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Alan Rhoda
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Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 2/6/2004 2:14 PM (GMT -6) |   | There are several sides in the ongoing providence/free will debate: theological determinists, Molinists, open theists, etc. One remarkable thing about this debate is how the major proponents of the various positions seem almost unable to make any significant headway in satisfying their critics. Thus William Lane Craig and Thomas Flint remain completely unfazed by the arguments by critics of Molinism, such as Robert Adams and William Hasker. At the same time, Adams and Hasker seem to be unimpressed with the defenses of Molinism offered by Craig and Flint. Why the impass? I want to suggest that the deadlock is due in part to the fact that Craig/Flint and Adams/Hasker have two completely difference perspectives on the future. Since these differences haven't been explicitly recognized by either party (as far as I know), the arguers are to a significant extent talking past each other.
The two perspectives on the future are:
(SFV) The future can be exhaustively described in terms of either "will" or "will not".
(OFV) The future cannot be exhausitively described in terms of either "will" or "will not".
SFV stands for "settled future view" and OFV stands for "open future view".
Molinists like Craig are committed to the SFV. In fact, as they see it, the future simply couldn't be any other way. As Craig says near the end of his book "Time and Eternity", the future is defined as that which will be. On this view the actual world is a single timeline streching from the beginning to the end (if there is one). Since Craig believes in libertarian free will he holds that there are several different possible ways branching out from the present that the future could go, corresponding to the various choices that could be made. Nevertheless, it already is and always has been settled which of those possibilities is the actual future, the one that will happen. If a different choice were to be made than what is in fact going to be made, then that would have been the future.
In contrast, open theists are committed to the OFV. As they see it, the future must be partly described in terms of "might and might nots", "will probablys", or the like. The future cannot be simply defined or understood as what "will be". On this view the actual world is a single timeline only up until the present, at which point various possibilities branch out corresponding to the various choices that could be made. The important point is that, for the OFV, it need not NOW be true that any one these branches represents the actual future, simply because the relevant choices have not yet been made.
Now Craig has a number of arguments for the SFV that have significant intuitive appeal. I won't canvass all of them, but here's a couple. First, how can it be that "It will rain tomorrow" uttered on Monday can have a different truth value than "It rained yesterday" uttered on Wednesday, when they have exactly the same truth conditions, i.e., rain on Tuesday? Second, isn't it just obvious that either "Bush will be reelected in 2004" or "Bush will not be reelected in 2004" is true? The day after election day in November either one or the other will be the case. So one of those must NOW be true. And the same holds for any state of affairs S obtaining in the future at time T. At T, either S will have obtained or S will not have. So it must NOW be true for any S and any future time t that either "S will obtain at t" or "S will not obtain at t" is true.
I think these arguments can be answered and that they depend for their intuitive appeal on a fallacious move that I am tentatively calling "de-futuring the future" (Other possible terms: "misplaced presentness" or maybe "the time-travel fallacy". Any better suggestions?). That is, their persuasiveness seems to depend on our ability to imagine the future at time T as though it were present or already past. So viewed, the future has to be completely settled simply because the past and present are completely settled, and the future is being viewed as though it were either present or past.
It seems to me that Craig (and many, many other philosophers) habitually de-futures the future without realizing it, and that this is why he repeatedly charges open theists will all sorts of logical confusions like denying bivalence or misconstruing the correspondence theory of truth. As he sees it, the future obviously just has to be that which "will be", so any claim to the contrary has result from muddled thinking. What I am suggesting is that perhaps Craig's thinking is muddled on the issue.
Anyway, I have more to say, but I gotta run. Does this make sense to anyone else? What do y'all think?
God bless,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 2/6/2004 4:08 PM (GMT -6) | | Alan-
Excellent thoughts. Some time ago you and I talked about this but I have no idea which thread the stuff is buried in! I jotted down some thoughts then from various posts at the time and have kept it filed away. The following thoughts kinda sum it up.
What do we do with Craig’s claim that any true past tense proposition can be rendered timelessly true by making the verb timeless and adding a temporal indicator? For example, “John Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 2, 1963” can be rendered timelessly true as “John Kennedy is assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963.” Since timeless truths, if they are ever true, are always true, Craig argues that it follows that “John Kennedy is assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963” was true before Nov. 22, 1963, in which case “John Kennedy will be assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963” was also true before Nov. 22, 1963. Since all past tense propositions can be thusly rendered timelessly true and converted into true future tense propositions, it follows that there can be no true future tense “might and might not” propositions.
In response, we ought to distinguish between two sorts of tenseless, or timeless, proposition. On the one hand, 2 + 2 = 4 is timelessly true without any temporal indicators. On the other hand, “x happens at T2,” though grammatically tenseless, is temporally indexed. This difference is significant. One cannot construct timelessly true propositions describing events that are actualized in history without including a temporal indicator. Mathematical truths on the other hand do not require temporal indicators, and one might rightly inquire as to why.
We submit that “John Kennedy is assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963” (formed on the basis of the true past tense “John Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963”) is fundamentally unlike the mathematical truth 2 + 2 = 4 (spoken at any time). How so? Mathematical truths are not historical events whose truth may be rendered timeless by grammatical word play. 2 + 2 = 4 is not a temporally actualized event. Kennedy’s assassination is. Mathematical truths are only discovered by us to be true on some date in history. But they are not historically actualized. This is what “timelessly true” means. Thus, “John Kennedy is assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963” is grammatically tenseless, while “2 + 2 = 4” is metaphysically tenseless. We argue then that temporal events cannot shed their temporality and become timelessly true in the sense that mathematical truths are true. Events actualized in a temporal world have temporally bound truth values.
What’s at the heart of the distinction between grammatically and metaphysically timeless? While it is certainly the case that some tenseless statements are always true (i.e., mathematical truths), this does not follow from their being grammatically tenseless. Rather, it follows because the content (as Alan pointed out in the discussion we had) of the statement contains no temporal references. As with all propositions, propositions referring to temporal events are true only to the extent that what they affirm is determinately the case. But if self-determining free will entails ontological indeterminacy, then there must exist true propositions describing indeterminate events. And this “might and might not” alone is able to do.
What of the proposition “John Kennedy is assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963” spoken in, say, 1900? Assuming the event was not unconditionally determined by God and that the assassin’s choice was a self-determining one, the proposition in question is false, in spite of the fact that Kennedy was assassinated on the date specified. What was true in 1900? The follow was true: “John Kennedy might and might not be assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963.” The assassination itself is perfectly explainable in retrospect on the basis of its having been true before it occurred that it only “might and might not” occur.
The assumption (and that’s all it is) of any event that occurs that it must have been true before it occurred that is “will” occur is simply not true, for its having occurred is explainable on the grounds of its having been true that it “might and might not” occur as equally as its having been true that it “will” occur. Here is where I’d like to suggest an important distinction that might help us understand why Flint/Craig and Adams/Hasker are talking past each other. Let’s distinguish between “THAT event x will or will not occur” and “WHETHER event x will, will not, or might and might not occur.” By “THAT event x will or will not occur” I mean to describe the either/or of actualization, and certainly events are either actualized or they are not. It is true of any state of affairs that it either obtains or it does not obtain. With “that” our options are only TWO: either/or. Now, by “WHETHER event x will, will not, or might and might not occur” I mean the determinacy vs indeterminacy of x’s occurring, an entirely different matter. With “THAT” we have two possibilities (x either occurs or it does not). But with “WHETHER” we have three possibilities (x will occur, x will not occur, and x might and might not occur). Failing to recognize the difference between THAT and WHETHER an event occurs leads to the false assumption that “will” and “will not” are the only available possibly true future tense propositions. This, I believe, is part of Craig's problem. He assumes that because events either occur or they don't (i.e., that since states of affairs either obtain or not) that "will" must be true of all events that occur while "will not" must be true of all events that do not occur.
Lastly, there can be no objection to the existence of true future tense “might and might not” propositions on the basis of a successful dismissal of the demand for truth-makers. The simple fact (if it be a fact) that future tense propositions have no truth-makers can say nothing against there being true future tense “might and might not” propositions. All that could be said on the basis of rejecting truth-makers is that if there are any true “might and might not” propositions, nothing “makes” them true.
I think part of the reason why Craig will argue there are no true “might and might not” propositions are a) the grammatical word play deal (he actually argues this, i.e., true past tense props can be rendered timelessly true by reframing the prop as grammatically tenseless and relocating the prop to a time prior to the event in question) and b) the assumption of any event that occurs that it was true before it occurred that it “will” occur.
I was assuming, Alan, that Craig would agree with our claim that indeterminacy is a metaphysically distinct state of affairs alongside determinacy (i.e., that indeterminacy is ontological), but I’m now wondering if he’ll dismiss this as another version of the grounding objection.
Tom  | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 2/6/2004 8:42 PM (GMT -6) | | Laika: No correspondence to facts, no truth value.
Tom: Actually, if there's no correspondence to facts there is a truth value, and it's "false." If "John Kennedy is [or will be, or will not be, or might and might not be] assassinated in 1963" does not in 1900 correspond to some fact, then it's false in 1900.
Laika: Wouldn't these [propositions like "In 2525, Picard is captured by the Borg"] have indeterminate truth values then?
Tom: Not if bivalence holds universally, in which case "In 2525, Picard is captured by the Borg" is false. Now, one could argue that Carroll's "'Twas brillig and the slithy tothes..." is different. Since it's meaningless one could argue either that it's a false proposition or that it doesn't even qualify as a proposition.
But with true "might and might not" propositions it's not the truth value that's indeterminate, it's the state of affairs that's indeterminate. Propositions expressing these states of affairs do have a determinate truth value however.
Laika: Tom, where the heck are you?
Tom: I'm in Maui! Totally jellin out on the beach, watching the whales breach just offshore, enjoying the 80 plus degree weather, wearing shorts and Hawaiian shirts, etc., visiting my eldest daughter here. I'm back in St. Paul Feb. 13-16, so we'll have to touch base then!
Enjoy the snow. 
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JET
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Total Posts : 397
| Posted 2/7/2004 4:46 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Alan:
The two perspectives on the future are:
(SFV) The future can be exhaustively described in terms of either "will" or "will not".
(OFV) The future cannot be exhaustively described in terms of either "will" or "will not".
quote:
TGB:
What do we do with Craig’s claim that any true past tense proposition can be rendered timelessly true by making the verb timeless and adding a temporal indicator? For example, “John Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 2, 1963” can be rendered timelessly true as “John Kennedy is assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963.” Since timeless truths, if they are ever true, are always true, Craig argues that it follows that “John Kennedy is assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963” was true before Nov. 22, 1963, in which case “John Kennedy will be assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963” was also true before Nov. 22, 1963. Since all past tense propositions can be thusly rendered timelessly true and converted into true future tense propositions, it follows that there can be no true future tense “might and might not” propositions.
In response, we ought to distinguish between two sorts of tenseless, or timeless, proposition. On the one hand, 2 + 2 = 4 is timelessly true without any temporal indicators. On the other hand, “x happens at T2,” though grammatically tenseless, is temporally indexed. This difference is significant. One cannot construct timelessly true propositions describing events that are actualized in history without including a temporal indicator. Mathematical truths on the other hand do not require temporal indicators, and one might rightly inquire as to why.
Here’s another way, I think, of saying the same thing:
The proposition “John Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 2, 1963” is ambiguous. The proposition can mean either:
(a) John Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 2, 1963 and it was always the case that John Kennedy would be assassinated on Nov. 2, 1963.
Or
(b) John Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 2, 1963, but it was NOT always the case that John Kennedy would be assassinated on Nov. 2, 1963.
Only (a) is a “timeless truth”. Craig merely assumes that the proposition means (a) and not (b).
Thanks,
JET
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 2/7/2004 2:50 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom: What do we do with Craig’s claim that any true past tense proposition can be rendered timelessly true by making the verb timeless and adding a temporal indicator? For example, “John Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 2, 1963” can be rendered timelessly true as “John Kennedy is assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963.” Since timeless truths, if they are ever true, are always true, Craig argues that it follows that “John Kennedy is assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963” was true before Nov. 22, 1963, in which case “John Kennedy will be assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963” was also true before Nov. 22, 1963.
Alan: Nice summary of how Craig argues. As you point out in response, we need to challenge the assumption that all tenseless statements are timelessly (or, more exactly, omnitemporally) true. Stripping the tense from statements allows Craig to "de-future the future" and arrive at the result that the future is exhaustively settled.
Tom: In response, we ought to distinguish between two sorts of tenseless, or timeless, proposition. On the one hand, 2 + 2 = 4 is timelessly true without any temporal indicators. On the other hand, “x happens at T2,” though grammatically tenseless, is temporally indexed. This difference is significant. One cannot construct timelessly true propositions describing events that are actualized in history without including a temporal indicator. Mathematical truths on the other hand do not require temporal indicators, and one might rightly inquire as to why.
Alan: I like this distinction, but what about statements like "JFK is assassinated"? Here the temporal indicator is left off altogether. The statement seems to mean that at some time or other it will have been the case that JFK is assassinated. Perhaps what we should say is that only logically or causally necessary propositions can be timelessly or omnitemporally true. If everything was determined, then it would seem legit to me to say that "JFK is assassinated at T" is omnitemporally true. But causally contingent propositions seem to me not to be omnitemporally true.
Tom: What of the proposition “John Kennedy is assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963” spoken in, say, 1900? Assuming the event was not unconditionally determined by God and that the assassin’s choice was a self-determining one, the proposition in question is false, in spite of the fact that Kennedy was assassinated on the date specified. What was true in 1900? The following was true: “John Kennedy might and might not be assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963.”
Alan: I agree completely.
Tom: The assumption (and that’s all it is) of any event that occurs that it must have been true before it occurred that it “will” occur is simply not true, for its having occurred is explainable on the grounds of its having been true that it “might and might not” occur as equally as its having been true that it “will” occur. ... Let’s distinguish between “THAT event x will or will not occur” and “WHETHER event x will, will not, or might and might not occur.” By “THAT event x will or will not occur” I mean to describe the either/or of actualization, and certainly events are either actualized or they are not. It is true of any state of affairs that it either obtains or it does not obtain. With “that” our options are only TWO: either/or. Now, by “WHETHER event x will, will not, or might and might not occur” I mean the determinacy vs indeterminacy of x’s occurring, an entirely different matter. With “THAT” we have two possibilities (x either occurs or it does not). But with “WHETHER” we have three possibilities (x will occur, x will not occur, and x might and might not occur). Failing to recognize the difference between THAT and WHETHER an event occurs leads to the false assumption that “will” and “will not” are the only available possibly true future tense propositions. This, I believe, is part of Craig's problem. He assumes that because events either occur or they don't (i.e., that since states of affairs either obtain or not) that "will" must be true of all events that occur while "will not" must be true of all events that do not occur.
Alan: Nice analysis, Tom. We'll make a philosopher out of you yet! I'd like to try to put the point another way. For any state of affairs S and any time T, it is true at T either that S obtains or that S does not obtain. But this is different from saying that at all times it is true either that "S obtains at T" or that "S does not obtain at T". Thus, neither "Bush will be reelected in 2004" nor "Bush will not be reelected in 2004" need NOW be true, even though after the election one or the other will be the case. Strictly speaking, though, as long as Bush's being reelected remains causally contingent, both "Bush will be reelected in 2004" and "Bush will not be reelected in 2004" are both false. It it remains causally contingent all the way up until the election, then neither will ever be true, because by that time it won't be future anymore. Instead, either "Bush was reelected in 2004" or "Bush was not relected in 2004" will be true.
Tom: I was assuming, Alan, that Craig would agree with our claim that indeterminacy is a metaphysically distinct state of affairs alongside determinacy (i.e., that indeterminacy is ontological), but I’m now wondering if he’ll dismiss this as another version of the grounding objection.
Alan: I think he probably will dismiss it, either as a version of the grounding objection and/or as invoking the "fallacious" reasoning of logical fatalism. Perhaps I'm wrong, but I suspect that Craig's thinking is too deeply committed to a settled future that it may be impossible to get him to consider other alternatives.
God bless,
Alan
PS: I'm working as much as I can on that article, Tom. The hexagon idea is really neat! There's a few minor technical glitches to patch, but mostly I'm trying to set a philosophical context for the hexagon in terms of the SFV/OFV debate. I think it will significantly strengthen the paper because it involves anticipating the objections that someone like Craig will likely raise and then rebutting those by means of the logical insights offered by the hexagon. It think it's going to take me a couple more weeks to finish. I hope you and Greg like it when I'm done. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 2/7/2004 3:51 PM (GMT -6) | | Alan: PS: I'm working as much as I can on that article, Tom. The hexagon idea is really neat! There's a few minor technical glitches to patch, but mostly I'm trying to set a philosophical context for the hexagon in terms of the SFV/OFV debate. I think it will significantly strengthen the paper because it involves anticipating the objections that someone like Craig will likely raise and then rebutting those by means of the logical insights offered by the hexagon. It think it's going to take me a couple more weeks to finish. I hope you and Greg like it when I'm done.
Tom: I'm sure it'll be great! Just make sure you mark your comments so we know what's what.
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JET
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| Posted 2/7/2004 4:03 PM (GMT -6) | | 1) Is the hexagon basically the same as the triangle within a triangle that Tom drew up a couple of months ago?
2) Is the paper likely to be published? When will you know?
3) Any chance Craig would critique it before publication?
4) When do WE get to see it? | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 2/7/2004 4:47 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by JET
1) Is the hexagon basically the same as the triangle within a triangle that Tom drew up a couple of months ago?
2) Is the paper likely to be published? When will you know?
3) Any chance Craig would critique it before publication?
4) When do WE get to see it?
Patience my good man...patience.  Doc, Alan, and I have been working on a paper that attempts to summarize all the "stuff" we discussed regarding indeterminacy logic. We may share it with a select number of Christian philosophers to get some feed-back and then prepare it for publication. Nothing definite yet.
Yeah, the hexagon is the triangle within a triangle. Remember the one I drew? Just enlarge the inner (unside down) triangle to the same size as the larger one. What you should have is a perfect star of David. Then draw lines connecting the six points, a hexagon. Can't say any more right now! 
Pray for it!
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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Matthew Timothy Short
Huh?
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| Posted 2/8/2004 2:40 AM (GMT -6) | | Alan Rhoda: SFV stands for "settled future view" and OFV stands for "open future view".
Tim: I believe both are true, that there is that which is 'settled' and that which is 'open' about the future, what does that make me, confused  ? | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 2/8/2004 6:45 AM (GMT -6) | | Tim: I believe both are true, that there is that which is 'settled' and that which is 'open' about the future, what does that make me, confused ?
Tom: It makes you an open theist, because when Alan says OFV he means "partly" open and "partly" settled. Both are true. It's just that both cannot be true abou one and the same future event. Some events are settled and some are open. Congrats.
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Matthew Timothy Short
Huh?
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| Posted 2/8/2004 9:39 AM (GMT -6) | | Dear Tom,
I do believe that there are events settled and open (contingent). But I cannot throw my hat in the ring with the open theist for other various reasons . . . belief
Today, healing took place in a relationship of which God foretold me of, this was over 4 years ago that he told me about it; this event or rather this healing was settled in God's mind and mine for that matter, then. Though before God told me, such healing was contingent and the timing of its occurrence was contingent, therefore, without over elaborating, do you know what I mean?
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Tom
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| Posted 2/8/2004 11:49 AM (GMT -6) | | Tim: I do believe that there are events settled and open (contingent).
Tom: Does this mean some events are settled and other events are open? Or does this mean the same events are both settled and open? If the former, then you're an open theist like it or not. If the latter, then you believe the same events are both "settled" and "not settled," for "not settled" is what "open" means. Since it's contradictory to claim A and ~A, your claim that one and the same event can be both settled and not settled is self-contradictory and thus meaningless.
But if by "contingent" you mean indeterminate, and you believe there are SOME such events in the future, then that's open theism.
Tim: But I cannot throw my hat in the ring with the open theist for other various reasons...
Tom: If you have other reasons for not being an open theist then you have other reasons for believing there are no indeterminate/contingent events, for open theism is nothing more than the belief that the future is partly indeterminate.
Tim: Though before God told me, such healing was contingent...
Tom: Contingent (i.e., indeterminate) means "healing x might and might not occur." But if God told you "healing x will occur" then it's false that "healing x might and might not occur." Both can't be true. To claim both are true is self-contradictory and can't hold meaning for you or anybody else. So, what was "settled" about the healing? What was "indeterminate" about the healing? It can be true that an event "will" occur (i.e., is "settled") but WHEN it occurs (which is what you seem to be saying) is indeterminate (i.e., is "open"). That's not self-contradictory. What's self-contradictory is to say the occurence of the healing itself is both settled and not settled.
Glad to hear of the healing!
Blessings,
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Matthew Timothy Short
Huh?
Date Joined Apr 2002
Total Posts : 635
| Posted 2/9/2004 1:47 AM (GMT -6) | | So, what was "settled" about the healing? That it would occur once it was settled or rather certain conditions were meant.
What was "indeterminate" about the healing? That it did not have to occur before it was settled and it's timing in the future.
Tom: It can be true that an event "will" occur (i.e., is "settled") but WHEN it occurs (which is what you seem to be saying) is indeterminate (i.e., is "open").
Tim: Yes, I agree.
However, I am also saying, "the healing was indeterminate before it was settled." or "Though before God told me, such healing was contingent...
Tom: Contingent (i.e., indeterminate) means "healing x might and might not occur." But if God told you "healing x will occur" then it's false that "healing x might and might not occur." Both can't be true.
Tim: You only could be correct about what you say above, because God merely said at a certain point in time that healing would occur, before that certain point healing only could occur and was indeterminate or rather conditional.
Tom: ...open theism is nothing more than the belief that the future is partly indeterminate.
Tim: If that were all that it professes, I indeed would be an open theist . . . though there are more things I have heard it say since 4/9/02 on this site that I do not believe. Therefore, my hat stays out of the ring . . . because of all of the baggage 'the belief that the future is partly indeterminate' brings with it by many of its professors.
Therefore, lets just say I agree with you and others here that contingency is a valid Biblical doctrine or teaching, it must be or Jesus died for nothing, not my own volitional choices.
Imagination projects unreal images out of the mind and seeks to attach reality to them. Faith creates nothing; it simply reckons upon that which is already there. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 2/9/2004 9:02 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Tim: What was "settled" about the healing? That it would occur once it was settled or rather certain conditions were meant.
What was "indeterminate" about the healing? That it did not have to occur before it was settled and it's timing in the future.
I honestly don't understand.
quote:
Tim: I am also saying, "the healing was indeterminate before it was settled" or "Though before God told me, such healing was contingent...
Only...ONLY...open theism allows you to say an event WAS indeterminate and then BECAME determinate.
quote:
Tim: You only could be correct about what you say above, because God merely said at a certain point in time that healing would occur, before that certain point healing only could occur and was indeterminate or rather conditional.
I'm dizzy now.
quote:
Tom: ...open theism is nothing more than the belief that the future is partly indeterminate.
Tim: If that were all that it professes, I indeed would be an open theist . . . though there are more things I have heard it say since 4/9/02 on this site that I do not believe. Therefore, my hat stays out of the ring . . . because of all of the baggage 'the belief that the future is partly indeterminate' brings with it by many of its professors.
Well, Tim, if you're convinced the future is partly open and partly settled then you'll have to deal with whatever "baggage" this entails. If you don't like the baggage, you'll have to actually abandon belief in a partly open and partly settled future. Not calling yourself an "open theist" won't help.
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 2/9/2004 9:59 AM (GMT -6) | | JET: The proposition “John Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 2, 1963” is ambiguous. The proposition can mean either:
(a) John Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 2, 1963 and it was always the case that John Kennedy would be assassinated on Nov. 2, 1963.
Or
(b) John Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 2, 1963, but it was NOT always the case that John Kennedy would be assassinated on Nov. 2, 1963.
Only (a) is a “timeless truth”. Craig merely assumes that the proposition means (a) and not (b).
Alan: Good observation, JET. What I hear you saying, and I would agree, is that Craig's arguments for the settled future view (SFV) assume the very thing that needs to be shown. In other words, his arguments simply beg the question against the open future view (OFV).
Thanks,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 2/9/2004 10:14 AM (GMT -6) | | John: Maybe it means nothing, but when I hear the phrasing, "JFK is assasinated on Nov 22, 1963," it sounds very reminiscent of two things:
1. The timelines used in the history textbooks and encyclopedias that I used to read all the time as a child.
and,
2. That a passive, timeless (eternal) observer is dispassionately relating the unavoidable facts of history (fate).
Alan: Good point, John. I think that many people, if not most, have been conditioned to think of the future as exhaustively settled because they draw a faulty analogy with timelines of the past. Because the timeline represents everything as settled, it is easy to make the mistake that the future must be exhaustively settled by imaginatively extending the timeline into the future. This in effect "de-futures the future", because as one projects oneself up the timeline and looks back at events that are NOW future, they look like past events, and consequently as settled. This picture of the settled timeline is, of course, a fundamental metaphor for the idea of a timeless God surveying the course of history from the vantage point of an eternal 'now'.
Thanks,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Matthew Timothy Short
Huh?
Date Joined Apr 2002
Total Posts : 635
| Posted 2/14/2004 2:14 AM (GMT -6) | | To Jo-Anne,
James
5 If you need wisdom-if you want to know what God wants you to do-ask him, and he will gladly tell you. He will not resent your asking. 6 But when you ask him, be sure that you really expect him to answer, for a doubtful mind is as unsettled as a wave of the sea that is driven and tossed by the wind. 7 People like that should not expect to receive anything from the Lord. 8 They can't make up their minds. They waver back and forth in everything they do. - New Living Translation
Tim: The indeterminate thing in God's mind though it is settled on giving wisdom, is will a person ask expecting Him to answer wisely . . .
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Matthew Timothy Short
Huh?
Date Joined Apr 2002
Total Posts : 635
| Posted 2/14/2004 2:41 AM (GMT -6) | | borg: Interested in your comment about the fact that if things aren't indeterminate then Christ died for nothing.
Tim: I do not believe Christ could have failed on the cross and that the greatest thing God did, is to die for my sins and in giving me the freedom to choose life in Christ.
Indeterminate is anything not settled or fixed; not definite; uncertain; as an indeterminate decision to choose life in Christ, which is not precise as to when or certain of it's making, and why I think it would have been a futile death, if I didn't have an 'indeterminate free will'!
I am still learning basic communication skills, keep me abreast of my progress . . . | | Back to Top | | |
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