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Sahid
Megistered Rember
Date Joined Jun 2004
Total Posts : 2013
| Posted 12/10/2006 1:33 PM (GMT -6) |   | Goodness defined by God - I didn't mean to start a "chicken or egg" thing. I just mean to say that the Christian conception of God is such that he is good. Jesus says "No one is good except God alone." So, practically speaking, we can (and can only) define goodness by looking to God. If you say that God loves Jesus primarily and loves us only by extension (if that is what you are saying), then the motivation to love all is not godly and therefore nor is it good.
Jeff: If they did abandon those notions, your view would make more sense to me.
Zach: Such people do exist. There are people that truly believe that existence is essentially meaningless suffering and that good and evil are only glorified ways of saying pleasant and unpleasant. These people do not necessarily judge others to be bad. As you said this would be hypocrisy that reveals that they do not truly disbelieve in morality. But I don't understand why you say "if they did abandon..." Of course they must have abandoned those notions. I contend that full dispair only comes after morality (and its allowance for moral outrage) is replaced simply with sadness. I would venture to guess that there are millions of people who experience despair to this degree. They may intellectually hold to a belief in morality (or not), but practically speaking / in reality, they do not believe it. This is a real and significant population for whom appeal to moral order (reasonably) has no weight. Appeal to a fairy tale would be just as effective, because these people have no rational justification for belief in moral order. In fact such a belief in the face of intense suffering is unreasonable. Jesus, who remembers God, can say, "why have you forsaken me." A sufferer who has no recollection of a just or good God cannot even address the question.
Jeff: But insomuch as He suffers for others...
Zach: But only as a byproduct of his love for Jesus. Logically speaking, his suffering for others is accidental, not necessary. Is this what you are saying? As I understand your position, God does not say, "I love humans, so Jesus, lets you and I suffer for them." He says instead, "Jesus, I love you, and so I will suffer for you and even for other humans to the extent that it doesn't get in the way of me loving you." This is why we are allowed to suffer, right? Because our suffering is necessary for God's glorifying of Jesus?
Are you not saying that God's love for humankind is subordinate to his love for Jesus? And is this not your explaination for God's allowance of suffering? If so, it is not God who suffers for us, but we who suffer for God. God only is suffering for us as a means of loving Jesus. If this was not your basic thesis, I missed something big.
Jeff: So I was trying to explain how an intuitive belief in final causes would lead a person to believe that the highest sentient satisfaction is an end of our existence. But I'm allowing for small exceptions of truly insane people who are utterly irrational...
Zach: But perhaps not every sane person ascribes to your belief in final causes. Perhaps there exists a set of people who are actually, practically existentialists. Perhaps there are people who have read Nietzsche and have come to believe that language and reason are metaphorical constructs that do not reflect real life. Perhaps there are sane people who have endured so much pain that they have stopped believing in the reality of order. In fact such people do exist, and in great numbers. I think you are too hasty in assigning insanity to all who do not accept your telelogy. It is not intuitive to all.
Jeff: I had asked if you thought a sin was wrong, and you did not answer.
Zach: Sorry I missed it. I didn't mean to ignore the question. I think within an explicit or implied covenant sin is wrong. But I do believe it is possible for a person to exist outside of such covenants for a time, and in such a state sin is not "wrong." I do not believe that right and wrong have any meaning outside of a covenant. Any potential meaning would be ultimately arbitrarily decided by the whim of the most powerful party (might makes right). Any belief in morality outside covenant boils down to might/God makes right. And at this point there is no difference between God and Satan in the justification of their actions: both do what they want to people without consent.
Jeff: But if sin is not wrong, God seems to be arbitrary to design the causal order in such a way to cause sinners to die.
Zach: I don't think so. A human's "natural state" is nonexistence. God brings humans into an existence with certain limits. If any do not like it, they can go back to where they came from. God only "awakens" them, to offer them the choice. If they choose "no," this is their perogative. The main problem with my position is how to deal with those people who are unable to effectively choose "no."
Jeff: Not sure what you mean here. I was only bringing up the idea because I don't see why God would bring unbelievers to such a confession if they were completely unaccountable to Him in the first place.
Zach: The verse you referred to does not say that God will bring unbelievers to confession. It says that every tongue will confess that Jesus is Lord. It does not say that God will force this to happen. It does not say that every tongue will confess that Jesus is a just Lord. Many Christians being persecuted by Rome eventually acknowledged that Caesar was Lord. This does not mean that they considered him just or good.
Jeff: Well, I think we will have free will without the ability to sin...
Zach: That is fine, but such free will is morally vacuous. If God's free will does not allow him the ability to choose between good and evil, he is an amoral being. Jesus thinks that God is good. Taken with your belief in God's inability to sin, this can only mean that God is pleasant. It cannot mean that God is moral. Morality requires freedom of choice where matters of good and evil are concerned.
Jeff: ...but you have agreed that there will be a change, nonetheless. Why is this if God is already loving us fully now by virtue of non-interference with our volitional choices? Does this supposed future change have anything to do with God's love, per your view?
Zach: I believe there is a change. But I'm not sure whether we are talking about sanctification or glorification. I personally equate santification with self-contol in matters of Christ-likeness. I believe that it is possible for this to happen in our earthly lifetimes (although cannot know of any specifics happenings). By glorification I mean whatever our final state is. In either case I don't think our capacity for morality will be cut off. Why would it need to be? The reason why things will be different at the end, is that final states will have been reached by all. There will be no more "weeds with the wheat" that prevent the harvest. There will be a time when the only ones left will be those whose "knees bow and tongues confess" that Jesus is Lord de facto and de jure. At such time there is nothing to stop a just God from ruling fully. Theodicy will not be an issue any more.
Jeff: Granted, but all rational actions must take a potential future into account. To do otherwise would be irrational. I don't know how to even conceive of love apart from rationality, which entails the realization that there will be a future...
...So if God forgives us independent of the existence of a future state, is God's forgiveness benevolent in any meaningful way? What does it accomplish? When I say we, as rational beings, know we are to choose our highest good, that necessarily involves long-range good vs. the short-range good, which is a lower good. Christ himself appealed to just such reasoning.
Zach: Yes. I don't say that God ignores potential futures. I just say he doesn't ignore the present in favor of one of those potential futures. The actual person (not one particular possible future person) must have primacy.
Jeff: Do you think that God knows that there are bad consequences that will inevitably result if He doesn't stop the creational project right now?
Zach: Yes. I'm not saying there are no bad consequences.
Jeff: Is there a point when God will bring the creational project to an end such that evil men will not be able to choose evil anymore? If so, how is God loving in that case, per your definition of love? This is what I'm looking for: a basis, in your view, for God stopping the "free" creational project in such a way that His love (i.e., permission of freedom) is not negated. As I currently understand it, God is not loving, per your view, if He stops the free choices of evil men at any time in the future.
Zach: Yes and no. Yes, there will be a time when evil is no longer choosen. No, it will not happen as a result of God removing that part of our free will. You seem to believe that sin is inevitable given a free moral will. I gather that this is why you say God cannot sin, because if he could, he inevitably would. I do not believe this. A choice can be open and remain unchosen. When the Kingdom comes in its fullness and power, I believe this is how things will be: moral not amoral.
Jeff: I simply don't believe the future is as open as you do. I think God knows that some natural evil will result in only meaningless suffering and death.
Zach: I agree, but I don't think this was the necessarily the case pre-fall, and I believe natural evil has carried over and become meaningless as a result of sin.
Jeff: But when they don't even hold that God's interest is their own interest, it behoves them, for the sake of logical consistency and avoidance of hypocrisy, to abandon all concepts of right/wrong/ill-desert.
Zach: I agree.
Jeff: But they don't.
Zach: I disagree.
Jeff: Fair enough. But since I don't believe that God foreknew our creation from eternity past...
Zach: I, too, share the belief that my particular creation was not know with certainty from eternity past. But I think God can choose to directly love me when I am created. Direct love does not require foreknowledge.
Jeff (my edit): What I disagree with is the idea that love has to do with the allowance of freedom, independent of any interest in the sentient satisfaction of [potentially existent future] sentient beings.
Zach: I do believe that God can take possible future beings into account, just not to the negation of the actual present being.
Jeff: So those who will get a second chance, post-mortem, will experience God's goodness somehow? Will that be in the form of tolerating their evil choices or how?
I guess so. I really haven't thought about how God might offer post-mortem salvation. Maybe the preaching to the souls in prison has to do with that. But I feel weird even guessing. I do, however, think that certain sin are not counted against people because of their circumstances. (Not agreeing or knowing of covenant being the biggest two that I can see right now.)
Jeff: I suspect the Jews believed Daniel was forgiven even though he had no access to the levitical sacrificial system. Just like the thief on the cross was forgiven apart from baptism.
Zach: Yes, but they considered Daniel a good guy. Did they think that forgiveness was readily available to Caesar or Jesus? No. They would probably say that both must go find some way of atoning for their sin (like killing an animal or having a certain surgury performed) before forgiveness could be available. Remember that it was the High Priest of the Jews who first came up with the idea of Jesus as a substitutionary sacrifice. They killed him in order to appease someone who considered himself a deity.
Jeff: You were saying that God honors sincerity even when the terms are made up by man. So how do you account for child sacrifice systems? Are they to be assumed to be insincere, even though you say that folks have reason to see god as cruel and selfish?
Zach: I would say that God does not like sacrificial systems (children, animals, Son of God, etc.). I've used the alcoholic metaphor before. God does not like alcoholism, but it is possible for alcoholics to do good things. That one participates in an evil system in no way implies that all of one's actions and motivations are impure. It's like the guy (Emth) in The Last Battle who thought he was worshipping Tash but was actually serving Aslan. Tash is a bad guy, but he has some good followers. At the end Aslan accepts Emth.
Jeff: Do you consider Revelation, then, to be as accurate as the gospels? Also, why would we trust a guy like Paul to be accurate when he claims that he is revealing a "word from the Lord" if he is arrogant (stupid?) enough to ignore his own advice about "not judging" brothers in matters for which we have liberty in Christ? I don't think any court of law would give any credence to such a person. Especially when Paul appealed to himself as an apostolic authority in each epistle where he supposedly usurps the very authority of Christ.
Zach: First, I don't think 'accurate' is the best way of praising apocalyptic literature. I would say that it accurately represents the person of Jesus with the understanding that it is not intended to be literally accurate. As to Paul, I'm not sure what you mean. I do not suppose that he usurps the authority of Christ. At least I don't think I do. Is it your contention that Paul is inconsistent on the matter of judgment or is this something you ascribe to me? He may well be, but I don't think I understand what you are getting at. These are getting to be long posts. Maybe I said something and forgot I said it. I'd be surprised if I made it this far without a few inconsistencies.
Jeff: "Satisfying" is the very notion of propitiation, I thought. So it does seem you are saying that Christ's death is propitiatory in some way.
Zach: Christ's death is propitiation toward whoever demands his death. Satan and the Jews demanded his death. So the passion satisfies the (unjust) demand for blood made by what I would call a satanic and violent system of retribution. I follow Rene Girard very closely on this point. The demand for a fully guilty while at the same time fully innocent victim is found at the root of nearly every society. He defines this as the scapegoat mechanism. For those who still believe in this system's legitimacy, Jesus is (or can be) seen as the final sacrifice. Thus, the scapegoat mechanism can be done away with. I don't believe in it's legitiamacy. For me Jesus' innocence, willingness to suffer, and eventual vindication through resurrection shows that his death was unjust, and that those systems are bad which seek to atone for sin by imputing sin onto a victim who is then killed. God was not orchestrating the death of his Son in order to appease his own demand for blood. Jesus came and submitted himself to the will of evil men in order to demonstrate the depths of their sin and at the same time the love and power of God.
Jeff: The difference is, I think God will stop evil choices one day.
Zach: That is the difference. I do not believe that God will abolish moral choice.
Watch me fly. Freedom like wings and I will use them. Freedom like wings and I will spread them wide. - StavesacrePost Edited (Sahid) : 12/10/2006 12:42:18 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 12/10/2006 4:52 PM (GMT -6) | | | Zach: Jesus says "No one is good except God alone." So, practically speaking, we can (and can only) define goodness by looking to God. If you say that God loves Jesus primarily and loves us only by extension (if that is what you are saying), then the motivation to love all is not godly and therefore nor is it good.
Jeff: If God created for Christ, and that purpose entails reproduction of the human race over time in an causally-orderly world, then that purpose conditions what God will do and forebear to do, wouldn't it? That's what I'm saying. Maybe saying that's love is inaccurate. But I don't know how else to say it.
Jeff: If they did abandon those notions, your view would make more sense to me.
Zach: Such people do exist. There are people that truly believe that existence is essentially meaningless suffering and that good and evil are only glorified ways of saying pleasant and unpleasant. These people do not necessarily judge others to be bad. As you said this would be hypocrisy that reveals that they do not truly disbelieve in morality.
Jeff: I would say if there are people whose environments have truly destroyed their ability to conceive of a well-intending creator, then God will not hold them accountable for what they do without guilt--because where little is given, little is required. But I think there are many, like Dawkins, who have been challenged with his inconsistency and still essentially usurp the role of everyone's moral judge. He will be held accountable for his hypocrisy. Because he is not content to allow the world to be truly godless. He assumes the role of moral judge in an amoral world.
Zach: But I don't understand why you say "if they did abandon..." Of course they must have abandoned those notions. I contend that full dispair only comes after morality (and its allowance for moral outrage) is replaced simply with sadness.
Jeff: Dawkins, for one, does not have mere "sadness." He has righteous indignation. He's the kind of person I'm talking about. Do you think he will be held accountable?
Zach: I would venture to guess that there are millions of people who experience despair to this degree.
Jeff: Perhaps. But I don't think all atheists are like what you're describing. For example, I have a friend who is an agnostic. He believes that if there is a god, he is more like a deistic god that doesn't care about suffering at all. Yet he says some people deserve to suffer. When I tell him that no one can deserve to suffer if there is no purpose in the cosmos, he is hard as a rock--even though he agrees that animals can not deserve suffering for causing suffering. Will he be held accountable, per your understanding?
Zach: They may intellectually hold to a belief in morality (or not), but practically speaking / in reality, they do not believe it.
Jeff: Well, I would say that much was true of the religious crowd that killed Jesus, even though they would be considered covenanters by you, wouldn't they? Covenanters can be shameless hypocrites, too, eh?
Jeff: But insomuch as He suffers for others...
Zach: But only as a byproduct of his love for Jesus. Logically speaking, his suffering for others is accidental, not necessary.
Jeff: To my mind, there is no necessary god-world relationship. Thus everything about this creation is, in that sense, accidental. But this creation exists for Christ. It can not be said to exist for Jeff, to my mind. Hence, all good that I experience is, in that sense, conditioned by the purpose of this creation. That's what I'm saying. If love is the wrong word to describe that manner of conditioning, I don't know any other way to say it.
Zach: As I understand your position, God does not say, "I love humans, so Jesus, lets you and I suffer for them."
Jeff: Right. But because I don't assume that Christ is now or ever was in possession of all of the Father's knowledge. I also assume that Paul is right that all things are OUT OF the Father vs. THROUGH the Son. This tells me that the idea of creation originated in the mind of the Father--not the Son. The Son is not coincidentally, per my view, going along with everything the Father is doing as if each are benefitting identically from creation. This latter would imply that the Son has an identical interest in creation even though he didn't purpose it. I don't see why I can assume that.
I realize most views of the Trinity hold that each person knows and feels identically. I don't see that we can get that from scripture, though. I think we can only get that they know and feel benevolently--but not identically.
Zach: He says instead, "Jesus, I love you, and so I will suffer for you and even for other humans to the extent that it doesn't get in the way of me loving you." This is why we are allowed to suffer, right? Because our suffering is necessary for God's glorifying of Jesus?
Jeff: This is why we suffer to the extent that we do. I think even the pre-Fall plan would have entailed certain kinds of relatively insignificant suffering. But not the kind of suffering that creates the so-called "problem of evil." If there was no purpose for this creation that entailed an interest for Christ, I suspect God would have started over when the Fall occurred.
Your view, to my mind, doesn't even explain why there was a Fall. God's benevolence according to you doesn't even seem to have anything to do with the elimination or avoidance of suffering. God could have created the world in the process of WWII and He would be considered just as loving to you, wouldn't He? If God is only interested in meaningful suffering as opposed to eliminating suffering, I don't see why He would have created the world very good in the first place. It seems like there would not have been enough meaningful suffering in a world like that. Why would God even desire to wipe away our tears, etc, per Revelation, if He so enjoys meaningful suffering?
Zach: I think you are too hasty in assigning insanity to all who do not accept your telelogy.
Jeff: I don't say they are insane. I say truly insane people are excusable for their wrong thoughts. I also think some sane people will be held to less--where little is given, little is required. Hypocrisy will be judged, though, I think.
Jeff: I had asked if you thought a sin was wrong, and you did not answer.
Zach: Sorry I missed it. I didn't mean to ignore the question. I think within an explicit or implied covenant sin is wrong. But I do believe it is possible for a person to exist outside of such covenants for a time, and in such a state sin is not "wrong." I do not believe that right and wrong have any meaning outside of a covenant.
Jeff: And this is why you posit a post-mortem chance for those non-covenanters, right? Isn't this post-mortem chance necessary to explain God's benevolence? If not, why do you posit it? If so, then divine love can not be limited to the tolerance of freedom. It must involve the gift of an informed choice so that one can truly choose one's greater sentient good. But then why does God not give them knowledge to avoid suffering/death now? Why is God bound by love to do the one but not the other?
Jeff: But if sin is not wrong, God seems to be arbitrary to design the causal order in such a way to cause sinners to die.
Zach: I don't think so. A human's "natural state" is nonexistence.
Jeff: How can a being have a natural state of non-existence? Isn't that a contradiction? Nor is death necessarily non-existence. If it is, then ressurection is not the re-awakening of an existing being, it is the creation of another being. This would mean that we cease to exist at death as surely as sinners do, per your view. In which case, there is no post-mortem state for any of us.
Zach: The main problem with my position is how to deal with those people who are unable to effectively choose "no."
Jeff: Like retarded people, or what? Why couldn't they be given a post-mortem chance with those who had no reason to believe?
Zach: The verse you referred to does not say that God will bring unbelievers to confession. It says that every tongue will confess that Jesus is Lord. It does not say that God will force this to happen. It does not say that every tongue will confess that Jesus is a just Lord.
Jeff: Yes, but the other verse I quoted about every mouth being stopped seems to indicate that they will have no argument against God. That seems to imply they will understand His arguments and concur.
Jeff: Well, I think we will have free will without the ability to sin...
Zach: That is fine, but such free will is morally vacuous. If God's free will does not allow him the ability to choose between good and evil, he is an amoral being. Jesus thinks that God is good. Taken with your belief in God's inability to sin, this can only mean that God is pleasant. It cannot mean that God is moral. Morality requires freedom of choice where matters of good and evil are concerned.
Jeff: I would say God is amoral in the sense that there is no moral law that guides Him. Good and evil don't necessarily entail a moral meaning, to my mind. Right/wrong/ill-desert do, though. These latter imply a law and accountability to it. Good/evil do not, necessarily. Good/evil can refer directly or indirectly to sentient states apart from moral accountability. That's why we can talk about what's good for a dog, e.g.
Zach: I believe there is a change. But I'm not sure whether we are talking about sanctification or glorification. I personally equate santification with self-contol in matters of Christ-likeness. I believe that it is possible for this to happen in our earthly lifetimes (although cannot know of any specifics happenings). By glorification I mean whatever our final state is. In either case I don't think our capacity for morality will be cut off. Why would it need to be? The reason why things will be different at the end, is that final states will have been reached by all. There will be no more "weeds with the wheat" that prevent the harvest. There will be a time when the only ones left will be those whose "knees bow and tongues confess" that Jesus is Lord de facto and de jure. At such time there is nothing to stop a just God from ruling fully. Theodicy will not be an issue any more.
Jeff: Well, I thought your claim is that theodicy is already a non-issue. Because love, per your view, is the tolerance of choice with no regard to the sentient consequences of those choices. Regardless, my question now is: is there a point (like Christ's coming) where there will be a quantum change in the behavior of believers? Or do we go on gaining self-control in a fallen environment until we are completely self-controlled even after Christ's coming?
Zach: Yes. I don't say that God ignores potential futures. I just say he doesn't ignore the present in favor of one of those potential futures. The actual person (not one particular possible future person) must have primacy.
Jeff: I agree that God does not ignore us at any time. But Christ did say that we should suffer for righteousness sake, now, for rich rewards later. That implies that future good can take precedence over pleasure for a short season in the here and now.
Jeff: Is there a point when God will bring the creational project to an end such that evil men will not be able to choose evil anymore? If so, how is God loving in that case, per your definition of love? This is what I'm looking for: a basis, in your view, for God stopping the "free" creational project in such a way that His love (i.e., permission of freedom) is not negated. As I currently understand it, God is not loving, per your view, if He stops the free choices of evil men at any time in the future.
Zach: Yes and no. Yes, there will be a time when evil is no longer choosen. No, it will not happen as a result of God removing that part of our free will.
Jeff: Then the my question is this: "Does God play a role in that elimination of evil?" Not just desire it, but actually do something--like work in us the will and ability to do His good pleasure. And if so, does He do this with no regard for the elimination of suffering entailed in that change? This is what I'm looking for: is there anything in your view of God's love/benevolence/goodness that involves an active divine role in the removal of suffering? If so, then doesn't your view have to explain why, if God's love has only to do with tolerance of choice, that He is working towards this elimination of suffering? Doesn't your view, as well as mine, require an explanation of this active divine role.
Zach: You seem to believe that sin is inevitable given a free moral will.
Jeff: Not at all. I think sinlessness was possible in the pre-Fall world. But not now, apart from certain divine aid that was unnecessary, pre-Fall.
Zach: I gather that this is why you say God cannot sin, because if he could, he inevitably would. I do not believe this.
Jeff: No. Rather, I say sin is the violation of a law. God is not subject to a law, and, hence, can not sin.
Zach: A choice can be open and remain unchosen. When the Kingdom comes in its fullness and power, I believe this is how things will be: moral not amoral.
Jeff: I agree that a choice can remain open and remain unchosen. But as an open theist, I can't know that it will remain unchosen.
Jeff: I simply don't believe the future is as open as you do. I think God knows that some natural evil will result in only meaningless suffering and death.
Zach: I agree, but I don't think this was the necessarily the case pre-fall, and I believe natural evil has carried over and become meaningless as a result of sin.
Jeff: I think natural evil of the order we experience now did not exist pre-Fall. I think that's what the entrance of sweating, child-birth pains, etc. are telling us. I think suffering pre-Fall would have been like the normal pains that we learn to and can avoid. There are significant sufferings now that are unavoidable.
Jeff: But when they don't even hold that God's interest is their own interest, it behoves them, for the sake of logical consistency and avoidance of hypocrisy, to abandon all concepts of right/wrong/ill-desert.
Zach: I agree.
Jeff: But they don't.
Zach: I disagree.
Jeff: I don't say all don't. But I think there clearly are cases where people like to judge other people after denying any purpose to life.
Zach: I, too, share the belief that my particular creation was not know with certainty from eternity past. But I think God can choose to directly love me when I am created. Direct love does not require foreknowledge.
Jeff: But the degree of God's intervention in my behalf can be constrained by the original purpose of creation. God didn't even know I would exist when He planned our creation. Christ did exist at that time, though. That's why creation can be for Christ, but not for me.
Jeff: So those who will get a second chance, post-mortem, will experience God's goodness somehow? Will that be in the form of tolerating their evil choices or how?
Zach: I guess so. I really haven't thought about how God might offer post-mortem salvation. Maybe the preaching to the souls in prison has to do with that. But I feel weird even guessing. I do, however, think that certain sin are not counted against people because of their circumstances. (Not agreeing or knowing of covenant being the biggest two that I can see right now.)
Jeff: I really don't see any difference, then, in your main thesis. You believe, as I do, that God will not allow those who are "with excuse" to suffer or die without being given sufficient information to make an informed choice. I just believe more people are sufficiently informed than you do. Dawkins, per my view, is sufficiently informed (because of his moralizing and judgmentalness) even though he rejects a creator, partially, on the grounds of the problem of evil.
Jeff: I suspect the Jews believed Daniel was forgiven even though he had no access to the levitical sacrificial system. Just like the thief on the cross was forgiven apart from baptism.
Zach: Yes, but they considered Daniel a good guy.
Jeff: But they didn't think he was sinless. I have a hard time believing they were as legalistic as you think they were. Just like they realized the sabbath could be trumped by a suffering ox. The pharisees were hypocrites, but they weren't completely irrational. Virtually no one is.
Zach: Remember that it was the High Priest of the Jews who first came up with the idea of Jesus as a substitutionary sacrifice. They killed him in order to appease someone who considered himself a deity.
Jeff: It seems more plausible that they realized Christ was going to create a conflict with Rome. This is what hypocrites do--they claim motives of pragmatic concern when their real motives are selfish. I don't see how the idea of substitutionary sacrifice is even hinted at by them.
Zach: I would say that God does not like sacrificial systems (children, animals, Son of God, etc.). I've used the alcoholic metaphor before. God does not like alcoholism, but it is possible for alcoholics to do good things. That one participates in an evil system in no way implies that all of one's actions and motivations are impure. It's like the guy (Emth) in The Last Battle who thought he was worshipping Tash but was actually serving Aslan. Tash is a bad guy, but he has some good followers. At the end Aslan accepts Emth.
Jeff: So conventanters have to do good things for their sincerity to be accepted?
Zach: As to Paul, I'm not sure what you mean. I do not suppose that he usurps the authority of Christ.
Jeff: What epistles do you think Paul wrote? Do you accept those as authoritative? If not, how do you explain Paul's supposed error? I thought I remembered you saying that Paul made theological claims that were flat wrong. If Paul only wrote what he thought Christ had given him, how do we explain such error? If, on the other hand, he was writing what he knew was contrary to Christ, then why would we care about anything he wrote? Such a man has no fear of God.
Zach: Christ's death is propitiation toward whoever demands his death. Satan and the Jews demanded his death.
Jeff: Who, other than the religious leaders that conspired for his death, demanded it? I don't even think they demanded it except as any murderer demands the death of the victim--not as a sacrifice.
Zach: Jesus came and submitted himself to the will of evil men in order to demonstrate the depths of their sin and at the same time the love and power of God.
Jeff: Didn't Christ say, "if possible, let this cup pass from me?" This seems to imply that even Christ didn't know his death was necesssary. He simply trusted the Father that it was necessary. If Christ wasn't sure his death was necessary, I doubt he expects me to figure out what it means apart from scripture. But scripture alludes to "spotless lamb" and "shedding of blood" and such things. These phrases don't seem to allude to your idea of satisfaction. Do you think they do?
Post Edited (jefscott) : 12/11/2006 6:01:14 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
Megistered Rember
Date Joined Jun 2004
Total Posts : 2013
| Posted 12/20/2006 2:01 AM (GMT -6) | | I'm not trying to say that all atheists are like what I am describing. I'm not saying that atheism is never bad.
I'm not trying to make any specific Trinitarian statement. All I meant was that God's primary, basic motivation was not love for humanity (according to your view). And, in fact, if increasing meaningless human suffering was better for Christ, God would have done it. If God is so motivated, he doesn't seem very much like Jesus.
I'm not saying that God's goal is meaningful suffering. I don't think God starting WWII for us would be a good thing. All I'm saying on this point is that God is being good when he allows us to start our own WWII.
Jeff: Your view, to my mind, doesn't even explain why there was a Fall.
Zach: There was a fall because people chose to sin and because God allows people to sin.
Jeff: God's benevolence according to you doesn't even seem to have anything to do with the elimination or avoidance of suffering.
Zach: No. God's benevolence according to my doesn't even seem to have anything to do with the immediate elimination or avoidance of suffering.
Jeff: I don't say they are insane. I say truly insane people are excusable for their wrong thoughts. I also think some sane people will be held to less--where little is given, little is required. Hypocrisy will be judged, though, I think.
Zach: Well my thought is keeping with the same general idea. All of what you said plus a category where certain people (not every atheist) are held to nothing--where nothing (in the way of a good reason to believe) is given, nothing is required.
Jeff: And this is why you posit a post-mortem chance for those non-covenanters, right? Isn't this post-mortem chance necessary to explain God's benevolence? If not, why do you posit it? If so, then divine love can not be limited to the tolerance of freedom. It must involve the gift of an informed choice so that one can truly choose one's greater sentient good. But then why does God not give them knowledge to avoid suffering/death now? Why is God bound by love to do the one but not the other?
Zach: First of all, I do not necessarily believe that relationship with God is always a choice for one's greater sentient good. Some sane and informed people choose to reject that relationship. For them, spite or rebelliousness or drama are more sentiently satisfying. Second, God's love extends to all people - not just the victims but the oppressors also. If one party freely acts in order to cause a second party suffering, God cannot relieve the suffering of the second party without eliminating the first party's freedom. God is bound by love to do the one but not the other, because the other is loving to one person at the expense love for another.
Jeff: How can a being have a natural state of non-existence? Isn't that a contradiction? Nor is death necessarily non-existence. If it is, then ressurection is not the re-awakening of an existing being, it is the creation of another being. This would mean that we cease to exist at death as surely as sinners do, per your view. In which case, there is no post-mortem state for any of us.
Zach: Ok. Humans have no natural state because they do not exist naturally but only by willful act. I believe that death is ultimately non-existence. I believe that resurrection is the re-awakening an existing being. I don't necessarily believe that an human being has already ceased to exist. But the Bible does speak of an end even to hell, and I'm not a universalist...
Jeff: Like retarded people, or what? Why couldn't they be given a post-mortem chance with those who had no reason to believe?
Zach: I meant those who are unable to end their own lives.
Jeff: Yes, but the other verse I quoted about every mouth being stopped seems to indicate that they will have no argument against God. That seems to imply they will understand His arguments and concur.
Zach: I disagree. Stopping mouths seems like a metaphor of power, not agreement. In fact Psalm 63 says that they "Will go into the depths of the earth. They will be delivered over to the power of the sword; They will be a prey for foxes."
This is not about ackowledgement of justice. It is about David's enemies being dead.
Jeff: I would say God is amoral in the sense that there is no moral law that guides Him. Good and evil don't necessarily entail a moral meaning, to my mind. Right/wrong/ill-desert do, though. These latter imply a law and accountability to it. Good/evil do not, necessarily. Good/evil can refer directly or indirectly to sentient states apart from moral accountability. That's why we can talk about what's good for a dog, e.g.
Zach: I believe that God does adhere to a moral of love. I agree that "good" and "evil" do not necessarily entail morality. They could just mean pleasant and unpleasant. But you do, in fact, believe that there is a moral law that guides God. You said so yourself. You believe that God cannot sin. He is morally unfree or amoral. He is bound to this moral law, and those who are deterministically bound to a moral law are themselves amoral. I believe that God is free to choose to sin or not. He chooses not. Otherwise God is a slave to forces beyond his control. Belief in a slave-God is tenable, but it is my opinion that it is not in keeping with the revelation of the Father in Jesus.
Jeff: Well, I thought your claim is that theodicy is already a non-issue. Because love, per your view, is the tolerance of choice with no regard to the sentient consequences of those choices. Regardless, my question now is: is there a point (like Christ's coming) where there will be a quantum change in the behavior of believers? Or do we go on gaining self-control in a fallen environment until we are completely self-controlled even after Christ's coming?
Zach: My claim is that theodicy IS a legitimate issue for certain people. Yes, I do believe that there will be a point of radical change in the behavior of believers and in the environment. I believe in a new heaven and new earth. But this does not mean that we will ever lose the ability to sin. We will instead gain the self-control to make the right choice. We will not be given a lobotomy, but we will reach maturity.
Jeff: This is what I'm looking for: is there anything in your view of God's love/benevolence/goodness that involves an active divine role in the removal of suffering? If so, then doesn't your view have to explain why, if God's love has only to do with tolerance of choice, that He is working towards this elimination of suffering? Doesn't your view, as well as mine, require an explanation of this active divine role.
Zach: Yes. I believe that God does and will actively remove suffering. Just not at the expense of the free will of sinners. My view is NOT that "God's love has only to do with tolerance of choice." My view is that God's love is directed toward people with meaningful free will. If God "loves" in such a way that the objects of his love are forced into binding "agreements" without their agreement, then they do not have meaningful free will at the most crucial point.
This active divine role is only held back by God desire to love sinners (which among other things, includes respect for the sinner's free will).
Jeff: I really don't see any difference, then, in your main thesis. You believe, as I do, that God will not allow those who are "with excuse" to suffer or die without being given sufficient information to make an informed choice. I just believe more people are sufficiently informed than you do. Dawkins, per my view, is sufficiently informed (because of his moralizing and judgmentalness) even though he rejects a creator, partially, on the grounds of the problem of evil.
Zach: No. You are mixing two different things. God's allowing suffering is not based on the sufferer's knowledge. That is not what I'm saying. I do not believe "that God will not allow those who are 'with excuse' to suffer or die without being given sufficient information." I DO believe that God will allow all sorts of people to suffer and die. It happens all the time. How could I think otherwise. Injustice does happen. God's allowance of suffering is dependent upon his love for (and therefore respect for the free will of) the one causing the suffering.
Jeff: It seems more plausible that they realized Christ was going to create a conflict with Rome.
Zach: That's what I said.
Jeff: So conventanters have to do good things for their sincerity to be accepted?
Zach: No... They just need to sincerely desire acceptance.
Jeff: If Paul only wrote what he thought Christ had given him, how do we explain such error?
Zach: I don't see why it needs explanation. Good people make mistakes all the time. And no, I do not consider any epistles "authoritative." Only Jesus is Lord. Perhaps there are epistles that comply with Jesus' authority. But I see no need to consider anything written by Paul to be absolutely correct on every theological point. Maybe some of his letters are; maybe not. Also, I pretty much agree with most scholars on which epistles were written by Paul, but that a letter is written by Paul doesn't really figure into my understanding of whether it is truth. I try only to look to see if it is consistent with Jesus.
Jeff: Who, other than the religious leaders that conspired for his death, demanded it?
Zach: The crowd said, "Crucify Him."
Jeff: I don't even think they demanded it except as any murderer demands the death of the victim--not as a sacrifice.
Zach: I think that IS a sacrifice. The murderer sacrifices the victim to himself. I highly recommend Rene Girard on this subject.
Zach: Jesus came and submitted himself to the will of evil men in order to demonstrate the depths of their sin and at the same time the love and power of God.
Jeff: Didn't Christ say, "if possible, let this cup pass from me?" This seems to imply that even Christ didn't know his death was necesssary. He simply trusted the Father that it was necessary. If Christ wasn't sure his death was necessary, I doubt he expects me to figure out what it means apart from scripture. But scripture alludes to "spotless lamb" and "shedding of blood" and such things. These phrases don't seem to allude to your idea of satisfaction. Do you think they do?
Zach: I agree with what you said about Christ asking for the cup to pass from him. His submission to God was carried out in his submission to men. I do think that the allusions you alluded to fit within my framework. But I consider Jesus (not the Bible) the Word of God. Within a sacrificial system "spotless lamb" et al. are the standard appeasing divine justice metaphors. From the point of view of victims, they are a statement of God's indentification with the lowly. The victim is not necessarily being judged for evil. The sacrifice is not alwas deserving of death. Jewish sacrificial systems (like most others) have their roots in human sacrifice (Isaac, Joseph, Egyptian plagues, Moses' son). And the attitude that permitted the sacrifice of the lowly in order to perserve the community persisted. This is seen in the persecution of the poor all the why up into the time of Jesus.
Either way, Jesus is the perfect sacrifice given to someone who demands blood in order for reconciliation to take place. I personally think that the blood is demanded by the satanic impulse within humanity. It is Satan who demands innocent victims, not God.
Watch me fly. Freedom like wings and I will use them. Freedom like wings and I will spread them wide. - StavesacrePost Edited (Sahid) : 12/20/2006 1:05:55 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 12/23/2006 11:50 AM (GMT -6) | | | Zach: God's benevolence according to my doesn't even seem to have anything to do with the immediate elimination or avoidance of suffering.
Zach: If one party freely acts in order to cause a second party suffering, God cannot relieve the suffering of the second party without eliminating the first party's freedom. God is bound by love to do the one but not the other, because the other is loving to one person at the expense love for another.
Jeff: Zach, I don't have time to respond to all of your last post right now. But I think these two statements help me see more clearly where you're coming from. It seems that you are saying that God's love truly does concern Him about our sentient satisfaction/elimination of suffering--but that He must do it in an unbiased way. For you, God's love has partly to do with the tolerance of unrestrained freedom. Thus, for God's love to be unbiased, He can never restrain freedom in the interest of sentient satisfaction. Is this correct?
First of all, how do we explain Christ's casting out of demons and the such. Weren't those acts of power violations of the freedom of demons, per your view? Second, it seems to me that the various conditions of life are biased towards greater ranges of freedom for some people over others. Some people, by virtue of extreme privation in childhood, are never functionally developed to where they have much choice at all. They become conditioned to react with various defense mechansims due to really dysfunctional associations caused at a very young age. It would seem that God does not guarantee us an equal playing field to even have the same capacity for choice. Third, seemingly the range of choices is different for post-Fall humans than it was for pre-Fall humans.
The only way I know how to account for the restraint of demons and angels, by your view, is to suppose they aren't volitional or that they aren't loved by God. And I don't know how to make sense out of a hopeful eschatology if freedom is never constrained (at least by different conditions of choice) or restrained in any way. Nor do I see how God's interest in elimination of suffering is truly significant if He is, as I write, perfectly loving those children whose lives are virtual hells merely by allowing them the few relatively meaningless choices they are capable of. Nor do I see how the variance in range of human choice can be considered unbiased if free choice is what is (at this time) so important to God.
In short, I don't see why the unbiased nature of God's love should not apply to the conditions of choice and sentient well-being, also. Why should the mere allowance of choice in the midst of such vast disparity of conditions be the only thing that is unbiased if, indeed, sentient satisfaction has anything to do with God's love?
It seems that your view entails the idea that God's love has phases to it. It is as though, now, freedom is the only object of God's love--whereas, later, sentient satisfaction becomes an object of God's love also. Alternatively, it might entail the idea that God's love has no phases because He never intervenes in a way that would imply any bias whatsoever on His part. But, in that case, I don't see what role eschatology has in Christian thought. But Christ certainly seemed to talk about rewards in an eschatological future that renders our suffering "worth it." Thus, the very fact that some humans are lucky enough to hear the story and learn about how to make their suffering meaningful seems to be a kind of advantage that God has provided for them. Why wouldn't this provision of advantage be considered a bias of a sort?
Paul seems to make a similar point by saying that the circumcision profited because they had first received the oracles of God. Even if the OT was not a divine revelation, having access to the gospels would count as this same kind of advantage. But an advantage that came about by divine intervention would seem to have the same kind of effect as a bias. Maybe I don't understand what you mean by bias.
Post Edited (jefscott) : 12/24/2006 12:02:14 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
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| Posted 12/26/2006 2:29 AM (GMT -6) | | I'll try to answer it all.
J: Thus, for God's love to be unbiased, He can never restrain freedom in the interest of sentient satisfaction. Is this correct?
Z: Yes, but it is not merely "for God's love to be unbiased." It is for God's love to exist at all with (morally) sinful humanity as its object. As soon as God inhibits the ability to commit a sin, he not only denies us moral choice, he also makes us into puppets (at least partially). And what is the alternative? Sentient satisfaction without freedom to make moral choice? What if a person consciously wants to have morality? Is heaven the place where we are tied down and forced to be happy? If God wants to make us sentiently satisfied, he hardly has to tie us down.
J: First of all, how do we explain Christ's casting out of demons and the such.
Z: If demons are independent conscious beings, we have a problem. I don't believe that any more.
J: Second, it seems to me that the various conditions of life are biased towards greater ranges of freedom for some people over others.
J: It would seem that God does not guarantee us an equal playing field to even have the same capacity for choice.
Z: I agree. But why is this a problem? This is exactly the explanation that I have been giving for suffering: God allows people/sinners the freedom even to harm people/victims. Were He not to grant this freedom, He would be only loving toward the good. But God is loving to the point of forgiveness and even yieldedness. Maybe in the past, people thought of God as the being who brought suffering on sinners, but the perfect revelation of Jesus (or even Job for that matter) says otherwise. God gives rain to the righteous and the unrighteous. He is forgiving not only to his own (like the tax-collectors) but to all. He teaches us to adopt this attitude so that we may be correctly called sons of the Most High.
The issue is not the free will of the sufferer. Of course God allows that to be thwarted and even stopped. This much is obvious. We see it, hear about it, and read it in the Bible. The issue is the free will of the persecutor. Does God force persecutors and persecution to stop? Obviously not. So this must be in keeping with God's good and loving character. By the fact that he is allowing harmful activity to continue, taken together with the faith that he is both good and almighty, we can only conclude that such allowances for evil are in fact good.
J: Third, seemingly the range of choices is different for post-Fall humans than it was for pre-Fall humans.
Z: Maybe. Tell me more of what you mean here.
J: And I don't know how to make sense out of a hopeful eschatology if freedom is never constrained (at least by different conditions of choice) or restrained in any way.
Z: Why? What is nonsensical about God and certain humans choosing to live in love?
J: Nor do I see how God's interest in elimination of suffering is truly significant if He is, as I write, perfectly loving those children whose lives are virtual hells merely by allowing them the few relatively meaningless choices they are capable of.
Z: That is not the issue. I am NOT saying that God's gift of free will to the sufferers justifies their suffering. We have three basic choices: (1) God grants satisfaction without freedom, (2) God grants freedom without satisfaction, or (3) God grants a certain amount of freedom and a certain amount of satisfaction based upon some other standard (or arbitrarily). If (3) is what we are going for, we need to be discussing that other standard by which the correct balance of satisfaction and freedom is determined. If we argue for (1), we must answer the question of why God bothered giving us freedom and allowing suffering at all. I am arguing for (2). God grants the freedom even to take away the freedom of others. If anyone doesn't like how God has set this world up, they can leave. I don't believe that God forces anyone to stay. I don't believe that he threatens those who leave with post-mortem punishment for leaving.
I think it is undeniable that God does allow humans the freedom to take away the freedom of others. If he didn't allow it, it wouldn't be happening this very instant in Guantanamo, Afganistan, Somalia, and down the street in the home of an abusive parent. God does allow evil. God is love. Therefore, love does allow evil.
That evil harms others is truly tragic. But this is not a problem for which God must be justified. {No one is forced to suffer. Anyone can end his or her life if they want to.} Therefore, they have no reasonable complaint. It's like me refusing to open my umbrella and then complaining to God about getting wet. --That part in brackets is the problem with my belief that I referred to earlier.
J: In short, I don't see why the unbiased nature of God's love should not apply to the conditions of choice and sentient well-being, also.
Z: Because to create us in such a way that we cannot touch the freedom of another, is to make us incapable of relationship. And that's the whole point of creation in the first place. To make the conditions "unbiased" is to remove free moral choice. In such a world we might be able to see and communicate with one another, but there could be no intimacy or vulnerability. If we were all constrained so that we could never harm one another, it would be impossible to make morally significant choices. We could eat forbidden fruit and die, and God would allow it just like the Bible says he did. But, in my view, sin (which BTW is not mentioned in the fall account but first appears with Cain and Able), requires a victim. And in such a world there could be no victims. God could have made the world this way. Maybe there are other worlds that he created that way. But it is plainly obvious that he did not create this world that way. And there is no logical or ethical requirement that he do so.
J: Why should the mere allowance of choice in the midst of such vast disparity of conditions be the only thing that is unbiased if, indeed, sentient satisfaction has anything to do with God's love?
Z: Choice is necessary for love (at least the type of love that Jesus displays). If God eliminates the choice of those who choose to cause suffering, then God eliminates love in their case. Therefore a loving being (if he loves like Jesus) must allow suffering. This loving being will actively seek to maximize sentient satisfaction, but if he does so at the expense of freedom, he is unloving toward sinners and only loving toward the sinless.
J: It seems that your view entails the idea that God's love has phases to it. It is as though, now, freedom is the only object of God's love--whereas, later, sentient satisfaction becomes an object of God's love also.
Z: No, freedom is always necessary for love. And the goal of love is always sentient satisfaction of the beloved. It's like changing a light bulb on a high ceiling. The goal of having a light bulb is to have a comfortable room. But if you refuse to do the uncomfortable activity of climbing the step ladder to change the bulb, it is impossible to enjoy the comfort of the light. There are phases, but these are not phases in God's love. They are phases in what choices free humans make. One day, without compulsion, we who exist will stop choosing to sin.
J: But Christ certainly seemed to talk about rewards in an eschatological future that renders our suffering "worth it."
Z: I too, believe that there will be rewards in an eschatological future that renders our suffering "worth it."
J: Thus, the very fact that some humans are lucky enough to hear the story and learn about how to make their suffering meaningful seems to be a kind of advantage that God has provided for them. Why wouldn't this provision of advantage be considered a bias of a sort?
Z: No. It is an advantage that human choice has provided for them. Or, more accurately, there is a disadvantage that human choice has placed on others. It is an advantage, but the disparity is not the "provision" of God.
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Similitude
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| Posted 12/26/2006 7:43 PM (GMT -6) | | | Z: That evil harms others is truly tragic. But this is not a problem for which God must be justified. {No one is forced to suffer. Anyone can end his or her life if they want to.} Therefore, they have no reasonable complaint. It's like me refusing to open my umbrella and then complaining to God about getting wet.
J: There are infants and young children that suffer that have no knowledge or strength of will to commit suicide.
Z: There are phases, but these are not phases in God's love. They are phases in what choices free humans make. One day, without compulsion, we who exist will stop choosing to sin.
J: This, as I understand it, is exactly what open theism claims we can not know. If the conditions or ranges of choice are not modified, we can not know that sinning will stop. If such a thing is actually knowable, then open theism seems to be false.
How, e.g., do we explain, in terms of the open view, how Christ knew that he would find faith on earth when he returned? I would think such a prediction is merely a wish or a proclamation that God would assure it somehow. I don't see how the open view can explain it any other way. If it was a probabilistic guess, than it would seem he realized that some change in conditions grounded that probability. But that change in conditions would have been done by God, wouldn't it? Even if it was simply the incarnation itself.
If you are referring to character solidification, then it would seem that you are saying love can only be said to exist when a sufficient number of voluntary choices, each entailing some measure of self-discipline, result in complete solidification. But surely there is a sense in which a solitary act can be an act of love. So yeah, love requires freedom, but it doesn't necessarily require complete character solidification. True, God can require that of us. But I don't see why it is necessary for the sheer existence of love, on our part. It certainly didn't seem to be necessary for the thief on the cross, unless we are to suppose he has a whole lot of post-morem discipline to endure.
J: Thus, the very fact that some humans are lucky enough to hear the story and learn about how to make their suffering meaningful seems to be a kind of advantage that God has provided for them. Why wouldn't this provision of advantage be considered a bias of a sort?
Z: No. It is an advantage that human choice has provided for them. Or, more accurately, there is a disadvantage that human choice has placed on others. It is an advantage, but the disparity is not the "provision" of God.
J: But it was not a human choice that Christ incarnate, much less when or where he did it. Was it? I don't see how. So it was seemingly God's choice that people after B.C. and of certain locales had the advantage of access to the story. Granted, we can say that access to the story, pre-mortem, has nothing to do with love or sentient satisfaction. But that's the only way I can see around it, per your view. Otherwise, it seems we have a divinely-caused advantage.
And what about child-raising? If I have a child that needs medical attention involving a shot to stay alive, am I wrong to have him subjected to the shot against his desire? If no, does such a subjection by the parent/doctor have anything to do with love/benevolence? I'm thinking maybe we're just defining love/benevolence differently.
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Similitude
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| Posted 12/30/2006 3:14 PM (GMT -6) | | |
Z: God does allow evil. God is love. Therefore, love does allow evil.
J: I've been thinking, I think I know how to articulate how I think the syllogism should work. Love can be a noun or a verb. When I think of the statement, "God is love," I think God does loving acts. IOW, I think we use love as a noun only because we can abstract a quality from actions. Apart from the verb aspect of love, the noun idea of love is meaningless.
How, then, do I account for God as being love in terms of His actions? I assume that the object of any loving act is the sentient satisfaction of some sentient being. You seem to be saying something similar insomuch as you say that the purpose of freedom is the short-term and long-term consequences free acts can achieve. I would say that the consequences of freedom that are valuable to God are the sentient states that our free choices affect in Him. Apart from anticipation of sentient states caused by actions, I can't even conceive of what it means to be motivated.
So to say that God allows evil doesn't totally capture the idea entailed in God performing an act of love. If God is loving by "allowing" evil, He must be doing something, per my understanding of love. And I think He is. He is forebearing. This means that God has a natural impulse to prevent the evil--just as all benevolent people do. But He restrains Himself. This restraint is the action we call forebearing. Forebearance is as truly an action as any other--it's just that it's an action upon one's own self.
But the question is: Who is the beneficiary of God's forebearance? It doesn't seem to necessarily be the victim of the evil. Because, as you have agreed, there is not necessarily any reward for suffering unless it is suffering with Christ. Thus, the victim can not always be the beneficiary of God's forebearance. But the inflicter of suffering doesn't seem to be the beneficiary of God's forebearance, either. Surely God is not forebearing for the sentient satisfaction that the ill-doer receives from inflicting suffering on others. And if God is the beneficiary of His own action, then God is "seeking His own," seemingly. And this is supposedly is not what love does.
I say that Christ is the beneficiary insomuch as God's forebearance is done to extend the timespan of the creational project so Christ's kingdom can ultimately be more full and glorious. The kind of order that conditions meaningful freedom must be preserved if the sentient satisfaction that freedom can occasion for Christ is to be achieved. Such an order entails some uniformity of natural laws.
But God is not doing any evil to the victim, either. He is doing nothing for or against the victim. If we are right about many of these sufferings, they are truly tragedies because they have no future significance or meaning. I think we would both be glad to find that there is some kind of future "compensation" for such suffering. But I know of nothing that requires it unless the "God is love" statement somehow implies it. So I say that God is love insomuch as when He acts, He acts benevolently for some sentient being.
So God is not loving, per my understanding, merely by allowing freedom independent of the sentient states affected by free choices. Given that, it makes perfect sense to me that there could be states in the world, like that of the pre-flood Genesis account, that would be too depressing for a loving person to forebear if, in fact, that person had the sheer power to stop it. Indeed, if God allowed the universe to continue indefinitely without interference with freedom, yet with enormous amounts of suffering, with no end in sight of eschatological relief, I would question His benevolence.
As I understand open theism and scripture, the "end in sight" of eschatological relief is grounded in God's unbearable sentient dissatisfaction with ubiquitious evil, and nothing else. IOW, God forebears for Christ as long as He can and then intervenes. And He providentially works in history to maximize Christ's glory along the way.
For the longest, my resistance to universalism was grounded in the fact that I could only see God's forebearance as contributing to His own sentient satisfaction in the form of something like glory. Now that I can see it as contributing to Christ, I can see even forebearance as a loving act for another. This is why I think it's fair to posit the possibility that God's benevolence is ultimately directed to the sentient satisfaction of all once the temporal purposes of creation are achieved. Indeed, once we allow for any specific, post-mortem, benevolent act not explicitly mentioned in scripture, we can allow for others so long as God's interest in sentient satisfaction is understood in a manner consistent with all else we know of Him.
My syllogism, then, would look something like this (assuming that the Father has no need of love or glory from creatures):
1) God is love, which means that all His actions have as their object the sentient satisfaction of one or more other sentient beings.
2) God is also an empathetic being who experiences some measure of suffering from other sentient beings' undeserved suffering.
3) God is sentiently motivated, which means He seeks pleasure and not suffering. Therefore, He will exercise His power to stop His own suffering unless loving forebearance of the suffering can result in the sentient satisfaction of another. He will forebear, then, when the sentient satisfaction of others can occasion a sentient satisfaction/pleasure in Himself that renders the endured suffering "worth it," to Him.
4) Therefore, freedom alone is not the object of God's love (=loving action).
5) Therefore, God's tolerance of undeserved suffering is an act of love insofar as it is an act of forebearance for the sake of another's sentient satisfaction.
6) Therefore, I see no other explanation of who that "other" can be but Christ, unless all undeserved suffering will be compensated for in some way that scripture does not reveal.
But even if such a hypothetical compensation is true, I still don't see any way to explain such a state of affairs except by positing that there is some more urgent priority, now, that justifies the tolerance of the suffering in the first place. IOW, what could suffering infants be accomplishing from their sufferings (that are not for righteousness sake) that would merit a compensation from God in the future? What, IOW, is it in God's nature that would explain His obligation to compensate the suffering that He, Himself, is effectually choosing by continuing to forebear in a world that can't turn on a dime? I think we need to explain this if we are not going to account for God's forebearance in terms of Christ's glory/kingdom.
Post Edited (jefscott) : 12/31/2006 9:07:44 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
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| Posted 1/3/2007 6:29 PM (GMT -6) | | J: But the inflicter of suffering doesn't seem to be the beneficiary of God's forebearance, either. Surely God is not forebearing for the sentient satisfaction that the ill-doer receives from inflicting suffering on others.
Z: Why not? This is the alternative that I have been arguing for.
J: I say that Christ is the beneficiary insomuch as God's forebearance is done to extend the timespan of the creational project so Christ's kingdom can ultimately be more full and glorious.
Z: If so, then God will not allow the creational project ever to stop. There will be no eschaton.
J: This, as I understand it, is exactly what open theism claims we can not know. If the conditions or ranges of choice are not modified, we can not know that sinning will stop. If such a thing is actually knowable, then open theism seems to be false.
Z: Not if God knows that all chatacter tends to solidification and some form of annihilationism is true.
J: If you are referring to character solidification, then it would seem that you are saying love can only be said to exist when a sufficient number of voluntary choices, each entailing some measure of self-discipline, result in complete solidification.
Z: I disagree. Love can exist before solidification. How does my position imply otherwise? At the end, all existing free choosers will have solidified in love without being coerced to do so. This is the case because those who solidify without love have separated themselves (i.e. sinned), and a life fully separated from God cannot sustain itself. I don't see how you can get the idea that love cannot exist before solidification from my view. I don't say that love requires solidification. I do say that all ways in which one's life can be oriented tend to eventual solidification, and so love (being included) also does end in solidification like everything else.
J: Otherwise, it seems we have a divinely-caused advantage.
Z: Agreed. But I still believe that post-mortem opportunities (or C.S. Lewis style acknowledgement of Christlikeness) are available to the "disadvantaged."
J: And what about child-raising? If I have a child that needs medical attention involving a shot to stay alive, am I wrong to have him subjected to the shot against his desire? If no, does such a subjection by the parent/doctor have anything to do with love/benevolence? I'm thinking maybe we're just defining love/benevolence differently.
Z: I think that in the case of a person who is unable to choose, those who care for that person should make choices for that person that will bring him or her to the place where choices may one day be made. So if I must impose my will upon a person to whom I cannot communicate in order to save his life, I will do it. This is what I see God doing. He creates us (with no regard to our yet nonexistent will) and then lets us make our own choices. We must respect the freedom of a free creature in order to love. But if that creature has no actual freedom but only potential freedom, we must impose our will upon this (not yet free) creature until the time when the creature does possess free will. When exactly this moment comes in the case of children, I don't know.
Watch me fly. Freedom like wings and I will use them. Freedom like wings and I will spread them wide. - Stavesacre | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 1/7/2007 6:54 PM (GMT -6) | | | Yo, Zach. I'm having a hard time keeping up. I won't be taking three day weekends and holidays for a while, so I'm gonna have an even harder time the next few weeks, probably. So let's take one issue at a time and get it hashed out before moving on. I think it'll save us time. So lets start back with this one.
Jeff: If no, does such a subjection by the parent/doctor have anything to do with love/benevolence? I'm thinking maybe we're just defining love/benevolence differently.
Zach: I think that in the case of a person who is unable to choose, those who care for that person should make choices for that person that will bring him or her to the place where choices may one day be made. So if I must impose my will upon a person to whom I cannot communicate in order to save his life, I will do it. This is what I see God doing. He creates us (with no regard to our yet nonexistent will) and then lets us make our own choices. We must respect the freedom of a free creature in order to love. But if that creature has no actual freedom but only potential freedom, we must impose our will upon this (not yet free) creature until the time when the creature does possess free will. When exactly this moment comes in the case of children, I don't know.
Jeff: Fair enough. But you didn't say whether you deem such an imposition an act of love/benevolence. This is what I'm trying to understand. Because in past posts/threads, it seemed you were arguing that we are not to restrain freedom since God doesn't. So would you say that we are to impose upon volition-less infants because God does? If so, what does God do for volition-less infants. If God doesn't, then why are we to do what He doesn't do. Flesh that out a bit for me so I can see how you might explain God's love as somehow different in effect from ours--or not. Holler back at you next weekend. Have a good one!
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Similitude
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| Posted 1/14/2007 11:45 AM (GMT -6) | | | OK. I think, then, we differ fundamentally on what love is. To me, love can be for volitionalless creatures as much as it can be for volitional creatures. Love is volitional. But it can be for any sentient being, to my mind. The only requirement is that there is something the lover can do to increase the highest sentient satisfaction of the beloved.
To my mind, the value of freedom is that it provides for different kinds of sentient satisfaction. Unfortunately, it comes with the risk of sentient dissatisfaction.
So let's move to another issue I'm still not clear on. You said:
Z: Not if God knows that all chatacter tends to solidification and some form of annihilationism is true.
AND...
Z: At the end, all existing free choosers will have solidified in love without being coerced to do so.
As I understand solidification, it means that actions are no longer volitional--they are habitual. So the only way I know how to conceive of volitional actions in a solidified person is if there is some way for new conditions to come about wherein the person is not solidified--i.e., conditions of new kinds of choices. How, then, do you explain how God is eternally non-solidified if all character "tends to solidification."
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Similitude
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| Posted 1/14/2007 3:47 PM (GMT -6) | | Zach: So, in our final states, I believe that we can have aquired the habit of love, and can honestly say that this love was (and continues to be) freely chosen. I do not believe that we will lose the ability to sin. I do believe we will lose the illusion that sin is a worthwhile choice.
Jeff: I'll explain how I think this subject applies to God. It reminds me of the debates between JEE etal about this issue. It took me a long time to understand what JEE was trying to say. I agree with him that God has the sheer power to do an act that He would say is a violation of His nature. But that's the point, He can't do it because it's a violation of His nature--not a limitation of power.
What this means, to me, is that God can have no impulse/desire that He could even direct to an end that violates His holy nature. This supposes that God has natural impulses associated with His natural feelings just like we do. If God can choose what to feel OR not know what is the best way to direct their associated impulses, then all bets are off. In short, I think God CAN do an act that could be seen as unrighteous in some context. But I think God CAN'T be MOTIVATED to do such an act. And it is this absence of motivation that explains to me why God can not but do what He deems as fitting.
Zach: As to what love is: I agree that one can love a volitionless creature as well as a free creature. But I don't think I'm going to far into left field by saying that love for one's houseplant or dog is qualitatively different from love of one's spouse or love of God.
Jeff: I would say that the love of a houseplant is not a love that benevolently affects the plant. To me, a non-sentient being can not experience anything that could be considered good or bad. Sentient beings can experience good/bad (i.e., pleasure/displeasure). And volitional beings can experience pleasures/displeasures that are conditioned by social states of affairs. This is the difference to me, then. Volitional beings can experience different kinds of benevolences (pleasures/displeasures) that non-volitional, sentient beings can not. But in either case, sentient beings can be treated benevolently or malevolently. A plant can't, though.
With regard to the covenanters vs. non-convenanters, I think you're post on the other thread clears me up on your position. You said God holds us accountable to our own system of judgment. I assume you mean that for non-covenanters, too. If this is what you're saying, I totally agree. I think this is what Paul means when he says those without law will be judged without law--they will be judged by the standard by which they judge others.
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Similitude
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| Posted 1/14/2007 8:36 PM (GMT -6) | | Zach: The love for a volitional being must somehow take into account that being's will. At some point or another in the case of sinful creatures, love either requires disregarding the will in favor of welfare or disregarding welfare in favor of the will.
Jeff: I think it depends on what we mean by love. If by love we mean actions, then I don't see that God is loving us by doing nothing for our welfare. I assume that for us who believe, God is doing much. He is leading us with His Spirit. He seals us with His Spirit. He will glorify us. He works in us the will to do His good pleasure--which we are to work out. He answers some of our requests. And so on. But to the extent that He is doing nothing for our welfare, I assume that Christ and God, Himself, are the main beneficiaries of God's creation of free creatures. Without it, Christ's reign and glory could not occur.
But granted, God's love for us is qualitatively different because we are volitional creatures than it would be if we were mere dogs. But only, to my mind, because it makes for unique kinds of sentient satisfaction for us and God. Apart from that uniqueness, I assume His love for sentient animals is analogous to His love for us. Both the animal and God receive some sentient satisfaction from it. Just not as excellent a sentient satisfaction as that attainable from loving relationality between volitional beings.
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