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|  J.N.Darby Registered Member

Date Joined Feb 2005 Total Posts : 124 | Posted 1/3/2012 6:19 PM (GMT -6) |   |
A common determinist objection to freewill theism is that it places some form of merit in the souls of those who come to faith - that they have something that the unsaved don't, whatever it may be, and that "something" is ultimately what brings them to salvation, rather than sovereign election by the Lord. This is sarcastically illustrated here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n5NQXHcluQA
One comment says: Think about it what Spurgeon is saying - if salvation is synergistic (both God and man), what is the difference between you and a non-believer? You listened to God where they didn't? You were smarter than they? You were more in touch with God than they were?
If you're a Calvinist, you realize that God is no respector of man. Why did He choose me and not someone else? I haven't the foggiest idea. It sure wasn't because I'm smarter than a non-believer, nor was I in any more touch with God than anyone else. Whatever reason it is, it is for Him to know and me to be thankful for it!
While I don't personally buy in to this argument, I've never personally seen it addressed in the writings of Arminians and Open Theists. Is anyone here aware of any articles or books that address this concept (especially on the internet, as I am lacking funds to buy books till probably June)? Does it perhaps even have a name?
[And lest anyone misread or misunderstand me, as so often happens, I am a freewill theist and open theist.] | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Tom Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 10353 | Posted 1/3/2012 11:14 PM (GMT -6) |   | | | |
 |  Similitude Registered Member
 Date Joined Apr 2004 Total Posts : 4968 | Posted 1/4/2012 9:00 AM (GMT -6) |   | JND: A common determinist objection to freewill theism is that it places some form of merit in the souls of those who come to faith ...
Jeff: Maybe I've misunderstood freewill theism all along. As I've conceived of it, freewill theism is the view that holds:
1) benevolent theism is true
2) humans have the capacity for bona-fide libertarianly-free action
3) God endowed humans with libertarian free-will for a benevolent purpose.
So for a benevolent-theist to oppose freewill theism (per my conception of it), he/she must deny either 2) or 3). The denial of 3) seems to virtually contradict 1). And I can think of nothing more epistemologically problematic than the denial of 2), for that denial undermines virtually all else.
That is why the view that all persons inherit total depravity is so hard to swallow for most people. It's a scorched-earth approach to a world-view. It leaves nothing worth having.
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 |  J.N.Darby Registered Member

Date Joined Feb 2005 Total Posts : 124 | Posted 1/4/2012 9:22 AM (GMT -6) |   | Well, obviously many Calvinists, Augustians, and other theistic determinists have no problem denying #2 and #3; and as for #1, they seem to have come to an entirely different understanding of "goodness" and "benevolence" than other Christians generally hold.
Similitude said...
JND: A common determinist objection to freewill theism is that it places some form of merit in the souls of those who come to faith ...
Jeff: Maybe I've misunderstood freewill theism all along. As I've conceived of it, freewill theism is the view that holds:
1) benevolent theism is true
2) humans have the capacity for bona-fide libertarianly-free action
3) God endowed humans with libertarian free-will for a benevolent purpose.
So for a benevolent-theist to oppose freewill theism (per my conception of it), he/she must deny either 2) or 3). The denial of 3) seems to virtually contradict 1). And I can think of nothing more epistemologically problematic than the denial of 2), for that denial undermines virtually all else.
That is why the view that all persons inherit total depravity is so hard to swallow for most people. It's a scorched-earth approach to a world-view. It leaves nothing worth having.
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 |  Similitude Registered Member
 Date Joined Apr 2004 Total Posts : 4968 | Posted 1/4/2012 10:34 AM (GMT -6) |   | That's the point. Their view of benevolence is so counter-intuitive that most people can't even relate to it. That's why it's hard to argue with academically. It starts off being completely off the radar of human intuition. The burden of proof is on them, and they have nothing.
Now, on the other hand, they do have LOTS of scripture that seems to suggest that eternal life and human belief in the gospel is freely given by God. But that is totally consistent with a benevolent God. God can bestow His benevolence thus and still be true to a utilitarian approach that renders all His acts of grace conducive to the greatest long term good of all (with "all" including the godhead) so LONG as universal reconciliation is true. This way, God can work out providential histories (like the millenial reign that JND was so convinced of) that glorify the resurrected Christ in unique ways while never compromising the greatest long-term good of all humans.
Indeed, if JND was like most contemporary dispensational pre-millenialists, he believed the fully instituted New Covenant would involve the gracious writing of the Law of God on the hearts and minds of EVERY Israelite born during the millenium. That may be anathema to many a free-will theist, but it is not contra the absolute benevolence of God if UR is true. It just means that the ressurected Christ must become beneficiary of creation in certain ways so that he can receive the full contingent joy that was set before him and for which he suffered in his first coming.
I see no exegetical difference in positing full-blown UR and baby UR. Neither have any substantial scriptural support other than the logical tension resulting from the revealed character of God juxtaposed against biblical eschatology. Once you posit full-blown UR, the same kind of utilitarianism works, and universally, as does for baby UR. Why would God allow the world, full of groanings and travailings and baby deaths, to continue on so long unless there was SOME utilitarian good that rendered those baby deaths worth it for those babies in the long run?
Jesus' parables about the last being first all testify to the fact that endowments of grace NEED NOT be distributed fairly. Grace by definition is NOT justice. All we need to render it all sufficiently benevolent is for the relevant utilitarian result to work out. UR gets us that--whether baby UR or universal, it's the same kind of logic at work. In short, a perpetuated natural evil creates the exact same need for a utilitarian solution to the problem of evil as does the unfair distribution of pure grace. Nothing else can solve all the problems.
However, with Asher, I would agree that a species of utilitarianism that involves injustice is problematic. The kind of utilitarianism that works must satisfy these 2 conditions at least:
1) Injustice can not be done by God (i.e., God can't require of us if He hasn't given sufficiently in the first place), and
2) All persons must eventually deem whatever sufferings they experienced to have been worth the satisfaction they will ultimately receive from God.
Post Edited (Similitude) : 1/4/2012 10:17:15 AM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
 |  J.N.Darby Registered Member

Date Joined Feb 2005 Total Posts : 124 | Posted 1/4/2012 9:38 PM (GMT -6) |   | A bit of a tangent there, but a good one :) Did you have any further thoughts or info regarding my particular question?
Similitude said... That's the point. Their view of benevolence is so counter-intuitive that most people can't even relate to it. That's why it's hard to argue with academically. It starts off being completely off the radar of human intuition. The burden of proof is on them, and they have nothing.
Now, on the other hand, they do have LOTS of scripture that seems to suggest that eternal life and human belief in the gospel is freely given by God. But that is totally consistent with a benevolent God. God can bestow His benevolence thus and still be true to a utilitarian approach that renders all His acts of grace conducive to the greatest long term good of all (with "all" including the godhead) so LONG as universal reconciliation is true. This way, God can work out providential histories (like the millenial reign that JND was so convinced of) that glorify the resurrected Christ in unique ways while never compromising the greatest long-term good of all humans.
Indeed, if JND was like most contemporary dispensational pre-millenialists, he believed the fully instituted New Covenant would involve the gracious writing of the Law of God on the hearts and minds of EVERY Israelite born during the millenium. That may be anathema to many a free-will theist, but it is not contra the absolute benevolence of God if UR is true. It just means that the ressurected Christ must become beneficiary of creation in certain ways so that he can receive the full contingent joy that was set before him and for which he suffered in his first coming.
I see no exegetical difference in positing full-blown UR and baby UR. Neither have any substantial scriptural support other than the logical tension resulting from the revealed character of God juxtaposed against biblical eschatology. Once you posit full-blown UR, the same kind of utilitarianism works, and universally, as does for baby UR. Why would God allow the world, full of groanings and travailings and baby deaths, to continue on so long unless there was SOME utilitarian good that rendered those baby deaths worth it for those babies in the long run?
Jesus' parables about the last being first all testify to the fact that endowments of grace NEED NOT be distributed fairly. Grace by definition is NOT justice. All we need to render it all sufficiently benevolent is for the relevant utilitarian result to work out. UR gets us that--whether baby UR or universal, it's the same kind of logic at work. In short, a perpetuated natural evil creates the exact same need for a utilitarian solution to the problem of evil as does the unfair distribution of pure grace. Nothing else can solve all the problems.
However, with Asher, I would agree that a species of utilitarianism that involves injustice is problematic. The kind of utilitarianism that works must satisfy these 2 conditions at least:
1) Injustice can not be done by God (i.e., God can't require of us if He hasn't given sufficiently in the first place), and
2) All persons must eventually deem whatever sufferings they experienced to have been worth the satisfaction they will ultimately receive from God.
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  |  J.N.Darby Registered Member

Date Joined Feb 2005 Total Posts : 124 | Posted 1/4/2012 9:55 PM (GMT -6) |   | Well, I'm just using it as a generic term to refer to Arminianism and Open Theism collectively. But there's David Basinger's book "the Case for Freewill Theism". Just don't ask me to quote anything from it because I sold my copy and it's been years since I read it.
The sense in which I used it in my question is to say that Calvinists and other such determinists have this objection (the one in my question) to Arminians and Open Theists.
Similitude said...No. But I would appreciate you informing us of any specific definitions of "freewill theism" you run into if, indeed, there are multiple definitions. Always helps to know how others might be defining terms differently than ourselves.
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