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aquinas
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2003
Total Posts : 36
| Posted 2/6/2004 12:49 PM (GMT -6) |   | Hi,
I am not sure I understand Craig's view. Craig argues:
1. God is creatively active in the temporal world.
2. If God is creatively active in the temporal world, God is really related to the temporal world.
3. If God is really related to the temporal world, God is temporal.
4. Therefore, God is temporal.
I am not sure why premise 3 must be true. If someone could explain I would be most grateful. Also, despite the fact that I chose the name "aquinas" for my signin name, (something I wish I had not done. if anyone knows how I can change my signin name without changing all my other info, I would like to hear that as well)I really am interested in hearing why this premise is true. Thanks. 
If we allow pious feelings to decree what nature should be, we are bound to wrong nature, for how could we find in piety a principle of self-restriction? In theology, as in any other science, the main question is not to be pious, but to be right. For there is nothing pious in being wrong about God! --Etienne Gilson | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 2/6/2004 2:29 PM (GMT -6) | | Hey Aquinas,
Very briefly, it depends on whether the relation between God and the world is an exclusively one-way relation (God ---> world), or is in some respects a two-way relation (God <----> world). Since the world is temporal, God can remain atemporal only if his relation to the world is strictly one-way. That is, creation must in no way affect a change in God. Classical theism embraces this view and its attendant doctrines of divine impassibility and aseity. Any kind of theism that accepts libertarian free will (and Craig does), admits that some things are settled by creatures and not simply by God. Thus our choice in some sense "conditions" God. According to Craig this conditioning is counterfactual: If we were to choose otherwise then God would have known otherwise. But if creation conditions God in any way, then the God/world relation is at least partly two-way.
The problem with Craig's argument, as you give it, is that he needs to articulate what he means by "really related" and by "creatively active". Until those terms are cashed out, it's not a persuasive argument as it stands. At any rate, a classical theist like Geisler wouldn't find it very impressive.
Hope that helps.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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aquinas
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2003
Total Posts : 36
| Posted 2/13/2004 3:19 PM (GMT -6) | | Laika and CalvinnHobbes,
Thanks for responding. Good to hear from you CalvinnHobbes. (professional epistemologist man) :) I would love to hear your thoughts on this!
Laika, I really do understand what you are saying. I am still exploring how God can be simple and yet maintain something that resembles a "relationship."
We should probably clarify our terminology. I assume that you are talking about "relations" in a very general sense when you are talking about "one-way" and "two-way" relations. Using the word "relation" synonomously with "relationship" would certainly lead to confusion. I am spacially related to a rock, but I certainly don't have a relationship with it. (I assume that when you talk about "relationships" you are speaking of something of a personal nature.) We don't have personal relationships with rocks. We have personal relationships with persons. God is a person (3 persons), so it certainly seems reasonable to think that we could have a personal relationship with Him.
Is this the way you are using these terms? Would you agree with what I have stated so far?
What kinds of things are necessary for a "personal" relationship? Could you be more specific than "a two-way relation?" (i.e. do you have to be able to have a two way conversation with another to have a personal relationship?)
CalvinnHobbes,
I understand that you like CalvinnHobbes, but it is a very long name to type. I hope you don't mind if I abbreviate that to CnH? If that is not pleasing to you, let me know. :)
Also, if I ever figure out how a one-way relation provides for a relationship, I will let you know. :) To be honest, I don't know. Geisler states that it does, but so far I don't know how it does.
My wife and I were talking about simplicity and personhood while we were dating. She can explain it better than I can, but she was telling me that simplicity did not imply that God was less than personal, but more than personal. I believe she used the term "trans-personal." Of course that is not an argument, it is an statement that I would like to explore.
I really believe that if open theists are going to make any headway with people like Geisler or other classical theists, they have to address simplicity. If God is simple, the rest of what Geisler teaches follows. Most of Geisler's Systematic Theology 2 is dedicated to showing how simplicity is related to every attribute of God. I have not read much by open theists, neotheists, or process guys to know why they reject simplicity. If you know, I would love to hear some of the reasons.
P.S. Thanks for the link. I will listen to it as soon as I can.
Matt
If we allow pious feelings to decree what nature should be, we are bound to wrong nature, for how could we find in piety a principle of self-restriction? In theology, as in any other science, the main question is not to be pious, but to be right. For there is nothing pious in being wrong about God! --Etienne Gilson | | Back to Top | | |
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jlreed
Registered Member
Date Joined Sep 2002
Total Posts : 17
| Posted 2/13/2004 4:14 PM (GMT -6) | | The problem here is that in medieval metaphysics of relations, relations are understood to be monadic relations instead of the contemporary notion of polyadic relations. For a classical theist like Aquinas, relations between God and creatures are in the creature and not the Creator. That is, *real* relations are understood according Categories 7 from Aristotle. There Aristotle discusses the ontological status of relations. Relations are composed of three elements: subject, term, and ground. The subject of the relation is that which is being referred to another, the term is that to which the subject is being related, and the ground is the basis for the relation. Take the following relation: Socrates is larger than Simmias. Socrates is the subject, Simmias is the term, and the accidental being of quanity is the ground for the relation. Now, in God's relation to creatures he never has the same reason for the relation with creatures. For creatures are related to God due to their esse participatum. That is, creatures are related to God due to their dependence on God. God makes all the difference to creatures. Creatures' intelligibility and existence depend on God. On the other hand, God's intelligibility and existence are utterly independent of the creature. Creatures add nothing to God. God is no more perfect, loving, etc. when creatures are added to reality. This is what Aquinas means by a one-way relation.
However, this does not mean that God is not related. God is *really* causing, loving, answering prayer, and acting intimately on behalf of his children. But none of this action adds anything to the Deity. So, God is personally and intimately related to his creatures. | | Back to Top | | |
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CalvinnHobbes
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2003
Total Posts : 88
| Posted 2/16/2004 4:13 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
However, this does not mean that God is not related. God is *really* causing, loving, answering prayer, and acting intimately on behalf of his children.
Is there any difference between the atemporal and simple Pure Act's "actively grounding my being and intelligibility right now" on the one hand and "actively answering my temporal act of prayer right now" on the other? The former, as a one-way relation of existential dependence upon/to an unaffected atemporal and simple being, makes enough sense to me, I suppose.
I'm finding the second a little harder to make sense of, if in fact the eternal being is in no way affected either by what it does or by what we do. Or do we say the eternal being is affected, just not in any way that changes its being (whatever that would mean)?
Am I asking bad questions? I have to admit, the deeper I try to peer into the atemporal, simple Pure Act, the less I know what I'm talking about, and the less I even know what the @#$! I'm trying to ask.
Shane
"The longer I live, the more I read, the more patiently I think, and the more anxiously I inquire, the less I seem to know." ~President John Adams | | Back to Top | | |
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jlreed
Registered Member
Date Joined Sep 2002
Total Posts : 17
| Posted 2/18/2004 2:13 PM (GMT -6) | | Shane's concern seems to be that of responsiveness in God. Shane states the following: "actively answering my temporal act of prayer right now." That sentence if filled with unclear language. In what sense are we using the words 'actively,' 'answering,' and 'now'? For the Thomist, these words are analogical. That is, their predication depends on the subject. God 'acts,' 'answers,' and 'now' is eternal. God's acts are not temporal actions. God's present cannot fall apart into past, present, and future. On a time line, a slice of time is lit up, then another, then another, and so on. The 'now' of time is a changing present. In contrast, all of eternity is lit up at once. God acts, answers, and wills in the eternal present. I hope that is a clear rendering of some of Aquinas' doctrines.
Now the question is, "Does God do anything because of what I do?" That is, does God give me something because I ask? Does God answer prayer? If God does, then it seems that I can affect God. But if I can affect God, then God cannot be simple, immutible, and have a one-way relation to me. If can no affect on God, then God will never do anything based on what I do. Then prayer and other meaningful items of religious experience seem now to be sacrificed due to a Thomistic understanding of God.
The answer is difficult, but not insurmountable. It is true that Divine Simplicity rules out any composition in God, but it pains to show that, on Aquinas' view, that God could not do otherwise than he has done. Divine Simplicity does not rule out contingent acts of God. This conclusion is enough to show that God can be responsive to prayer. In order to do be responsive to creatures, God has to do something he does because of what a creature does. But he does not have to change his plans before the action in question. All that is necessary for God to be responsive is that if the creature had done otherwise, God might have done otherwise as well. On Aquinas' account of simplicity and eternality it is possible for God to fulfill this condition for responsiveness, due to the fact that God could have done otherwise. However, none of creature's acts necessitate God's action in an absolute sense. That is, God is not determined to do as he pleases by what creatures do. God freely incorporates human decisions into his plan. So, it is due to God's sovereign plan that man have their prayers answered due to their action. But this fact is ultimatley due to God's plan. | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 2/19/2004 2:54 PM (GMT -6) | | This seems to be a relevant thread to post this in. It's a link to an online article that discusses Aquinas' Five Ways in what seems to be a fairly even-handed way. The author makes the point, which is evident to anyone who read the first few questions of the Summa Theol. that Aquinas' arguments for the various divine attributes like simplicity, immutability, etc. depend predominantly on his arguments in the Five Ways.
www.quodlibet.net/aqu5ways.shtml | | Back to Top | | |
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CalvinnHobbes
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2003
Total Posts : 88
| Posted 2/21/2004 8:20 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Shane's concern seems to be that of responsiveness in God. Shane states the following: "actively answering my temporal act of prayer right now." That sentence if filled with unclear language. In what sense are we using the words 'actively,' 'answering,' and 'now'? For the Thomist, these words are analogical. That is, their predication depends on the subject. God 'acts,' 'answers,' and 'now' is eternal. God's acts are not temporal actions.
Yeah, it's definitely the Pure Act's eternal responsiveness (or probably all of its acting from eternity in general) that I'm concerned with. My phrase actively answering my temporal act of prayer right now shouldn't be that confusing, I don't think. I'm trying to use these terms according to conventional understandings (which Aquinas acknowledges, and I agree, are limited by our experience of the limited.) You could say I'm using them according to their meanings on this side of the doctrine of analogy. It's the Thomistic analogical expressions about acting from eternity that I find to be filled with unclear language.
I see how simplicity, atemporality/eternity, pure actuality, etc. follow from Aquinas' cosmological reasoning, assuming his reasoning is air tight. I know that the via negativa gets us these. But it's that positive knowledge that analogy is then supposed to come in and give us (with its added index of infinity) that I'm not finding all that helpful, particularly when it comes to the Pure Act's acting from eternity (and especially concerning its intimate relationship with rational, temporally-relating creatures.) To just say that the Pure Act's acting and relating from eternity is more than the positive perfections implicit in our limited concepts of temporal/progressive act-ing and relat-ing, doesn't seem to be getting me anywhere.
I guess, it seems to me that all Divine actions (on the Divine end of the causality anyway) collapse into the same single eternal act of the Pure Act according to the doctrine of simplicity (as all Divine attributes collapse in ontological identity.) **If I'm wrong here, please let me know.**
But if the Pure Act's eternal act of answering my prayer is identical to its one eternal act (at least on its end of the causal event), I kind of get the idea that the Pure Act isn't itself doing anything different when it's say answering vs. not answering my prayer from eternity, or say creating one thing vs. destroying another from eternity. If all distinctions in the eternal divine acting are only in the effects, then I don't see how this acting can be part of any sort of dynamic relationship.
I understand the Pure Act as the ground of all being, concurrently sustaining the existence of every living thing, and that the Pure Act is really related to us in this way. But I'm having difficulty making any sense at all of the more particular kinds of relating that a dynamic relationship would seem to to me to imply. At least I would think that such a relationship should imply something more particular on the divine end of things than the simple act of holding all things in existence.
Am I making any sense? Am I misunderstanding some distinction between the divine nature and its activity? If so, what is the basis for this distinction? Is the Pure Act, which I've seen some Thomists say should better be conceived as pure activity, one single act or many different acts?
I appreciate your efforts to bring me some clarity.
Shane
"The longer I live, the more I read, the more patiently I think, and the more anxiously I inquire, the less I seem to know." ~President John Adams | | Back to Top | | |
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jlreed
Registered Member
Date Joined Sep 2002
Total Posts : 17
| Posted 2/22/2004 4:37 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by CalvinnHobbes You could say I'm using them according to their meanings on this side of the doctrine of analogy. It's the Thomistic analogical expressions about acting from eternity that I find to be filled with unclear language.
This might be a source of confusion. If you're using the terms according to the meanings on this side of the analogy, then you're going to be confused about eternity. I'd suggest learning more about medieval logic and analogy; especially their logic of relations. See Jeff Brower's article "Medieval view of Relations" in the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy.
quote:
To just say that the Pure Act's acting and relating from eternity is more than the positive perfections implicit in our limited concepts of temporal/progressive act-ing and relat-ing, doesn't seem to be getting me anywhere.
Where do you want to go?
quote:
I guess, it seems to me that all Divine actions (on the Divine end of the causality anyway) collapse into the same single eternal act of the Pure Act according to the doctrine of simplicity (as all Divine attributes collapse in ontological identity.) **If I'm wrong here, please let me know.**
This is a fallacy. To say that two things refer to the same thing, it doesn't follow that the attributes are the same. See On the Power of God question seven. This problem has been addressed by Stump, Burrell, Owens, Mascall, Gilson, McInerny, etc. I know you've read alot of Thomistic works, so I'm surprised you're making this claim.
quote:
If all distinctions in the eternal divine acting are only in the effects, then I don't see how this acting can be part of any sort of dynamic relationship.
It might help to read some Neo-Platonism. The reason why God causes so many diverse effects from one eternal act, is because of the perfection and unity of the power. The higher the intellectual power the more immaterial and simple it is. The higher intellenges can cause more by doing less. And once we reach the highest cause, God can do the most by doing the least. As long as God answers prayers, causes your existence, loves his creatures, cares for them, etc. what is it that you're missing? In classical theism, God is doing all of these things. However, he does it via the most perfect power.
quote:
Am I making any sense? Am I misunderstanding some distinction between the divine nature and its activity? If so, what is the basis for this distinction? Is the Pure Act, which I've seen some Thomists say should better be conceived as pure activity, one single act or many different acts?
Knowledge of God is always difficult. However, I'm not sure I know what it is you're looking for in God. That is, what kind of God do you want? And how does Aquinas' view keep you from having that?
In addition, I think the major problem is failing to understand the doctrine of analogy. Which is not a surprise, given the difficulty of that doctrine. But if the Cosmological argument is sound, then we all have to struggle with this notion of the Divine, viz., the I am who I am. So, all language about God's activities are going to fall short, and as long as our view is coherent and gives us the necessary conditions for religious experience, I'm not sure what else you could ask for.
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jlreed
Registered Member
Date Joined Sep 2002
Total Posts : 17
| Posted 2/23/2004 3:21 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by CalvinnHobbes
I've actually thought that the doctrine of simplicity holds that all of the divine attributes are ontologically identical. I must be failing to see how possessing different attributes doesn't imply any sort of composition, if those attributes really are different. I don't know.
All of the Divine Attributes are *one* in God, this is true. What that means is that God contains all that is in the lower, but in a higher unity. In God, there is no composition of essence. However, the created order is a mulitplied expression of that one essence. So, in a sense you are correct, all of the divine attributes are one in God, because God is a perfect unity. However, our statements about God refer to God using diverse concepts due to our way of knowing. So, the divine attributes names that we use are distinct, although they all refer to the same thing. Hence, it doesn't follow that because all attributes are one in God that God's omniscience = omnipresent, and so on.
quote:
I guess I just want a view of God that brings some clarity to my relationship with him. I've found studying Thomism to obscure more than clarify.
What about your relationship with God are you looking for clarity?
quote:
Comments like this come across as subtly condescending. I would appreciate you leaving them out if you could.
This is not condescending in any sense. I just know how much you've read, so I was surprised. Please don't take this personally. I will respect your request and not come across as condescending. | | Back to Top | | |
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