is, in relation to everything that they represented they were accurate), but I had never actually been to Africa or seen it. It seems that there would be still something deficient in my knowledge about Africa.

Tom: Indeed there would be. But the problem here is easily addressed (if we’re talking about knowledge of propositions). If you know some proposition about Africa, say, “The country of Egypt is located on the continent of Africa,” but have never been to Egypt to verify this, then you have some OTHER reason for believing this proposition to be true. Perhaps you believe your history books, or Egyptians you’ve met who told you Egypt is in Africa, or the satellite photos that show it to be so, etc. Those can all be good reasons that justify your belief that the proposition is true. But this is what we’ve been trying to say God’s knowledge is unlike. If God believes the proposition in question to be true, it’s because he non-inferentially apprehends the truth-grounds (the territory, viz., Egypt's being in Africa) of the proposition (the map). God is present in Egypt and Africa. He comprehends both Egypt and Africa in his direct, unmediated, experience.

The point is, it’s possible to have justifiable reason to believe some proposition (map) is true where the reason is not direct, immediate apprehension of the actual truth-grounds (territory) for that proposition. MOST truths we hold to are known in precisely this way. But NONE of God’s knowledge is acquired this way. That’s been our point. God does not know Egypt is in Africa the way most of us know this (namely, by trusting whatever secondary means we have—talking to Egyptians, viewing satellite photos, etc.); God knows this because God directly apprehends Egypt in Africa. So while it's possible for us to know truths about Africa without ever having been to Africa (in which case there'd be something seriously lacking in our knowledge--viz., non-propositional apprehension of the realities themselves), this isn't the case with God (or so we're arguing 'perfect knowledge' implies).

HB: It seems to me that perfect knowledge absolutely demands tautological reproduction of the known - that is, if you want to stick with representation.

Tom: I dont' see how. If God’s knowledge of me is a tautology of me, then God’s knowledge of me is another me in all that is constitutive of me. It would have to reproduce me, including, for example, my physicality, my ontological independence from God, my freedom to choose. Do you see no problem with this? Multiply it out. There would be a tautological, material clone (for lack of a better word) of the entire universe ontologically distinct from this universe within the mind of God. This would have to be the case since I "the object of God’s knowledge” am ontologically other than God, but I "the subject of God’s knowledge” (i.e., God’s knowledge "of me") would not be ontologically other than God (since God’s knowledge is constitutive of God). So there’s just no way God’s knowledge of me can itself possess every attribute I as ontologically independent of God possess. One attribute that comes to mind would be ontological independence from God. God cannot possess this attribute, but he’d have to possess it if his knowledge of me (constitutive of himself) reproduced this attribute of me, which it would have to if it reproduced a tautology of me. Hence I don't think God's knowledge of me can be a tautological reproduction of me.

This has nothing to do with representational vs non-representational ways of knowing. I’m just talking about the nature of God’s knowledge of non-God entities.

I’m inclined to believe there’s just ONE me known by God who non-inferentially and directly apprehends me in his experience (via his abiding sentient presence sustaining everything constitutive of me, if you wish). That’s sufficient for perfect, non-deficient, maximal (whatever you wanna call it) knowledge “of me.” But in the end, any knower’s knowledge of S by definition remains “knowledge of S” and not “S” itself.

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 8/18/2006 12:51:06 PM (GMT-5)