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Originally posted by gem
According to the classical view, as I understand it, God knows all that was, is, or ever will be. This knowledge is intrinsic to God, a sine qua non of God if you will, and can neither be increased nor diminished. He has possessed all knowledge eternally.

God could not have chosen to create in any way other than his intrinsic knowledge dictated. This world was not chosen as the best of all possible worlds, it was not chosen at all, it is merely a function of God's unchangeble intrinsic knowledge.

The problems continue to unfold, it's like peeling an onion.

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Originally posted by Laika

Plus creation would have had to have ALWAYS co-existed with Him since God moving from the state of existing sans creation into the state of co-existence with creation would violate the classic view of "immutability".

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Originally posted by Alan Rhoda
The classical theorist has a rejoinder here. He would say that creation did not bring about any kind of change in God, for God eternally willed to bring about a temporal effect. God didn't "move" from a state of existing sans creation into a state of co-existence with creation.

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Originally posted by Laika

O.K. as soon as they say God "eternally willed to bring", the "to bring" is future tense. Even in God's timeline, there was a point when creation changed from in His mind to actual. I know you don't believe this but don't you see any violation of logic and grammar as well? Changing viewpoints doesn't change reality.

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Originally posted by Alan Rhoda
My point is that on the classical view, from God's eternal perspective everything's always there. There is no point in God's mind at which creation changes from being just a lovely idea to being a reality.

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Originally posted by Alan Rhoda

Hello Alan,

Thanks for the response.

Jerry: According to the classical view, as I understand it, God knows all that was, is, or ever will be. This knowledge is intrinsic to God, a sine qua non of God if you will, and can neither be increased nor diminished. He has possessed all knowledge eternally.

Alan: This is correct, except that I would add that on the classical view God's knowing is bound up with God's willing. Foreknowledge is bound up with providence. God knows what will happen because God has willed it to happen.

Jerry: This was actually the idea that got me thinking about this when it was expressed on another forum while discussing "the decree". The problem with it is that God's willing must be logically subsequent to his existence, while his knowledge, being intrinsic to his being, is coterminus with his existence. So God cannot will that which he does not first know. Therefore he cannot, "know because he wills", he can only, "will because he knows." He can only will to happen that which he knows will happen. The "willer" (along with his intrinsic knowledge) must be antecedent to "the willing". In the same sense that God is the "I am," he is the, "I know." He is what he is, and knows what he knows, and can't do anything about it.

Jerry: If this is true, then God does not have the power of contrary choice. In fact, he doesn't have choice at all, because choice requires at least a logically prior indeterminacy, and there is no indeterminacy in absolute, intrinsic knowledge. He cannot act contrary to what he intrinsically knows. He certainly cannot elect in the Calvinist sense, because such election is a choice of individuals, but the "choice" cannot be anything more than affirming his intrinsic, unchangeable knowledge. So "election" can only take on the Arminian sense (assuming they have it right), yet without the element of choice per se. God can only know that he will save those who believe, and know who they are.

Alan: Your argument moves a bit too fast. If God's knowing is bound up with his willing, and if God is timeless and absolutely unchangeable, then it follows that God cannot CHANGE his mind, will other than he has willed, and thereby know other than he knows. Nor can God choose in the sense of CHANGING from a state of indecision to a state of decision. But a classical theorist would insist that God could have willed other than he did. Nothing in God's nature compelled him to create, but God has eternally and unchangeably willed to create. Had God willed differently then he would be eternally different in that respect than he in fact is. God's willing is nonetheless free because nothing within him or outside him compelled him to will exactly as he has willed. God's creating and his election of individuals is part of this free yet eternal willing, his "eternal decree".

Jerry: I think this is all answered be realizing that God's knowledge of what will be necessarily precedes the willing of it. So he is compelled internally by his attribute of omniscience. In order to exercise his will, God must first *be*, but his being entails his definite, unchangeable knowledge. Therefore he cannot will other than he knows without changing his knowledge, which the classical definition prohibits. It would also drastically alter the meaning of knowledge.

Jerry: God could not have chosen to create in any way other than his intrinsic knowledge dictated. This world was not chosen as the best of all possible worlds, it was not chosen at all, it is merely a function of God's unchangeble intrinsic knowledge.

Alan: Again, your assumption here, which the classical theorist would reject, is that God's knowledge is in place prior to his willing. On the classical doctrine of divine simplicity, the two cannot be separated.

Jerry: It seems to me that they must be separable, otherwise willing becomes an attribute of God, and he is then unable not to will something. The classical theorist is conflating the act of willing, which is not an attribute, with omniscience, which is an attribute. I can't see how the classical theorist can escape the dilemma created by his definition, which entails factual contradiction.

Regards,
Jerry

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