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Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 3/19/2010 3:30 PM (GMT -6) |   | The name of this thread is the catchy name given by Tom Flint to an objection to Molinism based on might-conditionals.
Here's how the objection goes:
First, according to the standard account (SA) of the relation between might- and would-conditionals:
(1) "If A were the case then C might be the case" =df. "It is not the case that if A were the case then C would not be the case".
(2) "If A were the case then C might not be the case" = df. "It is not the case that if A were the case then C would be the case".
Letting "w-->" stand for a would-conditional and "m-->" for a might-conditional, these can be written as follows:
(1) "A m--> C" =df. "Not-(A w--> not-C)"
(2) "A m--> not-C" =df. "Not-(A w--> C)"
Second, if an agent (say, Cuthbert) has libertarian freedom in a given situation with respect to whether he does some action (say, buys an iguana) then it seems that he both might and might not do that action. In other words, it seems that both of the following might-conditionals are true:
(3) Cuthbert is in C m--> Cuthbert freely buys an iguana
(4) Cuthbert is in C m--> Cuthbert freely refrains from buying an iguana
But given SA, (3), and (4), it follows that both of the corresponding would-conditionals are false. If correct, this is death to Molinism, which requires that the truth of both (3) and (4) be compatible with the truth of either
(5) Cuthbert is in C w--> Cuthbert freely buys an iguana
or
(6) Cuthbert is in C w--> Cuthbert freely refrains from buying an iguana
It seems, then, that Molinists must give up SA, the standard account of the relation between might- and would-conditionals.
It's doubtful, however, whether there is a plausible alternative account, and so Molinism looks to be in trouble. | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 3/19/2010 4:18 PM (GMT -6) | | One response to the mighty objection comes from Molinist Ed Wierenga. (Note: I'm relying on a recent handout of Tom Flint's for this summary of Wierenga's position.) In his book The Nature of God, pp. 141-142, he proposes to accept SA, the standard account of the relation between might- and would-conditionals, while denying that it conflicts with Molinism.
How so? Well he offers three distinct readings of "S might do B in C":
(1) If C were actual, S would have the power to do B. (C w--> Power(S,B))
(2) It's possible that both C be actual and S does B. (Possibly, C and S does B)
(3) If it were the case that C, then it might be the case that S does B. (C m--> S does B)
Wierenga grants that (3) is incompatible with Molinism but argues that "S might do B in C" is just as plausibly read along the lines of either (1) or (2). Hence, a Molinist can accept SA, accept the truth of ordinary "might" sentences, and avoid the conflict with Molinism by insisting that those sentences be read along the lines of either (1) or (2).
What shall we say to this?
In my judgment, Wierenga's strategy fails because neither (1) nor (2) is strong enough to capture the sort of "might and might not" conditionals that are relevant for libertarian freedom. (1) and (2) are, in fact, perfectly consistent with standard compatibilist accounts of freedom.
This is most obvious in the case of (2). Given the metaphysical contingency of natural laws, it is (or was) possible that C and S does B and possible that C and S does otherwise than B even if it is determined in C that S does B!
As for (1), to use this to try to capture libertarian freedom requires that both "C w--> Power(S,B)" and "C w--> Power(S, not-B)" be true. But either this dual power implies both the "might" and "might not" variants of (3) or it does not. If it does, then (1) is incompatible with Molinism and the mighty objection stands. If it does not, then the Molinist must deny either the "might" or "might not" variant of (3) and affirm the other. (He can't, after all, reject both while affirming SA.) But then he must affirm either (3) and the corresponding would-conditional or reject those and affirm the corresponding might-not and would-not conditionals. Either way, the result is compatible with determinism. (Example: Suppose I'm in a coma. Still, assuming my muscle's haven't fully atrophied, there's a sense in which I have the "power" to get up and walk around as well as the "power" to keep lying there. No one should think that this sort of "power" is sufficient for libertarian freedom.) | | Back to Top | | |
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