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ewashington7000
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Date Joined Jan 2010
Total Posts : 9
| Posted 1/23/2010 6:14 PM (GMT -6) |   | Grace unto you, and peace, from God our Father and The Lord Jesus Christ.
This is too simple...lol
This paradox actually has been resolved quite some time ago by logicians. That is to say, there is nothing that renders God's omniscience logically inconsistent with man's 'free will.'
First, this seeming conundrum rests on that which is commonly called a 'modal fallacy' (or perhaps better known as a 'modal scope fallacy'). That is, there is a confusion between de re necessity (i.e., necessity of the thing) and de dicto necessity (i.e., necessity of the saying).
Thus, if an omniscient God knows that person X will go to the park tomorrow, simply, person X will go to the park tomorrow.
There is no logical necessity laid on person X's going to the park tomorrow; namely, it is not logically impossible for for person X to NOT go to the park tomorrow (i.e., de re necessity).
That which is logically necessary is that if an omniscient God knows that person X will go to the park tomorrow, person X goes to the park tomorrow (i.e., de dicto necessity).
Now regarding 'free will,' there is also a confusion between the 'semantical' relationship of truth and the 'causal' relationship of truth regarding this paradox.
For instance, 'foreknowledge' of a certain event does NOT ''cause this certain event to actualize or transpire. For example, if God foreknows that a certain individual X will commit murder in the year 2028, God's foreknowledge of this individual X committing murder in the year 2028 does NOT cause this individual to commit murder. Rather, it is the individual X's own (i.e., free will) actions that causes he or she to commit murder in the year 2028.
Thus, that which semantically 'makes' such a proposition or statement true is the individual X actually committing murder in the year 2028 - not God's foreknowledge, or prediction, of such an event.
Therefore, God's omniscience is logically consistent with man's free will.
The Grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ be with you ALL. Amen. | | Back to Top | | |
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Asher
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Total Posts : 477
| Posted 1/24/2010 4:14 AM (GMT -6) | | This is too simple...
You miss the point.
First, omniscience, if omniscience means knowing all that is possible to know, is not the problem. Exhaustive, definite, knowledge of something that is not there to be known is the problem. Understand...open theists also believe in omniscience. We just disagree with you about what constitutes the set of {all that is possible to know} The future does not exist. It is only a conceptual tool we use for planning. You are committing the fallacy of hypostatization with regard to the future.
Secondly, the problem open theists point to is not one of causality. Take causality out of the equation.
The problem is that we find it difficult to call a will free when...if given exhaustive definite foreknowledge...it is logically impossible to make (with the person themselves as the causal agent) a different choice than the one that they must make, given God's infallible foreknowledge that that exact choice is what they will perform.
Minimally, for a person to have free will...they must 1) be the causal agent of their acts (again this is not the problem) and 2) be able to act otherwise (here is the problem)
Here is the picture that the traditional view paints:
a person arrives at a nexus of choice...they are presented with a number of different options...they choose one (as a causal agent)...and God foreknew which choice they would make. Viola! Foreknowledge and free will are compatible.
Here is the picture that the open view paints OF THE TRADITIONAL VIEW:
a person never arrives at a nexus of choice...not really...they may be under the illusion that they are arriving at a nexus of choice...but there is really no choice to be made...a choice requires that there be more than one option...given God's EXHAUSTIVE...DEFINITE...FOREKNOWLEDGE...only one option remains available...the one that God foreknew...
It is not that God or His foreknowledge in some way become the causal agent instead of man (if that did happen then that would also falsify free will) that is NOT what open theists are saying. It is that, given exhaustive definite foreknowledge, choice is only an illusion. We will come to point A and we will perform act 1, we will come to point B and we will perform act 1, we will come to point C and we will perform act 1...forever until the end. At any given point there is only ONE action that is possible to actually perform....and that action is whichever action God foreknew. | | Back to Top | | |
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ewashington7000
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Date Joined Jan 2010
Total Posts : 9
| Posted 1/24/2010 1:15 PM (GMT -6) | | This is still too simple…lol
Grace unto you, and peace, from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ
Do I really miss the point?
Well suffer me to clarify some of my intellectual tools (i.e., concepts), as this 'ought' to sharpen my argument.
First, knowing all that is possible to know is a a vacuous truth; however, knowing something that does not exists is logically impossible.
Since Plato, most philosophers agree that there are (at least) three conditions that must be satisfied for a human being to have knowledge of matters of fact. Let's call our human being "x", and knowledge of matters of fact "P:" The three conditions:
1. P (is true)
2. x has good evidence, "e", that P (and has little, or no countervailing evidence)
3. x believes, on the basis of e, that P
Regarding God, it may be desirable to drop the second condition; for, arguably, God knows directly - without any need of evidence. The third condition may pose some problems as well. Regarding human beings, the third condition captures the 'mental' or 'cognitive' aspect of knowledge. But, as you are aware, the beliefs of an omniscient God are unlike those of human beings. That is, those of an omniscient God are infinite, unchanging, infallible, and incorrigible.
Be this as it may, there remains one comment element (at least) in the case of a human being's having knowledge and and an omniscient God having knowledge: namely, that which is known is true. That is to say, neither an omniscient God nor any human being can literally know anything that is in fact false. Put another away, truth is a prerequisite of knowledge (or using the vocabulary of logic, truth is a necessary condition for knowledge). (In the case of an omniscient God, truth is not only a necessary condition for an omniscient God's knowledge, but it is also sufficient. If we let "g" stand for "an omniscient God," "K" for "knows," then gKP implies P, and P implies gKP. That is, gKP implies P is equivalent to P implies gKP. In other words, to say that some omniscient God (g) knows (K) some matter of fact (P) implies that some matter of fact (P) is true; and to say that some matter of fact (P) is true implies that some omniscient God (g) knows (K) some matter of fact (P). For an omniscient God is all-knowing, infallible, unchanging, all-true etc.)
Now someone may believe strongly that some proposition is true; indeed, she may even insist that she both knows that some proposition is true and has incontrovertible evidence that that proposition is true. But, if that proposition is in fact FALSE, then she does NOT know. (This is not to say that she must have some way of finding out that she is mistaken. Here, I am merely divorcing truth from belief.) Every proposition that is genuinely known (that is, to be true) is true; but the converse - namely, that every proposition that is true is known - certainly does not hold for less-than-omniscient human beings.
Thus, "Exhaustive, definite, knowledge of something that is not there to be known" is historically, by definition, logically impossible. Further, you assume that I commit such a fallacy because you hold the position that the future does not exist. Actually, I am more of a negative theorist, in that I rarely posit anything into 'actuality.'
Second, that which you call "the problem" that open theists point to is referred to by logicians as 'the subtle logical, error that open theists fail to detect;' namely, the modal fallacy.
I will try to both use modal propositional logic to demonstrate this logical fallacy and how open theism commits such internally. I will first introduce some logical tools, and then render your argument appropriately.
Symbol Its meaning
Let: “=df” stands for “is by definition”:
~ =df not the case
◊P =df It is (logically) possible that P. Example: It is (logically) possible that the United States was defeated in WW II (Note: Whatever is NOT self-contradictory is logically possible.)
☐P =df It is (logically) necessary that P. Example: It is logically necessary that there are either fewer than 10 million stars or more than 1 million stars. (This may not seem obvious to many but this proposition cannot be false. Note: If P is not logically possible, then ~ P is logically necessary. Thus, ~ ◊P implies ☐~P .) Therefore, ☐P =df ~◊~P
∇P =df It is contingent that P. Example: It is contingent that United States purchased Alaska from Russia. (Note: A proposition, Q, is contingent if and only if ◊Q and ◊~Q.) Therefore, ∇P =df ◊P & ◊~P,
The above are some modal concepts or notions. I will cal them for short modal statuses.
To sum up the above, every proposition is either logically possible or logically impossible. And no proposition is both.
Drawing the net a bit finer, and dividing the class of logically possible propositions into those that are necessarily true and those that are contingent, we have three exclusive categories. Every proposition is exclusively either necessarily true, necessarily false, or contingent. That is, every proposition falls into one of these latter three categories, and no proposition falls into more than one.
Just as the expression “truth-value” is a generic term encompassing “truth” and “falsity”, the expression “modal status” is a generic term encompassing “contingent”, “necessarily true”, and “necessarily false”.
Finally, no proposition ever changes its modal status. We will call this principle “The Principle of the Fixity of Modal Status.“ And for the purposes of assessing your argument, note especially: no contingent proposition ever ‘becomes’ necessary or impossible.
Now we are ready to address your open theistic argument. You say :
If given exhaustive definite foreknowledge...it is logically impossible to make (with the person themselves as the causal agent) a different choice than the one that they must make, given God's infallible foreknowledge that that exact choice is what they will perform.
Let's try to translate your above argument from English prose into the symbolism of modal, propositional logic:
Let: "G" stand for "an omniscient God (g) has exhaustive definite foreknowledge"
Let: "C" stand for " to make (with the person themselves as the causal agent) a different choice according to her own free will. (Note: The latter part part of the original proposition is truncated as is this unnecessary to the argument.) Thus, symbolically, your argument as follows:
G ⊃ ~ ◊C
~ ◊C ⊃ ~F
∴ G ⊃ ~F
Translated back into English prose, you argument roughly looks as follows:
Premise 1:
If an omniscient God has exhaustive, definite, foreknowledge, then it is NOT possible for a person to make a different choice according to her own free will.
Premises 2:
If it is NOT possible for a person to make a different choice according to her own free will, then there is no free will.
Conclusion:
Therefore, If an omniscient God has exhaustive, definite, foreknowledge, then there is no free will.
Your argument is VALID but not SOUND. That is to say, at least on of the premises of your argument is not true.
Let's take a careful look at Premise 1:
If an omniscient God has exhaustive, definite, foreknowledge, then it is NOT possible for a person to make a different choice according to her own free will.
Now for a conditional statement, such as Premise 1, to be true in modal, propositional logic, the consequent can never be false while the antecedent is true.
The antecedent of Premise 1 is an omniscient God has exhaustive, definite, foreknowledge. This antecedent is generally acknowledged to be true. Therefore, let's assign its truth value as true.
However, the consequent states that it is NOT possible for a person to make a choice according to her own free will. This is not only statistically (probably) FALSE but actually FALSE as well. To make the claim that it is NOT possible for a person to make a different choice according to her own free false requires only one instance where a person makes a choice acccording to her own free will.
Instances of such are not hard to find. When a woman decides to don her favorite red dress but then suddenly changes her mind, even perhaps whimsically opting for her not so favorite blue dress instead, does she NOT possess and exemplify free will by doing so? When another woman, even one who has grown accustomed to the tendencies of her spouse, foreknowing that he doesn't like any cake other than cheese cake, orders cheese cake for her husband, does she do so necessarily? Or doe she do so freely?
Thus, the antecedent is true while the consequent is false in Premise 1. Therefore, Premise 1 is false because its true antecedent materially conditionalizes a false consequent.
Now Premise 2 is trivially true.
Thus, Premise1 (true) coupled with Premise 2 (false) - the Premise Set - are together false.
Thus your open theistic argument is valid but NOT sound (i.e., one or more premises are false.)
Lastly, your very last paragraph reflects utter confusion. Neglecting the difficulties of defining 'one action,' at any given point, it is hardly ever the case there is only ONE action that is possible to actually perform. Rather, at any given point, there is (probably) an infinite amount of actions that it is POSSIBLE to perform. It is just that whatever an omniscient God foreknows to happen, simply happens; and by logical extension, whatever any human being foreknows to happen, simply happens. From weathermen to astronomers, we all, to some degree more or less, possess knowledge of events; and often, we predict events truthfully. But neither our foreknowledge nor predictions preclude our free wills, respectively.
Note: 'Logical actuality' is not identical to 'logical possibility.' Now that which is logically actual is indeed logically possible; but the converse does not not hold. That is, to make matters worse, it is logically possible that I am NOT debating with you about open theism. But it is not the case that because it is logical possible that I am NOT debating with you about open theism that it is logically actual that I am debating with you about open theism.....lol
The Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you All. Amen | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 1/24/2010 2:05 PM (GMT -6) | | |
Thanks E again for the contribution. Good effort. Appreciate it.
You seem like a smart person, so rather than respond point for point, I’ll just direct you to some thoughts that should supply you with almost everything I’d want to say. It’ll save me time poking out the details and it’ll give you a much more complete argument for how some (not all) open theists argue their case. Alan Rhoda is a great friend and has a number of excellent articles that should be interest to you on his personal website. There’s one particular paper (“Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future,” F&P 23 (2006)) on his site which I’d suggest starting with. Since that paper Alan’s gone on to publish some others. But all of the articles there address the issues you raise. Alan’s blog is loaded with conversations of this as well, though I don’t know where he’s been lately. His last post was back in September.
Blessings,
Tom
KIXYTΘEMTA | | Back to Top | | |
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ewashington7000
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2010
Total Posts : 9
| Posted 1/24/2010 2:25 PM (GMT -6) | | Grace unto you, and peace, from God our Father and The Lord Jesus Christ,
As an addendum, I think that that which is being denied by open theists is knowledge of future contingents. If so, how do open theist explain the frequent practice of concerned parents' forewarning their children to NOT cross the street when the lights are green? Is it because these concerned parents 'foreknow' that if their children do so, their children will be harmed? By such 'foreknowledge,' will the children of these concerned parents NOT have the free will to disobey? Or are they both foolish for even interacting with each other, since choice is only chimera or an illusion?
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Asher
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Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 477
| Posted 1/24/2010 3:11 PM (GMT -6) | | Dude, part of a good faith interchange is that you TRY to understand the other person's position.
Please separate what open theists actually believe and what we say must be the case IF there is exhaustive definite foreknowledge.
ewashington7000 said "I think that that which is being denied by open theists is knowledge of future contingents."
No, that is what you are denying. That is exactly what open theists ARE affirming.
If God has EXHAUSTIVE:
(He knows ALL...which in the case of non open theists would include the future, but in the case of open theists would not include the future, but only present concepts about states that both [will and will not] and [may and may not] exist at a later time.)
DEFINITE:
(What God knows, he knows with certainty, it is fixed...which for you would include all things...but for open theists would include knowledge both of things that will certainly come to pass and also probabilistic knowledge of contingents)
FOREKNOWLEDGE:
(For you the past, present and future are all currently existing states that God's knowledge can access (via whatever means) and His knowledge of future states is called FOREKNOWLEDGE....for me, the past does not exist as a state of reality, it exists as conceptual memory...the present is all that actually exists, and each present moment is replaced by each successive present moment...the future does not exist as a current state of reality, but only as a conceptual planning tool...SO, for me what you mean by FOREKNOWLEDGE just simply does not exist...what there IS is present knowledge...present knowledge about the present...my present knowledge of the present is neither EXHAUSTIVE nor DEFINITE...God's present knowledge of the present is both EXHAUSTIVE and DEFINITE...there is also present knowledge of the past...my present knowledge of the past is neither EXHAUSTIVE nor DEFINITE...God's present knowledge of the past is both EXHAUSTIVE and DEFINITE....there is also a forward looking kind of present knowledge...my present knowledge of future successive states of the present is neither EXHAUSTIVE nor DEFINITE...God's present knowledge of future successive states of the present is also neither EXHAUSTIVE nor DEFINITE...
...the past is fixed and is knowable by God EXHAUSTIVELY and DEFINITELY...the present IS and is knowable by God EXHAUSTIVELY and DEFINITELY...the future does not yet exist...it is comprised of things that are presently fixed given present trajectories of mechanics and of things that are not presently fixed given present trajectories of mechanics (such as the free will acts of causal agents)...God knows the fixed as fixed and He knows the probabilistic as probabilistic. There is your future contingents...and they are known by God as CONTINGENTS not as something that He can have DEFINITE knowledge about now.
Human beings never have EXHAUSTIVE, DEFINITE knowledge...not of the past, not of the present, not of the future.
God has EXHAUSTIVE, DEFINITE knowledge of the past and of the present...but not of the future.
ewashington7000 said "Or are they both foolish for even interacting with each other, since choice is only chimera or an illusion?"
Please separate the different things that I actually believe.
I do not believe that choice IS an illusion. I am an open theist. Choice is real.
When I posited that choice was an illusion, I was referring to your position, not mine. Choice is only an illusion if EXHAUSTIVE DEFINITE FOREKNOWLEDGE is the case. I do not believe it is the case, you do. | | Back to Top | | |
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ewashington7000
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Date Joined Jan 2010
Total Posts : 9
| Posted 1/24/2010 3:47 PM (GMT -6) | | Grace unto you, and peace, from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.
Thanks for the material Tom. I will read through its contents thoroughly, although I am probably already familiar with the arguments thereof. I actually have read some of Boyd's material. Similar to Pike, Boyd merely argues the typical incompatibilitist position.
But since you are making recommendations, I will recommend that you read some of Dr.Norman Swartz's online articles: The Modal Fallacy -
http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/modal_fallacy.htm
Foreknowledge and Free Will - http://www.iep.utm.edu/f/foreknow.htm
The crux of my argumentation stems from his reasoning.
The Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. | | Back to Top | | |
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Starkman
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Date Joined Oct 2001
Total Posts : 1747
| Posted 1/24/2010 7:06 PM (GMT -6) | | ewashington7000 said...
As an addendum, I think that that which is being denied by open theists is knowledge of future contingents. If so, how do open theist explain the frequent practice of concerned parents' forewarning their children to NOT cross the street when the lights are green? Is it because these concerned parents 'foreknow' that if their children do so, their children will be harmed? By such 'foreknowledge,' will the children of these concerned parents NOT have the free will to disobey? Or are they both foolish for even interacting with each other, since choice is only chimera or an illusion?
Hey there, ewashington7000,
Actually, ewasthington7000, you've demonstrated the very essence of freewill choice, if you look at exactly what your questions entails: the child who faces the green light is not giving his parents the certainty that he (the child) will or will not cross the street. Further, the parents could not possess knowledge of the child's choice. And that's the whole point.
The last thing an open theist should (or, really, could) deny is the knowledge of future contingencies; e.g., the child might or might not cross the street. What an open theist will deny is that every single contingency sits in God's mind as either already decided (by whom?!) or is just known, in what ends up being only so in some unexplainable way—"Well, He's God, and therefore He knows absolutely everything," we are often told, or, in your case, the argument that there is no logical necessity laid on a person in view of God's exhaustive (and therefore, settled) knowledge of everything we will ever think, say and do.
All the child has to in order to demonstrate the fallacy of either of the two arguments above that are in defense of God having exhaustively settled foreknowledge is to ask his parents (in sticking with your contingency question) a simple question, "Mother, Father [moving this now into a Creator/Creation context], since you know what I will do—cross or not cross the street—and since you know this information exhaustively, and therefore, your knowledge of my choice is settled as to what I will do, and my choice cannot, therefore be differently that what you have always known I will choose, tell me the choice I will make."
A simple question the child asks, but so revealing. For all the child has to do, once told what he will choose, is to choose differently! It will then become quite clear that the knowledge the child's parents (or God) have could never contain exhaustive knowledge about every choice the child choose.
These facts are clear:
a) the child can, and often will, choose differently than what the parents were "sure" the child would do.
b) it makes absolutely no difference whether the parents tell child what they think the child will do. What is true in the decision making the child demonstrates once his parents have told him what they believe, the truth of this reality to choose other than what the parents thought is no less true if the parents do not tell the child what they believe about the child's choices. (This is very, very important, and cannot be dismissed.)
c) were it the case that the parents know what the child will choose, whether or not they tell the child any of the decisions the child will make, the child will never be able to choose other than what the parents know. Such knowledge, whether revealed to the child, would be demonstrated in the most awkward fashion imaginable; the child will find himself, in some unexplainable and incomprehensible manner, unable to choose other than what he was told. (This, however, is obviously not reality!)
d) what the parents would know with certainty is that the child might or might not cross the street.
e) it cannot be argued any better with regard to God's knowledge of the child's choices; that God can have complete (and therefore, settled) knowledge of all the child's future choices (which, we must remember, included knowledge of everything the child will ever think, say or do), yet still claim that it is possible for the child to choose his decision by the use of freewill. For we would run into the same awkward and incomprehensible outcome as noted in "d" above. Freewill choice-making must mean that even God cannot have exhaustive knowledge about one's choices, because that person could never choose differently, regardless of whether God did or did not reveal the choice that would be made. (Again, this is so very important grasp, but all too often this truth is just run over without considerable thought given to it.)
Think hard about this, because the reality, practicality and "the way things really are" scream at us to reconsider our former logic and philosophical analysis when the results subscribe to God having exhaustively settled foreknowledge.
Now none of the above is stated in formal logic argument (I wouldn't know how to do that). But the reality of the truth of what I've said is the way things really are. It's how we do life. It's what must apply to our relationship to God as well as to people; we make choices by the act of freewill, the very act itself meaning no one, not even God, can possibly know what we will choose in every single choice we will ever make.
You commented, I noticed, on Squidoo about the book I wrote on this subject. My book is called "Where the Future Meets Reality," and deals with open theism not from a formal logic or philosophical perspective, but from the way life really is. You might find it interesting (and you can find the book at www.lulu.com or Amazon.com) if you're interested in pursuing open theism from this perspective.
Thanks,
Starkman | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 1/25/2010 5:54 AM (GMT -6) | | EW,
Let’s see where we agree first.
I have no problem with the notion of knowledge as justified belief. Let’s go with that (Plato’s 3 point re: knowledge of matters of fact and all). And I agree that we have to qualify this in God’s case—God’s knowledge is direct (not mediated), infallible, and exhaustive (co-terminus with reality). I’d also add that God’s propositional knowledge is not the primary sense in which God knows things. If God’s knowledge is direct and unmediated, then I’d suggest this means God directly apprehends realities, i.e., experiences them. Propositions describe these realities and are true just in case the realities are as the props describe and false otherwise. So for me divine knowledge of propositions isn’t the ground floor so to speak of God’s knowledge. God can express his knowledge of realities in propositional terms if he needs to, and generally that means when he needs to communicate to us. But anyhow.
I also grant EM (excluded middle) and bivalence, both of which you seem to grant as well.
So omniscience boils down to “knowledge of all and only truths” if you’re talking propositions. God knows all truths and believes no falsehoods (given the qualification above that the propositional piece is secondary). And Greg, Alan, and I don’t deny bivalence in an attempt to find a place to hide propositions describing future contingents either. All props describing future states of affairs are either true or false, including props describing future contingents.
One more piece. I know possible world semantics likes to attach “contingency” to “props” and speak of a proposition being contingent or not. But technically speaking, if one admits bivalence, then there’s never anything contingent about A PROP. A proposition can be contingently true or false. But it’s not contingently a proposition. The future contingents we’re interested in are the states of affairs (events, say) that obtain or not and not the propositions describing them. The props are true given their correspondence to the realities/state of affairs that GROUND them. So for every true prop there’s some reality, some state of affairs that obtains AT THE TIME the prop is true which grounds its true, or by virtue of which the prop is true.
We recognize the distinction between de dicto and de re knowledge as well. But remember, de dicto knowledge is GROUNDED in ‘re’ i.e., in reality. What we say (dicto) is true or not given what is (re). No prop (diction) can be true if reality (re) is not AS THE PROP describes. So distinguish between MAP (diction, de dicto) and TERRITORY (reality, de re) all you want. But do not DIVORCE THEM (which you seem to be doing). Truth supervenes upon being (generally), so maps describe territories and are true to the extent they correspond to territories. Maps don't CAUSE the territories they describe. Quite the opposite (we argue). Territories cause (if I can use the word loosely) maps (the truth of maps).
In the end, we simply argue that our props (our language and semantics) should FOLLOW our ontology (the way we believe the world is). That is, semantics is determined by ontology, not the other way around. So if there is genuine freedom, say, free will regarding choice, or if future indeterminacy is a feature of the way the world is, then this ought to find its way into our semantics. For us, this gets worked out by distinguishing between three future tense props (jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive re: the future):
X will occur.
X will not occur.
X might and might not occur.
I’m bothered by time constraints and what I’m not able to say. It’s all our article (Alan, Greg, and I) you have the link to.
Don’t get hung up on how ‘will’ and ‘might’ are used popularly, because there is no single, fixed use. The point is that we DO believe some future events have an objective probability of 1 of occurring (i.e., they’re determined to occur). And we believe other events have an objective probability of 0 of occurring (i.e., they’re determined NOT to occur). And then we believe there are events whose probability of occurring is greater than 0 and less than 1 (they might and might not occur). This LOOKS similar to P is a contingent prop just in case might-p and might not-p. But we’re not talking about logical possibility per se. We’re talking about historical possibility. And proposition might describe a logically possible state of affairs but be determined NOT to occur. So we need a more hardy, historical, ontological notion of possibility to work with.
And this relates to your point that “foreknowledge doesn’t cause the events described.” Unfortunately, E, no open theist claims that God’s “knowledge” of what I shall do “causes” me to do what I do. The problem isn’t foreKNOWLEDGE as much as it is foreTRUTH. That is, if props are true by virtue of correspondence to actual states of affairs that ground their truth, then one has to ask, What grounds truths describing in 1900 what somebody not yet existing shall do in 2100 (200 years later)? If a prop is a kind of map of some particular reality, then I want to know what reality is grounding the truth (the map) about what I shall do an eternity before I do it. "I" cannot be the one determining the truth about what I do if that truth eternally precedes me, for I am not eternal. And it doesn't follow that God's 'knowledge' of this truth is what's 'causing' me to do what I do. But if I claim that if the truth about what I shall do eternally precedes me, then something (never mind who and what that something is) other than me is grounding that truth, not me, and THAT is what grounds the incompatibilist's argument. For the incompatibilist insists that in the case of free acts, the AGENT is the one who grounds the truth about what they do. They are the final arbiters in determining which of several possibilities gets actualized.
So what grounds the truth of a prop in 1900 claiming some person will do such and such in 2100? It can't be that person, for he doesn’t exist in 1900 to ground the truth of the prop in 1900, and retroactive causation is impossible (so the actual choice in 2100 can't be what causes the prop to be true in 1900 (or in or 500 BC or at the creation of the universe). But what CAN be true and grounded in contemporaneous realities is the possibility that the person perform said act and not perform said act. And the best proposition to express this openness between what we say really are possibilities (their performing and not performing X) would be something like “might and might not” (and not to say WILL or WILL NOT).
This is all granting presentism and the B-theory of time of course. I don’t know any A-theorists who are open theists.
Tom
KIXYTΘEMTAPost Edited (Tom) : 1/25/2010 8:21:41 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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ewashington7000
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| Posted 1/25/2010 7:59 AM (GMT -6) | | Starkman said...ewashington7000 said...
As an addendum, I think that that which is being denied by open theists is knowledge of future contingents. If so, how do open theist explain the frequent practice of concerned parents' forewarning their children to NOT cross the street when the lights are green? Is it because these concerned parents 'foreknow' that if their children do so, their children will be harmed? By such 'foreknowledge,' will the children of these concerned parents NOT have the free will to disobey? Or are they both foolish for even interacting with each other, since choice is only chimera or an illusion? Hey there, ewashington7000, Actually, ewasthington7000, you've demonstrated the very essence of freewill choice, if you look at exactly what your questions entails: the child who faces the green light is not giving his parents the certainty that he (the child) will or will not cross the street. Further, the parents could not possess knowledge of the child's choice. And that's the whole point. The last thing an open theist should (or, really, could) deny is the knowledge of future contingencies; e.g., the child might or might not cross the street. What an open theist will deny is that every single contingency sits in God's mind as either already decided (by whom?!) or is just known, in what ends up being only so in some unexplainable way—"Well, He's God, and therefore He knows absolutely everything," we are often told, or, in your case, the argument that there is no logical necessity laid on a person in view of God's exhaustive (and therefore, settled) knowledge of everything we will ever think, say and do. All the child has to in order to demonstrate the fallacy of either of the two arguments above that are in defense of God having exhaustively settled foreknowledge is to ask his parents (in sticking with your contingency question) a simple question, "Mother, Father [moving this now into a Creator/Creation context], since you know what I will do—cross or not cross the street—and since you know this information exhaustively, and therefore, your knowledge of my choice is settled as to what I will do, and my choice cannot, therefore be differently that what you have always known I will choose, tell me the choice I will make." A simple question the child asks, but so revealing. For all the child has to do, once told what he will choose, is to choose differently! It will then become quite clear that the knowledge the child's parents (or God) have could never contain exhaustive knowledge about every choice the child choose. These facts are clear: a) the child can, and often will, choose differently than what the parents were "sure" the child would do. b) it makes absolutely no difference whether the parents tell child what they think the child will do. What is true in the decision making the child demonstrates once his parents have told him what they believe, the truth of this reality to choose other than what the parents thought is no less true if the parents do not tell the child what they believe about the child's choices. (This is very, very important, and cannot be dismissed.) c) were it the case that the parents know what the child will choose, whether or not they tell the child any of the decisions the child will make, the child will never be able to choose other than what the parents know. Such knowledge, whether revealed to the child, would be demonstrated in the most awkward fashion imaginable; the child will find himself, in some unexplainable and incomprehensible manner, unable to choose other than what he was told. (This, however, is obviously not reality!) d) what the parents would know with certainty is that the child might or might not cross the street. e) it cannot be argued any better with regard to God's knowledge of the child's choices; that God can have complete (and therefore, settled) knowledge of all the child's future choices (which, we must remember, included knowledge of everything the child will ever think, say or do), yet still claim that it is possible for the child to choose his decision by the use of freewill. For we would run into the same awkward and incomprehensible outcome as noted in "d" above. Freewill choice-making must mean that even God cannot have exhaustive knowledge about one's choices, because that person could never choose differently, regardless of whether God did or did not reveal the choice that would be made. (Again, this is so very important grasp, but all too often this truth is just run over without considerable thought given to it.) Think hard about this, because the reality, practicality and "the way things really are" scream at us to reconsider our former logic and philosophical analysis when the results subscribe to God having exhaustively settled foreknowledge. Now none of the above is stated in formal logic argument (I wouldn't know how to do that). But the reality of the truth of what I've said is the way things really are. It's how we do life. It's what must apply to our relationship to God as well as to people; we make choices by the act of freewill, the very act itself meaning no one, not even God, can possibly know what we will choose in every single choice we will ever make. You commented, I noticed, on Squidoo about the book I wrote on this subject. My book is called "Where the Future Meets Reality," and deals with open theism not from a formal logic or philosophical perspective, but from the way life really is. You might find it interesting (and you can find the book at www.lulu.com or Amazon.com) if you're interested in pursuing open theism from this perspective. Thanks, Starkman
Grace unto you, and peace, from God our Father and The Lord Jesus Christ.
[As a prefatory remark, I will like to note that no one has yet countervailed any formal arguments that have demonstrated regarding the 'modal fallacy' inherent (latently) within the open theist's argument pertaining to free-will etc., essentially ignoring the 'deathblow' (logically) that has been dealt to it. Rather, I have received plenty of informal arguments, most of which have been logically (i.e., formally) inconsistent or unsound. As a mathematical logician, this can be playfully frustrating; but I will try to do my best to do what I do. I must (i.e., not logically but deontically or obligatorily) do so….lol]
Notwithstanding, back to these matters at hand. "…the child who faces the green light is not giving his parents the certainty that he (the child) will or will not cross the street. Further, the parents could not possess knowledge of the child's choice. And that's the whole point."
First, "certainty", as I am sure you are aware, is no more a necessary condition for knowledge (and foreknowledge by logical extension) than sugar is a necessary condition for iced-tea. That is, without sugar, one can still have (i.e., possess) iced-tea; analogously, without "certainty," one can still have (i.e., possess) knowledge (and foreknowledge by logical extension). In fact, arguably, if not most, there are reams of knowledge (and foreknowledge by logical extension0 that human being posses without "certainty."
"Let me explain, even in some of the words words of Norman Swartz:
"The two phrases “x knows” and “x knows for certain” are no more equivalent than “x sees the distant mountain” and “x sees the distant mountain perfectly (for example, from miles away x can see the veins in the leaves on the trees)”. Persons who do not have perfect pitch may, nonetheless, know when a pianist has hit a wrong note. One doesn’t have to hear perfectly to hear. Two mathematicians may prove the same theorem; one of these proofs may be ‘elegant’, the other ‘circuitous’; but both are proofs. A proof need not be elegant in order to be proof.
"Similarly with knowledge. What one knows need not be certain; some, probably most, things that we know fall short of certainty, but it is arbitrary and stultifying to refuse to acknowledge these cases as genuine cases of knowledge. By setting the standards too high, as did Descartes and as do many of his intellectual heirs even today, is to rob the concept of “knowledge” of its utility.
"To know the future, it is not required that we be infallible (that is, incapable of making a mistake). The person who sees a bus fast approaching knows that it will not (miraculously) turn into a marshmallow. And she is right: it does not. Realistically, few of us (unless corrupted by a bad introductory philosophy course), would be tempted to say, “She didn’t know. After all, the bus could have turned into a marshmallow.” True enough, there is one sense in which the bus could have turned into a marshmallow, and that sense is that such an eventuality is a logical possibility (that is, is not logically self-contradictory). Indeed it is a matter of the very definition of “matter of fact” or “contingency” that such propositions are both possibly true and possibly false. Every true contingency is (as a matter of the very definition of “contingency”) possibly false; and likewise every false contingency is (as a matter of the very definition of “contingency”) possibly true. [More on this in section 5 below.] But nothing of particular significance follows from these latter facts.
"One must be careful not to ’slide’ from “possible” to “probable”. Just because an event is possible does not justify the inference that it is probable. The proposition that the US Congress will adopt Swedish as the country’s sole national language certainly is a logical possibility (that is, is not self-contradictory). But that proposition has a probability, for all intents and purposes, of zero. Every contingent proposition is both possibly true and possibly false. And some propositions that are possibly false have a reasonably high probability of being actually true; while some (other) possibly false propositions have a (nearly) zero probability (/zero likelihood) of being true. The essential point for our knowing a contingent proposition is (a) our having a well-founded belief that it is true and (b) that it is true. Its being possibly false is irrelevant. Its being probably false is quite another matter, but whether it is probably false or is not probably false is not entailed by its being possibly false.
Every true contingency whatsoever, not just those about the future, is possibly false. It is truth that counts, not possible falsehood. Actual truth ‘trumps’ possible falsehood in the matter of a proposition’s being known." - Norman Swartz
Having now, presumably, a common basis or understanding, let's attend to your arguments:
You arguments are internally confused, conflating concepts inhering in contraries or contradictions. That is, you say that:
"All the child has to in order to demonstrate the fallacy of either of the two arguments above that are in defense of God having exhaustively settled foreknowledge is to ask his parents (in sticking with your contingency question) a simple question, "Mother, Father [moving this now into a Creator/Creation context], since you know what I will do—cross or not cross the street—and since you know this information exhaustively, and therefore, your knowledge of my choice is settled as to what I will do, and my choice cannot, therefore be differently that what you have always known I will choose, tell me the choice I will make."
The problem with the above example is that you assume that because the parents know beforehand (epistemic determinism) that which which their children will do, their children CANNOT choose to do other wise. This argument ought to be manifestly INVALID to those of you who understand/appreciate the logicality WITHIN your above argument.
That is, because the parents foreknow that which their children will do, does not preclude their children's free wills to do otherwise, respectively. Despite their parents' foreknowledge, the children CAN choose to cross the street, cut school, kill themselves, kill their parents etc. - essentially CHOOSING to do anything other than which has been predicted by their parents. All that is being is stated by such foreknowled is that in ACTUALITY, the children will do that which their parents have foreknown. The foreknowledge of the parents does NOT cause their childrens' actions to transpire. Rather, it is the children's own VOLITION (I.E., FREE WILL) that does so.
For instance, I predict that at least some one of you will respond to this post. I CAN arguably say that I FOREKNOW that this will happen. (Some of you are probably verifying this prediction right now.) The test to this foreknowledge claim of mine is verified when at least one of you does that which I have predicted (i.e., responds to this post). Since this has been accomplished, has any one you been forced to fulfill or verify my prediction? As a matter of fact, has any one of you have been forced to nullify or falsify my prediction? Surely, you ALL POSSESS THE FREE WIILL to verify, falsify, nullify or fulfill my prediction!!! Some of you have, in fact, done so (i.e., done otherwise). But what has happened? I would suspect that YOUR responses would be of the sort that YOUR choices COULD NOT be different from the ones that YOU CHOSE, despite the fact that under no coercion or necessity, YOU all FREELY chose to do that which YOU did….lol
"were it the case that the parents know what the child will choose, whether or not they tell the child any of the decisions the child will make, the child will never be able to choose other than what the parents know. Such knowledge, whether revealed to the child, would be demonstrated in the most awkward fashion imaginable; the child will find himself, in some unexplainable and incomprehensible manner, unable to choose other than what he was told. (This, however, is obviously not reality!)"
I have just countervailed/counterobjected your above example, even by refuting - and dare I say confuting - its core argument.
"Freewill choice-making must mean that even God cannot have exhaustive knowledge about one's choices, because that person could never choose differently, regardless of whether God did or did not reveal the choice that would be made. (Again, this is so very important grasp, but all too often this truth is just run over without considerable thought given to it.)"
"Freewill choice must mean….God cannot…..could never choose…" You sound like a Necessitarian. Why is the case the free choice must mean….God cannot….could never chose? Perhaps you do use necessity (e.g., logical, deontical, doxastic) too freely. You ought to learn how to live with contingency...trust me - it;s harmless...lol Again, a proposition is contingent when it can be both possibly true (which by logical extension is also possibly false) and possibly false (which by logical extension is possibly true).
Let's attend to the (logical) modalities. Middle Knowledge - you folks call it Molinism - why? Why invent such fabulous theories when simple modal, propositional logic has solved this centuries ago?
I won't even begin to adduce scriptural references supporting informally God's omniscience. They are indeed statistical but true but aplenty.
The Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you ALL. Amen | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 1/25/2010 8:29 AM (GMT -6) | | Tell you what E, when you can summarize Alan's paper (our core arguments there) then I'll think about paying attention to your claim to have delivered a death blow to open theism per se. Until then, it's a little difficult to take the claim seriously. I appreciate your confidence, though!
Besides the 2006 F&P paper ("Omniscience, Open Theism, and the Nature of the Future" which I'd start with), there's a good bit of the conversation (with Alex Pruss) evaluated and discussed in Alan's more recent paper--
If you spend sometime digesting these two papers you might help your own arguments better if only by taking them into account so that your arguments are current.
Peace,
Tom
KIXYTΘEMTAPost Edited (Tom) : 1/25/2010 7:49:31 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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ewashington7000
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| Posted 1/25/2010 8:51 AM (GMT -6) | | Similtude said...
Here's the way I would put it most simply. The only way God could foreknow exactly what I will libertarianly choose is if God's mode of foreknowledge is a complete mystery. And that is another way of saying that God's exhaustive foreknowledge, if a fact, is not knowable by humans by any apriori or aposteriori means. It could only be revealed. And yet there is not one verse in the bible that unequivocally says God foreknows BY exhaustive foreknowledge, while there ARE verses that imply He foreknows based on His intentions to compentetly bring about His own ends. Nor does positing exhaustive foreknowledge explain anything that needs to be explained, as far as I can tell. Exhaustive foreknowledge seems to just be posited as a mysterious truth to no real explanatory avail that I can understand.
Whoaaaaaaaaa……
Grace unto you, and peace, from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ
Hold on now……No Scriptures?
It is well to note that the ancients use to often employ literary polarities, or diametrical opposites, to signify the concept of "totality." For instance: bond or free - all covered; just and unjust - spans all; jew and gentile - as any non-jew use to be considered gentilic - no discrimination or respect of persons; and notably alpha and omega or beginning and end - God's knowledge. Pay heed to the last instance.
Isaiah chapter 45 and 46 but more specifically: Isaiah 46:10-11
10 'Declaring the end from the beginning,' and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure:
46:11 Calling a ravenous bird from the east, the man that executeth my counsel from a far country: yea, I have spoken it, I will also bring it to pass; I have purposed it, I will also do it.
Exhaustive = Total knowledge to me...scripturally.
Not to suggest that you are an open theist, but open theism has been invented by human beings to explain that which theiy haven't YET understood (HINT: MODAL FALLACY), or refuse to, accept.
By the way, have you ever noticed/considered the modernity of this discussion? That is, neither Moses nor Paul seems to be so willing to restrict God's ability to know, but 16th and 17th centuries thinkers seem willing. What about the modernity of such a notion as "free will." Picture Adam expostulating with God, futilely of course, arguing that His Creator does NOT know his future actions exhaustively. Analogously, picture 'the first clay molded' arguing with its molder, i.e., The Potterer, that 'The Potterer' does NOT know what will become of it exhaustively.
Perhaps they think the God of All is too small….
The (Eternal) Grace of Our Lord Jesus be with YOU ALL. Amen | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 1/25/2010 9:15 AM (GMT -6) | | EW: Exhaustive = Total knowledge to me.
Tom: As it does to me. God knows all truth. Whatever is true about the past, present or future, I agree God knows it. The question is, how ought the truth about future contingency be propositionally expressed?
EW: By the way, have you ever noticed/considered the modernity of this discussion?
Tom: "Discussion" is a wide net. You may want to be specific, because there's nothing especially novel about the conversation (freedom, foreknowledge, present truths about future contingent events, etc., all pretty old stuff).
EW: That is, neither Moses nor Paul seems to be so willing to restrict God's ability to know.
Tom: Nor would I seek to restrict it.
T
KIXYTΘEMTAPost Edited (Tom) : 1/25/2010 8:27:11 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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Total Posts : 680
| Posted 1/25/2010 5:18 PM (GMT -6) | | This thread caught my eye while I was dropping by. I've only skimmed the thread. EW's initial post, at least, doesn't say anything that (sophisticated) open theists have overlooked. There's certainly no knock-down refutation of open theism there.
EW's response to the foreknowledge problem is simply a variation on Ockhamism. It's a popular solution, but one I and others have explicitly argued against.
As for the modal fallacy charge, it's simply a red herring. While there are folks like Swartz who think all incompatibilist arguments trade on this fallacy, this is provably false.
Let Np = "It is causally necessary that p" (i.e., p is true in all causally possible futures).
Let p = God believes that there is a sea battle tomorrow
Let q = there is a sea battle tomorrow
The following argument is provably valid (where '-->' stands for the material conditional):
N(p --> q)
Np
Therefore
Nq
Given that there being a sea battle tomorrow is a future contingent, Ockhamists will reject the second premise, whereas (most) open theists will reject the first (they reject, in other words, the possibility of God, or anyone, having infallible beliefs about future contingents). Since it would take a long discussion to settle which response is best, I'm going to end here.Post Edited (Alan Rhoda) : 1/30/2010 12:42:55 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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JET
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Total Posts : 397
| Posted 1/25/2010 5:50 PM (GMT -6) | | |
ewashington7000: "... I will like to note that no one has yet countervailed any formal arguments that have demonstrated regarding the 'modal fallacy' inherent (latently) within the open theist's argument pertaining to free-will etc., essentially ignoring the 'deathblow' (logically) that has been dealt to it. Rather, I have received plenty of informal arguments, most of which have been logically (i.e., formally) inconsistent or unsound."
JET: Every once in a while someone will show up here wanting to talk about the ‘modal fallacy’ argument and become frustrated that noone is responding to the argument directly. There is a simple reason why we don’t engage these arguments directly. But before I explain, I’ll go ahead and respond to your formal argument very specifically as follows: I will (formally and officially) grant that, assuming Ockhamism is true, your argument is valid and sound. Our quarrel is not with your formal argument, but with your underlying Ockhamist assumptions and semantics. Thus, your formal argument, while familiar to us, is not particularly interesting or relevant (to us). Much more interesting and relevant is the underlying question as to whether or not the Ockhamist semantic provides the best way to understand and speak of the future. | | Back to Top | | |
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ewashington7000
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Total Posts : 9
| Posted 1/29/2010 3:27 PM (GMT -6) | | JET said...
ewashington7000: "... I will like to note that no one has yet countervailed any formal arguments that have demonstrated regarding the 'modal fallacy' inherent (latently) within the open theist's argument pertaining to free-will etc., essentially ignoring the 'deathblow' (logically) that has been dealt to it. Rather, I have received plenty of informal arguments, most of which have been logically (i.e., formally) inconsistent or unsound."
JET: Every once in a while someone will show up here wanting to talk about the ‘modal fallacy’ argument and become frustrated that noone is responding to the argument directly. There is a simple reason why we don’t engage these arguments directly. But before I explain, I’ll go ahead and respond to your formal argument very specifically as follows: I will (formally and officially) grant that, assuming Ockhamism is true, your argument is valid and sound. Our quarrel is not with your formal argument, but with your underlying Ockhamist assumptions and semantics. Thus, your formal argument, while familiar to us, is not particularly interesting or relevant (to us). Much more interesting and relevant is the underlying question as to whether or not the Ockhamist semantic provides the best way to understand and speak of the future.
Grace unto you, and peace, from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.
The above quote is rather interesting. How can one concede that the modal fallacy argument is both valid, let alone SOUND (which SOUNDNESS, by definition, ought to be the trump card), while deeming the selfsame argument as 'irrelevant,' especially when the open theist's argument RESTS on the committal of such a fallacy? ?!!!???!!!
If an open theist uses a logic to defend her or his argument that is often invalid, let alone NEVER sound, why is it the case that hardly any attention is paid to this?
The Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you All. Amen,
P.S. Tom...I have read those articles thoroughly.....I will write a response shortly...but as I have predicted, those articles TEEM with fallacious argumentation...HINT..._odal Fallacy | | Back to Top | | |
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JET
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Total Posts : 397
| Posted 1/30/2010 1:48 AM (GMT -6) | | |
ewashington7000: How can one concede that the modal fallacy argument is both valid, let alone SOUND (which SOUNDNESS, by definition, ought to be the trump card), while deeming the selfsame argument as 'irrelevant,' especially when the open theist's argument RESTS on the committal of such a fallacy? ?!!!???!!!
JET: I conceded your argument subject to the qualification: “assuming Ockhamism is true”. My point was simply that, in your first post, your argument is based on the assumption that one can work out the logic of contingency by separating the “de re” from the “de dicto”. I don’t believe that it is a valid move. However, I have conceded that your argument works GIVEN your assumptions. Therefore, unless you're interested in talking about those assumptions, there is not much more to discuss about your formal argument per se.
However, you don’t seem interested in talking about the validity of your Ockhamist assumptions. You never responded to Tom's attempt to cut to the chase when he wrote: “We recognize the distinction between de dicto and de re knowledge as well. But remember, de dicto knowledge is GROUNDED in ‘re’ i.e., in reality. What we say (dicto) is true or not given what is (re). No prop (diction) can be true if reality (re) is not AS THE PROP describes. So distinguish between MAP (diction, de dicto) and TERRITORY (reality, de re) all you want. But do not DIVORCE THEM (which you seem to be doing).”
That is where we need to go if you really want to engage our respective views because that is where we fundamentally disagree. Post Edited (JET) : 1/30/2010 12:55:53 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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