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Alan Rhoda
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Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
 
   Posted 5/10/2010 3:06 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
The whole rationale behind Molinism is to reconcile a strong view of divine providence with future contingency. I think it can be argued quite effectively that Molinism cannot accomplish both of those objective even if we grant the coherence of middle knowledge.

First point: One can construct a successful argument for fatalism (the denial of future contingency) with only two assumptions:

(1) There exists something - call it a 'future determinant' (D) - that singles out a unique sequence of possible events (F) as "the" actual future.
(2) The character or content of D is fully specified independently of how future events actually turn out.

Given (1) and (2), we can argue as follows:

(3) Unpreventably, if D then F.
(4) Unpreventably, D.
Therefore,
(5) Unpreventably, F.

This is a valid argument for fatalism.

Second point: Molinism seemingly endorses both premises of the fatalistic argument.

Molinism endorses the first premise because:
- God's meticulously providential decree qualifies as a future determinant - it picks out a unique sequence of events as "the" actual history of creation.
- Moreover, we can also get a future determinant by combining (a) the actual past with (b) the laws of nature and (c) divine middle knowledge. Together, (a), (b), and (c) pick out a unique sequence of future events as "the" actual future.

Molinism endorses the second premise because:
- The content of God's providential decree is fully specified by God independently of the actual occurrence of any creaturely events. After all, God's decree is necessary for there being any creaturely events in the first place.
- The actual past and laws of nature do not depend on what actually happens in the future. They help explain what happens in the future, not vice-versa. Similarly, the content of middle knowledge does not depend on what actually happens in the history of creation - after all, God's middle knowledge is fixed prior to God's providential decree and so independently of there being any creation in the first place.

Consequently, Molinism entails fatalism.

Third point: To avoid fatalism, Molinists have to deny a premise of the fatalistic argument. But

- If they deny the first premise then they deny meticulous providence.
- If they deny the second premise then the content of God's decree (and the content of God's middle knowledge) is specified by the actual occurrence of events in history. This trivializes meticulous providence, for it means that the content of God's decree is only retrospectively specified insofar as it concerns future contingents. You and I, by making the free choices we do, can bring about God's having decreed what God has decreed.

Either way, Molinism loses all providential advantage over open theism.

Here, then, is the dilemma: Either Molinism fails to avoid fatalism and secure future contingency or Molinism fails to establish robust meticulous providence.
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