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ewashington7000
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2010
Total Posts : 9
| Posted 1/30/2010 1:07 PM (GMT -6) |   | JET said...<SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; FONT-FAMILY: 'Verdana','sans-serif'; mso-bidi-font-style: italic">ewashington7000:<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes"> <SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; FONT-FAMILY: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">How can one concede that the modal fallacy argument is both valid, let alone SOUND (which SOUNDNESS, by definition, ought to be the trump card), while deeming the selfsame argument as 'irrelevant,' especially when the open theist's argument RESTS on the committal of such a fallacy? ?!!!???!!! <SPAN style="mso-bidi-font-style: italic"><?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" /><o ></o><SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; FONT-FAMILY: 'Verdana','sans-serif'; mso-bidi-font-style: italic">JET:<SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; FONT-FAMILY: 'Verdana','sans-serif'; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold"><SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes"> I conceded your argument subject to the qualification: “assuming Ockhamism is true”. My point was simply that, in your first post, your argument is based on the assumption that one can work out the logic of contingency by separating the “de re” from the “de dicto”. I don’t believe that it is a valid move. However, I have conceded that your argument works GIVEN your assumptions. Therefore, unless you're interested in talking about those assumptions, there is not much more to discuss about your formal argument per se.<o ></o > <SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; FONT-FAMILY: 'Verdana','sans-serif'; mso-bidi-font-style: italic; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold">However, you don’t seem interested in talking about the validity of your Ockhamist assumptions. You never responded to Tom's attempt to cut to the chase when he wrote:<SPAN style="mso-spacerun: yes"> <SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; FONT-FAMILY: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">“We recognize the distinction between de dicto and de re knowledge as well. But remember, de dicto knowledge is GROUNDED in ‘re’ i.e., in reality. What we say (dicto) is true or not given what is (re). No prop (diction) can be true if reality (re) is not AS THE PROP describes. So distinguish between MAP (diction, de dicto) and TERRITORY (reality, de re) all you want. But do not DIVORCE THEM (which you seem to be doing).”<o ></o > <SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; FONT-FAMILY: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">That is where we need to go i<SPAN style="FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: black; LINE-HEIGHT: 115%; FONT-FAMILY: 'Verdana','sans-serif'">f you really want to engage our respective views because that is where we fundamentally disagree.
JET,
(Eternal) Grace unto you, and peace, from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ
"… the logic of contingency…"?!
For clarification:
Within my first post, MY argument pertains to the 'unsoundness' of the open theistic argument AGAINST epistemic determinism. That is, the aim within my first post is to FIRST dissect the formal (i.e., logical) structure of the core argument for open theism, exposing/indicating the latent/patent logical fallacy within in it.
Now, the core assumption (enthymematic in nature) within the argument of my first post is that there is a 'common' understanding of both modal, propositional logic amongst the discussants, and the definition, meanings, and concepts thereof.
However, contrary to my core assumption, you assert that my "argument is based on the assumption that one can work out the logic of contingency by separating the “de re” from the “de dicta.”
Admittedly, I am a tad nonplused by the meaning of your assertion. Moreover,"… the logic of contingency…"?!? - What does that/such mean? And "Valid move?" If you are referring to the 'inferences' that I have employed within my formal argument, every inference that I have employed within my formal argument ACCORDS with the 'rules of inference' of modern day logic. (But I am loath to call such accords as "valid moves." )
Nonetheless, what I am saying is NOT that 'one can work out the logic of contingency by separating the "de re" from the "de dicta."' Rather, what I am saying IS that 'one can work out the logic of open theism, (even) by distinguishing (i.e., PROPERLY separating) the "de re NECESSITY" from the "de dicto NECESSITY."'
'"However, you don’t seem interested in talking about the validity of your Ockhamist assumptions. You never responded to Tom's attempt to cut to the chase when he wrote: “We recognize the distinction between de dicto and de re knowledge as well."
As I have just finished reading the material that Tom has asked me to consider, I will respond to his 'attempt to cut to the chase' accordingly; but do you really "recognize the distinction between de dicta and de re knowledge as well?"
It behooves me to point something out that seems to be an egregious equivocation of terms on your part: an act which tempts me to believe that you really do NOT "recognize the distinction between de dicta and de re knowledge as well." Namely, within MY argument, I mention "de dicto NECESSITY" (i.e., the NECESSITY of "the saying') and "de re NECESSITY" (i.e., the necessity of the thing). I do NOT speak of any "de dicto knowledge" or "de re knowledge," as you have suggested within your response. (By the way the Dr.Rhoda: the above is a bona fide case of Ignoratio Elenchi - the 'Red Herring' fallacy that you have accused me of committing, even in the form of a Straw Man. 'Just though that you ought to know.)
"But remember, de dicto knowledge is GROUNDED in ‘re’ i.e., in reality. What we say (dicto) is true or not given what is (re). No prop (diction) can be true if reality (re) is not AS THE PROP describes. So distinguish between MAP (diction, de dicto) and TERRITORY (reality, de re) all you want. But do not DIVORCE THEM (which you seem to be doing).”
Hunh?!!!!?!!! The above quote, to say the least, ought to be symbolized/caricatured by a GIGANTIC RED HERRING. I have already established that you have supplanted the term "knowledge" in for "necessity" within my phraseology of modal scoped necessity.
Notwithstanding, in modal, propositional logic, the distinction between 'de dicto' and 'de re' is one of scope: NOT ONTICITY or ONTOLOGY. That is, regarding 'de dicto,' the modal operator's (e..g, necessity within my argument) scope covers the whole or entire saying; whereas regarding 'de re,' the modal operator's scope covers the thing considered.
For example, it is necessary that (if Jane is an aunt, Jane is a female). The modal operator's (i.e., necessity's) scope is over the entire saying (i.e., de dicto necessity: not de dicto knowledge.) This is a necessary truth.
Now an example of 'de re necessity' can be found within Dr. Rhoda's revised draft of The Fivefold Openness of the Future, page 12. Dr. Rhoda reasons that from (A→E) and (E→C), it follows (A→C); and from (A→E) and (E→O), it follows that (A→O); and from (A→E) and (E→P), it follows that (A→P). Therefore, combining the aforementioned strict implications, A→(C and O and E and P), which is valid. However, an example of 'de re necessity' is summarily seen within the very next sentence within the same paragraph. "…If the future is alethically open, then it must be open in all of the other four senses." Within this sentence, the modal operator's scope covers only the thing mentioned or considered (i.e, de re necessity - namely, (C and O and E and P) or all of the other four senses.) The proposition (C and O and E and P) expresses a contingent truth - not a necessary one. In fact, this is where, amongst others, Dr. Rhoda commits the modal scope fallacy, a certain deathblow to his argumentation ( Dr. Rhoda's argument is unsound).
The (Eternal) Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with (not against) you All. (God has no respect of persons.) Amen. | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 1/30/2010 2:16 PM (GMT -6) | | EW,
I appreciate your engaging with my paper, but your reading of my words on p.12 is uncharitable. Properly understood, I do not commit the fallacy you allege.
Thus, you concede the validity of my derivation of A-->(C & O & E & P), but you read the following sentence "In other words, if the future is alethically open, then it must be open in all of the other four senses" as introducing an illicit de re modal operator, e.g.., A-->Necessarily(C & O & E & P). Charity precludes such a reading, however, since I explicitly said "in other words", referring back to the preceding formal statement A-->(C & O & E & P). And that's all I'm saying here. Nothing more.
What throws you, it appears, is my placement of the word "must" in the apodosis of the conditional. In colloquial English, however, it is not uncommon to use the word "must" in that way with the intent of qualifying the connection between antecedent and consequent, not the consequent alone.
For example, one might colloquially define "validity" as follows: "An argument is valid just in case the conclusion must be true if the premises are true." You might object that the word "must" here is misplaced. Fine, but it's just not good colloquial English to say "An argument is valid just in case it must be the case that the conclusion is true if the premises are." Pedantic logicians may talk that way in professional discourse, but normal people don't. The upshot is that colloquial English is sometimes ambiguous between necessity of the conditional and necessity of the consequent. That's where context and charity come in.
Best,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 1/30/2010 3:46 PM (GMT -6) | | EW: 10 'Declaring the end from the beginning,' and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure:
46:11 Calling a ravenous bird from the east, the man that executeth my counsel from a far country: yea, I have spoken it, I will also bring it to pass; I have purposed it, I will also do it.
Exhaustive = Total knowledge to me...scripturally.
Jeff: Actually, that very passage argues against exhaustiveness. The end from the beginning is a finite period of time. It's not saying God has known these things from eternity. Moreover, by saying "I will DO all my pleasure" and "I have SPOKEN it, I will also BRING IT TO PASS; I have PURPOSED it, I will also DO it" clearly speaks of God's knowledge being grounded in the fact that He knows He CAN and WILL bring about the future He has determined will happen. It says nothing of merely knowing things independent of His providential actions to bring about prior purposed ends. It's the fact that God has the POWER to bring about His purposes that is said, in this passage, to ground His foreknowledge of the fulfillment of those purposes.
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ewashington7000
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2010
Total Posts : 9
| Posted 1/30/2010 3:58 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom said...
Couldn't have said it any better, JET. Exactly. EWash is basically saying, "Hey, open theism commits a logical fallacy within Ockhamism." We're like, "Yes. So what? We're not Ockhamists."
EWash, you need to understand that it's no argument against open theism that it violates the logic of a system/semantics we don't hold to. That's rather to be expected.
Truth supervenes upon being, baby. Ontology determines semantics.
Tom
Tom,
Grace unto you, and peace, from God our Father and The Lord Jesus Christ,
Please clarify that you which you mean by Ockhamism; for as my last post ought to indicate, there seems to be a lot of equivocating on terminology.
Regarding ontology, I contend that human beings determine semantics (Quine) - not ontology (mine...lol). Plus, for me, truth is identical to ontology; thus, I hold that truth is logically bi-conditional with/to ontology (i.e., two way entailment.) Therefore, I find that, logically, for me, truth supervenes upon being, if and only if, being supervenes upon truth.
On a side note, Tom, methinks I have realized something of great importance. Experience has taught me that pertaining to God's omniscience, free will, contingencies etc., those who do not subscribe to open theism tend to do metaphysics strikingly, differently than does who do subscribe to open theism and vice versa. For example, pertaining to our discussion, this can be seen in the strikingly different prephilosophical dispositions of non-open theists relative to open theists. This phenomena (and I foresee another ontological argument/accusation brewing) is totally acceptable. It seems as though, nevertheless, open theists are collectively Necessitarians, in that open theists to tend to posit some type of nomologically, or nomic, necessity within their argumentation to explain phenomena that, collectively, non-open theist find to be merely contingent. [And by contingent, I mean phenomena - i.e., matters-of-facts or state-affairs - that are BOTH possibly true and possibly false (i.e., true in some possible circumstances (/worlds) and false in some circumstances (/worlds) but NOT BOTH true and false in some possible circumstances (/world), as this actualizes a self-contradiction.] In short, our methodologies are contrasting with one another.
Now, again, this is NOT to say that either group has gotten it 'right or wrong'; for such notions as 'right or wrong' within this discussion seems to be misplaced, in that only degrees of more or less plausibility seem to be likely. HOWEVER, this IS to say that we CAN assess logical validity within each other's respective logical frameworks/arguments, thus revealing logical consistency/inconsistency.
Logical consistency comes down to epistemology; and the epistemology within the logical framework of open theism is logically inconsistent - by its own definition. I have demonstrated this, amongst others things, even by using the very article written by Dr. Rhoda that you have asked me to read, utilizing the selfsame logical machinery as Dr. Rhoda. Yet, despite the fact that the argument that I have proposed (in defense of my non-open theist claims) is sound, even as corroborated by you open theists, there still seems to both be an unwillingness to analyze the very arguments that you open theists employ, or a refusal to accept their logical implications, by you open theists. Go figure. This is akin to the current widespread practice of mathematicians teaching classical probability theory (from grad students downward), appealing to the Principle of Equipossibility, despite the fact that Joseph Louis Francois Bertrand in his "Calcul des probabilities" has demonstrates that such a theory is logically inconsistent. Mathematicians ignoring logically inconsistency. Go figure 2x.
P.S. I am aware that I have placed primacy in logical consistency. Considering my belief in a more or less plausible theory, in stark contrast to 'right or wrong' theory, I contend that logical consistency, amongst others, ought to be that which we all seek. Perhaps I am sadly mistaken.
The (Eternal) Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with (not against) you ALL. (No partiality with God) Amen. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 1/31/2010 3:15 AM (GMT -6) | | EW,
I appreciate your passion. I wonder a bit how easy it is for you to relax and chill out over a beer, but that’s just me talking.
It seems you now agree that within our given frameworks each of our views is logically consistent. I hope you see too that whatever modal fallacy you think we’re making, we only make it given the assumptions of your framework. I hope Alan’s comments help you see where we’re coming from.
For me, to say truth is identical to ontology is not quite the same as saying truth is logically bi-conditoinal with/to ontology. The former collapses the de re/de dicto distinction. The latter does not. To me the two are related asymmetrically, the way maps and territories are related. The truth of maps is grounded in (determined by) the territories they describe. True maps are logically bi-conditional with their territories only in the (epistemological) sense that because one knows a map to be ‘true’ one can then conclude what the territory is like. The supervening of truth upon being is also, for me, asymmetrical. Ontology determines truth, not visa verse. True propositions do not ‘bring about’ the states of affairs they describe. It’s being true that “Tom exists” isn’t responsible for bringing it about that I exist. Quite the contrary (there's the asymmetry).
Our basic point, EW, is that for every true map there’s some corresponding territory, for every true proposition there is some actual state of affairs that grounds the truth of the proposition. So if it’s eternally true that I shall do such and such in 2010, some equally eternal state of affairs other than me must be grounding that truth for I am not eternal. This speaks to the claim by some that what I actually do in 2010 is responsible for its being eternally true that I shall do that which I do. Others admit that I cannot eternally ground truth in the required sense, so they just deny that truth is grounded at all. This is the objectionable feature of Ockhamism that stands between us and, say, Bill Craig. The asymmetrical tie that binds truth to ontology is cut. Truths float around as metaphysical surds, ungrounded in anything. On this view it being eternally true that some state of affairs X shall obtain in 2010 says absolutely nothing about whether X shall obtain freely (i.e., libertarianly) or as causally determined. (And THIS in turn, Alan can correct me, is what's behind the accusation that we have committed a modal fallacy; but never mind that for now.) But Craig's is a view on the relationship between truth and ontology that a Piercean cannot entertain. For if the truth that I shall bring about X at some point in time in the future is determined prior to my own existence, then I can’t be that which determines the truth about whether X obtains or not. The truth about my actions cannot both precede me and be determined by me.
Again, we’re not saying that “knowing” X will occur prior to X’s occurring is what somehow “causes” X to occur. That is NOT our argument against foreknowledge of future contingents. You supposed this to be our argument (as have so many others to date), but it’s not. It’s not the act of knowing before I exist that I shall exist and shall do X that we think determines my doing X (and so establishes incompatibility). It’s the fact that some reality other than me has determined the truth about my choices. This fact reveals the incompatibility, for if some reality other than me is determining the truth about my choices, then it can’t also be true that “I” stand as the final arbiter (so to speak) in determining whether or not the foreknown act obtains. If TRUTH is grounded in REALITY (that is, if some proposition is made true by some contemporaneous actual state of affairs), and if which choice I make is determined via my self-determining freedom, then the truth about my free choices cannot precede the exercise of my self-determining freedom. That exercise of will is the reality (de re) that determines the truth (de dicto) about me in this case. If that truth precedes the exercise of my will (which is does on all non-open theistic approaches), then it's not the case that my exercise of will is determining the truth about my choices. Thus, foreTRUTH (an indirectly foreknowledge) is incompatible with my being free in the libertarian sense.
EW: On a side note, Tom, methinks I have realized something of great importance. Experience has taught me that pertaining to God's omniscience, free will, contingencies etc., those who do not subscribe to open theism tend to do metaphysics strikingly, differently than does who do subscribe to open theism and vice versa.
Tom: I actually don’t think this is true, EW. All I think is the case is that open theists are the most philosophically consistent Pierceans around. But they’re not doing ontology that differently. I’m a theist for probably the same reasons you are. I’m a presentist for basically the same reasons that non-open theists are presentists, and I adhere to the correspondence theory of truth and truth-grounding for the same reasons that non-open theist philosophers hold to those views, etc. So I don’t think open theists are working out their ontology radically differently than non-open theists for the simple fact that there are non-open theists who share our basic ontology.
When I read Bill Craig for example (his book God and Time), I find SO MUCH to agree with. He’s a trinitarian theist, a presentist, maintains the B-theory of time [correction, A-theory; thanks Alan!], holds to libertarian freedom, etc. Basically the same ontology. He just thinks (because he has a view of providence I don’t share) that the truth about everything that happens in this sort of world is eternally known to God and that this knowledge is providentially useful to God. And the reason he can make this additional claim consistently as a philosopher is because he divorces ‘truth’ and ‘ontology’ in a way I don’t and can’t. I think his whole presentist ontology is weakened by this move, but it’s not a radically different ontology.
EW: Now, again, this is NOT to say that either group has gotten it ‘right or wrong’; for such notions as ‘right or wrong’ within this discussion seems to be misplaced, in that only degrees of more or less plausibility seem to be likely. HOWEVER, this IS to say that we CAN assess logical validity within each other’s respective logical frameworks/arguments, thus revealing logical consistency/inconsistency.
Tom: Right. But then the title you gave for this thread (Open Theism: DEBUNKED!) wouldn’t be exactly accurate.
All the best,
Tom
KIXYTΘEMTAPost Edited (Tom) : 2/1/2010 7:57:31 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 1/31/2010 2:42 PM (GMT -6) | | Hey Tom, nice post. Though I presume you meant to label Craig an A-theorist, not a B-theorist. 
You're exactly right, though, that A-theorists like Craig, who affirm an ontically open future (i.e., future events don't exist), a causally open future (i.e., determinism is false and there are future contingents), and an alethically settled future (i.e., there is a complete, true, temporally invariant story about how the future goes) have to divorce truth and ontology.
The basic problem is that if future events don't exist and if there are future contingents, then there are, by hypothesis, no truthmakers for 'will' or 'will not' propositions about future contingents. Yet, intuitively, such propositions (being contingent, positive, existential, singular, etc.) require truthmakers if they are to be true.
Craig's response is standard Ockhamism: Granted, neither 'will' nor 'will not' propositions about future contingents have truthmakers, but that's no problem (he says) because they will have truthmakers (or not, depending on how the future contingencies are resolved).
But this won't work. In fact, it initiates an infinite explanatory regress. That any given 'will' or 'will not' proposition about a future contingent will have a truthmaker is itself a 'will' proposition about a future contingent. So Craig essentially tries to ground truths about future contingents in truths about future contingents. This merely pushes the grounding issue back a step and starts a vicious infinite regress because the grounding issue is perpetually deferred and never cashed out in an existing truthmaker.
Other non-open theist philosophers make the same point. Not wanting to embrace open theism, Michael Rea sticks to Ockhamism while rejecting the idea of an ontically open future. This solves the immediate problem because if future events exist then there are (tenselessly existing) truthmakers for a complete, true, temporally invariant story about how the future goes. Trenton Merricks, on the other hand, sticks to presentism and instead rejects the correspondence theory of truth. Still others (e.g., Paul Helm) avoid open theism by denying future contingency.
In the end, it's a matter of both logical consistency and the bullets one is prepared to bite. Consistency can tell you that you have an inconsistent set of beliefs and that something has to go, but it can't tell you what has to go. At that point it's a judgment call about what to give up. | | Back to Top | | |
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