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Alan, wouldn’t Molinists complain that your definitions beg the question regarding the relationship of CCFs to God’s providential decree? In other words, the LFW is already assumed in the CCFs that God chooses to instantiate. We argue that there are in fact no true CCFs, but doesn’t it have to be true that there are no true CCFs for your argument about meticulous providence to work? So this argument is only as successful as the argument against there being any true CCFs, right?
And wouldn’t libertarian Molinists say their understanding of meticulous providence is just a ‘bit’ different than that a non-Molinist Calvinist (so that “meticulous” doesn’t quite describe the same sort of thing for each)? For non-Molinist Calvinists, God’s providential decrees are constrained ONLY by logical possibility, while for Molinists God’s providential decrees and also constrained by the truth of CCFs (which are not determined by God). So the Molinist would argue that our freedom (via the CCFs) gets figured into the equation prior to God’s decrees and so plays its part in limiting God (beyond the limits of logical possibility) to which worlds God can choose to create. That would be a constraint the Calvinist will object to as ‘limiting’ God’s freedom and sovereignty in an unacceptable way. For the Calvinist “meticulous” encompasses his view of divine freedom/sovereignty unconstrained by any consideration of creaturely contributions (and the truth of CCFs would be considered a creaturely contribution or 'condition' upon God's decrees). The Molinist doesn’t believe God is THAT free and so can’t believe that “meticulous” represents THAT kind of providence. Sure, both can say of everything that occurs in the world that God decreed it, but for the Calvinists the decree is unconditioned by consideration of anything outside the will and good pleasure of God while for the Molinist the decree is conditioned by the truth of CCFs.
Does any of this make a difference to your argument though? I’m not sure (except perhaps for the fact that Molinists might object to your argument that there are unspoken premises that make it untrue, though formally valid).
Alan: But if CH(E occurs) is 1, then E cannot be a future contingent.
Tom: Don’t they try to argue that the ‘contingency’ of future contingents is definitionally figured into E via the truth of the CCF describing E?
Alan: Molinists can't say that, however. Nevertheless, it seems that Molinists should be committed to the truth of (b). On their account, God's creative decree is explanatorily prior to any future event…
Tom: While the CCFs describing those events are explanatorily prior to God’s decree, right?
Alan: So the Molinist has to deny that God's creative decree is a "hard fact". The Molinist, in other words, has to say that what free choices we make can "bring it about that" God decrees the world that he has decreed. But then God's decrees lose all providential "bite".
Tom: Ah, I forgot that Molinists deny that God’s decree is a ‘hard fact’. Interesting. Maybe here they’d skirt the criticism by saying that what you’re describing is our (temporally) lived experience of the (logical and atemporal) explanatory relation between the truth of CCFs and God’s decrees. In other words, we’re FEELING the explanatory priority which our freedom plays in God’s decree that we come to actually exist. That's the mystery we're experiencing. They’d argue perhaps that in a sense we DID tell God (providentially) what WOULD be in this actual world (via CCFs) but God freely decided that this world (of all the ‘would-worlds’ he had to choose among) would become the actual world. This is essentially the difference between what ‘meticulous’ betokens in an unconditional (Calvinistic) providence and a relatively conditional (Molinist) providence.
Tom
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Oh...
Did you see Alex Pruss’s last post over at Prosblogion (Another argument against Molinism)? An interesting argument against Molinism. Maybe others here would be interested. Let me throw it up here (in blue):
Pruss: I shall use the phrase "non-derivatively libertarian-free" (NDLF) to describe a libertarian-free choice that does not inherit its freedom from earlier free actions. This corresponds to Kane's Self-Forming Actions. Now consider this plausible principle:
Thesis 1: If x NDLF-ly chooses A in circumstances C, and p is a proposition explanatorily prior to x's choosing A, then were x not to have NDLF-ly chosen A in C, p would still have been true.
A consequence of this is the following PAP:
Thesis 2: If x NDLF-ly chooses A in C, then x's failing to NDLF-ly choose A in C is logically compatible with any proposition that is explanatorily prior to x's NDLF-ly choosing A in C.
The argument from Thesis 1 to Thesis 2 is this. Suppose Thesis 2 is false. Then we have a proposition p explanatorily prior to x's NDLF-ly choosing A in C such that p entails x's NDLF-ly choosing A in C. But then x's failing to NDLF-ly choose A in C entails ~p. It is obvious that if x NDLF-ly chooses A in C, then x's NDLF-ly choosing A in C is not logically necessary. But if u entails v, then at least if u is contingent, were u to hold, v would hold. So, were x to fail to NDLF-ly choose A in C, then ~p would hold. But by Thesis 1, it follows that were x to fail to NDLF-ly choose A in C, then p would. But these two conditionals cannot both be true if the antecedent is possible, as it is. So Thesis 2 cannot be false.)
Now on to the argument. If Molinism holds, then the following scenario is possible:
Scenario 1: God believes that were he to place agent x in circumstances C, the agent would NDLF-ly choose A in C, and for that reason God in fact places agent x in circumstances C.
Now, assume that if p and q are explanatorily prior to r, so is the conjunction p&q. Suppose Scenario 1 holds. Let p be the proposition that x is in C, and let q be the proposition that God believes that were God to place x in C, x would NDLF-ly choose A in C. Then p and q are explanatorily prior to x NDLF-ly choosing A in C. Hence so is their conjunction. Hence, their conjunction does not entail x's NDLF-ly choosing A in C (by Thesis 2). But, necessarily, God believes only truths. So, q entails that were God to place x in C, x would NDLF-ly choose A in C. By modus ponens, p&q entails that x NDLF-ly chooses A in C. Hence, p&q both does and does not entail that x NDLF-ly chooses A in C, which is a contradiction.
This is, of course, a version of Adams' circularity-in-the-order-of-explanation argument. Strictly speaking, it doesn't show that God can't know conditionals of free will, but only that it is incoherent to suppose him to act on that knowledge in the way indicated in Scenario 1.
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This is what always got me about Molinism. They agree on LFW and what it means (i.e., we’re free with respect to choosing A in C just in case our choosing A in C and our not choosing A in C are equally explainable in terms of C and all the antecedent conditions leading up to C). I always thought this was their tightening the noose around their own necks, because according to Molinists, God’s providence (God’s guaranteeing that he gets A and not ~A in C) depends just on God’s bringing about C. Put me in C and I “would” do A (so says the CCF). But given LFW, there’s a world in which I do ~A in C. So C is no guarantee of my doing A. C equally explains my doing ~A. So how can C be providentially useful to God’s decreeing a world in which I choose A in C? Well, Craig would say, “The CCF that says if you were in C you WOULD do A freely” is what informs God’s decree. But this CCF seems incompatible with the definition of LFW. But then like you said, we’re just back to Ockham vs Piece.
Tom
KIXYTΘEMTAPost Edited (Tom) : 1/27/2010 1:34:08 AM (GMT-6) |