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Sahid
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| Posted 5/2/2007 4:30 PM (GMT -6) |   | Jeff, I'm mainly addressing this to you to see what you think, but anyone feel free...
Previously, concerning Christian ethics, I basically went with this conception: God made us free moral creatures so that we might freely accept loving relationships with God and our fellow creatures, and therefore any action that I take to impair another's freedom also impairs their potential for loving relationships. Since God's highest good is loving relationship, to impair loving relationship is bad or immoral in God's view.
I know that you don't hold loving relationship to be the #1 all-encompassing good of God, but bear with me.
I'm starting to think that for maybe a significant portion of our lives we are not free moral creatures. Maybe even for most of our waking lives. Perhaps there are times not when we choose to put aside free will, but times when something else overwhelms our freedom. Call it our animal nature or something. There are times when people just 'snap' and a huge change is seen. But what if there are little 'snaps' sprinkled all throughout our lives? Like when my favorite team makes a great play, I stand up and shout. Is this a free moral decision? It feels more like instinct or a predisposition. That's a more dramatic example, but maybe I operate on predisposition by default and only 'wake up' to make true decisions at infrequent moments.
I think this could have a major impact on how I conceive of ethics. Essentially, we would all be children most of the time. And the rules that apply to free moral beings with the potential for freely chosen loving relationships would not apply. If I held a lower anthropology, I could justify a more accomodating ethic.
Impart me some wisdom. I'd like to hear other viewpoints on this.
Watch me fly. Freedom like wings and I will use them. Freedom like wings and I will spread them wide. - Stavesacre | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 5/2/2007 6:16 PM (GMT -6) | | Zach, I agree with what you're saying there. I've read where you've said something similar. Like animals, we become conditioned to act according to association. We call this habit. But unlike other animals, we are conceptual and logical. Hence, we can intelligently approve or disapprove of our habits. And we can inductively infer the consequences our behavior will result in over time, whereas animals can't.
When someone pulls out in front of me, I immediately hit my brakes or something like that. I don't think this is true volitional behavior. It is purely implusive. But I can intelligently realize that breaking is appropriate in such circumstances. The animal can't do this in any truly rational way.
Where volition tends to come into play is in forming habits and making decisions where we have competing impluses. Christ sweating as drops of blood while summoning the fortitude to face his own passion is an obvious example of the latter. The desire and attendant impulse to avoid suffering is not morally evil, per se. But we are accountable to restrain impulses and summon them into action to the extent that we know such self-control is morally required of us. And what is required of us depends on what "is given" to us.
And I think D. is absolutely right that when our perspective is complete, we will be motivated by attainable goods rather than avoidance of accountability. I.e., such a perspective entails knowing that what is required of us is for our own good AND the good of the rest of the moral universe. But in either case, the discipline-equivalent of "sweating as drops of blood" may be necessary to act aright.
So my short answer is YES. Much of the time we are not actually struggling volitionally with competing impulses/desires.
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Tom
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| Posted 5/2/2007 6:31 PM (GMT -6) | | | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 5/2/2007 8:37 PM (GMT -6) | | | There's a few factors to consider, I think. First, you're not really deciding for your friend since he doesn't actually have to give the guy a ride. On the other hand, if he feels uncomfortable with it (because of a presumed risk or an inconvenience), it might be appropriate to defer to your friend's wishes since he does have a kind of perogative with his own car.
Personally, I have picked up hitch-hikers when I'm by myself and passed others by on other occasions when I'm with someone who fears hitch-hikers. I do the latter because there truly is a risk involved with hitch-hikers. At some level, it seems a bit inappropriate for me to involve another in a risk without their consent unless I think the hitch-hiker is in some circumstance that is compelling.
In this same way, I think the compellingness of the situation with the guy needing a ride from your friend would be the determining factor for me if I knew my friend felt uncomfortable with the stranger but, yet, would acquiesce to my offer of a ride. Especially since your friend does have the final say with his own car anyway--he can always say no.
In any case, a situation like that provides an opportunity to talk with your friend about when and why we ought to risk for the sake of others. After all, we risk every time we get in a vehicle to go to work. So discussions like that help us learn the boundaries and sensitivities of others so we can better know how to weigh relative suffering in these kinds of cases. For I think it is the relative significance of diverse suffering (like the suffering ox vs. the missed sabbath rest) which we're trying to adjudicate in these cases. There may be cases where the friend's discomfort is actually a more intense suffering than that experienced by the person needing the ride. People are different in what severely stresses them.
These kinds of cases are hard because of the limited time for discussion and informed decision-making. So in cases like these, one can only hope that if circumstances were truly dire, the person needing the ride would articulate that. Hopefully, that kind of information could change the mind of the friend. If not, in such a dire situation, we should probably get out of the friend's car ourself and help the guy find a ride.
Post Edited (jefscott) : 5/2/2007 8:47:22 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 5/3/2007 5:58 AM (GMT -6) | | Let me add this. I think the bible gives a lot of rules and guidelines that we can see with reasonable certainty. Beyond that, applying the golden rule, like in the case of the hitch-hikers I mentioned above, requires making our best judgment of what basic human duties/rights are, how and when mercy is to prevail over those, and how and when it is appropriate to occasion risk for others--all the while doing that with a mind as fully persuaded as possible. This latter typically requires ME to err on the side of mercy for my neighbor and risk for myself. But when my mercy requires risk for others, the adjudication can require the wisdom of Solomon to sort it all out.
In the case you mentioned, your friend ultimately has say over his own car. So the only real issue there is whether you ought to try to persuade him against his original instinct. This is a case of persuading him to risk for himself. This is the only difficult adjudication when there is no truly compelling, emergency situation at hand, to my mind.
So long as you are certain that the risk is obligatory--even for your friend--there is no ethical issue at all in the attempted persuasion. But that gets back to whether there are rules for all people. If not, or even if they are relative to what God "gives," the difficulty arises--especially if your friend is known to "give in" to pressure. Because persuasion can feel like pressure to some people. And he may not interpret it as "persuasion."
Post Edited (jefscott) : 5/3/2007 6:02:55 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 5/3/2007 5:51 PM (GMT -6) | | | I think authority is based on greater good or lesser evil. Nothing more or less. With the parent, that equates to a statistical tendency of adults to make better decisions than children. But clearly there are exceptions. But intervening can be problematic, too. Because there are at least two factors to my mind. One is the state. If the state makes rules about intervening between a parent and child, violating those rules undermines the state to some extent and, hence, the good it can accomplish. If the state doesn't forbid intervention, there is still the considerations of what kind of retaliation the parent is apt to do if we intervene. These things must be weighed against how compelling intervention seems to be in a given case.
But why do we think parents should take responsibility for their children in the first place? I think it is because we observe empirically the effects of parental instinct. This instinct seems to motivate biological parents to care more for their own children than other children. This, in turn, is interpreted to be the very design of the Creator. IOW, it is a greater good than any conceivable alternative. Because it can not be good to want people to act contrary to what they think their duty is OR to want kids to be loved less than they could be. This would be desensitizing.
Judgment is necessary all the way around. To my mind, it's always about weighing the diverse sufferings and their impact on the moral order. There's two ways I think this judgment occurs:
1) We are to adjudicate between conflicts in the revealed rules themselves. The suffering ox trumps the sabbath, e.g., without undermining the true intent of the sabbath law. Namely, it is good to rest a day a week and focus our minds on other things than making money. The whole David/shewbread and priest/sabbath adjudication.
2) On matters where the bible is not explicit, we are to judge as honestly as possible how to apply the golden rule.
In the case of the friend, we have the clear fact that the car belongs to him. We have the other fact that you would like someone to help you if you were in the situation of the person broke down. The ambiguities are at least two:
1) Do you have the right to pressure your friend into acting as you would in his shoes, or do you only have the right to try to persuade him that it is in his own interest as a moral person to help people in situations where he, himself, would want help? The golden rule, to my mind, argues for the latter, in my own personal judgment.
2) Does your friend really expect others to risk giving him a ride if the tables were turned for him? If not, he may be honestly applying the golden rule to the best of his understanding. Maybe he weighs risks and suffering different than we would based on his own sensitivities and sense of responsibility. There is nothing inherently wrong, I think, with weighing risk against how compelling a need is. We are bound to differ as individuals in this regard. Which is why I would get out of the friend's vehicle and help the other guy find a ride if I thought the need was compelling enough. But if helping an ox requires risking my life, I might think better of my responsibility to my family than the ox.
The bottom line is, "give to him who asks" can not mean that you give someone else's property or its use to others simply because they ask YOU. Because that's not really giving at all. It's stealing. I think we can agree on this much. And, to my knowledge, neither Christ nor the rest of the bible says anything explicit about how to handle the specific situation you bring up. Hence, I don't see how we can get around judgment on this one.
Post Edited (jefscott) : 5/3/2007 5:59:55 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 5/5/2007 11:48 AM (GMT -6) | | | Z: Words like 'good,' 'judgment,' and 'discernment' seem to be referring to the practice of going with your gut. If that is what we are left with, then I am willing to face it, but I am trying to get at something with a more substantial content.
J: You are right that induction is more troubling than deduction. But most epistemologists, I think, will say that we know virtually nothing apart from induction. All meaningful deductions are based upon premises that are acquired inductively. We can't prove deductively we're not in a matrix--or that we didn't just pop into existence 5 minutes ago with all of our apparent memories.
But when we say that inductions are tentative, that does not mean that all inductions are equally tentative. Some things are more "certain" to us than other things. Because some inductions seem so obvious that, apart from them, all becomes unintelligible enough to be paralyzing. How many people would go to work Monday if they thought there was a small chance the sun would come up that day? Or if they thought gravity could just as probably cease to operate in the next 5 minutes as continue to operate?
Hence, the intellectually honest person just admits that we have to concede that all moral choice involves some certainty about our inductions. But moral judgments are just inductions about human nature. An in the same way, some of those inductions are way more "certain" than others. This is why the need for judgment does not equate to total subjectivity. Some things are obvious enough to act upon. Other things are less so.
When I was younger, I was more troubled by the concerns you bring up. Like you, I loved math and the deductive world. But as I studied epistemology, I began to see the importance of induction in human thought. We take so many of our inductions for granted, we tend to think we know them intuitively when we don't. We learned them as infants, inductively. Think about babies learning language inductively. It's amazing! Similarly amazing is how babies learn to inductively judge distances and the three-dimensional configurations of objects.
Z: You mentioned minimizing suffering; are you suuporting a hedonistic or eudaimonic consequentialism?
J: Eudaemonism. As I undertand the difference, hedonism tries to measure pleasure independent of the concept of final cause (and, seemingly, the relation of present actions with sentient satisfaction over time--especially post-mortem time). To me, the correspondence theory of truth is based on the human category of final cause. The human mind organizes experience categorically according to the relation of final cause as surely as it does according to the relations of time and space.
The theistic eudaemonist, then, interprets the world and ethics in terms of means and ends. He believes that his own disposition to avoid suffering and increase pleasure is intended/designed. He also inductively infers at a relatively young age that social pleasures, insomuch as they are pleasures important to human well-being, are intended and that, therefore, we are intended to act in those ways that enhance social harmony. And it seems that most people naturally judge others morally, in this regard. Which seems to further suggest that people conclude that there is something like moral accountability for those who diminish or undermine social harmony for selfish ends. Because they intuitively think that the final cause (God) of our creation is sentiently dissatisfied when we act contrary to the ends we are created for.
Granted, we differ in how we interpret the best way to promote and maintain social harmony. I think the bible tells us ways to promote the good. It does so in ways that are counter-intuitive to all of us in some respects. I've never known a Christian yet that didn't find at least some of it's injunctions as counter-intuitive at first. I think we have to trust and obey before the Spirit can existentially change our hearts and minds where we can "see" the true SOCIAL value of those injunctions. As we "use" what God gives us, He gives us "more." And from those who don't use what He gives them, He takes away what they have.
Much of the difference in our opinions of the highest good is rooted in the fact that we are different in what stresses us, intensely satisfies us, and so forth. In other words, our differences have more to do with the relative importance we assign to different pleasures and pains (because of the sensitivies of our own constitution) rather than any absolute differences in our human nature. For some, respect is paramount. For others, control is. And so on... And these have to do with how we are "wired." None of these goods is intrinsically wrong to desire. But they shouldn't trump all other goods at all times and in all circumstances. But we tend to be biased towards our own sensitivities at all times and in all circumstances.
If we sought to inductively ascertain what is best, socially, for the good of the whole, I think even then we would be less likely to err on the side of our own weaknesses. But alas, we do tend to err on the side of our own personal weaknesses. As we do, we tend to desensitize ourselves even further so that we are less able to understand what the highest social good is. Because we are fallen and weak, we must sacrifice to some extent to attain greater, more valuable and lasting, goods. But we are short-sighted.
Z: Is there some clear definition of 'good' at all or is it simply the subjective preference of anyone?
J: I think there is a clear definition of the highest good in the abstract. But there is no clear definition of the practical good. For this latter would entail more information than anyone could possibly memorize because of the complexities of the interactions in the world. In the abstract, I would say the highest good is that action (including thoughts) which is consistent with and conducive to the maximal sentient satisfaction of all sentient beings (including God/Christ). This latter takes into consideration the relative weight of sentient states over time--not just the intensity of momentary satisfaction.
Z: So my two problems with the greater-good (how is this not ultilitarianism again?) ethic are closely related.
J: Utilitarianism is a temporal way of looking at pleasure only. It doesn't even assume justice/accountability are real relations the way the bible talks about. Per utilitarianism, as I understand it, there is no such thing as rules like "Vengeance is Mine, saith the Lord." Every thing depends on societal conditions according to utilitarianism. God's pleasure seems to be irrelevant to utilitarians.
Per the view that I hold (that is best articulated in Noah Porter's "Elements of Moral Science"), there are goods that are consistent with and conducive to the highest sentient satisfaction of all sentient creatures (including God/Christ) precisely because God will assure that ultimate consequences (including post-mortem ones) will work out accordingly.
Z: (2) how do we maintain sufficient confidence in our conception of good when so many people (even those claiming divine sanction) have been so frequently mistaken?
J: Here's my list:
1) Faith. Faith, per Romans 10, is trust in God's word. Granted, I have to inductively infer which books are trustworthy. But induction is just as necessary in concluding that the gospels are trustworthy history. No way to get around induction that I can see.
2) I have to use induction to exegete what I conclude is God's word. But I don't select portions of prophets to exegete. I take Christ's words to infer which folks were prophets. I make my best guess as to what writings Christ was saying were the writings of that prophet. And I work my way back that way. As I understand it, that's part of what was considered in determining the canon. The NT I infer inductively, also. I take what has been handed down and see if it makes as much sense as anything else. Most folks. including unbelievers like Bart Ehrman and believers like C.S. Lewis, see a difference in canonical "NT" writings and other writings. I do too.
3) For what is not clear from scripture, I use induction to infer best how to love others as myself.
4) I trust God to not lead me into tests above what I am able.
5) As I pass tests, I trust that God will give me more insight (as long as I'm honestly seeking) into His word/will. Hebrews talks about the mature who can get the meat out of scripture, as opposed to mere milk. I think the implication is that there is growth in undertanding the bible inductively that works synergistically with our growth in character. When we fail to grow in character, God will "take away" what insight we had.
5) is what explains why we don't need everything spelled out for us from the get-go. God will give as we grow. He gives as we seek. He gives as we ask according to His will. The process is one of feed-back. As I grow on milk, God gives me more insight into that self-same word from which I got the milk--until finally, I can see the meat in that word. And this process just keeps going until I die or the parousia occurs.
Post Edited (jefscott) : 5/5/2007 12:19:28 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
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| Posted 5/5/2007 12:28 PM (GMT -6) | | I want to make sure I understand. What do you mean by induction? Is it something like ignoring those possible premises which would result in absurd or unpleasant conclusions?
How does an inductive method lead you to the faith of Romans 10 rather than someother religion/world-view? I'm sorry to keep harping on it, but if 'induction' is equivalent to going with my gut, then we can justify anything. How is your method less than pure subjectivity? I mean, apart from the biases of upbringing, is the resurrection of Jesus more 'certain' in your inductive method than say the enlightenment of Buddha or the prophecy of Mohammed or simple deism? I believe in Christian claims because of deductive arguments based on pure assumptions.
I can see where you are comming from in assuming some uncertainties. I admit to the same thing. Admitting the approximate reality of the perceived world can be done through induction in a very loose sense of the word. I prefer just to say it's simply an assumption based on my desire for order. I don't really see how it's inductive though. We must be using the word differently. I've taken induction to be argument from specific to general while deduction is argument from general to specific. Either method must make logically arbitrary foudational claims. To assume the correspondense of the perceived world to a real world is not then induction; it is simply a claim with no basis. There are no specific examples of my perception matching reality upon which I can base a claim that such matching is the general rule.
But all these assumptions or 'inductive' claims are of a different quality (at least for me) than claims relating to Jesus and the Bible. Taking certain groundless assumptions to be true, I then decide what is believable within this presumably real world. By faith in Jesus is not blind or pietistic. I have reasons for believing Jesus lives. They may not be air-tight or beyond the shadow of a doubt, but I do believe them to be very likely true. I cannot say the same for foundational claims on reality. There is no 'likely' or unlikely' there.
All that to say, I can't 'just believe' in Jesus or the Bible in the same way that I 'just believe' that I am a real boy living on a real planet. If I were to 'just believe' in Jesus that way, then I might as well 'just believe' in unicorns. Such 'pure assumption' can be used on foundational philosophical questions because we can honestly do no better. But with the specifics of a belief system we can do better.
With all due respect, your position sounds like 'let the Holy Spirit (or Karma or your gut sense of right and wrong) guide you.' It is informed by a holy book, but if that holy book's authority is based on the same sort of induction that leads us to think the world is real, then any words written by anyone might legitimately claim the same sort of authority over me.
Watch me fly. Freedom like wings and I will use them. Freedom like wings and I will spread them wide. - StavesacrePost Edited (Sahid) : 5/5/2007 12:38:31 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 5/5/2007 5:26 PM (GMT -6) | | Z: By faith in Jesus is not blind or pietistic. I have reasons for believing Jesus lives. They may not be air-tight or beyond the shadow of a doubt, but I do believe them to be very likely true.
J: I think most people would say the same thing about their beliefs about science. Those beliefs are not blind or pietistic. So be more clear as to how you distinguish between the supposed blindness of your belief that there is a sun we circle and the non-blindness or your belief that Jesus was a real person who is also a pre-existent creator. Maybe then I'll know better how to address your questions.
Note, too, that I don't think all christian belief is about historical claims. There is experience. But ALL experience is interpreted inductively, to my mind. I say this because we know we have the capacity to be deluded and have illusions. Otherwise, it would be impossible to explain seemingly contradictory experiences that occur. IOW, hypotheses can be falsified by deduction.
But a hypothesis based on the axioms of analogy and parsimony is not a hypothesis based on blindness since these are axioms grounded in our category of final cause. I don't know any other way to explain the fact that most moralists think something like the golden rule is a true guide to proper behavior.
What is the golden rule but a specific case of reasoning from the specific to the general? What basis, apart from the belief that our experience is to be explained as analogously and parsimoniously as possible, do I have to assume that treating my neighbor as I want to be treated will positively affect his/her sentient satisfaction--or that he/she even has the capacity for sentient states? This is induction, isn't it? Similarly, how can we even conceive of the gospel's historical claims apart from believing there is a real world where people can live, die, and ressurect in time? And how can we believe what is not even conceivable? Isn't it induction that gets us these conceptions of a real orderly world that we make propositions about?
Post Edited (jefscott) : 5/5/2007 6:39:17 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
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| Posted 5/6/2007 2:23 PM (GMT -6) | | I believe that the world I see is real. There is no induction with this claim. It is just a claim. I believe it because I suspect it makes me happier than the alternatives.
I believe that the earth orbits the sun because (1) I simply/pietistically believe the world I see is real and (2) because within that world people who seem reliable have testified to seeing evidence of the earth orbiting the sun.
I believe that Jesus was and is a real person by exactly the same type of argument. (1) I take it on blind faith that the world is not just my imagination or something and (2) seemingly reliable people have reported about Jesus.
I find nothing logically necessary about the existence of God much less the life, death, and resurrection of a man named Jesus. And if there were no good reason to believe in the resurrection of this man I would probably reserve my judgment but remain skeptical.
I believe that Christianity, properly speaking, is the belief in and remembrance of a particular historical event just as Judaism was the belief in and remembrance of a particular historical event. Once we believe that this event did in fact happen, we can then go on to interpret it inductively and then apply these interpretations deductively. But belief itself does not necessarily rest entirely on pietism. Sure, I'll grant that the claim to the world's reality is pietistic, but that's all the blind faith needed. We can use reason built upon this foundation to decide between Christianity and Wicca for instance.
So I can (assuming a real world approximating my experienced world) deductively decide which beliefs are the most plausible. Some of these beliefs entail definitions of good. Christianity (IMO) is once of these. I do not believe we are left simply with our gut (or a sense of supposed divine direction) in deciding moral questions.
What it sounds to me like is that your position is to take certain ethical mandates to be binding out of a gut sense of right and wrong. Sometimes these mandates conflict (as with an ox in a ditch on Saturday). When these conflicts occur we are again left to our gut feelings about what mandate is more weighty in the particular circumstance.
I use the phrase 'gut feelings' instead of induction because I don't see what particulars your ethical decisions are based upon if not particular gut feelings themselves. I'm not sure that you have or would even endorse a potential hierarchy of ethical mandates, and even if you did, I am guessing this hierarchy would itself be based upon what would amount to what I call a gut feeling or what you call induction.
I think a key distinction between us is that I seek to draw a distinction between 'induction' and 'purely blind assumptions.' I may be wrong, but it sounds like you combine the two. The 'induction' by which I determine that the world is real is not the same 'induction' by which I determine that Jesus is risen. Unfounded blind assumptions must be made if we are to think at all, but these assumptions are not inductive or they wouldn't be unfounded and blind.
J: "One inductively infers THAT a book is authoritative and then submits to it."
Tell me how I'm wrong but this sounds a whole lot like pure subjectivity. Are you using 'inductively' to mean 'reasoned from particulars to generalities'? If so, what particulars point to the Bible over the Vedas? I would suspect that such validating particulars are actually based on general rules about what makes for a reliable source. Whatever language we use, this is what I'm arguing for; there is some standard that we apply to potential holy books and people by which we deduce which ones are actually authoritative. If we do not do this, then we are just left with self-referential claims to authority and our own gut feelings.
If you ask me, the gospels are more authoritative than say the Koran, because by my standards of judgment the gospels are very reliable, but books dictated by people who wage wars of conquest are very suspect because they are very likely to have gained authority through a simple appeal to force and not the appeal to experience upon which the gospels are based. I think we must test the alternatives and see what we believe even to the point of abandoning the Bible and Jesus if they do not stand up.
Watch me fly. Freedom like wings and I will use them. Freedom like wings and I will spread them wide. - StavesacrePost Edited (Sahid) : 5/6/2007 2:28:07 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 5/6/2007 4:26 PM (GMT -6) | | |
Z: I believe that the world I see is real. There is no induction with this claim. It is just a claim. I believe it because I suspect it makes me happier than the alternatives.
J: But why do you think that the fact that it makes you happier is proof that you did not reason from particulars to generals? How could an infant possibly learn language or three-dimensional interpretation except by reasoning from particulars to generals? It is beyond me how it could be otherwise. The fact that learning this way makes us happier doesn't mean it's not-inductive learning.
Z: I believe that the earth orbits the sun because (1) I simply/pietistically believe the world I see is real and (2) because within that world people who seem reliable have testified to seeing evidence of the earth orbiting the sun.
J: Two questions, here. (1) What is pietistic belief? Seriously, I've never heard of that. (2) What renders, to your mind, a person who you pietistically believes exists as "reliable?" I'm not seeing how any of this works without reasoning from particulars to generals--at least in the sense of trends and tendencies. Without the belief that trends and tendencies will contine past the next 5 minutes into the future or have preceded us in the past (i.e., uniformity/analogy), how can we even get to plausibility?
Z: I believe that Jesus was and is a real person by exactly the same type of argument. (1) I take it on blind faith that the world is not just my imagination or something and (2) seemingly reliable people have reported about Jesus.
J: Since "reliable people" are part of the "world" you believe in by blind faith, your belief in Jesus must be based on blind belief. Not saying that's wrong, but I'm not seeing how you're escaping blind faith any more than the arbitrariness you suppose I'm using. And I don't see how blind faith is anything but a species of arbitrariness. Because for a belief to blind, it must not be known to be more probable than any other belief. Conclusions deductively drawn from blind premises are, themselves, blind.
Z: I find nothing logically necessary about the existence of God much less the life, death, and resurrection of a man named Jesus. And if there were no good reason to believe in the resurrection of this man I would probably reserve my judgment but remain skeptical.
J: I agree with what you're saying, here. I think most people do. But I also don't know how we come to ideas like "reliable people" without inferring from particulars to general. I wasn't born with concepts or propositions about "reliable people." I inductively inferred my way to such concepts and propositions.
Z: Sure, I'll grant that the claim to the world's reality is pietistic, but that's all the blind faith needed. We can use reason built upon this foundation to decide between Christianity and Wicca for instance.
J: Explain how you can deductively decide between Christianity and Wicca. Tell me the premises that are entailed in your pietistically believed world that deductively prove Christianity is true.
Z: So I can (assuming a real world approximating my experienced world) deductively decide which beliefs are the most plausible.
J: I agree. But I'm interested in how you do this since you don't think plausibility has anything to do with uniformity, analogy or parsimony. If you do think plausibility has to do with those, then you are using induction, to my mind. You haven't yet explained to me how I could know that it is more probable that gravity will work 5 minutes from now, or that people who typically say certain kinds of things won't start saying different kinds of things, or that people who feel pain from certain things won't start feeling pleasure from those things, without reasoning from the particular to the general.
Without this minimal degree of uniformity, there can be no probability calculations that have any meaning. I've never read anyone that has refuted Hume's formal argument to that effect. If you know of such an argument, I'll read it.
If you say you believe they are more probable because it allows you to deduce things about the future, the past, and things far away, I say welcome to the world of induction. You can say that your believe in a predictable world has nothing to with induction. I say that's part and parcel of induction.
Z: Unfounded blind assumptions must be made if we are to think at all, but these assumptions are not inductive or they wouldn't be unfounded and blind.
J: All knowledge is founded in the sense that our thought is regulated and conditioned by categories, but it doesn't follow that that foundation (i.e., the mode by which categories regulate/condition our apprehension) is blind in the sense that it is arbitrary. There are categories that humans simply have to think in--like time, space, causality, etc. Humans universally speak and think in terms of these. But insomuch as they are inherent in human thinking, they are not arbitrary. They are all we have. I just think final causality is one of them.
Z: Tell me how I'm wrong but this sounds a whole lot like pure subjectivity. Are you using 'inductively' to mean 'reasoned from particulars to generalities'? If so, what particulars point to the Bible over the Vedas?
J: You're missing what I'm saying. I live in a world where virtually all humans have basically similar beliefs about the physical world and morality. These, in turn, are used to make sense of historical and moral claims. In addition to these, I think there is real super-natural religious experience.
Forget this latter for now, though. We can inductively conclude that the gospels are probably historical. Then, I inductively infer that Christ believed the OT. THAT is what makes the OT authoritative for me. I can not read the gospels and conclude anything other than that Christ believed the OT consisted of prophetic writings. I inductively infer that what we have as the OT was pretty much the same thing as he had. I could be wrong. But that's the process.
You, on the other hand, seem to start with the assumption that your gut sense--that God would not do much of what the OT says He did-- means that it can't be prophetic. Therefore, you assume the Sermon is negating the Torah, even though Christ's introduction to the "you have heard it said" part says just the opposite. I don't really even understand how you see the intro the way you do. You explained it once, but I couldn't even grasp what you were saying.
I had that debate with HB, too. I never could understand him, either. To my mind, he made mush out of perfectly clear words to get around the view that Christ is interpreting the Torah as opposed to negating it. The interpretation view, too, fits perfect with the end where it says "for THIS is the LAW AND THE PROPHETS." He did not say, "Therefore, chunk the law and the prophets and listen to me instead." He said he came "not to abolish the law." That not "one jot or tittle" would pass away "until heaven and earth pass away." That those who did not teach and observe the "least" of those commandments would be "least" in the kingdom of heaven.
Besides all that, Christ predicts days of vengeance (which he relates to a prophecy of Daniel, no less) when there will be woe unto those who give suck. So I don't see how the NT is qualitatively different than the OT in the first place, with respect to the kinds of tribulations (even for babies) God supposedly causes in the world at times. I take these passages as plausibly as possible. I don't try to dictate what it can or can't mean. If the gospels seemed incoherent or inexplicably immoral by taking them as plausibly as possible, I would reject them--plain and simple. But they don't seem such to me.
Z: If you ask me, the gospels are more authoritative than say the Koran, because by my standards of judgment the gospels are very reliable, but books dictated by people who wage wars of conquest are very suspect because they are very likely to have gained authority through a simple appeal to force and not the appeal to experience upon which the gospels are based. I think we must test the alternatives and see what we believe even to the point of abandoning the Bible and Jesus if they do not stand up.
J: I agree with everything you're saying there. But for the life of me I don't see how what you're saying is anti-induction. We must be defining induction differently. You see, I agree that "books dictated by people who wage wars of conquest are very suspect because they are very likely to have gained authority through a simple appeal to force," but this is because I have found that every case of war that I've ever read about gives evidence of unpure motives (i.e., motives other than defending a civil society from a more barbaric one). It's about plausibility, not proof. Moreover, Christ's ethic makes more sense with my own moral intuitions than does the Koran. That may be because I wasn't raised Muslim. Regardless, it still plays into my sense of what is plausible.
I have no idea how morality can be rational apart from the golden rule. And Christ himself taught the golden rule. He also taught, as far as I can tell, the authority of the Torah ("these things ye ought to have done"). Granted, the Torah applies to covenanters only. But the consent of the human covenanter does not render the Torah authoritative. The fact that God supposedly covenanted Himself to the covenanters is what makes it authoritative (if, indeed, He did). You seem to deny that God was a party to the covenant. But I don't see Christ denying that.
Post Edited (jefscott) : 5/6/2007 9:01:58 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
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| Posted 5/8/2007 12:51 AM (GMT -6) | | Ok, not arguing just repeating in my own words...
What I think we agree on (now that I've seen the light):
- The correspondence between perception and reality can only be accepted or rejected in practice. There is no way to use argument at this level.
- If we assume this correspondence, we then end up using language to categorize. (And these categorizations are defined using some form of induction?)
- Once we've made our categories we can deductively decide if certain particulars fit into certain preconceived categories.
I think it's the second one that we are dealing with, i.e. what categories do we make and how do we make them. Namely, how do we define 'believable?' I'd say bare minimum, a source is believable inasmuch as some of it's other claims have been corroborated by experienced reality.
So for an outsider looking in, the Bible has problems fitting this minimum standard for believability. Admittedly, the concept of 'believability' is arrived at inductively or by some other less-than-strictly-logical means. But once we take the idea of believability as a starting point, there are difficulties with the Bible.
Some of these difficulties concern historical particularities. Some of these concern literary genres that we misinterpret. But there are some that deal with matters of faith.
---Before continuing, I should note that I think the Old Testament is very good. It is gooder than anything outside the New Testament. I agree with the writter of 2 Timothy that "all Scripture is God-breathed and is useful for teaching, rebuking, correcting and training in righteousness, so that the man of God may be thoroughly equipped for every good work." Yes. ---
I tend to see these difficulties of faith in the Old Testament as largely the consequence of God's habit in the Bible of revealing things in his own time. God does not address capital punishment in the garden of Eden. He doesn't teach Abraham the ten commandments. He doesn't tell Moses about the Davidic covenant. This is not a bad thing.
But this progressive method of revelation hits two kinds of difficulties. First, there can be resistance to new revelation building on the old. Second, God sometimes lets bad things slide when he's trying to make a more important point, and when he gets around to correcting those bad things we resist changing what we had thought was revelation. The example that comes to mind is Mark 10.
Mark 10 said...
"It was because your hearts were hard that Moses wrote you this law," Jesus replied. "But at the beginning of creation God 'made them male and female. For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh.' So they are no longer two, but one. Therefore what God has joined together, let man not separate."
God's appointed prophet/revealer let divorce slide. He even set up an institution, divorce certificates, especially for the purpose of letting it slide. But eventually God got around to setting the record straight. The Old Testament allows divorce; Jesus forbids it. The only allowance Jesus makes for divorce is to allow the legal act once actual covenant has already been broken.
So Jesus overturns a teaching of the Torah and still claims not to be abolishing the Torah. I take this to be approximately what was done when Old Testament figures further revealed God. The difference is that Jesus is the full revelation. That Moses declares the eating, worship, sexual, and economic habits of the past detestible and wrong does not mean that the Abrahamic faith is abolished.
Also, when interpreting Jesus we are confronted with his frequent "those who have ears to hear..." Jesus is letting us know that he is laying something between the lines. He does this a lot. He says something that will superficially answer the outsider but will carry much more meaning for the one with ears to hear. Like when he says render to Ceasar what is his and render to God what is God's. Superficially, this satisfies the Roman sypathizers, but those Jews who read their Bible knew that "The earth is the LORD'S, and all it contains, the world, and those who dwell in it." Whatever conclusions are to be drawn from this, the ears-to-hear interpretation at least forces the disciple to wrestle with a richer issue.
Likewise, the Matt 5:17-20 passage can be read two different ways. My previous comments give my understanding of v.17. Verse 18 sounds good to the keeper of the Law, but if we look closely, it's really just a statement of the obvious. The Law says what it says and will continue to say it in the future. Verse 19 refers to "these commandments." Grammatically, "these" is ambiguous. He could either be referring to these commandments that are in the Law and are not changing or he could be introducing these commandments he's about to give. With my intermediate understanding of Greek and having asked those who taught me, I think it's safe to say that the sentence itself doesn't give any reason to prefer one over the other. We are left to look at the context. "These" is used in proximity to the Law, but Jesus does overturn specific parts of the Law. You could reasonably see it either way. AND THAT'S THE CLUE. Jesus has a habit of putting some of his more scandalous teachings inside ambiguous language that lets those without ears to hear miss the scandalous part.
All this to say, it is not that I have a gut feeling that makes the Old Testament portrayal of God off-putting. In fact, my current understanding was originally very off-putting to me. Unless I'm fooling myself, I think that Jesus claiming not to annul any part of the law and then going on to annul parts of the law makes him less believable. I think it's very believable (because inductively we can generalize that Jesus used certain patterns of speak and deductively we can see that pattern here since it seems to fit the pattern) that Jesus was speaking here like he spoke at so many other times. If he was doing something similar to what I believe he was doing, then he is more believable than he would otherwise be (because his own claims would be corroborated instead of refuted by his subsequent teachings).
Watch me fly. Freedom like wings and I will use them. Freedom like wings and I will spread them wide. - StavesacrePost Edited (Sahid) : 5/8/2007 1:08:58 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 5/8/2007 6:55 PM (GMT -6) | | Z: I think it's the second one that we are dealing with, i.e. what categories do we make and how do we make them.
J: I don't think we make categories. I think we think according to them naturally. All people naturally think in terms of space, time, causality, being, relations, finality, etc. How we differ is in how we apply the category of final cause. Which plays out in induction. Hypothesis formation is regulated by what seems fitting to us. This generally entails the ideas of parsimony and analogy. Not because these are separate categories so much as these are what makes reasoning from particular to general possible. Without being able to do this, we could not predict the future enough to make a single move. We could know nothing of the past.
In a sense, we truly impose what we need to be true upon the world. But only in a sense--because our category of final cause compels us to conceive of an end for our natural impulse to know and carry out informed actions. We can't help but believe that our dispositional orientation to sentient satisfaction is designed. Intellectually, that orientation compels us to reject confusion and embrace the pleasure that comes from that understanding and simplicity which allows for planning and prediction.
The only alternative is to suppose that the intended end of those impulses is mass deception. This is a logical possibility. But no one seems to be able to believe it. So to live non-hypocritically, we go with the view that our natural intellectual impulses are adapted to true objects and products of apprehension. Noah Porter explains it a lot better than I do. So if you're interested, I'll get you a copy.
In short, our categories are nothing we can avoid. The category of final cause is the basis for our confidence in induction. It is why we can't help but believe in the correspondence of our impulse to generalize and the way the world actually behaves. Granted, some folks become skeptics. But as Lewis says, even they can't live consistently with their skepticism. They can only profess it.
But this desire to generalize is what we're talking about even when we describe how we unify Christ's theology. Unification is just another way of talking about generalizing via parsimony, analogy, etc.
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Similitude
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| Posted 5/13/2007 5:40 PM (GMT -6) | | |
Sorry to be getting back to this so late.
Z: But this progressive method of revelation hits two kinds of difficulties. First, there can be resistance to new revelation building on the old. Second, God sometimes lets bad things slide when he's trying to make a more important point, and when he gets around to correcting those bad things we resist changing what we had thought was revelation. The example that comes to mind is Mark 10.
Mark 10 said...
"It was because your hearts were hard that Moses wrote you this law," Jesus replied. "But at the beginning of creation God 'made them male and female. For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh.' So they are no longer two, but one. Therefore what God has joined together, let man not separate."
J: I agree that revelation is progressive. But in this particular case (and its parallel in Matthew) Jesus seems to be arguing that the exception for adultery came AFTER the original, more-stringent idea of no divorce (what God has joined, let not man put asunder). Jesus seems to be saying that Moses started the exception. Jesus, then, is arguing for the original way which doesn't allow for the hardness of heart--i.e., no forgiveness (see last part of Matthew 18).
Z: The only allowance Jesus makes for divorce is to allow the legal act once actual covenant has already been broken.
J: This assumes that Matthew 5 annuls the law as opposed to interpreting it. If he's interpreting it, then he is explaining what the Mosaic exception was. I think Jesus later advocates that we should forgive even adultery.
Z: Also, when interpreting Jesus we are confronted with his frequent "those who have ears to hear..." Jesus is letting us know that he is laying something between the lines. He does this a lot. He says something that will superficially answer the outsider but will carry much more meaning for the one with ears to hear. Like when he says render to Ceasar what is his and render to God what is God's. Superficially, this satisfies the Roman sypathizers, but those Jews who read their Bible knew that "The earth is the LORD'S, and all it contains, the world, and those who dwell in it."
J: Taken this way, it would seem to rule out ownership of animals and land. I don't think Jesus could have been advocating that. Paying for stuff and services does not seem to be something Jesus saw as contradictory to the fact that all is God's. There really is a sense in which things can be ours. Consequently, it seems more probably to me that Jesus is just saying that Caesar, insomuch as he was exercising the God-given authority of government, has a right to be payed for that service--just like Paul said, also. But that didn't rule out the propriety of paying tithes, obedience to the Law (render to God what is God's), etc.
I doubt seriously the Pharisees even disagreed with this. I suspect they assumed he would take something more like the zealot approach. They were not able to trap him.
Z: Likewise, the Matt 5:17-20 passage can be read two different ways. My previous comments give my understanding of v.17. Verse 18 sounds good to the keeper of the Law, but if we look closely, it's really just a statement of the obvious. The Law says what it says and will continue to say it in the future. Verse 19 refers to "these commandments." Grammatically, "these" is ambiguous. He could either be referring to these commandments that are in the Law and are not changing or he could be introducing these commandments he's about to give. With my intermediate understanding of Greek and having asked those who taught me, I think it's safe to say that the sentence itself doesn't give any reason to prefer one over the other. We are left to look at the context.
J: First, statistically speaking, "these" tends to refer to what precedes it. Second, Jesus said:
Think not the I am come to abolish the Law or the Prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill. FOR VERILY I say to you, until heaven and earth pass away, not one jot or tittle shall pass away from the law until all come to pass. Whosover, THEREFORE, shall break one of the least of these commandments...
It is the logical explanatory words ("For verily," "therefore," "till all come to pass") that make my view more plausible to me. "Till all come to pass" seems most plausibly, to me, to mean "until all that the law and prophets prophecied actually occurs." By your view, it reads:
Think not the I am come to abolish the Law or the Prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill. FOR VERILY I say to you, as a matter of fact The Law says what it says and will continue to say it in the future. Whosover, THEREFORE, shall break one of the least of these commandments...
So by this reading, Christ is saying the REASON he fulfills the Law is because it says what it says. To me, that seems like a lame reason to do anything. Then, the "Therefore" implies, by your view, that the REASON why they are to keep the commands that follow is because the Law says what it says. Again, that sounds, to me, like a really lame reason to obey Christ's commands.
Z: "These" is used in proximity to the Law, but Jesus does overturn specific parts of the Law. You could reasonably see it either way.
J: I don't know what law he annulled. It is later revelation, IMO, that explains how Christ's death/ressurection provides for sanctification apart from the law.
Z: Unless I'm fooling myself, I think that Jesus claiming not to annul any part of the law and then going on to annul parts of the law makes him less believable. I think it's very believable (because inductively we can generalize that Jesus used certain patterns of speak and deductively we can see that pattern here since it seems to fit the pattern) that Jesus was speaking here like he spoke at so many other times. If he was doing something similar to what I believe he was doing, then he is more believable than he would otherwise be (because his own claims would be corroborated instead of refuted by his subsequent teachings).
J: I agree with your point. I just don't see where Christ annuls the Law in the first place. And even if he did, the language seems very strained taking it the way you're taking it. So strained, in fact, that I would give up the game of hermeneutics if it were true. I guess that's what much of this gets down to. People have different standards of plausibility that constrain what they think is justifiably considered to be a reasonable exegesis.
If your view was the only one I could conceive of, I would still believe that Jesus was the prophecied Messiah, but I would give up on the possibility of anything like that sufficient degree of christian one-mindedness requisite for church discipline or teaching. My view is such a minority view itself that I find very few people that agree with me. But there is no doctrine that I believe that at least some group has not held to. But I've never known or even heard of anyone but you that holds to your view. Maybe there are many who hold it and I'm just unaware of them.
HB had similarly extreme views. But even he held that all NT books are as much God's words as are those we believe are Christ's words. IOW, he believed that what makes a prophet's words true is that they are God-given. Christ claimed that very same basis for the trustworthiness of those words of his that were not reiterations or interpretations of previous scriptures. He was not omniscient and, therefore, could not claim accuracy on any other ground. Since he grew in wisdom as a child, I have no reason to believe he could even know he was the messiah apart from revelation from the Father.
Regardless, it seems impossible to me that the kind of unification you have advocated can be done. The very fact that Jesus said God would avenge rules that out, to my mind. We love "as we love ourself." For us, this means don't avenge. For God, it doesn't. And this, alone, means that Christ's language has to be taken with a healthy regard for contextual constraint. This way, there is no contradiction between "give to him who asks" and "do not give that which is holy." Each is true in its own contextual meaning. And once we allow for contextual constraint, I see no reason to assume Christ is ever annulling the law. In every such supposed case, there is a plausible (I think more plausibe) case for Christ explicating the Law as opposed to trumping it.
Don't misunderstand me, though. I'm not saying that having a minority view renders it false. Rather, I'm saying that given my sense of what is plausible, certain views seem so implausible or incoherent that they seem to imply that God could not possibly hold us accountable for knowing even that degree of truth requisite for minimal christian community. Once things seem that implausible, I don't see any point in wasting other people's time over it. There's plenty else to do with that time.
I guess the reason why I'm this way is because I so resonate with the idea that each should be "fully persuaded in their own mind" and that "God is not the author of confusion." To encourage or warn another person on the basis of significantly implausible ideas just seems inappropriate to me. When I see scripture emphasizing the same thing, I go with it. I think even Jesus implies the same thing by statements like, "why call ye me lord and do not what I say" and "if the blind lead the blind, they will both fall in the pit." Presumably, Jesus has said something clear enough that we can know we are not preceding blindly. We all see this "clear enough" criteria differently though. I set the bar relatively high because of the relatively clear warnings about misjudging. And both encouraging and warning are species of judgment.
Post Edited (jefscott) : 5/14/2007 8:58:19 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
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| Posted 5/15/2007 5:41 PM (GMT -6) | | Deuteronomy said...
If a man marries a woman who becomes displeasing to him because he finds something indecent about her, and he writes her a certificate of divorce, gives it to her and sends her from his house, and if after she leaves his house she becomes the wife of another man, and her second husband dislikes her and writes her a certificate of divorce, gives it to her and sends her from his house, or if he dies, then her first husband, who divorced her, is not allowed to marry her again after she has been defiled. That would be detestable in the eyes of the LORD. Do not bring sin upon the land the LORD your God is giving you as an inheritance.
Matthew said...
Jesus replied, "Moses permitted you to divorce your wives because your hearts were hard. But it was not this way from the beginning.
Mark said...
It was because your hearts were hard that Moses wrote you this law," Jesus replied. "But at the beginning of creation God 'made them male and female.' 'For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh.' So they are no longer two, but one. Therefore what God has joined together, let man not separate."
The Matthew passage is even clearer than Mark; what Moses permitted was not the ideal. Jesus may be interpreting 'something indecent,' but regardless he sees the Deuteronomy passage and God's ideal as mutually exclusive. Moses (and/or God through Moses) departed from pure revelation for the sake of practicality or expedience. Jesus annuls this teaching which 'was not this way from the beginning.'
J: Taken this way, it would seem to rule out ownership of animals and land. I don't think Jesus could have been advocating that.
Z: I think the biblical teaching about possessions is one of stewardship not ownership.
J: Paying for stuff and services does not seem to be something Jesus saw as contradictory to the fact that all is God's. There really is a sense in which things can be ours.
Z: I agree. That sense is found in the way that stewardship sometimes resembles ownership.
J: Consequently, it seems more probably to me that Jesus is just saying that Caesar, insomuch as he was exercising the God-given authority of government, has a right to be payed for that service--just like Paul said, also.
Z: Neither Jesus nor Paul used rights language in the way a liberal democracy does. I think Jesus is saying that our service to Caesar is not based on Caesar's rights or legitimacy but instead on loyalty to our true Lord. Caesar has claimed possession of God's gold (by pure might-makes-right 'reasoning'). The believer could act like Caesar and take back the gold by force, or the believer can act like Jesus and be yielding and loving to evil men. The believer owes it to God to 'walk as he walked.'
J: But that didn't rule out the propriety of paying tithes, obedience to the Law (render to God what is God's), etc.
Z: Not exactly. If we give taxes to Caesar because the rights he claims are legitimate, then this does rule out loyalty to God. Caesar claims that he is Lord and therefore has the right to his subjects' property. If we agree with Caesar's claim about his rights, then there is no room for another Lord. If we are to remain loyal to God and still pay taxes, we must pay our taxes for another reason than Caesar's self-proclaimed legitimacy.
J: So by this reading, Christ is saying the REASON he fulfills the Law is because it says what it says. To me, that seems like a lame reason to do anything.
Z: First of all, 'oon' does not always carry a meaning of logical consequence. The King James may make it 'therefore,' but most translations I've seen leave it ambiguous or untranslated. Even the Amplified Bible leaves it 'then.'
But check out the ambiguity. He first says not one small part of the law will pass away. Then he says that 'these' commandments are vitally important and that keeping them is required in order to be anyone in the kingdom of God. If I'm right and Jesus was trying to speak to those with ears to hear, I don't know how he could have said it better. He remains entirely truthful and even respectful toward the Jewish heritage, but he also lets those who want to see an endorsement of everything Old Testament see what they want. He never explicitly endorses every jot and tittle, but if his listeners wanted to assume he did, then he made it easy for them to do so.
J: This way, there is no contradiction between "give to him who asks" and "do not give that which is holy."
Z: The "do not give that which is holy" passage has nothing to do with the subject of giving or submission. It is a metaphor dealing with when to speak. I've not argued that there is a contradiction here. The saying about counting your chickens has nothing to do with the ethical issues of animal husbandry either. Of all the teachings of Jesus this might be the most obviously metaphorical. If I was arguing for a literal interpretation of the gospels, this might apply, but I'm not. I actually see your view as the more literal one. It's just that the literal interpretations are taken with theunderstanding that these literal teachings are balanced against one another.
I do though think Jesus did his fair share of explicating rather than annulling. It's just that the explication points to the intention behind the Law. The Law's original role is temporary and in Jesus' time it is coming to an end. The Law has been pointing to him and now he is here. If there are those people who want to keep the Law as well as follow Jesus, that's fine. But it's probably better to "make no oath at all." There is nothing salvific to the Law. And now that we have Jesus and the Holy Spirit there is less need to use it as a guide. I don't think the issue is whether the Law is good or bad (It's good), but the issue is whether we will take the cross or the sword, trust in Yahweh or chariots, rest in the Lord or worry about tomorrow.
I don't know. I'm trying to see my way clear to justify a certain amount of lordship without consent on the part of believers. This is something that almost every person I respect believes in to some extent. I can see it with animals and children where there is no real consent to be given or refused. I can even see it among adults who seem to be on autopilot. If they want to be on autopilot, I suppose it's ok to do what I want to them as long as I don't disturb their chosen blissful apathy. I can confront them with what they see as a disturbing alternative, but I don't think I should force them to love their neighbor or to render to Caesar. I'm mostly looking for a practical way to tread this line without crossing it. For instance the world would be a better place if more money was donated to the right things instead of the current nonsense that is dominating American politics. Mr. Romney just spent $2 Million on campaign ads. Is that the best use of his money? But as soon as I force him to use that money to feed starving children, I have taken up the role of lord over him. And he seems as intelligent and morally capable as any of us. How do we presume to rule him? If my belief in my interpretation of the Bible's version of 'good' is based on induction and preference, how can I presume to rule over Mitt Romney or a woman who wants an abortion or an Iraqi man whose house and family must be destroyed for the sake of freedom or the terrorist who sees mass murder as necessary for good to be done? And didn't Jesus yield to some pretty bad people on a cross, and didn't he tell us to take up our crosses and follow him? Isn't lording over (voting/waging war/ruling withou consent) the exact opposite of taking up a cross?
Watch me fly. Freedom like wings and I will use them. Freedom like wings and I will spread them wide. - StavesacrePost Edited (Sahid) : 5/15/2007 5:48:18 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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| Posted 5/15/2007 6:30 PM (GMT -6) | | | Don't have much time, but I'll address the part where I think we're mostly in disagreement.
Z: If my belief in my interpretation of the Bible's version of 'good' is based on induction and preference, how can I presume to rule over Mitt Romney or a woman who wants an abortion or an Iraqi man whose house and family must be destroyed for the sake of freedom or the terrorist who sees mass murder as necessary for good to be done?
J: My response is the same of my last post. If you can't be sure enough from induction to help protect someone from harm, then I surely don't see why you should feel sure enough to argue that I'm wrong, much less to spend the time to do it. That's the difference I see. I see the emphasis the opposite as you.
Take our old point of contention for example. You say give a man a gun even if he claims he wants to use it to kill somebody. You feel it is a safer bet to do this than withhold the gun (assuming you have one, of course). To me, the benefit of the doubt works just the other way around. If I'm not really convinced of my view, why wouldn't I just withhold the gun? The killer is not harmed and the intended victim is less likely to be killed. How is this the greater ethical gamble, if indeed, uncertainty requires us to gamble?
Z: And didn't Jesus yield to some pretty bad people on a cross, and didn't he tell us to take up our crosses and follow him?
J: We are to yield, too, in the sense that we aren't to avenge ourselves. But not yield in the sense that we don't try to escape certain cases of harm. As for taking up a cross, this is truly figurative language. It is certainly not literal. So what is our cross? Paul talks of choosing to be defrauded to keep from bringing disrepute to Christ's name. This is yielding. This, in a sense, is taking up a cross. But it does not entail absolute pacifism. Because the grounds of it are specific, having nothing to do with yielding for yielding sake. That's the difference I see.
Z: Isn't lording over (voting/waging war/ruling withou consent) the exact opposite of taking up a cross?
J: I think, for the most part, all of your examples are valid. But not because we are to yield just to be yielding. For each case, there are very good consequential arguments that can be made against them. Why would yielding be the only act of self-control we are to do which has nothing to do with consequences to our neighbor? Now if you want to say that we are to simply trust that giving murderers weapons just because they ask for them actually WILL produce the best results for our neighbors, then I can agree with the principle, though I can't agree with the practice. And this is because both 1) the exegesis involved in this view and 2) the likelihood of such a practice producing a greater good seem more implausible than alternatives that come to my mind.
And again, we will always have different views of what is plausible. It's just that when our view of duty leads us to give guns to murderers simply because they ask, I'm just not sure what is really worth arguing over, anymore. Jesus said do good unto all men. I don't know what "good" means apart from affecting one's sentience positively.
So here's the thing. We have short choppy statements like, "give to him who asks," "seek and ye shall find," "ask and ye shall receive," "do good unto all men." We can suppose the latter really means "do good unto all men so long as you have their consent." But once we do this, we are either using other biblical statements to do this interpretation, or we are using philosophy. As I see it, you are using philosophy. You seem to be saying that the only way God can be love, per your perception of the real and ugly world, is if love is primarily non-interference, and only secondarily about positively affecting one's sentient states.
I try to apply a standard of plausibility to statements per the inductive rules used to ascertain authorial intent--without trying to fit them into some philosophical "God is love" straight jacket. If I can't do this to a degree that I can be "fully persuaded in my own mind," I quit arguing. Having taken that approach since I was 18 (I'm now 47), I just came to an understanding where I can actually see how God is love in the purely philosophical sense in the last two years. At no time before then, however, did I let that failure guide my exegesis. That's the only way to get at the historical Christ, IMO. I try to do it like an intellectually-honest, unbelieving historian would--without all the preconceived constraints. For, to my knowledge, Jesus never said "God is love."
I think this is the big difference in our approach. You need to believe God is love per your philosophical understanding of it. I need to believe God is benevolent in the sense that He is not the author of confusion when He communicates with words. I don't have any intuitive notion of a being who possesses all "compossible perfections" in the way that the Anselmians on this forum do. I have a category of final cause. I work my way step by step trying to see the purposes of creation as benevolent as I can and rest with that.
In the end, I don't see non-interference as being the essence of love. To me, my non-interference is love precisely when it results in the highest sentient satisfaction of those whose satisfaction I am aiming to affect. This, to me, is the criteria for yeilding. It is thoroughly consequential in perspective. In that sense, it is like Paul's consequential approach when he argued for choosing to be defrauded as opposed to taking a brother to law.
Post Edited (jefscott) : 5/15/2007 8:29:45 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Sahid
Megistered Rember
Date Joined Jun 2004
Total Posts : 2013
| Posted 5/16/2007 12:23 PM (GMT -6) | | I appreciate the discussion. When we are dealing with people who have 'good intentions,' things are easier. But if a person wants something I think is bad, doing the right thing is tricky. Do I let the other person decide what to do even if it's not what I want or do I force my preference upon him? Assuming a good, omnipotent God and a sinful world, it is clear what God chooses. So are we to be holy as he is holy, or are we to be holy in our own unique way?
When it gets down to it I am a consequentialist too since I believe that a yielded life will result in the most happiness for the most people. If I genuinely believed that my view would result in less overall happiness than possible, I doubt I would hold to it. But since (A) God lets people sin in horrible ways, (B) God has the best interest of everyone in mind, and (C) I am to be holy as he is holy/walk as he walked/follow him, I am led to believe that my view has the best consequences.
The Bible records God using violence. But if we want to see God, we look at Jesus. Jesus is the infallible, inerrant Word. Jesus predicts violence in the future. If we are to interpret that violence as God's direct action, then so be it. But Jesus has shown us how to walk now. I don't think 'take up your cross' is as figurative as you do. Surely, those who first heard those words thought it was figurative. But then Jesus was crucified. Now I don't take it so literally that I think we should all get ourselves killed. I do think we have our own crosses, like you said. But how does this "not entail absolute pacifism?" You say, "Because the grounds of it are specific, having nothing to do with yielding for yielding sake." But what is specific about taking up a cross if it can be applied to every Christian. And I'm not saying yield for yielding's sake. I say yield out of love for the neighbor. As much as we impose on the neighbor we keep him from being a person with moral decision-making capacity. Every time we impose ourself on him, we make him less of a person and more of an object or slave.
The general content of taking up the cross is the attitude of putting others (even bad people) above ourselves. The specific application can be yielding to being defrauded or actually enduring physical suffering. But the overall attitude is what is being taught.
Watch me fly. Freedom like wings and I will use them. Freedom like wings and I will spread them wide. - Stavesacre | | Back to Top | | |
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