Jeff: Second, if God is unsurpassably satisfied, then all divine experience is beautiful unless God is not even sentient in a way I can understand. Either way, it has the same problems for me that the blueprint view does. It makes my recognition of myself as a distinct being capable of making my own choices EITHER meaningless in thought OR morally irrelevant. That's what the blueprint view does.

Tom: Right. That's my point too.

Unison: This issue would exist regardless…right, Tom? I mean if God's aseity is GROUNDED on God's unsurpassably intense beautiful experience of Godself unto divine aesthetic satisfaction, it just is what it is, as far as the implications. We've already talked about how Creation can be said to be "relatively meaningless" to God, in the sense of contribution to God's aesthetic satisfaction level.

Tom: I don’t our relative meaningless with respect to divine aseity is the same meaningless Jeff and I feel when we contemplate the claim that we are God, our choices God’s choices, our dispositions his disposition just dressed up in contingent form.

Think of it this way, D (perhaps Jeff will agree that this is what he’s trying to say too), we often talk about “taking responsibility” for our choices, something you’ve agreed it essential to God-ward becoming. But consider the very notion of personal accountability or responsibility. To be responsible, accountable, is to be a cause, a final arbiter in a causal chain. Accountability follows the identity of causal chains. So for it to be the case that “I” and not God, am responsible for my choices, there has to BE an “I” which is “not God,” an entity sufficiently distinct from God so that we rightly say the entity may genuinely “take responsibility” before God. The point is that “ownership of choice” is grounded upon a sufficiently distinct ontology behind agency. That, among other concerns, is what’s important to me. Whatever this distinction is, it’s more than merely a logical or categorical move. It’s a substantial distinction, for it’s what makes “us” responsible and not God.

Now, if you want to posit a unifying principle or consciousness, the energies of God, as a kind of ontological medium in which all created or sensible entities subsist, I’m fine with that, so long as the necessary ‘real’ distinctions required by the sort of divine-human responsible relationality that’s at the heart of the biblical story don’t dissolve in that unifying consciousness. It’s unifying effect, whatever it may be, grounds and sustains the personal distinctions that just are divine-human relationality. But as far as I can tell, your new take is more pantheistic; the distinctions are ultimately not real, at least not real enough. On your view, as I understand it, God is the only “being” in the universe and a sinful, privated one at that. If you want to place the responsibility for evil at our feet and not God’s, you have to posit a sufficiently substantial distinction between divine and created ontology.

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Jeff: How can it be "at the expense of Itself" if IT is existing in a state of unsurpassable intensity of sentient satisfaction? Such a being could not be ill-affected sentiently in any conceivable way. But without being ill-affected sentiently, what does it even mean to say "at the expense of Itself?" As I see it, self-giving (meaning doing something for someone else "at the expense of yourself" ) doesn't necessitate a decrease in sentient satisfaction in one's self-giving activity. Self-giving may involve the ability to be ill-affected sentiently, but it doesn't necessitate it. Am I wrong on that?

and also…

Jeff: Here's where I'm not clear. I have no problem with saying there is some kind of satisfaction that the godhead experiences from its relationality that can not be improved upon--the unity part. But I have no way of ruling out that God is sympathetic (=compassionate). These words have the idea of experiencing pathos or passion WITH another. So God suffers WITH us and WITH the incarnate Son as he suffers, to my mind. In this sense, His total sentient state can be surpassed from what it currently is precisely because creation diminishes it. Our creation occasions SOFA's which necessitate love that suffers long. Divine experience, sans creation, occasions no such SOFA's.

Unison: This is the thought I had. Just because it "costs" Bill Gates something to buy an object doesn't mean that it truly "costs" him something. See what I mean?

Tom: Jeff, I’m gonna agree with Unison here and also add a small qualification. I conceive of divine aseity (in terms of Greg’s work, as D does) as an unsurpassably intense experience of relational beauty (I’m not trying to be philosophically precise here, OK?). As you say, there has to be some kind of essential, God-defining, experience that just is the “self-sufficient” event that is God. By definition that has to be impervious to contingent events. But where others create a secondary sort of shell surrounding this impervious ‘essence’ where God ad extra experiences us while God ad intra remains untouched (that makes little sense to me at least as I hear it expounded by its proponents), I take a different route. Forget dividing God up into ad intra and ad extra realms (except perhaps conceptually so far as it helps us describe our experience of God, but there’s no REAL ontological distinction here in the one God who experiences and is affect by us). Go with D’s analogy of Bill Gates. Suppose he’s got an infinite supply of money. Say he purchases some piece of property. He really does “spend” money. There really was an “expense” he incurred. It’s just that this expense, though felt, does not diminish his wealth, which is infinite. It’s like infinite sets. Take the set of all real numbers. Imagine its “intensity” be be in the number of members. How many members constitute the set? Well, an infinite number of members. Take the number 6 out of the set. How intense is the set? It’s equally intense, though a ‘real’ substraction has been made.

I place God’s experience of us and our affects upon God IN God, the real God, the ONLY God there is, unshielded by the invisible force field of his energies. This God really does note, feel, and experience us. But given the infinite nature of the joy that God provides himself, our contribution affects no diminishment in the divine life as unsurpassaly intense.

Hope that helps,

Tom

Post Edited (MANY) : 7/15/2007 11:30:00 PM (GMT-5)

Tom: But really does note, feel, experience us. But given the infinite nature of the joy that God provides himself, our contribution affects no diminishment in the divine life as unsurpassaly intense.

Jeff: Since we are to be longsuffering and forebearing as God is, should our joy be such that, if I am crucified for my testimony, the firing of the nerve endings in my hands and feet would not consciously and noticeably diminish the intensity of my sentient satisfaction? If so, it seems meaningless to talk about enduring, suffering, "beautiful struggle," etc. If not, isn't Christ's example of love non-analogous to the love we are to experience if he didn't really suffer consciously? If so, he's no real example at all right where it matters most.

For if Christ didn't really suffer sufficiently that only the joy before him could motivate him to endure, because of the intensity of his pleasure from union with the Father, then Christ's love truly cost him nothing of any significance. And, then, scripture is significantly misleading in this regard. What sense does it make for Paul to say the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with our future glory if the sufferings of this time (which are the fellowship of Christ's sufferings) are so trivial in comparison to our current bliss that we hardly even notice them? Granted, Paul could be dead wrong. I'm just not prepared to go there since I don't see a philosophical need for positing the view of aseity that requires it.

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Tom: As you say, there has to be some kind of essential, God-defining, experience that just is the “self-sufficient” event that is God. By definition that has to be impervious to contingent events.

Jeff: Write the definition of God so I'll see that the definition implies that God "has to be impervious to contingent events."

Tom: Eh, yeah. One “definition of God” coming right up! It’s right here in my back pocket.  

I didn’t say God is impervious to contingent events. He’s not. I said that which constitutes God’s own self-sufficiency has to be impervious to contingent events. That much is just the definition of “aseity.” If God is absolutely necessary existence, then whatever constitutes the essential attributes of that existence can’t be open to our influence. Again, that’s just definitional. The question is what attributes or experience constitute that aseity? I don’t think any of us can be dogmatic. We’re all groping in the dark, but I’m really impressed with the relational/aesthetic account of divine aseity of Greg's.

Did you ever get that $27 used copy of Greg’s dissertation for sale on amazon? Shame on you!

Jeff: This is where the whole ontological approach loses me. It constantly posits what is not even remotely intuitive to me. When I hear most people talk about God, the only thing they have in common is the idea that our world is the product of a final cause--nothing more, nothing less. I think most people would be shocked to hear that God, by definition, can not suffer noticeably from compassion. Indeed, I think most people would find that a God who can't consciously SENSE suffering is not really compassionate at all. There's a reason why the words compassion and sympathy have, as roots, words that have to do with intense feeling.

Tom: I wouldn’t want to suggest that God doesn’t actually sense or experience the world. I don’t think any of us can know the nuts and bolts of “how” God processes that. All I’m suggesting is that with respect to the loving sociality of the (perichoretic) triune relations, I have no reason to think that my having a meaningful relation to God must mean my having an impact on THOSE relations. However I impact God, I can have nothing to do with the experience of God as God, Father, Son, and Spirit. If the Son suffers, he does not fail to BE Son and AS Son provide the Father with all the reason to joy in the reflection of divine bliss that the Son ever provided (I’m off in la-la land!). You get my drift I hope. My wife and I can suffer with respect to our relationship with our children if our children hurt us. But that doesn’t have to impinge or diminish the intensity of the love and joy that my wife and I have in and for each other. Relating to our kids completely and meaningfully doesn’t HAVE to mean their having access to the husband-wife relationship. THAT can stay in tact and impervious to all the crap our children throw at us. If we have a problem imagining that, I suggest it’s a weakness in us. But it’s perfectly imaginable to me. It’s something I think my wife and I at least aspire to.

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Jeff: For if Christ didn't really suffer sufficiently that only the joy before him could motivate him to endure, because of the intensity of his pleasure from union with the Father, then Christ's love truly cost him nothing of any significance.

Tom: Jeff, why should our redemption rest in our ability to diminish the joy that the Father takes in the Son as a reflection of the Father’s own being? That’s like saying that I as a father don’t really suffer the disobedient actions of my children toward my wife unless my children are able to make me fail to perceive the essential joy my wife brings me with respect to her essential relationship to me. And if that relationship is infinitely pleasurable, whatever withdrawals are “felt,” they don’t render the pleasure God experiences qua God all of a sudden finite.

I could be wrong. God knows! But as far as I can tell, I don’t feel that God is less than fully engaged on an emotional level with creation if it’s also the case that God remains infinitely pleased with himself regardless of what I do.

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Unison: Ok, then, Mapmaker. Help me see it. This "distinction" that makes something completely "not God" (Whatever the heck THAT is! ) Obviously all of the distinctions I've already made aren't enough. So, I'll follow your lead on this. Give me something that clearly shows me the distinction you want.

Tom: Well, I don’t remember saying “completely.” I only said it seems to me that it has to be “sufficient.” I’m sure I can’t work the metaphysics out. I plead the fifth! Actually, pleading the fifth is claiming to know! I can’t even do that. I’ll plead ignorance. I’m just trying to reason from the assumption that I and not God am accountable for my choices to what has to be the case (ontologically or metaphysically) about that “I” and that “God." It seems to me that this distinction in ‘responsibility’ can only obtain if a corresponding ‘sufficient’ (how “complete” I don’t know) distinction in agency underlies it. And I don’t see how the requisite distinction in agency can obtain if it’s not a ‘real’ difference. How and where? I haven’t the foggiest.

Does my saying "I dunno" qualify me as an apophatic theologian?   

Tom

Post Edited (MANY) : 7/16/2007 12:51:42 AM (GMT-5)

I can't keep up. Kids to camp tomorrow.

I don't know the followup, the context, or where this went. BUT I can comment...

Christ's suffering IN HIS FLESH was still suffered by the Son. And the Father vicariously suffered in that too.

Simple and concise.

From some very reliable Orthodox source. (Ware or Hopko, I think.)

Hope that helped.

Let's give up arguing this unproveable stuff and talk about when is it right to demonstrate.

Post Edited (jefscott) : 7/16/2007 6:00:09 AM (GMT-5)

Jeff: I'm not saying God's suffering has anything to do with redemption, per se. I'm saying that the most simple way to explain God's compassion is to assume that He has a sympathetic nature like humans do such that He delights in our joy and suffers from our suffering in certain contexts. This way, no essential attribute is affected by God suffering.

Tom: Can you tell me what you think those essential properties are?

Jeff: And I've already admitted that there is some aspect of God's relationality within the godhead that is completely untouched.

Tom: Then we essentially agree. We probably disagree somewhat on what those essential aspects are. I think there's qualitative aspect to God's necessary experience, a kind of existential acme of aesthetic satisfaction. To my mind, quality betokens both a perceived value and sentient satisfaction. If that's part of what defines God, and I think it is, then it's off limits to us. But that is not to say God doesn't really feel. It's like an emotional counterpart to the infinite intelligence argument.

But we're all groping in the dark here, and I'm bailing water as well!

Tom

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Tom: Can you tell me what you think those essential properties are?

Jeff: For starters, I don't think we're obligated to know everything about God. I have two problems with Anselm; the same two Aquinas had:

1) Many (and I would say, by far, most) people don't believe in God because they found themselves, one day, in possession of  a concept or proposition in their mind about a perfect being. Regarding this problem, there is no consensus among those who do agree with Anselm on what perfection consists of.

2) Those attributes of God that render Him perfect may actually be extra-categorical, in which case we couldn't even understand them.

So I think the safe way to advance is to start with the fact that the universe seems to be explicable only if its ground is a final cause. To my mind, a final cause is a distinct being and person. I have no other way to even meaningfully conceive of a final cause. For volition requires sentience and intelligence to even meaningfully define it. Accordingly, some people sense that the universe is the product of a benevolent being, others an intelligent being, while others emphasize the finality of it. In each case, a person is the only kind of being that fits the bill.

Paul tells us that creation "shews" us the invisible attributes of God. I.e., given that creation IS a creation, it entails certain minimal implications about God's power, etc. Then when we add on scripture, we learn more about the godhead. But I think, for the most part, people tend to believe that there are certain attributes of the creator that simply must be true as brute facts if, indeed, we can trust our own epistemological capacities:

1) God must be benevolent in some meaningful sense if we are to trust our own intellectual impulses to organize our experience inductively, in terms of the inductive axioms of analogy, parsimony, etc. Albert once said if we wanted to know if the Sun was the center of the "solar system," we could just get in a space ship and go see. I reminded him that space ships are designed on the assumption that gravity works like Newton believed. But Newton came up with his theory of gravity on the assumption that the sun was at the center of the system as argued by those before him. But those who had argued thus did so on grounds of parsimony and aesthetic preference--NOT mere empiricism. Apart from induction, we could know virtually nothing. And we TRUST our own intellectual impulses to be adapted to the real world.

Moreover, this same trust that there is benevolence behind our universe is assumed when we trust the golden rule. We trust that our fellow humans are similar enough to us that we can know how to love them (i.e., increase their sentient satisfaction) and that they are designed as sympathetic beings as ourselves such that our own benevolent gestures will be accepted with gratitude (unless they are hardened) and our malevolent gestures will provoke a natural resentment (not necessarily hate). We make these kinds of analogical assumptions about the workableness of the moral order all the time without even thinking about it long before we learn about evolution. This means that we believe there is something benevolent about the orderedness of creation that mindless evolution alone can not account for. We interpret this order as evidence of benevolent ends in creation, having many a manifest implication for our volitional activity.

2) The sheer quantity and quality of the multifarious arrangements of the created order imply that its creator is mind-bogglingly intelligent. And to the extent that humans affirm--as necessary to account for a rational moral order--a just, moral accountability for violations of the golden rule, etc,  they believe that God must know and remember all that we've done so we can be judged justly. These intellectual capacities alone account for an unfathomable magnitude of intelligence.

3) The universe can only be explained as the product of final cause if that person that created it is mind-bogglingly powerful. Powerful enough to easily account for any post-mortem reckoning of violations of the golden rule, etc.

4) People typically find it easier to assume that the creator is self-existent rather than the product of an earlier creation. Whether they do this because of their own impulse to explain things parsimoniously or not, it is clear that most people find it needlessly complicated or practically irrelevant to assume that our creator is also created. Scripture affirms this belief by telling us that God swears by Himself because He knows of nothing greater.

Taking these 4 nigh universal beliefs and adding scripture and applying our best analysis to these ideas for consistency and further implication, we evolve a science of the attributes of God. As a science, it is tentative--always subject to revision from better analysis (in light of our categories; e.g., open theism) and exegesis. Anselm hasn't helped us a bit at coming to a greater consensus on what the attributes of God are. E.g., some Anselmians think we're nuts for believing in OT, etc.

We do the best we can and live a live of fervent love according to the most obvious attributes of God--those having to do with His wisdom/knowledge, benevolence, and power. These three having to do with the nature of His intelligence, sentience, and volition--the attributes of personality. From these, we have confidence that God is a) not oblivious to our well-doing and worship, b) delighted with sentient satisfaction of His creatures, and c) competent to render our efforts at pleasing Him worthwhile (even if this requires post-mortem providence).

To my mind, scripture really is a light in a dark place. Any approach that undermines our trust in its light in preference of philosophical speculation is suspect to me. Same goes for any tradition that claims it is better characterized by light than scripture. I've never found any claim in a reasonable exegesis of scripture that is counter-intuitive or counter-categorical (historically problematic for various reasons? yeah; but so are the claims of scientists and historians on matters about the deep past). But I find plenty of ideas posited by philosophers and theologians to be counter-intuitive and counter-categorical.

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